DECLASSIFIED I AuthoritySEPTEMBER 1971 0758 Arrived at the Pentagon '0804 Called SECDEF on the telephone and told him that I had the message extending the authoriza tion for the strikes through today and am send- ing it up for-his chOp He thought that it had gone Out and I said for all practical pur- poses it had but this was the official cons firmation SECDEF said that'when he had called Dr Kissinger lastinight to tell him that he had extended it he damn nearlwent through the roof and stated you peeple over there donFt you have an Air Force we don't give a damn about the military results Can't you even send a meSsage in the name of the President I said he gave me the same bit when I talked to him 'Laird said Henry called him back and apologized later I asked Laird if he gave him the same pitch about only being able to operate in the desert Laird said he had really apologized SECDEF was mad at Kissinger last night i - I told him that we could not just do these strikes at random and he said he did not care what we hit just as long as we got some publicity which is certainly a new twiSt Laird asked if the weather would be about the same today and I said yes but we will have to talk about this a little hit 0832 Chairman's Briefing - 0902 Met with LTGEN Vogt LTGEN Knowles and BGEN Pauly I told them that I was afraid the field was-holding out to be able to conduct a halls Out effort in PRIZE BULL There is no questiOn that we are going to have to go today or not at all Concurred Today is our last chance tomorrow is very questionable When I talked to Dr Kissinger last night he asked can you only fight in the desert I do not think the White House understands that they can not just arbitrarily pick a 35 mile strip on a given day and have good weather 'good results etc I directed General Vogt and Pauly to stay in very close touch with MACV and to go on a limited basis in any event teday 0907 Met with Admiral Zumwalt and VADM Minter concerning my forthcoming testimony at the hearing today They gave me their last minute views and showed me the break down of Some of the events that had tranSpired and somelof the opinions that had been proposed Admiral Minter indicated that he would be in attendance at my hearing 0920 Met with Captain valentine and we discussed the details of the statement'and set up the game plan for my testimony 3We also discussed the back-up informatiOn sequence of events that had ocoured since the initial Packard'memo and determined that the statement was alright however it was not cleared with SECDEF at this point 0933 Received a telephone call from Rady Johnson ba concerning the testimOny Rady pointed DocId 31291446 I I 30 DFECLASSIFIED Authoriwfioujiizo 7' 0939 out that the general opinion upstairs was that my testimony was a little harder than they might have liked it Although Secretary Laird was firm that I should face the committee alone he said there is one instance in my statement which is contrary tolthe original Packard memo I asked him what part he was talking about and Rady indicated it was in general and not any Specific part It is the best of both worlds type of thing Rady asked before I give my statement that I include the fact that the statement has not been cleared by OSD HoweVer I Still had been sanctioned to go ahead and give it anyway I asked him-what part he wanted me to take out - Rady said he would have to delete so much in View of the overall stafment that maybe I could just tone it down a bit and make it softer as they had suggested Admiral Gralla do He said it is not a question of censorship and nobody is-trying to make you change your statement not much but they do not want you to get into a controversy between the Chiefs and 05D in front of the committee I responded that if they ask me what the Chiefs position is I would have to give it to them but I did not want to go over at all Rady said even though it was in executive' sessibn they did not want to get any flap generated I still have to tell the truth 'I told him I could muddy the water a bit and I explained to him that we can make the thing work if you want me to say that this has really not been approved Rady re-emphasized again he wanted me to make it a little lighter I said how by my saying that I am authorized to give the statement but it has not been cleared by Rady said do not say he did not want to get him in the middle We beth agreed this has risen to a pretty spectacular level I said I do not have time to do stuff like this and Rady said they have a proposed subpoena Vyou know Called SECDEF on the telephone and told him that I had been in touch with MACV and I under stand that you want us to go this time for some of the targets regardless of the weather situation Secretary Laird asked if it looked-bad for tomorrow also I said the same thing as today likely the typhoon moving near Okinawa is Causing some effect The coastal targets may still be open and we can use the F-ds with the LORAN capability felt we could wait until after the security council meeting and he could talk to the President He thinks we should hit something because Henry gets all excited_and says this is a diplomatic- thing Henry apparently asked the Secretary don't tell me you don't have any airplanes that can fly I said of course we have airplanes that will fly but do not know exactly what he is up to yet Laird asked if they have the word to go tonight I said that vogt has been talking to Lavelle and he says he will have the planes up there regardless of the weather I just want them to recognize over in the White House that this is not necessarily_going to come up with very good EDA As long as they recognize this there is no problem 'Laird said let's just keep with it a while I said I was just taking a sounding with him and he said he thinks this is a lousy way to-operate but we are stuck with it - DocId 31291446 DECLASSIFIED Authority L- 0945 0949 1000 1130 1151 29025 Called Secretary Packard on the telephone and told him that I had received a call from Rady Johnson relative to the hearings Before I I left I wanted to-check with himTwhat he wanted me to say and that my statement has not been cleared by 050 but I have authority to give it I thought that was a little strange but I will say anything you like I do not want themv to ask me why it has not been cleared Secretary Packard said he did not think that everything I had in my statement was in support of the official policy they are preposing I said I was trying to avoid the discussion that I did not support the policy I was trying t0' zero in on the support necessary for the Merchant Marine in order to support the JSOP This was' approved by the security review people yesterw day They did take out other things that they thought I should not saywhole purpose of being there is to give the JCS position and all I am doing is more or less copying from the JCS papers 'Packard said that is fine and timely but we have not approved the JCS position -I can say I am here to give the JCS position and that of cburse the SECDEF has not approved the JCS position yet and that we will support whatever decision he makes Packard agreed that would be fine I said I did not want to go testify anyway and that I was caught in the middle of it Packard said on the one hand you can say what you think because you know everybody is free to speak but the only thing that needs to be said is that you want to -present the JCS position and it has not been approved by the Secretary I will also say whateVer decision is made I will support Departed the Pentagon for a 1000 testimony in the Rayburn House Office Building room 2118 at the Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Trans portation_of the HouSe Committee on Armed Services The subject is _Testified on the hearing as noted above The transcript of this meeting will be attached when receiVed NOTE My basic problem was that I had not been informed of the proposal and read about it in the Baltimore Sun I was giving a statement which SECDEF had not approved and that I did not want to be there in the first place Somehow the committee had gotten ahold of all the JCS papers and left me no alternative and no flexibility so I was forced to say exactly what I thought whether the testimony was cleared or not Arrived at the Pentagon Called LTGEN Vogt on the telephbne and told him I had the OPREP ONE message indicating that they were going regardless of weather and asked that the targets be plotted He said that was already done and they will come up shortly I asked where we would go under those circumstances and if we would still wait for the best window He probably wouldwould use the regular birds and would use pathfinder aircraft using LORAN I asked if the targets would be mainly POL storage and Vogt said yes and that is not a bad impact either I told John that I had a hell of a time this morning on the I hate to get caught I52 DocIdz3129l446 DECLASSHHED Authority W 15- in the middle -- Laird is upset everybody is whizzed off but I think I handled it pretty well I asked John to investigate how the hell they had gotten every single JCS paper had not released any of them to the committee He said he had not released any either 'They did not particularly like my statement but knowing they had the papers I had no latitude left Somebody gave them the papers and I never give JCS papers to Congress Vogt said it is strictly prohibited by law I emphasized to them_that we would support the decision of the SECDEF I said that this was unique as a_matter of fact because we are normally continuously consulted and I read it in the Baltimore Sun I did not tell them that They asked if the Secretaries were consulted and I said I did not know I softened the statement a little by saying that I thought there was a better way of doing it but this proposal would work Then they asked if I had changed my mind since the JCS paper of 6 June and I told them no I read my statement and tried to lead them around Robin Hood's barn to take up a little time and to put into perspec- tive what the JCS planning function were with regard to the JSOP and JSCAP My only problem was the business of procurement The One that does the procurring naturally gets more response from the people they were dealing with I said I was primarily concerned about the Navy and the Merchant Marine in this thing They started quoting statues and I said I had the laws reviewed by a lawyer and had Captain Valentine explain it to them Hall asked why I did not take it to the President and I said -this is not one of the major issues I think you have to retain the identity of the Services and I was strongly opposed to a logistics command as such SECDEF in his defense report said he I did not intend to set up a logistics command They were really trying to generate a confron tation They are trying to_get Secretary Packard on a legal technicality and statdbs I hope this has taught Packard a lesson Vogt said Packard is really well meaning and trying to improve the efficiendy but he should listen to someone before helgets himself in trouble on these things Then they brought up the Blue Riben Defense Panel and asked if I read the part on transpora tation which I had and that SECDEF had chosen not to accept the complex structure proposed I emphasized the service identity the esprit de corps loyalities traditions etc I was_very much Opposed to a logistics command which would break down the integrity of the services I wanted to get this in just in case they asked me if -in the'future I saw a trans world logistics command I leaped and took them over thezledge and painted a hard case against any kind of single service which I may be able to use later but still everyone up tOpside is upset I hope they do not think that I would lie Particularly when 080 is giving the committee JCS papers I had signed I said something about Shillito not trying to carry out the wishes of the Blue Ribbon Defense I a - DocIdz31291446 DECLASSIFIED I Ll 35% Authority L 1200 1244 1355 1435 1445 1702 1706 Panel I am_not sure Kaputo and Riley did not write the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel themselves rand are trying to get what they can out of it Vogt thought we should put it to bed for a while as we pretend to give it a very close new look I said they could possibly use common c0mputers and things like that to make it more cosmetically appealing Vogt said he would send the first draft of the Command and Control directive up for my OK and to release it to the Services before it gets turned green Attended farewell Ceremony and review in honor of the Undersecretary of the Army Beal River Entrance Attended lunch in office with Secretary Laird and Secretary Packard We discussed the items as indicated in my MFR V Received a telephone call from Dr Kissinger He said the President may ask me for a 10-minute presentation at the NSC meeting on the military situation in Vietnam Then he asked about the Operation for this evening I said I was going to bring over the charts showing the weather and a recommendation Henry said we do not want to_get flak for being ineffective abut on the other hand he asked how the weather would look 24 hours later I said I would bring over the full weather forecast and we would talk later following the NSC meeting He asked how late we could stop the operation I said we could -stop it late this afternoon but we had plenty - of time to discuss it is really bad they should check with me for final Henry said if the weather clearance I agreed Henry said the next time we would give them an operation in the desert on stationary targets in July I saidr Come on Henry you_are being unfair Let us go up to Hanoi it is wide open weather wise ' He said the minute we authorized it the weather would close in - Met with BGEN Pauly and Col Davis to discuss the pictures and target description of the targets proposed in OPREP ONE for the PRIZE BULL strikes c0mmencing tonight The strikes will cover a period commencing about 0800 Saigon time to about 1700 their time ' We discossed the POL targets and looked at the pictures and have a good feel now for both the all weather targets and the_VFR targets that will be hit if weather permits They also provided me with a last minute weather forecast for the target area Col Davis pointed out that during the month of september there area days average with de sirable weather conditions for this type of operation 24% of the time Departed the Pentagon with DEPSECDEF Packard to attend the 1500 National Security Council Meeting in the Cabinet Room at the White House subject current situation in South Vietnam See attached MFR Mv72-7l Arrived at the Pentagon Called LTGEN Vogt on the telephone-and'asked him to get Mel Zais John Pauly and company and have a council of war on how we are going to monitor this operation I also asked for the latest weather report just before I leave Docrd 31291446 DEIILASSIFIED Authority ddize - 1720 1728 29026 'together in about 305minutes in the NMCC _to work up the plans for his funeral I want a feel of where we stand I said I will the building who is going to watch it etc be leaving the building about 1830 so let's get General Vogt said he just came from the NMCC and received a complete run-down on targeting and the whole operation I said if it will be easier I will come to the NMCC Vogt said OK we will meet in the SIT room Called RADM Elliott Strauss RET on the phone and told him I had gotten a letter from Dickie Mountbatten and he was told by Lord Chamberlain I explained to Admiral Strauss the reason for this request They had failed to plan for some previous fUnerals and wanted to make this a good one Since he worked-with Americans he thought they would want to participate I committed you and J P McCOnnell who had worked with him and could not touch base before I committed Strauss' said he would be happy to do it and that Monty was his boys Godfather Met with LTGEN vogt LTGEN Zais LTGEN Knowles BGEN Pauly Col Davis and Col Coleman in the NMCC SIT room to receive a briefing on our status for General Vogt told me that with LORAN bombing the F45 could come within 200 feet CEP while bombing from 500' to 10 000' I asked about the SAMs and General Vogt indicated they would rely on the IrOn Hand and the jamming to counter the Most of the SAM sites are out of range and they should not be too much of a problem First target time is 2000 EDT tonight If we have all weather operation there will be about 230 sorties if it becomes VFR we can increase to 400 plus I asked about the possibility of the weather drying out and they are less Optimistic General Vogt said that the Operation would go unless we call and canel it The only other thing that could stOp it is if Conditions are absolutely unsafe for the aircraft I said they will think we did this because of what they did at Phnom Penh today Kissinger wants a very effective outcome now but that is a little difficult to predict That is why we cancelled it yesterday because we could not guarantee effective results I think we should 'be able to work at least on the coast and maybe we can get some of the VFR strikes up near Dong Hoi - - 'In our message to the Ambassadors and to Paris we should specify that this was 9 retaliatory strikes and that all press reports will go from COMUSMACV We decided that we would tell them after the operation actually is started -1 the message will be released at that time Apparently State has not been cut in yet and theaehe-question was raised as to who knows about it At the moment probably only Secretary Rogers knows We noted that Unger bitched considerably about not knowing on our previous operation Weather briefing showed that it was Northeast monsoon that the ceiling would be 3 000 feet 7 8 1% DocId 31291446 DECLASSIFIED Authority W 1757- _operation coverage with 7 miles in light rain from 0600 to 1100 the ceiling will consist of 3 000 bases and 7 000 tops 1500 foot scattered -3 000 broken l B coVerage at 1500 feet It may clear and to to 3 8 coverage from its present 7 8 later in the day I told them to watch it close to keep' me posted and not to hesitate to call Met with LTGEN Vogt LTGEN Zais and LTGEN Knowles concerning'the Command and Control of the I had discussed the Command and Control for with Secretary Packard today at our lunch with SECDEF I said there are two parts to the the equipment and the operation of it - Packard said well maybe he would form a council composed of himself me and should be relied on for technical advise only he should coordinate with and they should not be involved in the decision making process at all I added they may want to shift some billets rom the to tele-communications only to fill their requirements not to make Op- erational decisionsu Packard mentioned the comptroller review and this is no problem the comptroller is free to review any program I said I thought we should be able to bring the budget directly to SECDEF for approval and not have to go through the regular service fight Packard said he thought he would get the Service Secretaries in with me and'I said no sir -- the Secretaries have absolutely no business in the operational end and DEPSECDEF are responsible for the system and the operation The Service Secretaries and the Services meet the requirements levied upon them andiI will not'agree to the ServiCe Secretaries being involved McNamara used to screw things up by sending a problem on operatiOns to the Service Secretaries and one on IOgistics to the Joint Chiefs The directive should be a simple straight forward' spelling out who and what CJCS should be responsible for the operation and the equipment under I told Packard the CINCs will not be a problem The SIOP proper will require some authenticator changes and the procedures will change so that we can go direct to the forces if the CINCs are cut in simultaneously We can control this by changing the message addresseesL Zumwalt and Ryan both agree this is no problem Packard agreed that he would shorten the directive and 'Laird picked it right up he said we should add whereever CJCS appears' or Acting CJCS This is fine as long as he lets us handle the opera- tions under J3 It restricts the dabblers to and which we can control There will be no Service Secretaries involved and we will get our budget authbrized so it is not competing with other requirements The CJCS or the Acting CJCS can cover the relationships with the CINCs The NMCC is the priority system and the CINCs and services must conform to this Vogt said one problem was in re defining the NCA National Command Authority I said now it is set so the decision of the President should be transmitted via me Vogt said Packard described the NCA as the President and Secretary of Defense working through the CJCS he has the President issuing broad strategic guidance and obviously DocIdz31291446 we- DECLASSHHED Authority M3524 1835 1900 2 '1930 l- a he is using the old descriptiOn of the NCA with out including the Chiefs The problem arising is that since the Chairman will not command forces how can he be in'the NCA I am having counsel check the legality of this In an exercise in semanitics does the strategic director need to command The law saYs that the Chain goes the_Eresident -- SECDEF CINCs The Packard directive says that the NCA is the President and SECDEF We can use_the same_language but we need to say something to include the Chiefs who act in my place and want a more cosmetic directive The whole operation depends on the Chairman and how he Operates in the position It is_p055ible that a uture Chairman may not cooperate as well If the Chiefs are not intthe-Chain and SECDEF makes a decision the JCS can not do a thing about it The NCA discusses the options pro and con removes the Chiefs from the NCA and sends an execute via the Chairman or the 'Acting Chairman The intent of the legislation was to remove the JCS from the chain of command I said there is no written job description for the billet of Chairman however anyone observing would understand the problems Laird wants to return to the law I said the Chiefs as a corporate body do not make the decisions - Departed the Pentagon_for Quarters SIX Attended a reception followed by the Organization Day Ball hosted by the Third In antry The Old Guard in the'Koran Room the Officers' Open Mess Fort Myer Received word from Captain Knoizen that the let wave of PRIZE BULL was on target and the Operation icommenced on schedule in accordance with the ONE The weather was still had and expected to get worse 57 DocIdz31291446 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu