DECLASSHHED AuthorityW fol I I CJCS Memo No 7 September 1971 see-scour SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM son THE RECORD Subj Meeting with DEPSECDEF Monday 6 September 1971 Command and Control 1 DEPSECDEF reiterated his previous position that he feels we should have a single manager--or commander of the World Wide Mobile Command and Control System who would have the authority to plan and develop the command systems He made the 'following points We should designate a unit not a part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system Assign a top level commander responsible for overall command of the WWM0083 - Delegate overriding authority over the CINCs in execution of the Assign operational control of strategic -forces to this central commander 2 DEPSECDEF went on to say we must provide for three separate things Better Centralization Clarity as to who is responsible for what Civilian Control He said that this commander must have more than simply authority to fire weapons he must have authority to plan for equipment 3 He further dated that we need one man responsible for commun ications- one man responsible for intelligence and One man respon- sible for operations He feels there are too many nodes and too many people involved in the'decision process He said he is look ing for an expert to be asaigned as the Assistant Secretary oi Defense Telecommunications who would be responsible for the hardm were in the 4 He then handed me a memorandum a copy of which is attached After_glancing at it I said it contained nothing new in fact it is a rehash of the old PARTRIDGE Report on Command and Control isv sued in 1962 and warmed over by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report I told him that the problem should be looked on as having two parts The decision making process with respect to whether to fire nuclear weapons when to fire nuclear weapons and how many weapons to fire at what targets I pointed out that no kind of re organization within the military will solve this problem which is the responsibility of the President of his successor The second problem is simply the physical act of getting the order to the executing commands I told him that the big problem we have is in the Office of the frequently in the past the Joint Chiefs can never get any action I said I simply could not after reviewing the history of the Defense Reorganization Act- and point ing up the safeguards which the Congress intentionally included in the Act agree to a Super CINC I told him that his proposal would cause a great fight across the board I share his desire to improve the command and control system and in fact we haVe taken several actions since the issuance of WSEG 159 which is nothing more than a critique of a single operation I told him I could see no difficulty in transmitting the execute signal simultaneously to the operating forces provided that it was simultaneously sent to the but again pointed out to him that the injection of the CINCs into the chain was intentional in order to provide one additional authentication step Page 1 of 2 Pages Copy 1 of 1 Copy DocIdz31291446 DECLASSIFIED Authoriw iLSiZ o asae ssease SENSITIVE 5 Once again he discussed the Information Centers maintained by the Services and still does not appear to understand that the Services do not have operational control over any forces 6 _He then questioned me as to what was the most survivable cem mand and control system I replied that no fixed system could be considered as survivable if we are only to have one system then the Airborne system appears to be best however the ship system offers many advantages in terms of greatly increased capacity for communications berthing spaces computers etc which will per mit long term operations and is a long term augmentor to the timewlimited airborne post 7 I emphasized the need for suitable communications over UHF satellite links and told him that no matter what kind of organ ization we might develop the hardware that we had requested was still a hard requirement 8 I agreed to study the question further with a combination Defense JCS group but told DEPSECDEF once more I simply could not agree with the establishment of what would amount to a super CINC I simply could not see how it Would work particularly in situations where we are'involved in a conventional war which escalated into a nutlear war 9 It is clear that Dave PACKARD does not understand the Unified Command Plan system He is frustrated over the difficulty in making these very complex decisions and somehow feels that by reorganizing he can banish all the problems since then he w0uld not have to coordinate but simply talk to one individual He does not Seem to realize that such an individual-would be forced to develop a tremendous staff and furthermore unless the Office of the SECDEF will approve the recommendations of this individual whether in or out of the Joint Staff system--no progress can be made- and we would be back to square one 10 It-is clear to me while fully recognizing the inadequacy of our command and control system -together with the fact that the end of the world does not take place after the first exchange and hence considerable activity will follow requiring the use of an extensive command and control syStemJ that those who prepared the BRDP Report are still pecking away in their efforts to degrade and bypass the Joint Chiefs of Staff by excluding them from active -participation in any part of an operation I do not believe that Dave PACKARD prepared the memorandum attached to this sheet but rather I think it must have come from COOKE in or perhaps others who participated in the Report It is not coincidental that COOKE also participated in the development of the PARTRIDGE Report Page 2 of 2 Pages Copy 1 of 1 Copy DocId 31291446 DECLASSIFIED AuthomyW 29026 WMC cs ORGA NIZA The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel preirious WSEZC reporis anci' WSEG Report #159 allsupport the Ifindirig that the survival 'of Presi dential Authority audits interface with cannot be assurhecl in the event of a surprise I 3 This is slated ti'mc completely-negates the deterrc cc of our strategic nuclear foi-ces which geneifsce deterrence from their ability to isspond with destruction to 'an initial attack by the Soviets This is the crucialfact that'dictat'es the need to reor gani ze' MCCS Althougii there are many detailed problems with WW some of Which coul be improved by remedies existing structure Lin major tic-Jive icon uhe sti'ucLLii'c- anc - inc-mage- ment of the It is abucdantly clear from studies of and with the system that no satisfactory solution to the is possible without a complete rcorgim zat n of the syste m starting ati ne top and going down as far as is necessary The steps necessary f0 1' an adequate military command and control system are as follow 1 Responsibility for the overall maimgement of the i must be designated to one specific element in DOE To pro scrve civilian control this element must report directly to the Of ce DocId 31291446 DECLASSIFIED I i Authorityw i I Lx of the Secretary ovaefense This ale-meat muslt have direct authority ve all of those activities necessary for the efficient exercise of counnand These activities include 1 Authoritygver all command and control systems in DOD agencies and services to make sure thesebe integrated with and support the This recognizes that all DOD activities exist to support the WWIVICCS and the forces it commands not vice versa as is the case today 2 All communicatiqns necessary to support the Contro actioa Authority over communications must be both opera- tional and planning for future requirements This can beJaccxamplisher by maxing T a member of the military operations team and h vmg DCA an operating 3 All intelligence to Support the Command Contro actions Authority aver intelligence must recognize the need of the local cmmnanders to have adequate and timely inteliigence as well as the national command authority im uding the President tau have adequate intelligence for decision making This can be accomplished by making the I a member of military operations team and having IDEA and NSA an operating Moment 3H4 DocIdt31291446 DECLASSHHED Authority 4 The command and control of lhe strategic huclear forces is most important particularly because of the recent noclear parity which hac been achieved by the SoViots This strategiccommanii must be able to assure the effective use of all strategic nuclear forces It must be able to survive a Surorise attack and command U S forces to retaliate In case it is deemed necessary to have more flexibility in a nuclear force rctargeting to meet changing requirements limited attacks etc the strategic command must have cornpl to control oi the situtation at all times The crucially important requirement 014 a more effective strategic command is that this command be organized on the most stw'rmifnlined most efficient base povsible The entire commana nust be under a single coznmander available and responsive to the Secretary of Defense and the Presidcn at all times Hit-l control of and cations to all nuclear forces must be as direct and responsive as possible 5 The control of forces requires less time urgency them does Lhe control of nuclear forces The existing unified and specified commands supported by the Service commands can be made to function when brought under the proper maimgc-mon 'and control of the Steps 1-3 provide the basic restructuring cry to bring the comn'sand to a state adequate for conventional forces DocId 31291446 DECLASSIFIED AuthorityW fi 5 51 i I 3 i'i-fi 32M 1 m 6 The key element in making the improvements necessary in the operation of the is to put one commander in charge and give him the authority and responsibility directly from the Secretary with the support of the JCS to develop manage and maintain an adequate WW NECCS 3 6 DocIdz31291446 P1300 1 REORGANIZATION 01- warms JCS - Sec Def i ASD I IMO - ASD T I '1 Stralcgic Conunan _ -A To World Wide Unified and 1 Specified Commands an Strategic _p - Warning Anproariate ombui' Defense 1 5 - - l J f- SAC and appropriate Navy command l provide support 01' Strategic F0 recs but operational control is taken over SC when forces depioycd 1 1 15 315111011an a3mssv133q Wit HDECLASSIFIED 0 93063 917171621183131900 ru u- Authority REORGANIZATION OF Bomber Nav Command - - jpir Defense 7w - fice - I Sc Echf ASD I CMO A51 Siratcgic - 3 Cog xmanL A To World Wide Unified and Strateglc Specified Commands as f Warnin - rAppropriatc 1' 0 l_ 055 SAC and appropriate Navy commands provide support for Strategic Forces but operational control is taken over SC when forces This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu