Defense Book'tNew Studies 3rd 3-2342 Of ce of the Secretary of Defense $U 5l 552 I I cast RDD ESD WI IS 1 EO 13525 Date ma 1 er E0 3526 The 1956 Hungarian Revolution Declassify Deny in Full DcclaSSify in ML I A Fresh Look at the US Response Reason MDR Few events during the Cold War have received as much attention or generated so EO 13526 much criticism as the Soviet Union s crushing of the Hungarian revolution l While Moscow s action cost it the support of many Western communists and others on the Le Western powers have shared the blame for the revolution s failure Not only did the West essentially remain passive but Britain and France joined Israel in invading Egypt at the moment the revolution seemed close to success thus diverting world attention and providing cover for the Soviet Union to suppress the Hungarians U Nearly all accounts have criticized the weak U S reSponse Only a few months later a bipartisan Congressional group focused on the Eisenhower administration s lack of preparedness and inability or unwillingness to take effective action With the Hungarian revolution the whole earth quaked the group declared The United States the free world leader stood by 2 Numerous studies have accused the administration of hypocrisy for encouraging the peoples of Eastern EurOpe through public statements by Eisenhower and others beginning with the 1952 election campaign and through subsequent Radio Free Europe RFE broadcasts to throw off their communist The focus is on the period between the outbreak of violence in Budapest on 23 October which prompted the rst Soviet intervention and the second large-scale attack on 4 November that effectively ended the revolution Events preceding the revolution the many months of subsequent UN debate and continuing Hungarian resistance and the refu ee uestion are onl touchedu on 00S IN FULL Authority so 13526 I Records Declass Div WHS rowded CIA and agrees DEC 0 4 sweat 2 governments and then doing little when the Hungarians at tremendous human cost nearly accomplished this Passage of time and availability of new records have softened these judgments only Recent works still contend that the United States betrayed the revolution 4 Even a US diplomat who lived through the events in Budapest looking back a half century later concluded that Washington if unintentionally had misled Hungarians and then was unwilling to shoulder its responsibilities and to make a serious enough effort to nd a solution 5 U The harsh views should be tempered The United States was more prepared for turmoil in Eastern EurOpe than has generally been acknowledged and was pursuing in accord with its NATO allies a carefully constructed policy short-sighted in one key respect--which nevertheless nearly succeeded At the UN the Americans took the lead in addressing the Hungarian question right up to the time of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt The Legation in Budapest performed well under dif cult circumstances Finally reporting by western radios of UN consideration of Hungary s plight and the action it took in the Middle East crisis more than anything RFE said may have misled Hungarians into thinking the West would intervene on their behalf The major US shortcoming was that Washington made no plans to deal with sustained violent demonstrations in the Soviet bloc because it did not consider them possible For that matter no one else did U According to one tabulation the toll included 2 000 Hungarians killed 17 000 wounded 13 000 imprisoned or deported 229 sentenced to death and executed and nearly 200 000 out of a population just under 10 million who chose to ee the country E rsi Hungarian Revolution of 1 95 6 23 U Another source says that 26 000 were imprisoned and as many as 600 executed Kramer Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland 21 U In addition more than700 Soviet soldiers lost their lives and some 1 200 were wounded Gytirkei and Horvath Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary U DECLASSIFIED IN FULL SEGREI- Authority so 13526 Chief Records Daclasa Div WHS Date DEC 0 4 2m 3 As political and intellectual ferment spread through Soviet bloc countries in the wake of Nikita Khrushchev s February 1956 speech denouncing Stalin the United States continued to modify its policy toward Eastern Eur0pe an adjustment that had begun as early as 1952 and continued into the Eisenhower administration Instead of promoting unrest and revolution behind the Iron Curtain with the aim of toppling the communist governments it sought to encourage gradual change and the establishment of governments along the lines of Tito s in Yugoslavia that would enjoy a measure of independence from Moscow This objective underlay a National Security Council NSC paper adopted in July 1956 an for the East EurOpean satellites completed the following month Earlier in the spring Washington had established an interagency working group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State for EurOpean Affairs Jacob Beam to monitor developments in the Soviet bloc and make recommendations for responding to rapidly changing situations as it subsequently did during the riots that brie y swept Poznan Poland in June 1956 The United States wanted merely to keep the pot simmering in Eastern EurOpe not to have it boil over into a major outbreak of violence that would result in a bloodbath Since it desired and expected no more than brief small-scale outbursts it was not prepared to deal with a national revolution j r There may have been surprise in Washington and elsewhere that further unrest developed as quickly as it did but there was no doubt that it was going to happen at some point and that Poland and Hungary were likely places The charge by Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson echoed by others that it took the US Government completely by surprise has little merit Washington's attention particularly 05D 1 4 1w sscas DECLASSIFIEDIN PART CIA Jun Authority E013525 Chief Records 8 Daclass Div WHS Date DEC 0 4 20M 4 that of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been focused since the summer on resolving the Anglo-French dispute with Egypt following Egyptian President Nasser s nationalization of the Suez Canal Nevertheless Dulles s 18 October early draft of a Speech he planned to deliver a fortnight later referred to the rising tide of protest against the ruthless domination of the Kremlin which appears in the press on the radio and in public statements in Poland Hungary and other satellite countries The draft reiterated his belief that it had never been our purpose to try to provoke violent revolutions which would be bloodily repressed by vastly superior military forces But by maintaining a position of sympathetic encouragement and by following policies in the rest of the world which foster democratic devel0pment we can exert a contagious in uence which inevitably helps build up a steady pressure for freedom This pressure will in the long run prove irresistible U What surprised everyone was the suddenness of the crisis that erupted in Poland when Khrushchev and a high-level Soviet delegation appeared unannounced at the Warsaw airport on 19 October and confronted the new Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka recently released from prison and reinstated to communist party membership about the liberalizing trends taking place within the country and the rumored removal of hard-line gures from the government An emotional standoff ensued with Gomulka demanding that Khrushchev halt the advance of Soviet military units on Warsaw Fearing tough resistance by Polish militia and the general population and after receiving assurances that Poland would remain a loyal Soviet ally Khrushchev agreed and the his Passed-8 U DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records at Declass Dlv WHS DEC 0 4 2m W- 5 The Polish Dry Rim During both the Polish trouble and the early days of the Hungarian revolution that followed the Department of State s communication with its mission in each capital was severed Washington was so poorly informed about events in Poland that even if it had wanted it probably would not have become involved Gomulka s successful de ance of the Soviet Union however reinforced the U S inclination shared by other Western powers to stand back and let events run their course if something similar happened elsewhere in the satellites U Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles knew little more than what was in the newspapers At home the morning of 20 October a Saturday when he received reports of the confrontation between Polish and Soviet leaders Dulles decided to issue a statement expressing the hope that Poland was achieving the independence promised by the UN Charter and recalling the 1945 Yalta agreement about free elections He cautioned Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr that we must not however seem too action State of cials who came to work that day declined comment for the press admitting that they had little more information than appeared on the news tickers The department's situation report as of mid-afternoon depended entirely on press and radio accounts Not until late afternoon was it able to establish direct telephone connection with the Embassy in Warsaw U Eisenhower on the last leg of a campaign swing through the Western states prior to the 6 November presidential election was about to land in Denver when he received a message from Washington drawn mostly from press accounts about the Polish situation It quoted Khrushchev saying to the Polish leaders We Spilled our blood to liberate this DECLASSIFIED lN FULL Authority E0 13525 Ch f 03 Records a Declass Div WHS DEC 0 4 2014 6 country and now you want to turn it over to the Americans Before leaving the aircraft Eisenhower telephoned Dulles to discuss the situation then deplaned to make the following remarks We read about Poland in our papers we read about these captive peeples that are still keeping alive the burning desire to live in freedom a freedom that we have come to take almost for granted but which they have found is the most dif cult thing to sustain in the world Our hearts go out to them that they may at last have that opportunity to live under governments of their own choosing Later that day the President released a statement noting the numerous reports of Polish unrest and accounts of Soviet troop movements He said he was in close touch with Dulles and reiterated his sympathy for the Polish people s traditional yearning for liberty and independence 0 U Washington s lack of solid information was evident at a Special meeting of the interagency Intelligence Advisory Committee IAC that afternoon The minutes noted merely that members exchanged views on intelligence and information from various sources bearing on devel0pments in Poland and the apparent author s emphasis crisis in Polish-Soviet relations CIA Director Allen Dulles later said the reporting at the meeting had been fairly good but there were few if any contributions from anyone else U That evening Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Murphy summoned Polish Ambassador Romuald Spasowski to the Department to learn more about what was happening Murphy admitted that we did not have much of cial continuation as yet only the many newspaper accounts He asked whether Spasowski considered the reported movement of Soviet tanks toward Warsaw an internal or an DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 50 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS 8 s DEC 0 4 2014 1' international affair indicating that his answer would determine the course of the rest of the conversation The Ambassador replied An international affair Smiling Murphy said the conversation would continue Had Spasowski answered otherwise it would have ended However the Ambassador was of little help He could not con rm whether Khrushchev had made the statements attributed to him nor could he shed light on Soviet tr00p movements But an aide who accompanied him referred to Poland s grave economic dif culties and implied that US assistance would be welcome 2 U During a nationally televised interview on 2 October one to which little attention has been given Secretary Dulles candidly described the administration s cautious approach Asked what the United States would do if a bloodbath occurred in Poland he expressed doubt that one would take place If you have a whole people rising up it's unlikely that efforts will be made to put it down by mass military measures what we see going on is part of a process I don t think this liberation of Poland is going to happen overnight I think you see there is what I have called the yeast which is working but I think it will be a process which will not be as Spectacular as some newspaper reports seem to suggest Asked what the United States and its allies would do to hasten this development he replied We have been doing the only thing that can hasten it effectively in my Opinion that is to keep alive the idea of freedom to practice freedom and constantly see that it is brought to the attention of the Polish people Intervention meddling or interference by a foreign country he pointed out often proved counter-productive Freedom was a contagious thing and if anybody is apt to catch it it s going to be the Poles Asked whether the Soviet Union might become so alarmed that it would resort to repression in Poland and elsewhere Dulles reiterated what DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority so 1 3526 Chiet Records - Declass Div st DEC 04 2014 SEER-ER 8 he had been saying for several months that the Kremlin s adoption of more liberal policies had created a dilemma It had loosed irresistible forces that it would be dif cult to halt without resorting to Stalinist practices a dilemma from which I do not think they can escape Dulles then made what some observers considered an unfortunate remark in answering a question whether the movement of Soviet troops into Poland would constitute aggression He replied that under the Warsaw Pact the Soviet Union perhaps technically had the right to do so U Another questioner recalled the lack of US response to the 1953 East German uprising and inquired whether the United States would again sit back and allow a similar outcome in Poland Dulles s answer was unequivocal I do not think we would send our own Armed Forces into Poland or into East Germany under those circumstances I doubt if that would be a pro table or desirable thing to do It would be the last thing in the world that these people who are trying to win their independence would want That would precipitate a full scale world war and the probable results of that would be all these people would be wiped out lnstigating military activity was a tricky business he recalled as in 1944 when the Soviet Union stirred the Polish underground in Warsaw to revolt only to have it put down by the Germans I3 U If military intervention were ruled out came still another question what speci cally would the United States do According to one observer Dulles replied almost apologetically as if fumbling to gure out what could be done and said that it would be indiscreet to answer the question in full He brie y mentioned steps being taken to maintain the love of liberty such as Voice of America VOA and Radio Free - EurOpe broadcasts as well as lea ets carried into the satellites by balloons U DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Daclass Div WHS Date 0 9 Another interviewer wondered about the growth of national communism pointing out that in Poland one communist government merely seemed to be replacing another Dulles said the important thing was to see the breakup of the Soviet monolith Democracy could not be imposed Many countries had an internal government that we don t like That however is not a matter for of cial government action If we had that test we would have friendly relations with very few countries Asked about coordination with the British and French regarding the liberation of Eastern EurOpe Dulles thought that the United States has been more concerned about that than perhaps they have been and there is some feeling that to press that issue too much might lead to a danger of war in Europe But he added that the three countries were in broad agreement on policy and are in closer agreement within the last month or two than we had been at any time within the last few years Not everyone within the administration agreed with Dulles s approach At a meeting the next morning Beam stressed the importance of adhering to the Secretary s position as set forth in the televised interview despite pressure from the U S Information Agency USIA and others for a less restrained approach ls U Dulles s statements did re ect thinking at State Its Policy Planning Staff recommended that the United States encourage Poland to become increasingly independent of the Soviet Union and seek to avert Soviet forceful intervention which would not only terminate that independence but also might involve a risk of spreading hostilities One of its members thought the changes in Poland irreversible short of Soviet reoccupation of the country More importantly he said the pressures elsewhere to imitate the Poles will be irresistible He thought it would take a long time DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 50 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass DIV WHS Data 0 10 If we look for the demise of Communism next year we shall be disappointed If we are patient and if nothing happens that the Soviets can construe as a new and important threat to their national security we have good reason to hope for a desirable modi cation in the internal operations of the European Soviet bloc Although there might be many gains for us if we could stir things up to the point of causing direct Soviet intervention that course would carry very sizable risks We can make smaller but still substantial gains at virtually no risk U The crisis passed quickly By 24 October the bulk of three Soviet mechanized and two tank divisions brought up to the Polish-East German border had returned to their home stations Engineer bridging equipment according to US military intelligence reports remained in assembly areas near the Oder River suggesting possible use if needed U There was concern that Moscow might change its mind The British Ambassador in Warsaw believed the Poles had dealt the Soviets a notable diplomatic defeat but it hardly seems credible that the Russians could put up with such a snub both because of the repercussions among the other satellites and because of the vital strategic importance of Poland to the Soviet bloc Both he and US Ambassador Joseph Jacobs believed the Soviet loss of prestige should be played down for the obvious reason that they might feel more inclined to intervene with force if their discom ture were rubbed in U In Washington top of cials reportedly said that the time might come perhaps in six months when Poland would ask the United States to help reduce its economic dependence on the Soviet Union but right now United States and other Western leaders had better keep quiet about it Taking quick action would make it easier for Moscow to denounce Gomulka as a tool of United States imperialism They doubted whether the Soviet Union would use force to topple him Mostww s alternative to forceful action DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E013526 ChlEf Records 8 Declass Div WHS Date 4 ll they believed was to sit by while one satellite after another follows the example of Poland to the limit of its possibilities This probably would not mean the end of Soviet in uence in the area but Soviet power will be greatly weakened 9 U Eisenhower did not wait to hint at what the United States could offer In a campaign speech the evening of 23 October he noted that discontent 'unrest riots and demonstrations would continue in the satellite states until the tyranny exercised over them either dissolves or is expelled The day of liberation may be postponed where armed forces for a time make protest suicidal The mission of the United States was to help those freedom-loving peoples who need and want and can pro tably use our aid that they may advance in their ability for self-support and may add strength to the security and peace of the free world U State of cials felt that the President had made only an offer of economic aid In retrospect though it is easy to understand how pe0ple in Eastern Europe could interpret the remarks and the one he made at a rally two nights later that the United States had never forgotten them nor ever will as meaning something more For the administration the immediate question was how to convey the offer of economic aid privately to the Gomulka government State favored making the approach through the Embassy in Warsaw because calling in Spasowski would create too much press notice A discreet approach in Warsaw would likely generate less publicity Moreover Spasowski was regarded as an old-line Stalinist We could not be sure that his report to the Polish Government in Warsaw would be accurate and according to our desires He apparently has very close relations with the Soviet Ambassador and he would probably inform him DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Date 12 at once of our approach so that the Soviet Government would be apprised of it from here 2 U Just a few days before the Polish crisis erupted Eisenhower had announced that the United States despite considerable Congressional opposition would continue providing military assistance to Yugoslavia The administration now saw the events in Poland as vindication of that support Dulles had long believed that Yugoslavia s independence from Moscow should be encouraged a policy the Truman administration had begun because other communist countries would follow its example The White House issued a statement that the President s insistence on continued aid to Yugoslavia re ects itself in the Polish situation and in other unrest in other satellite nations Under Secretary Murphy declared that the aid helped to bring about some loosening of the bonds upon the once- ee nations of Eastern Europe and created problems for the Communist leaders which they have not yet been able to resolve 22 U '1 DECLASSIFIED IN PART 05D 1'4 C M00 Authority E013526 Mu l Chief Records Declaslev WH H m DEC 042014 thereby raising Hungarians expectations of what theitoo could achieve _on 050 1 4 c Mot2014 seems-'1' 14 Without the Polish example there likely would have been no Hungarian revolution See table 1 Even before the standoff in Warsaw Hungarian students wanting to show solidarity with participants in the Poznan disorders awaiting trial planned sympathy demonstrations that included demands for democratic reforms in Hungary As a Table 1 Hungarians Reasons for Attempting an Uprising Important Imponant Example of Poland 40 17 Rehabilitation of Rajk and others 18 24 Soviet Leaders Denunciation of Stalin 12 16 Encouragement from the West 11 13 Relaxation of Russian Control 9 14 Example of Yugoslavia 6 1' Don t know 8 12 TOTAL PERCENTT 104 103 TOTAL NUMBER OF 1 107 1 107 reSponses shown were 0 uestioh ow ere are some things that have been suggested as reasons why people in Hungary were willing to attempt an uprising CARD Which one of these in your opinion was most important in the minds of the Hungarians Which one was next most important Percentages total more than 100% since some respondents gave more than one answer footnote in the original IN PART Authorlty so 13526 OSD 1 4 Chief Records DeclassDiv WHs CIA m DEC 042014 further display of solidarity students in Budapest organized a march on 23 October to the statue of Joseph Bern a Polish hero of the 1848 Hungarian revolt The march turned into a massive public demonstration There soon followed the outbreak of violence that led to the return to power of former Prime Minister Imre Nagy who like Gomulka had been ousted from the communist party the new government requested Soviet forces stationed in Hungary to quell the disturbance U Thus began the Hungarian revolution lasting 12 days and passing through several phases In this important respect it differed from the recent troubles in Poznan and Warsaw and the 1953 violent outbursts in Czechoslovakia and East Germany all of which were almost over by the time the outside world digested what was happening For the Soviet leadership experience with the Polish de ance represented a kind of dress rehearsal for what would occur in Hungary 24 And it gave Washington an opportunity to consider what action it might take if a similar situation developed in the region enabling it to respond more quickly than it otherwise might to the outbreak of violence in Budapest But the follow-on after the initial response posed problems However ready Washington may have been for another are-up likely to be snuffed out as quickly as before none of its planning envisioned a prolonged struggle that would almost succeed in replacing a communist government with a democratic one Nor apparently did any other country including the Soviet Union The Budapest Legation 3 Performance Journalists who witnessed the revolution and even members of the US Legation in Budapest have suggested that the United States might have responded more vigorously DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13528 Chief Records a Daclass DIV WHS DEC 04 2014 seem I 16 to the revolution if the Legation had performed better 25 The criticism seems unwarranted It is difficult to identify what could have been done differently Any diplomatic mission required to function in the midst of major violence inevitably encounters trouble The Legation in Budapest located on the Pest side of the Danube near Parliament Square where much ghting took place was no exception U It also had to contend with unusual technical and personnel problems What most hindered its effectiveness was the severance of communication with the outside world for two long stretches during the first week of the revolution Unlike the Briti sh--the only Western staff with their own wireless transmitter the Americans relied on a leased land line to send communications to Washington The Hungarian Government had not permitted them to operate their own equipment because the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI had refused similar rights for the Hungarian Legation in Washington Within hours of the outbreak of violence Budapest s telegraph and telephone communications with the outside world were cut Nevertheless the staff continued to prepare cables Because few reached Washington Second Secretary Thomas Rogers and Assistant Army Attache Captain Thomas Gleason brought copies to Vienna on 29 October for the Embassy there to transmit Until then the Legation was virtually inaudible as far as Washington was concerned U Another shortcoming involved the staff's ability to communicate with the local population Though a few of the attaches and political of cers had a smattering of Hungarian the Legation had a shortage of uent speakers On-vith native command of the language Vice Consul Ernest Nagy was transferred in SSIFIED IN PART 050 1 4 cli 5013523 Chief Records at Dactass DIV WHS CIA -EeR q Date 0 4 17 September leaving only Press Officer Anton Nyerge_ -with that capability U The Legation s lack of leadership has been questioned Its approximately 30 members represented the largest staff among the Western missions in Budapest 29 but it was without a chief in the period leading up to and during much of the revolution After 4 V2 years service in Hungary Minister Christian Ravndal was transferred in August 1956 His replacement Edwin Wailes then serving as Ambassador in South Africa was appointed Minister in late July but did not leave Washington until 30 October arriving in Budapest on 2 November just before the second Soviet intervention U Some have viewed the delay as a sign of Washington s disinterest in Hungary or even mismanagement by the Department of State One writer contended that Wailes had been kicking his heels pottering around in his Washington rose garden since August None of this was true Wailes himself Was primarily responsible for the delay A veteran Foreign Service of cer with the rank of Ambassador he became upset and threatened to retire when State asked him to take the lesser Hungary position Although the Department said it was anxious to strengthen its representation there in view of recent Soviet bloc developments Wailes felt that it had decided to move someone else to South A 'ica and Was merely scratching for a place to put him State s personnel director urged him to reconsider and said that Dulles and others considered him one of the most valuable of cers in the Foreign Service He pointed out that the rapidly changing situation in Eastern Europe promised to make Hungary a challenging and interesting post and Wailes entered the Foreign Service in 1929 and served in China Belgium and Luxembourg Canada North A 'ica and Great Britain He also held several administrative positions within the Department of State before being named to his rst ambassadorial post in South Africa in September 1954 Earning th on y 05D 1-4 00 Chief Records 8 Declass Div was on let to Data mac 042014 rl 18 added Please don t let us down Wailes exacted a price for changing his mind He requested permission to return to the United States by sea and as he put it thereby receive 18 days rest as I have had little time off in many years He planned to report to the Department for consultation the day after Labor Day 4 September After that he hoped for a week s language training to brush up on French which would be followed by about a month s leave His swearing in as minister to Hungary was scheduled for 4 October These activities account for about two months of the delay When he was in fact sworn in and why he did not leave in early or mid-October is not known but on 25 October State informed the Legation in Budapest that he had applied for visas and would be departing in a week or ten days 3 U The delay may not have seemed a problem if the of cial serving in the interim had been a stronger personality In the absence of a minister Counselor N Spencer Barnes headed the Legation as Charge d Affaires Experienced in Soviet bloc affairs he had held posts in Moscow Teheran and Berlin before coming to Budapest in January 1955 Though intellectually sharp and a gifted writer he was almost universally regarded as a timid man The interim nature of his position did not improve matters A colleague considered him lacking in rank weight or appreciable powers and for that reason he was exceedingly cautious weak and soft He did not take any action when the situation demanded it An example cited of Bames s timidity and it seems misplaced--was his Whanging apparently on his own initiative a white ag from Barnes s residence during the 23 October demonstrations Nyerges heard about the ag and rushed to the house to take it down One journalist observed that the incident did not say much for American resolve In fact he %cr it re ected the butler s lack of resolve not that of DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Date 0 l9 Barnes or the United States Another colleague compared Barnes unfavorany to Ravndal a decisive vigorous gutsy fellow whose word was listened to in Washington He was certain that if Ravndal had been in Budapest during the revolution the United States would have reacted quite differently 32 However given the breakdowns in communication it is hard to see how someone else would have made any difference U Moreover the Legation s messages re ected anything but timidity o en including bold recommendations for action Perhaps this is because Rogers did much of the drafting Anything he drafted was of course subject to Bames s revision and approval but he recalled that Barnes did not often disapprove U During the ghting Legation staff had frequent contacts with participants that shaped the nature of its recommendations After its members witnessed the ghting at the Hungarian radio building the evening of 23 October and Nagy s speech in Parliament Square that badly disappointed the crowd it strongly urged that US media for the time being avoid taking any kind of stand on Imre Nagy Re ecting the views of a crowd demonstrating outside the Legation a few days later it urged that the Soviet intervention be brought before the United Nations It also pmposed that Washington issue a high-level statement of sympathy and suggested the statement s text 34 U Hungarians were not reluctant to ask for help On the evening of 25 October a man broke into the garden of Rogers s home Admitted to the home by the children he told Mrs Rogers that he had a message for transmission to the United Nations the contents of which she telephoned to the Legation Signed by the ghting youth organization it recapitulated in detail events of the last few days and appealed for the UN to discuss the Soviet intervention 35 The same evening another man left at the DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records a Dectass DIV WHS Date 0 SEGKEL 20 Legation door a lea et signed by the new provisional revolutionary government and civil defense committee It listed 17 demands including the end of martial law the immediate termination of the Warsaw Pact a general political amnesty and the establishment of socialism based on true democracy He came the next day and said he had headed a delegation that met the night before with Nagy who had agreed to all their demands U Shortly after midnight on 2 November three young men came to the Legation and asked that an urgent message be sent to Washington requesting support of their cause at the United Nations They wanted to unite all the rebel groups and have one representative from each appointed as an overseer in every major government department They wanted use of a Legation car or help in getting the minutes of their meetings to Gyor where they could be printed as lea ets and distributed by aircraft over Budapest The youths asked that details of their negotiations with government leaders be brought to Washington s attention and demanded the intervention of UN forcesd-Ui j The Legation also made efforts to reach out to theHungarian government Since the lack of communication with Washington deprived it of of cial instructions it took the initiative on 28 October to telephone the Foreign Ministry with a proposal for a cease re It wanted to bring about a compromise between the insurgent groups and the government to end the bloodshed Speaking to the Deputy Foreign Minister the Legation s representativeueither Barnes or Rogers--said that the bloodshed was regrettable that a cease re seemed desirable and speaking purely unof cially we would assume that any foreign Legation including this one would be glad to do whatever was practical to end the ghting The Hungarian of cial appreciated the thought but said DECLASSIFIED lN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Date 0 4 21 nothing could be done since the insurgents were being crushed and made clear he had no intention of dealing with them The Legation believed it advisable not to spam the approaches by the insurgent groups in order to improve the chances for the government to negotiate with them and asked for State s advice But State felt that no Speci c response to these approaches was necessary 38 U On another occasion Rogers attempted to obtain the British Legation s agreement for a joint proposal that a left-of-center coalition government be established which would include Nagy and members of the Social Democratic Party one which Moscow might accept but the British Minister wanted a more right-wing coloration and Rogers was not sure that the proposal was forwarded to London 9 U The military attaches were active On 30 October Air Attache Colonel Welwyn Dallam talked with the government s chief of military protocol who said the government s aim was to establish an independent socialist state similar to Yugoslavia Dallam pessimistic felt that the Soviet Union would settle for nothing less than the complete crushing of the revolution continued Communist political control of the government and continued Soviet military occupation He said that the Hungarian people of both sides apparently referring to government supporters and rebels were looking to UN for action 40 U The author of the intemal history of its role in the revolution was not impressed with the Legation s performance From his standpoint its reporting had less value than that of Western journalists because it had a narrower range of contacts While some active participants in the revolution did come into the Legation these were naturally not of our choosing and in many cases were justi ably open to some suspicion DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 0 13528 Chief Records a Declaas Div WH8 DEC 0 4 2014 22 Moreover the reporting was at best sporadic and laced with premature analysis and assumptions of the sort that diplomats feel their government stands in need of 4 U Despite criticisms from various sources and taking into account the dif culties it faced on the whole the staff performed well That it did not have a greater in uence on shaping policy in Washington resulted more from the break in communications with Washington than from its own shortcomings U Leading at the UN The United States has also been criticized for a lack of interest even opposition to raising the Hungarian question at the United Nations 42 This was not true at least at rst as the State Department had to pressure the British and French to get the matter on the Security Council s agenda Some have charged that the administration s main motive was to gain the support of voters of East European descent in the presidential election The evidence indicates the opposite Motives were mixed but Eisenhower and Dulles seemed genuinely concerned about the Hungarian situation and wanted to avoid even the appearance that UN consideration was designed to attract voters U Although State had decided during the summer not to bring the Poznan disturbance before the UN that course of action remained an Option if similar situations developed On 23 October its Policy Planning Staff was in fact considering a UN appeal in case the Soviet Union changed its mind and decided to intervene militarily in Poland 43 This facilitated its turning to the UN as the initial response to Soviet intervention in Hungary Moreover since the UN had been wrestling for several weeks with the question of Egypt s nationalization of the Suez Canal attention had been focused on it as a possible arbiter in international disputes U 4 FULL Authonty 0 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Dlv WHS Date DEC 0 4 2014 23 There was another reason for prompt action others were demanding it The Hungarian National Council in New York on 25 October sent telegrams to Dulles and to UN Secretary General Dag asking that Hungary be placed on the Security Council s agenda That evening Dulles broached the idea with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge From a political standpoint the Secretary worried about people saying that here are the great moments and when they came and these fellows were ready to stand up and die we were caught napping and doing nothing He raised the possibility of acting as early as the next day and having the British and French join in the US initiative U Dulles discussed the matter with his brother Allen Director of Central Intelligence expressing concem that Hungarian migr s might jump the gun by going to the UN via the Latinos He told the President that State was seeking British and French support but he doubted they would want to act quickly If action was not taken the next day Friday 26 October the Secretary wondered whether it was worth doing at all a remark apparently re ecting his concem that over the weekend Soviet forces would be able to put down the trouble Eisenhower was willing to wait until Monday to gain multilateral support and avoid the impression that the United States was raising the issue for domestic political reasons Dulles doubted if other NATO countries eSpecially the major ones would come along with us as they will interpret it as being an election move But the President did not want to act alone some agreement from our allies no matter who puts it in would take the noose off Both men agreed that raising the matter in the UN was a close call The worst thing Eisenhower said would to be thought of as guilty of spurious interest 45 U g t ss g g IN FULL y 1 526 Chief Records 8 Daclass Div WHs Date 0 24 Dulles then called Lodge to inquire about circulating to the signatories of the 1947 Hungarian Peace Treaty 3 letter condemning the Soviet invasion and sounding them out on possible further action State had drafted such a letter stressing the Soviet intervention but not criticizing the Hungarian government If the signatories opposed further action Dulles said at least we would have a reason for not acting Lodge suggested that they try rst for a resolution and failing that settle for a letter 5 U State s Bureau of International Organization Affairs 10 unsure of the bene ts of UN involvement in East EurOpean troublesgfeared that over-zealous activity on our part could stimulate counter-action and resentment that would defeat our objectives of encouraging the satellites to loosen their ties with Moscow But silence might be subject to misinterpretation At the least we must continue to make clear by appropriate and timely statements our readiness to extend assistance if desired and our championship of the cause of human freedom The strongest action the Security Council might take would be to exhort the contending sides to stop ghting and or to establish an ad hoc investigative committee to prepare the way for further Council action if necessary If the Soviet Union exercised its veto the uniting for peace machinery could be utilized to move the case to the General Assembly In any event 10 felt that the United States should take the initiative and persuade others to join a small power initiative would be less likely to succeed and we would be regarded as having employed a stooge and as not having the courage of our convictions U Already at work on the matter the mission in New York concluded that any UN involvement was unlikely to change the immediate course of events so the object had DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority Chiet Records a Daclass Div WHS DEC 0 4 2m Korean War Uniting for peace machinery 25 to be It should provide the widest possible expression of moral support to the Hungarian peeple and other satellite peoples an opportunity for exposing Soviet actions completely and a basis for keeping open the possibility of needling the Soviets in future Any resolution calling for UN action must be mild enough to avoid the charge that it is merely a Cold War move exible enough to accommodate changes in the Hungarian situation and broad enough to permit a complete expose of Soviet actions In any event the likelihood of a veto by the Soviet Union in the Security Council would not be considered a deterrent 43 U On the contrary the US Mission staff in New York felt a veto would increase U S prestige and particularly enhance the organization s standing in the eyes of the satellite peOples It preferred a mild resolution which would receive fairly widespread support particularly if action were taken expeditiously while public interest is high It also favored sending observers if the Hungarian Government approved or at least to neighboring countries to interview refugees We could announce we were not courting a veto that we did not want a cold war item that we wanted real results Whoever cleared the message for transmission to Washington added Recommend prompt action We will get maximum support if we strike while iron is hot The mission s draft resolution called for appointment of a committee consisting of Australia Iran and Yugoslavia to investigate the situation and report at the earliest practicable date 49 It did not Speci cally mention sending observers to Hungary but the committee would presumably have to do this as part of its investigation U To secure multilateral support State that evening approached the five peace treaty signatories along with France seeking their backing for either circulating a letter within DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS seem Date DEC 0 4 2014 18-36% 26 the Security Council or submitting a resolution One Council member Yugoslavia was a special case that State feared might find it awkward to support either step given its special relationship with the Soviet Union and the possibility the two governments were already discussing the Hungarian situation Not wanting to exclude Yugoslavia and thereby prejudge its position State left the decision up to the US Ambassador in Belgrade as to whether and how to approach the government It also sent its initial thoughts on the ghting in Budapest for communication to Belgrade noting that it did not expect unarmed Hungarians to be able to defeat the Soviet forces Under the circumstances it wanted to minimize the bloodshed keep the Hungarian Government from taking reprisals and assuming it still has some good-will with populace encourage it to proceed with rapid democratization The Yugoslavs could facilitate this process by lending support or using their in uence with Moscow However when the Ambassador informally raised with the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry the idea of joint UN action with the Western powers it made clear its unwillingness to join them 50 U Washington s close allies eventually went along with the proposal but with reservations Canada s Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson favored UN consideration because it might prevent further bloodshed but warned against rash intervention in Eastern EurOpe that might hurt the Poles and Hungarians by provoking a cruel and powerful reaction from those who may be waiting for an Opportunity to move in and destroy these new liberating and national forces using the excuse of foreign threats or interference from our side The French Foreign Ministry said that it was essential that the resolution not contain any disposition which may disturb our actions in DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Date DEC 0 4 2m 27 Algeria and our relationship with Morocco and Tunisia We are particularly against the formation of a committee of inquiry SI U The British presented a bigger stumbling block Although the Prime Minister s of ce expressed sympathy and admiration for the insurgents struggle and announced a donation of money to the International Red Cross for medical and other supplies the Foreign Office was reluctant to take a strong public stance of support The press quoted authoritative sources in London as believing that direct Western intervention would certainly lead to harsher punitive measures by the Soviet Union in Hungary and other satellites and could also lead to war British of cials recalled the warning Khrushchev had made when he visited England in April that the Soviet Union would ght to retain control of its position in Central Europe 52 U The Foreign Of ce preferred not to raise the matter in the Security Council and instead wanted to wait until the opening of the General Assembly regular session on 12 November where it felt a fuller debate could take place Discussion there would make clear the West's interest in the Hungarian situation while gaining time to decide how to play our hand in the Assembly in the light of the way in which events turn out in Hungary over the next two weeks It considered the Western position in the Security Council weak The Soviet Union could exercise a veto and also justi ably argue that the Hungarian Government had requested help in dealing with an internal revolt a matter outside UN jurisdiction Since no large scale troop movements have taken place the British said it would be dif cult to contend that a threat to international peace had arisen In a telling comment as events would prove the Foreign Of ce believed that Security DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Dectass Div WHS Date' DEC 042m 28 Council inscription would encourage the Hungarians to needless self-slaughter and the Soviets to be rougher and tougher than they already are U The excuses went on Taking the matter up in the Security Council would imply that the United States and Great Britain were conniving with the rebels Moreover the General Assembly was a better place to raise the issue since smaller and neutral nations Would be more inclined to speak out Finally delaying debate until the second week of November would assure the Soviet Union that the West had no intention of intervening which for the rebels was the kindest message the West could give But the question had to be handled carefully in the General Assembly so as not to prejudice the British presence in Cyprus As the US Embassy in London observed even though a Soviet veto would keep the Security Council from acting the mere suggestion would disturb the British Government which had its hands ll in Suez and feels shortage of friends 53 U Dulles told the President he planned to send a personal message to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd urging prompt inscription on the Security Council agenda He would tell Lloyd that focusing attention on Hungary would discourage the Soviet Union from carrying out widespread reprisals and would give us a chance to talk privately with them at the UN Such talks were nothing new Following Stalin s death in March 1953 when the collective Soviet leadership signaled a willingness to negotiate on outstanding international issues US and Soviet diplomats at the UN had engaged in informal but fruitless contacts 54 The President suggested that Lloyd be told that the situation was so terrible that we would be remiss if we did not do something In a message to Lloyd sent later that evening Dulles pointed out that the revolt was assuming preportions that might DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Daclaas DIV 29 bring a major Soviet intervention The emotional reaction in the United States he stated would certainly be quite serious It was most important to focus attention on Hungary and at the same time to create an opportunity for infomtal discussions with Soviet UN representatives 5 U Dulles s message led to a British about face with Lloyd now agreeing to join in the Security Council action Whether the reversal had anything to do with the military measures Britain France and Israel were secretly planning to take against Egypt is not known The decision may also have resulted from a report from Budapest the previous day that 2 000 demonstrators had gathered outside the British Legation and that some who entered the building had asked that their request be passed to London for the UN to take up the question of the Soviet intervention Not only did the British now favor Security Council action they wanted a meeting held the next day a Sunday because they maintained that quick action would bolster the morale of the Hungarian people and limit time for the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Government to counterattack France wanted to meet even earlier that afternoon or evening -but agreed on Sunday to allow the delegations time to prepare Lodge felt that they should avoid a call for a cease re that might allow the Soviet forces and Hungarian Government a chance to consolidate their positions The British and French agreed and reiterated their objections to any resolution that mentioned a commission of inquiry which might embarrass the British in Cyprus and the French in Algeria 56 U State wanted the meeting limited to quick adoption of the agenda without any substantive debate Expecting the Soviet representative to object violently it cautioned Representatives of the three countries had met at Sevres outside Paris on 24 October to make nal arrangements for the attack on Egypt DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Date 30 Lodge not to engage in rebuttals but to say that in view of the urgency of the situation the United States did not wish to submit a resolution and reserved the right to deal with any Soviet charges at a later meeting This would allow exibility to determine a precise course of action and the kind of resolution to be submitted later It also reminded Lodge that it needed more information from Budapest from which it had been cut off and that any decision on a course of action would require concurrence at the highest level in Washington U A Washington journalist noted that although the appeal to the Security Council was taken at US initiative and there was an intense desire here to assist the insurgents it is still limited by a certain caution Russia would not easily tolerate anything but a Communist government in Hungary and that therefore any Western action should if possible avoid provoking the Russians further or suggest to them that the West is attempting to bolster a hostile State within the political boundaries that Russia has hitherto considered essential for her security The State Department is apparently still seeking a way of offering the Russians a manner of withdrawal that will not be too humiliating U At the Security Council s 28 October meeting the rst time since the Korean War that it had convened on a Sunday Soviet representative Arkady Sobolev argued against including Hungary on the agenda on the ground that it constituted interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation The Western powers he said sought to encourage a reactionary underground movement bent on overthrowing the legally constituted government He claimed a speech Secretary Dulles had given in Dallas the previous evening had plainly called for the replacement of the existing Hungarian Government by DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div 3 another Over Sobolev s protest the Council voted 9-1 with Yugoslavia abstaining to place the item on the agenda By the same vote it rejected his proposal to adjourn for three or four days to allow members to obtain more information 59 U In the discussion that followed Lodge defended action by the UN quoted extensively from Dulles s Speech and brie y recapitulated events closing with a reference to contradictory reports that the Hungarian Government had begun negotiations with the Soviet Union to withdraw its tr00ps but also that new Soviet forces had entered the country and that large-scale ghting had broken out When the meeting adjoumed it was le to the Council President s discretion when to call another 50 U It took the Security Council five days to convene a meeting intended only to raise the question Given the time required for this initial step and the confused situation within Hungary it is dif cult to agree with those who later contended that the UN during these rst few days should have diSpatched Secretary General Hammarskjold to see rst-hand what was going on It would have been virtually impossible to get agreement to do so And no one was even suggesting it at this point U Washington 3 Policy Takes Shape Eager to have the Security Council take up the Hungarian question as a multilateral initiative Eisenhower was in no hurry to do much else alone His deliberateness stemmed in part from the uncertainty surrounding the situation and in part from his customary cautious approach to decision-making Although Poland and Hungary were not on the agenda of the 26 October meeting Allen Dulles brought them up during his brie ng on world developments Discussion proceeded in a curious way Deputy Secretary Reuben Robertson attending in Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson s DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority ED 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS DEC 0 4 2014 SEW 32 absence apparently said nothing and JCS Chairman Admiral Arthur Radford s only contribution was raising a question about the American Communist Party s reaction to the East European events Secretary Dulles s remarks were few The President Allen Dulles and disarmament adviser Harold Stassen dominated the discussion In summarizing developments in Hungary Allen Dulles said that it was too early to reach any firm conclusions but thought the revolt constituted the most serious threat yet to be posed to continued Soviet control of the satellites U The discussion brought out the major reason for Eisenhower s hesitancy his fear of provoking the Soviet Union into rash action He wondered whether the Kremlin s leaders in view of the serious deterioration of their position in the satellites might resort to very serious measures and even to precipitate global war When Germany faced certain defeat near the end of World War II Hitler had carried on to the very last and pulled doWn EurOpe with him Soviet leaders the President thought might do something similar Responding to his concerns Stassen wondered about getting a message to Minister of Defense Marshal Georgii Zhukov that the Soviet Union should not look on freedom in the satellites as a threat to Soviet security We should make clear said Stassen that this development would not impel the Western powers to make any warlike move against the Soviet Union Eisenhower did not think such a step because he doubted whether the Soviet leaders really feared a Western attack U Stassen had suggested that in view of the signi cance of the satellite developments the President might want to call a Special NSC meeting Eisenhower however preferred to have the interested departments and agencies rst analyze the DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 50 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS DEC 0 4 2m 33 situation and then present their ndings to the NSC This was better than to plunge right into a discussion in the Council on these dif cult subjects But he set no deadline for them to accomplish this task before the next regularly scheduled meeting on 1 November 62 U Greatly worried about the Soviet reaction after the meeting Eisenhower warned Radford and Allen Dulles to stay unusually watch rl and alert At Radford s request the Joint Chiefs discussed the possibility that a serious defeat by the Soviets in the satellites could conceivably result in precipitous action on their part The Defense Department adepted alert measures including noti cation of the US Commander in Chief Europe USCINCEUR General Alfred Gruenther ugi Stassen persisted In a letter to Eisenhower that a ernoon he apologized for not making his views clearer at the NSC meeting Soviet leaders he believed may calculate that if they lose control of Hungary that country would be taken into NATO by the United States and this would be a great threat in Soviet eyes to their own security May it not be wise for the United States in some manner to make it clear that we are willing to have Hungary be established on the Austrian basis independent -- and not af liated with That afternoon he also met with Secretary Dulles and reiterated his idea that we should let the Russians know that we would accept for the satellites some neutralized status like that of Austria and suggested that it be done through diplomatic channels or through Tito Dulles doubted that it was desirable to use any such channels as the Russians could publicize what was happening and give the revolutionary elements the impression that we were working secretly with the Russians behind their backs But he would think about some other way to get the idea across although he was unsure whether DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 1352B Chiet Records a Dectass Div WHS DEC 0 4 2014 34 we should go so far as to commit these countries to an Austria type neutralization mm Dulles told the President he was reluctant to follow up on the suggestion unless it went through the Security Council where we could have some backstage talks going on during the time the Council was in session which would be more or less legitimate U Dulles adopted Stassen's suggestion in part He added language to his speech in Dallas on 27 October assuring the Soviet Union that the United States had no military interest in either Poland or Hungary And let me make this clear beyond a possibility of a doubt The United States has no ulterior purpose in desiring the independence of the satellite countries Our unadulterated wish is that these peoples from whom so much of our own national life derives should have sovereignty restored to them and that they should have governments of their own free choosing We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies We see them as friends and as part of a new and friendly and no longer divided Europe He cleared this passage with the President and asked his brother and the Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Amory to go over the nal draft with a small group of State Department of cials none of whom objected to the part reassuring the Soviet Union U In the speech Dulles also said that those who peacefully enjoy liberty had a duty to seek by all truly helpful means that those who now die for freedom will not have died in vain l-Ie Spoke of help the United States might provide and made clear that it was economic not military The captive peoples should never have reason to doubt that they have in us a sincere and dedicated friend who shares their aspirations They must know that they can draw upon our abundance to tide themselves over the period of economic adjustment which is inevitable as they rededieate their productive efforts to the service of their own people rather than of DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority so 13525 Chief Records a Declass on was DEC 0 4 2014 SEGREL 35 exploiting masters Nor do we condition economic ties between us upon the adoption by these countries of any particular form of society U Other assurances came from an unlikely source Secretary of Defense Wilson whose indiscreet public remarks on more than one occasion in the past had aroused the President s ire Appearing on 28 October on the same television interview program that Dulles had a week before and speaking with the tact of a diplomat Wilson said he did not think developments in Poland and Hungary would cause any revision in the US defense posture Like Dulles he explicitly ruled out American military involvement An interviewer mentioned the rebels pleas for Western help Is there any way he asked that the United States and its NATO allies could assist these people who are fighting for freedom Wilson replied The American people are very sympathetic with the people of any land that are trying to throw off tyranny and oppression and assert their freedom and their right to life liberty and the pursuit of happiness When it comes to intervention that s a much more dif cult thing We deplore bloodshed in any of these things and hope that they can be solved and many times they are by men of good will nally asserting a position in various places over the world and in the light of world public Opinion work something out that is just and fair U An interviewer mentioned Adlai Stevenson s charge that the East European turmoil had caught the administration off guard Wilson disagreed pointing out that the world s trouble spots were well-known but it took time to deal with them Did the United States have any idea about the timing of the Polish crisis or the Hungarian rebellion In that kind of situation Wilson observed it was impossible to tell within a day or month or even sometimes within a year but potentially the thing was there because to hold peoples with long records of freedom under tyrannical domination for any great length of time through the years is almost impossible Asked whether the Republican Party had DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E013526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS DEC 0 4 2014 36 contributed to the unrest in Eastern Europe Wilson answered unequivocally would say not When the moderator pressed him referring to statements by Republican Spokesmen that this was the case Wilson said that such statements wouldn t be correct exactly The fact that we haven t gotten into any more trouble in the world or lost out I could say that the Administration deserves some credit for but the exact timing of the of the business 1 would say we had nothing to do with it Another questioner jumped in Well you would not feel then as Mr Dulles says said he feels that the Eisenhower administration s stubborn insistence on the idea of the eventual liberation of peoples held under foreign domination that their refusal to give Soviet tyranny a good name by making agreements and sitting down time and again with them has held the hope of freedom alive in those countries Wilson replied that he certainly agreed with Dulles But as for the planning of any particular event at any particular time we had no hand in that Did the United States have agents inside Hungary that started the rebellion Wilson replied Not to my knowledge certainly U Questioning reverted to military assistance Had the provision of military equipment to Yugoslavia over the years encouraged the Hungarians to revolt Wilson was not sure It possibly has because they have a clear example of another nation another people that have asserted their independence from Moscow in spite of their Communist type of society Before the discussion turned to other subjects a question was put directly to the Secretary Have you seen anything within your Department where there is a suggestion of arms aid to the Hungarians if they make this rebellion stick Wilson s replied rmly I have Oi- g U DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Daclasa Div WHS Date 0 4 37 Other comments by Defense of cials reported in the press painted a bleak picture of the rebels chances Under such headlines as Pentagon Sees Hungarians in Losing Battle and Reds Can Quell Revolt in a Few Days the Chicago Tribune cited unnamed Pentagon sources as saying the rebels lacked the tight military organization weapons and supply lines plus outside support necessary for victory over the Russians Little wonder that students in a northwestern Hungarian town reported receiving word from sources along the Austrian border that military aid from NATO countries appeared to be hopelessly out of the question although no one knew why 0 U In the absence of an NSC decision the closest thing to a statement of policy came in a paper prepared on 28 October by Richard Davis of State s Policy Planning Staff whose recommended courses of action Dulles approved the following day As Davis saw it the principal U S objective regarding the satellites was to encourage as a rst step toward eventual full national independence and freedom the emergence of national communist governments While they might continue to be in close political and military alliance with the Soviet Union they would be able to exercise to a much greater degree of independent authority and control than formerly in the direction of their own affairs primarily con ned in the rst stage to their internal affairs The rapid pace of developments in Hungary and lack of reliable rst-hand information Davis felt made it difficult to foresee the course of events Citing con rmed reports that additional Soviet tr00ps were entering the country Davis found it dif cult to believe that the Soviet Union after committing itself so deeply to intervention could disengage its forces until order is reestablished under a Hungarian Government willing and able to maintain its military and political alliance with the He believed that the basic objectives and conclusions DECLASSIHED IN FULL Authority - E0 13526 32 Div WHS 38 of the NSC paper adopted in July remained valid but he advanced several additional tentative conclusions and courses of action He argued that any US intervention either unilaterally or with other countries would precipitate a major crisis with the Soviet Union and possibly the outbreak of general war The United States and other countries should instead try to nd a balance between encouraging forces in the satellites moving toward US objectives and provoking counterforces including the Soviet Union to intervene and set back those liberalizing influences at work 71 U With regard to Hungary Davis listed several goals 1 Our immediate objective is to discourage and if possible prevent thher Soviet armed intervention in Hungary as well as harsh measures of retaliation or repression For this purpose the US should mobilize pressures on the USSR against such measures through the UN action and by other means while reassuring the USSR we do not look upon Hungary or the other Satellites as potential military allies and recognize legitimate Soviet security interests in its relations with these areas 2 In line with this approach consider making in the UN or elsewhere a proposal of Hungarian neutrality on the Austrian model 3 If the Nagy Government succeeds in establishing peace and its authority in the country we should use whatever capabilities we may possess to in uence the new Hungarian leaders to adhere to and ful ll the commitments they have made to the Hungarian people which will advance U S objectives including the promise to seek Soviet agreement for the total withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary A decision on long term US economic assistance was to be kept in abeyance While doubting that the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces from Hungary until assured of a government that would maintain friendly ties with Moscow Davis believed that the partially legible revision apparently in Robert Bowie s hand reads whether it is valuable to make DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records Declass Div mm Data 39 Polish and Hungarian events so far may well lead the Kremlin to reappraise the value of its present position in the Satellites and the costs of seeking to maintain it on the present basis He therefore recommended that the NSC Flaming Board urgently undertake a study of policies and actions which might encourage or bring about such a withdrawal U Stassen was convinced his recommendations had little effect The most they accomplished he recalled was to encourage Dulles to insert in the Dallas speech the reassuring words to the Soviet leaders He had really wanted a direct approach to the Soviets saying in effect Let us confer immediately on the Hungarian situation Let us work out some solution Dulles had said he could not do this because the revolution was moving in a way that was favorable to United States policy 3 U In fact Dulles did decide to make an approach but through Ambassador Charles Bohlen in Moscow rather than the Soviet UN mission He may have thought doing so in the Soviet capital minimized the chance of a leak Although there is no indication that his name ever came up a less risky New York channel might have been Anatolii Dobrynin who as a UN Deputy Secretary General was on staff and not part of the Soviet mission Dobrynin lived in an apartment separate from the Soviet compound and had his own direct means of communication with the Foreign Ministry M U On 29 October Dulles sent Bohlen a message having cleared it with Eisenhower which quoted the passage about Eastern Europe in the Dallas speech He asked that the passage be brought to the attention of the Soviet leaders including Zhukov Bohlen could - also mention a Western preposal for a treaty of assurance in connection with German reuni cation Dulles stressed that the d marche should be kept from being publicly DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div was DEC UL 2014 40 attributed to the United States It is ironic that at the time Dulles was instructing Bohlen to approach the Soviet leaders the Legation in Budapest presuming that a debate was taking place within the Presidium between proponents of an iron- sted approach and those advocating a moderate course warned State against any weak-kneed Western reaction that would tip the scale in favor of the harder line 5 U In the meantime Davis s paper formed the basis for the Flaming Board s drafting of a new policy paper to deal with events in Poland and Hungary During its deliberations the Board Assistants discussed but rejected proposals to take steps quickly to detach Albania and Czechoslovakia from the Soviet bloc give covert assistance to the Hungarian rebels and redeploy US forces as a waming to the Soviet Union 6 It is not clear who made these The NSC Special Staff also discussed the possibility of covertly supplying arms to the rebels but noted that matters like this traditionally fell outside the Flaming Board s purview It seems that at least some at the CIA favored a more direct involvement than diplomatic action Indeed Allen Dulles had cabled Wisner on 27 October that these are dramatic days and we must weigh care illy all our actions However I m not one of those who believes we should be hindered by Undue Caution 1i718 The possibility of supplying weapons to the insurgents became a live issue during the last days of October- recalled that insurgents came to the Legation several times asking for weapons especially anti-tank guns We don t need American soldiers they declared Just give us weapons send us weapons He knew of stockpiled weapons of Soviet manufacture in West Germany that had been captured during the Korean War if we wanted to keep it quiet we could have brought in some Chief Recordsa aclass Date DEC It 201 SEER-E513 4 also aware of a corps ofd-lungarian volunteers in West Germany apparently a reference to a fraternal group of former Hungarian officers who were armed and only waiting for the authorization to set off for Hungary an authorization that was never given No evidence has been found that this possibility was considered U While the Legation had not received a formal request for arms or any kind of military assistance Military Attache Todd thought he should request guidance from Washington in case the government so inquired Delayed in transmission his message of 3 October did not reach the Pentagon until 2 November The next day of cials in the Of ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs ISA discussed it with Beam who believed strongly that any reply could be misinterpreted Therefore they sent none So the question of sending arms to Hungary apparently never got very far in Defense U The Planning Board s draft policy paper circulated on 31 October for consideration by the NSC the following day repeated much of Davis s language about the objectives in Eastern Europe In one important respect it went further It evidenced a cautious note of optimism in recommending what kind of help the United States should provide if a government came to power at least as independent as that in Poland In addition to furnishing disaster relief 2 increasing economic scienti c and cultural exchanges 3 being open to requests for moderate amounts of economic and technical assistance and 4 adopting measures to reorient Hungary s trade toward the West it preposed that the US Government make the new leaders aware of its support of their aims and to the extent that their success depends on such assistance be prepared to assist the ccomplish their purpose of forming and preserving DECLASSIFIED IN PART Auth E013526 05D 1 4 lld Chiegrll'ttgcordsueclass Dlv WHs CIA Lot 3 s DEC 2m 42 such a government 80 Whether the assistance would include direct nancial subsidies is not clear U The paper saw two courses open to the United States The rst was to continue the present policy i e pressure through public statements and action at the UN to inhibit the Soviet Union from further armed intervention and provision of food and medical assistance for Hungary The second was a more aggressive course to Open recognition of their belligerent status or overt military support and recognition of their government if one be formed and succeeds in holding a portion of the country But Stassen had added a third course to the draft paper -to try to facilitate the complete withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Hungary and the development of a Hungarian government broadly based on Hungarian public support with an independent status not allied to either the West or the East in a manner similar to the establishment of Austria He also wanted the NSC to consider whether the United States should indicate a willingness to consult with NATO on the probable withdrawal of some U S forces from Western Europe if the Soviet Union pulled its forces out of Hungary U The Joint Chiefs strongly opposed Stassen s recommendations They felt his proposed third course of action added little to the paper and feared that any offer of a partial withdrawal of troops might lead to a Soviet effort to obtain withdrawal of all US forces from EurOpe In their view it might not be necessary to offer Moscow anything If developments continued favorably there was a possibility that local actions will result in the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from that country without involvement of the United States The JCS even opposed the Planning Board s inclusion of a recommended DECLASSIFIED IN PART 050 1 -4 M00 Authority 0 13526 Chief Records Declass DIV WHS CIA At cl Col Data on I 2011 43 action that Dulles with the President s approval had already taken publicly and privately assuring the Soviet Union that we do not look upon Hungary or the other Satellites as potential military allies They believed that such assurances would undermine whatever influence the United States may have on the government which is established in Hungary and could in the future operate to our military disadvantage 82 U The Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD was prepared to back the JCS A brie ng paper ISA prepared for Secretary Wilson s use the day before the NSC meeting recommended that he concur in the draft paper which it considered generally acceptable but that he oppose Stassen s recommendations and support the JCS views if Admiral Radford made a convincing presentation observed that the policy approved in July NSC 5608 l was seriously inadequate in that in its emphasis on the evolutionary approach toward the Satellite problem it fails to give suf cient policy guidance as to what the U S should do in the event revolutionary action An NSC staff member had different reasons than those of the JCS and OSD for criticizing the paper He thought it presented little or nothing substantial and immediate which is not already done or contemplated Moreover it implied that the United States should do nothing more for the time being If this were true he wondered would it not be clearer to say In the meantime the U S intelligence community asked to rate the likelihood of precipitate Soviet action had furnished an assessment on 30 October as part of a general estimate of the East European situation In typically hedged language the estimate concluded DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS Date SEGREL 44 It seems unlikely that US action short of overt military intervention or obvious preparation for such intervention would lead the USSR deliberately to take steps which it believed would materially increase the risk of general war The Soviet leaders probably recognize that the US nuclear air capability remains superior to that of the USSR and have probably concluded that at present the USSR even if it launched a surprise attack would receive unacceptable damage in a nuclear exchange with the US The estimate sounded a note of caution Soviet suSpicions of US policy and present circumstances which involve Soviet troop movements and alerts probably increase the likelihood of a series of actions and counteractions leading inadvertently to war a series of events the estimate believed would most likely originate over East Germany not Hungary 85 U NA T0 Talk and Sympathy If the NSC was responding in a deliberate manner NATO by comparison moved ponderously lt produced papers held meetings and generally passed the ball to the United Nations One scholar has quipped that when it came to the Hungarian revolution NATO stood for No Action Talk Only There is no evidence that it considered military intervention in Hungary General Lauris Norstad Gruenther s deputy and soon to succeed him as Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACEUR recalled only that it had some intelligence warning on the Hungarian crisis He remembered discussions being held about what the hell can we do if we decide to do something But there was nothing useful or constructive that could be done U Since the spring of 1956 NATO had been following with interest the political and cultural thaw taking place in Eastern Europe but a paper its lntemational Staff circulated in late September warned against over-optimism regarding the liberalizing trends in the satellites and the ability of outside powers to in uence them It recommended that the IN FULL Authority 50 13526 Chief ecords Declass Div WHS Date' 45 West continue using its cultural and informational contacts to assure the satellite peoples of its moral support in their efforts to free themselves But since we are not prepared to use force to liberate them we should not encourage futile rebellions on their part U To allow delegations a full month to review and comment on the paper Secretary General Hastings Ismay scheduled it for North Atlantic Council NAC consideration on 24 October at which time the discussion centered on Poland and the region in general without reference to the tumultuous overnight events that had taken place in Hungary The meeting resulted in a request for the International Staff to prepare three papers 1 a summary of policies toward Eastern Europe being followed by NATO countries 2 an up-to-date background paper and 3 a paper directed towards a serious discussion of the possibilities for action if any to be taken by NATO governments to promote the deveIOpment of the thaw The rst paper was to be circulated within the next week or two the latter two prior to the December ministerial meeting 88 U Because of the rapidly worsening Hungarian situation Ismay called a special Council meeting for 27 October Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Alberico Casardi concerned that reporters would press representatives to comment on Hungary suggested that they keep the Kremlin guessing about intentions He thought representatives should avoid stating or even implying that under no circumstances would we consider military intervention in any way in the situation in Eastern Europe but they should also avoid suggesting that intervention was under consideration If we say we will not intervene then the Stalinists can argue that they have carte blanche to take any repressive measures they want If we say that we might DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority so 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS Date' 46 intervene then Russian national prestige becomes more involved and a disengagement more dif cult 89 Noting that the revolution showed no sign of ending he concluded The question which now arises is whether any regime with Communist participation can stabilize the situation except as a form of Soviet military government The Polish solution is thus overrun by events Either the Russians must bow to the will of the people and withdraw or they must intervene in a massive way The human cost of the latter course would be terrible and we can only eXplore every avenue which might offer a hope of persuading them that withdrawal is preferable 90 Casardi suggested that NATO mobilize world public Opinion seek to involve leaders of neutral countries offer medical assistance to Hungary support the UN Security Council s consideration of the question and appeal to the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces perhaps through Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak then visiting Moscow Casardi may have been echoing Washington s position by suggesting that the Council offer Moscow some form of assurance that the NATO powers will not encourage or even countenance the establishment by any Hungarian government of military ties with the West and a guarantee on the Austrian model of Hungary s neutrality perhaps of her demilitarization 9' After some discussion the representatives considered his suggested courses of action premature but thought that they merited consideration at a later date 92 They agreed that NATO as a body should not take any action regarding Hungary and that the question should be dealt with in the UN where care should be taken to avoid action or declarations which would give the Russians a pretext for even more violent intervention U The Council discussed Hungary again on 30 and 31 October without settling on a course of action At the latter meeting the discussion focused only on how far in advance of the December ministerial meeting Casardi should submit a paper recommending DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 50 13523 Chief Records Dec DI 656m 04 2014 a WHB 47 actions NATO might take with regard to the satellites The submission date was set for December 94 U U S British and French representatives took the lead in quickly ruling out any military action to aid the rebels The restraint Ca'sardi had desired was evidenced in the absence of of cial comment to the press His recommendation that the organization keep its intentions uncertain was apparently heeded Not until the middle of December did NATO issue a public statement about the Hungarian situation 5 U Turning Points During the last days of October and the rst day of November a concurrence of domestic and external events produced a fundamental watershed in the course of the revolution For policymakers in Washington and elsewhere the speed with which one development overtook another made it difficult to discern clearly what was happening U In New York the Security Council was indeed moving toward action regarding Hungary but another British about-face delayed implementation Lodge had worked out with Dulles and other State of cials a rather aggressive plan The US delegation would have a resolution introduced but not voted on at a meeting on 1 November calling for withdrawal of all Soviet armed forces political police and paramilitary units as well as veri cation of the withdrawal by neutral UN observers But the British balked Their Permanent Representative in New York Pierson Dixon likened the proposal to a Sword of Damocles that might halt what he considered favorable momentum underway in the Security Council The next meeting should instead be devoted to speeches condemning DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records at Dectass Div WHS Date 48 the Soviet intervention questioning the new Hungarian representative whether the Nagy government was in fact negotiating the withdrawal of Soviet forces and introducing a procedural resolution to suSpend deliberation for 48 hours to allow time for the negotiations to be concluded Then two days later a substantive resolution could be submittedg U State approved the British plan subject to developments and particularly whether by the time the Security Council met on 1 November the Hungarian Soviet negotiations had begun Waiting another two days before introducing a substantive resolution would allow the United States or other countries to deal with the Soviets directly if desirable That night State sent the US delegation a revised draft substantive resolution calling for the Soviet Union to cease its intervention and still proposing the creation of a UN fact- nding committee U In Budapest under pressure from student groups workers councils and revolutionary committees established in provincial cities and towns Nagy steadily discarded the communist system and instituted a series of reforms including a multi- party political system On 29 October Soviet forces began to withdraw from Budapest although they stationed themselves outside the city and other forces remained in the Inside Hungary the impression prevailed that the revolution had triumphed The Legation declared on 31 October that it became virtually certain in Budapest this morning that the Hungarian revolution was now a fact of history something which it had doubted could be achieved without the strongest Western support 98 U The Nagy government had announced the replacement of the previous government s appointee who had made such a poor showing at the 28 October Security Council meeting by newly appointed Foreign Minister Imre Horvath said to be en route to New York DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS Date 49 As favorable as the trend appeared within the country outside developments proved decisive On 29 October according to a plan worked out with Britain and France Israeli forces invaded Egypt with the aim of seizing control of the Suez Canal The next day the two Western powers issued an ultimatum that unless Israel and Egypt agreed to a cease- re they would move forces into the area as well U The Eisenhower administration had to make two critical decisions whether to concentrate attention on the Middle East at the expense of Hungary and whether to break with its close allies because of their action against Egypt State s Policy Planning Staff concluded that the United States should condemn the Israeli aggression and disassociate itself with the British and French action both actions fully supported by Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles With regard to Hungary the group decided that if the Soviet Union undertook massive repression any effective action by the United States would probably involve hostilities with the Soviets But displaying the same kind of optimism as the JCS and others had it believed that the long-term prospect seemed to be for gradually growing Hungarian independence even in the event of US inaction although the Soviets might keep sufficient troops in the country to slow down the trend and to ensure that Hungary remained an ally of the U In the Security Council the United States and the Soviet Union jointly sponsored a resolution condemning the invasion of Egypt which Britain and France vetoed The Suez crisis was then transferred to the General Assembly with an emergency session called for the evening of November As a result the Security Council postponed its meeting on Hungary The attention of the West in part because the Hungarian situation now seemed DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority so 13526 Chief Records a Daclass Div WHB DBIEIDEC nearing resolution shifted to the Middle East U 50 In Moscow events also took a sharp turn In a conversation the afternoon of 29 October Zhukov told Bohlen that the Soviet Union had not sent more troops into Hungary that its forces had concentrated on Budapest and had bypassed towns held by rebel forces and that they had not red any shots during the last two days Bohlen considered Zhukov s comments a mixture of untruths half-truths and possibly some elements of real fact He concluded that Moscow had decided to continue backing the Nagy government possibly leaving provinces and other towns for subsequent mopping up if the resistance could rst be broken in Budapest In this way a total military occupation could be avoided Bohlen therefore interpreted Nagy s statement about a Soviet troop withdrawal from Budapest as merely a trick with Soviet connivance to cause the insurgents to cease re 100 U Contrary to Bohlen s expectation the presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party the very next day 30 October decided to withdraw Soviet forces from Hungary It also issued a declaration which represented the views of the moderate presidium members on the principles governing Soviet relations with other socialist countries A key sentence indicated that the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People s Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet tr00ps on the territory of Hungary 1 U Because of Zhukov s remarks Bohlen doubted whether calling the Soviet leaders attention to Dulles s speech in Dallas as he had been instructed would have much effect on Soviet policy Moreover he was reluctant to bring up the treaty of assurance which the Western powers had raised at the Geneva conference in July 1955 because it was so DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Di WH seem Date DEC or 201 SEEM-3F 51 tied in with the question of German reuni cation and had provoked Molotov s strong opposition Since the Soviets had been advocating a nonaggression agreement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO Bohlen feared they might interpret his talking about a treaty of assurance as a hint that the United States might consider a broader agreement 102 U At an evening diplomatic reception on 30 October Bohlen made the approach He took Molotov and Zhukov aside but not Khrushchev or Bulganin for fear of arousing Speculation by journalists present The Ambassador translated from memory Dulles s remarks regarding Eastern EurOpe Molotov s only comment was that he would look up the speech Zhukov said he found it dif cult to reconcile it with the President s encouragement of the rebels which he thought constituted interference in Hungary s internal affairs Bohlen did not mention the treaty of assurance regarding Germany Despite the cool response by the two Soviet of cials some scholars have claimed that by making the demarche the United States gave the Kremlin a green light to do what it wished in U The next morning the presidium again met and unanimously apparently without debate--reversed its position of the previous day According to fragmentary notes Khrushchev urged that they not withdraw troops but instead take the initiative in restoring order Withdrawal would give a great boost to the Americans English and French who would perceive it as weakness on our part and will go onto the offensive To Egypt they will then add Hungary Moreover our party will not accept it if we do this Neither he nor anyone else mentioned events inside Hungary statements by Western leaders Bohlen s demarche or the Security Council consideration of the issue The motive seemed to be the loss of prestige a withdrawal would entail After learning DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chiet Records a Declass Div WHB no M2011 SEW 52 that the Soviet military would need only three days to prepare a major attack Khrushchev Molotov and Malenkov embarked on a whirlwind tour to confer secretly over the next few days with the leaders of the satellite governments and Yugoslavia and inform them of the presidium s decision Only Gomulka objected Before Khrushchev left Moscow Anastas Mikoyan who had been in Budapest when the decision was reached and who favored a negotiated settlement unsuccessfully pleaded with him to hold another meeting to reconsider and gave him the impression that he would commit suicide if Khrushchev refusedm U What the outside world saw happening in Moscow on 31 October was the publication of the previous day s hopeful declaration on relations with the satellites not the presidium s decision that morning to crack down on the revolution In Washington attendees at Secretary Dulles's staff meeting drew his attention to the declaration which they felt represented a shift in Soviet policy They discussed the Security Council meeting planned the following day it had not yet been postponed at which the British intended to request a 48-hour delay in considering Hungary Dulles emphasized that he did not want us to become distracted by Middle Eastern events from the critical importance of following and taking appropriate actions on the Hungarian U Did the Soviet leaders genuinely fear Western military intervention either a large- scale assault or the in ltration of smaller groups across Hungary s border with Austria Probably not Khrushchev repeated in his memoirs Moscow s propaganda line that the West was in ltrating troops into Hungary but a young Soviet Foreign Ministry of cial later assigned the task of writing a pamphlet to prove Western instigation and support of DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority so 13526 Chief Records Dectass DIV WHS DEE 20 53 the revolution could nd no evidence that this had happened The Soviet Ambassador in Budapest Yurii Andropov later privately admitted that the charge was nonsense I06 U Nor was there evidence of a military buildup in Western Europe Although U S forces in Europe went on alert no visible troop movements or threatening maneuvers took place One of the few intelligence documents Moscow has released a 28 October telegram from KGB Chief Ivan Serov who had been sent to Budapest after the outbreak of the revolution suggested that the UN was contemplating a massive intervention to help the Hungarians It reported statements by two U S Legation employees as they I Were leaving the city with their things The two men Olivart and West told an agent of our friends --presumably the Hungarian secret police- that if the uprising is not liquidated in the shortest possible time the UN troOps will move in at the proposal of the USA and a second Korea will take place The men whose names were Oliveiras and Vest were not Legation employees but couriers reSponsible for carrying the diplomatic pouch between State and overseas posts They could hardly be expected to re ect the Legation s views Indeed no mention has been found that it advocated or even discussed a possible armed UN intervention U Nevertheless the 160-mile border Hungary shared with Austria had become porous In the spring and summer of 1956 the Hungarian Government s removal of barbed wire and mines had already increased the movement of people across it According to one account when the revolution broke out-the West German Gehlen organization gave money and weapons to Hungarian refugees in Austria so they could return and take part in the ghting In addition members of private armies DEGLASSIFIED IN PART Authority E013526 OSD 1-4 Mal see-W Chief Racords DecIaslev WHS cm Date I r-r 54 composed of former Hungarians mobilized to come to the aid of the rebels One of them the fraternal Society of Hungarian Fighters established a headquarters in Vienna and may have in ltrated small bands of armed men into western Hungary A Russian migr group based in Germany the Narodnyi Trudovoy Soyuz NTS or National Labor Council also showed up in the border area with the main objective of encouraging defection of Soviet troops By the end of October it established a group to liaise with the rebels another to discuss with Austrian authorities the possibility of sending volunteer ghters into Hungary a Red Cross unit ready to enter Hungary and a propaganda team to prepare handbills for distribution How much activity the NTS pursued inside Hungary is unclear But Americans traveling from Vienna to Budapest on 30 October came across one of its lea ets in Hungarian and Russian its message attempted to persuade Soviet of cers and troops to join the Americans were also at the border Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson instructed the staff of the Vienna Embassy to stay away for fear the Soviet Union might use any of cial U S presence there in its propaganda According to a diplomat detailed to the Embassy there were all sorts of Americans wandering around Hungary-journalists wel fare people adventurers and so on Anxious to maintain the position of neutrality established by the Austrian State Treaty the previous year that resulted in the withdrawal of occupation forces the Austrian Government though sympathetic to the aims of the revolution took great pains to minimize the border crossings On 31 October it conducted the military attaches of the reiterate II or chief Records Doclass DIV ms 311 dd Data are at am 55 four former occupying powers on an extensive tour of the border area The attaches indicated their satisfaction with the precautions being taken 1 '0 In ltrations from Austria into Hungary that did occur had to have been on a very small scale U On the other hand the attack by British and French forces on Suez created a major problem Because of that crisis suddenly impinging on Hungary the President s advisers thought he needed to report to the American public immediately on both crises State sent a draft statement to the White House the afternoon of 3 October a few hours before the President was to deliver it over national radio and television Speechwriter Emmet Hughes thought the draft terrible He and Eisenhower made several changes including dampening State s optimistic language about developments in Eastern Europe For example their revised version called popular pressures more and more insistent instead of irresistible as State s draft had characterized them When Dulles came to the White House to review the new version he insisted on retaining some of the original phrasing The differences were minor but they did re ect the generally positive assessment of developments by Dulles and others at State The Secretary s attitude also showed in his telephone cements that day to Vice President Richard Nixon Two things are important from the standpoint of history It is the beginning of the collapse of - the Soviet Empire The second is the idea is out that we can be dragged along at the heels of British and French policies that are obsolete I U The President s statement that evening even with the rewriting exuded optimism about Eastern Europe He spoke of the Polish peeple with their proud and deathless devotion to freedom securing a peaceful transition to a new government Hungary was not far behind Today it appears a new Hungary is rising from this struggle a DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority - E0 13526 Syrian Records a Declass Div WHS at mac t an essay - 56 Hungary which we hope from our hearts will know full and free nationhood The President hailed the Soviet Union s declaration on relations with the East European nations including its stated willingness to consider withdrawing tr00ps If the announced intentions were carried out the world will witness the greatest forward stride toward justice trust and understanding among nations in our generation Eisenhower reiterated his willingness to provide economic aid to Poland and Hungary again emphasizing that we do not demand of these governments their adoption of any particular form of society as a condition upon our economic assistance And he pointed out that the US Government had sought clearly to remove any false fears the Soviet Union might have that we would look upon new governments in these Eastern European countries as potential military allies 2 U One newspaper saw the President s remarks as embodying a main objective of the administration s foreign avoidance of war He and Dulles were one-step-at- a-time men The idea behind their policy was that people who had taken the rst step to throw off a foreign tyranny would understand how to rid themselves of a domestic tyranny At this point war would deny them the time needed to take the second step 1 '3 U As it turned out the NSC did not discuss the new draft paper at its 1 November morning meeting Shortly before it started Secretary Dulles telephoned the President and mentioned the possibility of taking sanctions against the Israelis and what should be done at the General Assembly meeting that evening He thought we are going to have to make important decisions here today and don t know how much time we should spend at Policy toward Poland and Hungary slated to be the NSC's main topic he now felt DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 50 13526 Chief Records Daclaus DIV WHS Sm Date mac or an 57 was academic as the situation has pretty much taken care of itself The President accepted his suggestion that they focus entirely on the Middle East and so informed Council members at the start of the meeting l '4 U The only mention of Hungary came at the beginning of the meeting in Allen Dulles s customary brie ng on world developments He called developments there a miracle that belied all our past views that a popular revolt in the face of modern weapons was an utter impossibility The Soviet declaration on relations with the satellites was one of the most important statements to come out of the USSR in the last decade The main problem as he saw it was the lack of a strong guiding authority to bring the rebels together Nagy was failing to unite the rebels and they were demanding that he quit Unlike the previous week s meeting the brie ng sparked no comments It is interesting to speculate what position Eisenhower and Dulles would have taken on the new draft NSC paper in view of the strong JCS objections to certain of the recommendations But discussion of the paper was deferred U Instead of Eastern EurOpe the group concentrated on how to handle the Middle East crisis at the UN Secretary Dulles made an impassioned statement that unless the United States took the lead in condemning the use of force there the Soviet Union would do so and the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa would turn to Moscow The timing of the Anglo-French action particularly rankled him It is nothing less than tragic that at this very time when we are at the point of winning an immense and long-hOped-for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern EurOpe we should be forced to choose between following in the footsteps of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa or splitting our course away from their course Yet the decision must be made in a matter of hours before ve o clock this afternoon DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS 03 DEC Ill 201i SEW 58 Dulles spent the rest of the morning and early afternoon on Middle East matters before departing Washington by air to take part in the General Assembly s emergency session 5 U Aboard the aircraft Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Burke Elbrick discussed with him a memo recommending that the Security Council as soon as possible again take up the Hungarian question It would be a pity said the memo to lose the momentum we have established because of diversion of attention to the Middle East Elbrick felt that the emergency session of the General Assembly could not address the Hungarian question therefore he recommended continuing to deal with it in the Security Council before thinking about putting it on the General Assembly s regular agenda '6 U During the day the administration soon after deciding to concentrate on the Middle East on the assumption that the Hungarian situation was virtually resolved received contrary news from Budapest State learned of a radio broadcast con rmed by the Legation that Nagy had called in the Soviet Ambassador protesting the arrival of new troops immediately terminating Hungary s membership in the Warsaw Pact and proclaiming the country s neutrality The broadcast indicated that Nagy was informing Secretary General Hammarskjold of these decisions and requesting that the Hungarian matter be discussed at the next General Assembly session U The White House did not receive news of Nagy s message to the UN until shortly after 3 o clock along with erroneous wire service reports out of Vienna mat new Soviet forces had begun reoccupying Budapest 8 The news caused Hughes in the midst of drafting the President s speech for that evening to revise the part restrain OSD 1 4 Md ciieirlitg omsanaclassnw wns CIA that Date DEC 59 on Hungary On seeing the draft Eisenhower said he favored using cautious language I m always scared of superlatives he declared Hughes mentioned that Dulles had overruled him the day before regarding the tone of the President s statement Eisenhower replied that he always thought Foster a little too Optimistic about deve10pments there He looked at things rationally and believed the Soviets would adapt to changed circumstances in a rational way Eisenhower said ve had a lot more experience than he has with these fellows- it s the same business as with Hitler you can 7 count on their doing the rational thing they are NOT rational l 19 U Whereas the mood in Washington had been so upbeat earlier in the day the President that evening spoke guardedly about Soviet intentions in his nal canipaign address in Philadelphia We are only today troubled by news of new Soviet efforts to suppress the people of Hungary by force If this be true this is a black day of sorrow But the Soviet Union has declared its readiness to reshape oppressive policies of a decade and to contemplate withdrawal of its armed forces from Poland and Hungary and Rumania If this be true and if this be done there could be in the making a bright new day of justice and trust among all nations He reiterated that the United States had no sel sh motive in Eastern Europe but reminded listeners that he had always made clear that we would never renounce our hope and concern for these lands and peoples While the US Government had publicly denounced the Soviet use of force in Eastern Europe we ourselves have abstained from use of force knowing it to be contrary to both the interests of these peoples and to the spirit and methods of the United Nations And referring to the Middle East the President said he was proud that the United States had publicly opposed the use of force there as well as in Eastern Europe 20 U Aut on y Chi'ef Records 8 Declass Div WHS DEC 01 2911 60 At the General Assembly s emergency session on the Middle East that evening Secretary Dulles doubting that any representative ever spoke from this rostrum with as heavy a heart said that the United States nds itself unable to agree with three nations with which it has ties of deep friendship of admiration and of reSpect and two of which constitute our oldest and most trusted and reliable allies He introduced a resolution calling for an immediate cease re the withdrawal of all military forces and requesting the Secretary General to observe and report on the compliance with the resolution Change of Tactics at the UN As aggressively as the United States to this point had pushed for Security Council consideration of Hungary it suddenly put on the brakes in effect switching positions with the British and the French Washington did not want to bring the matter to a vote incur a Soviet veto and have it transferred to the General Assembly where it would complicate that body s handling of the Middle East crisis On the other hand the British and the French were anxious to do precisely that U Back in Washington the afternoon of 2 November after an all-night session in New York Dulles telephoned Lodge to say that it was a mockery for the British and the French to come in with bombs falling over Egypt and then denounce the Soviet Union for perhaps doing something that is not quite as bad He instructed Lodge to oppose the submission in the Security Council of any resolution on Hungary but keep the matter on the agenda and suggest they try to have the Nagy govemment s new representative reach New York as soon as possible Dulles said there wasn t any hard information on what was happening inside Hungary but there was no doubt concerning Egypt He added that we may have to try to press for further action in the DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Date' DEC 201i 61 way of setting up a comm to deal with various aSpects of it a remark that might have referred to the Middle East or to the establishment of a commission or committee to deal with Hungary '22 U Two hours before the Security Council met on 2 November the three Western representatives went over their tactics Dixon now found Lodge s ideas much different from his Dixon wanted to submit a substantive resolution Lodge said he had no authority to do so Events were too confused Lodge maintained and State was unsure how to handle Hungary s declaration of neutrality It had no intention if the Soviet Union exercised its veto of moving on to the General Assembly Lodge claimed without much conviction Dixon reported to London that the Russians would be under greater pressure if the debate continued in the Security Council According to the French representative s report of the conversation Lodge wanted to postpone consideration of Hungary until the following Monday 5 November 23 U As their discussion grew heated Lodge suggested that British eagerness to transfer the issue to the General Assembly was apparently designed to distract that body s attention from the Middle East Dixon explained that the British had put forward their two-phase plan involving a delay of 48 hours because the Nagy government s position was then unclear and we did not wish to push them into Moscow s arms The declaration of neutrality had changed all that He told Lodge that the apparent reluctance of the Americans to harass the Russians on Hungary contrasted oddly with the alacrity with which they were pursuing their two closest allies in the Assembly on the Middle East In short it seemed like deliberate procrastination to leave the decks free for DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS Date 62 Assembly action against us The French representative supported Dixon and said he had instructions to submit a resolution quickly which he would do alone if necessary I24 U Urgent phone calls to Washington produced no change in the US position after which Dixon offered Lodge a deal Since the British wanted to maintain a tripartite front regarding Hungary he would not submit a substantive resolution if they could have a gentlemen s agreement to limit themselves that evening to making speeches then adjourn until the following day when together they would introduce a substantive resolution Lodge immediately agreed with evident relief I25 U The Security Council meeting did not go as planned Right away the members became embroiled in debate over who could represent Hungary at the meeting and the Council President made clear he did not expect to nish discussion at the meeting According to Dixon Lodge led off with a very feeble speech against the Russians in which he dwelt on the obscurity of the recent events and the need for time to clarify them Other representatives followed with strong condemnations of the Soviet Union and calls for prompt Council action Dixon and the French representative kept their part of the bargain by not introducing a substantive resolution I26 U The British became suspicious that the US delegation had let it be known it would not object to postponing the next meeting until 5 November As this seemed to me tantamount to breaking our gentlemen s agreement Dixon told the Foreign Of ce challenged Lodge privately at the table and he gave instructions to his team to organize adjournment until tomorrow afternoon while agreeing that we should have a tripartite meeting late in the morning to work out a draft resolution Afterwards Lodge assured Dixon he would join the British and French in tabling a resolution the next day Dixon DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 32 Rama-fats a Zetil fz Div WHS 63 felt however that the Americans might insist on including a preposal for an investigating committee and might still resist pushing the resolution to a vote m U In fact Lodge asked the State Department to authorize him to introduce both a procedural and a substantive resolution unilaterally at the next meeting If State still wanted to delay a vote on the substantive resolution to avoid a Soviet veto he recommended leaving blank the names of the countries to serve on the proposed investigating committee In this way the United States could keep the resolution pending until ready for a vote although it risked having the British or French secure priority for their own resolutions '28 U Two UN meetings were scheduled for 3 November The Security Council planned to take up the Hungarian question at 3 pm the General Assembly the Middle East crisis at 8 pm In Washington that morning State s Legal Adviser Herman Phleger reported that Secretary Dulles who had been taken to a hospital for stomach surgery during the early morning hours and with whom he had evidently been in contact did not want to join the British and French in introducing a Security Council resolution on Hungary Eisenhower said that such a thought was almost absurd I29 U Lodge therefore told Dixon that he had been instructed contrary to what he had said the night before to introduce a resolution immediately and without further consultation with the British and French This would avoid the appearance of being too closely identi ed with them He did not intend to bring the resolution to a vote and felt that the reported troop withdrawals might mean the Soviet Union would not veto the resolution if it did come to a vote Dixon did not consider it to start a row over this piece of American duplicity partly because I felt we would need all Mr DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS 03 DEC 0 Z ll cleanse - 64 Lodge s genuine sympathy for Britain in our struggle at tonight s Assembly and partly because the distrustfulness is only a of a much wider difference Robert Murphy told the French Ambassador that the United States wanted to avoid taking precipitate action in the Security Council that might look foolish a few hours later and it did not wish to do anything the Soviets might view as a provocation for strong U Initially the French Foreign Ministry instructed its delegation to toughen up the wording of the US draft so as to provoke a Soviet veto But Foreign Secretary Lloyd was opposed to doing so since he considered it in Britain s and France s interest to preserve what remained of the Western tripartite position in the Security Council ln any event Lloyd pointed out it was too late to try to use Hungary to strengthen our hand or procure delays in the Assembly over Egypt Accepting the British reasoning the French eventually agreed not to strengthen the US resolution U When the Security Council resumed deliberations at 3 o clock that a ernoon 9 00 pm in Budapest Lodge introduced the resolution and led off debate with a recapitulation of recent reports of further Soviet intervention including a quote from Nagy s message circulated at the Council meeting the previous night about the large- scale Soviet buildup He asked the Hungarian representative and Sobolev if they could con rm reports of fresh troops entering the country and whether negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet forces had begun The Hungarian who obviously had worked out his statement with the Soviet and Yugoslav delegations said that he could report with satisfaction the following promising information received from Budapest today The leaders of the Hungarian and Soviet armies met today at noon and both parties expressed DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Aulhority so 13526 321 Records Declass DIV WHS DE 1 2014 65 their views of the technical questions involved in withdrawing the Soviet troops They agreed that they would study each other s prOposals and that they would meet again at 10 o clock tonight Budapest time According to the Soviet proposal no more tr00ps will cross the border until an agreement is reached The Yugoslav representative immediately requested adjournment to avoid doing anything that might impede the negotiations Along with the Soviet Hungarian Yugoslav and two other representatives Lodge voted against a resolution to meet the following day which would have carried had it not been for his vote It was this vote -the culmination as it turned out of Washington s efforts to prolong Security Council consideration of the Hungarian issue- that later earned Lodge much criticism The Council then accepted a motion to adjourn until Monday morning 5 November to await the results of the negotiations in Budapest 32 Dixon considered the meeting completely unsatisfactory If the United States had been in the least anxious to obtain a vote on their resolution he lamented we could easily have defeated the delaying U at Straws The Nagy government s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact declaration of Hungary s neutrality and appeal to the UN were calculated gambles To soften the negative reaction in Moscow and to appear evenhanded it appealed not just to the West to safeguard its neutrality but to all four major powers In their public utterances over the next few days government of cials went out of their way to emphasize that Hungary did not want to join NATO restore capitalism or undo the achievements of socialism 134 U Why did Nagy ask that the General Assembly place the Hungarian question on its agenda Did he believe that a Soviet veto in the Security Council would prevent effective DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Div WHS saeaaqz- 66 action and that only the Assembly could act decisively Or was he as one scholar contended not expecting the Assembly to take up the question right away in emergency session but to wait until the regular session opened on 12 November He may have thus been seeking leverage on the Soviet Union to encourage it to halt the troop buildup in which event he would withdraw the appeal to the U To outsiders the situation in Hungary seemed confused and no longer as bright as just a few days before Nagy s requests for help contrasted sharply with the efforts of his government undergoing daily reporganization to convey a business-as-usual demeanor in the face of the Soviet buildup Under Secretary of State Hoover remarked at a staff meeting the morning of 2 November that the situation was being lost He requested a review of what actually has gone on and particularly what we have done and that adequate publicity be given to the situation This led Beam to observe that we still are not sure what we can do until we know more of the government with which we would U Washington s con Jsion showed in its dispatch of Minister-Designate Wailes to Budapest On 2 November Wailes arrived after a two-day layover in Vienna where he had informed Ambassador Thompson of State s instructions not to present his credentials to the Nagy government Thompson who felt strongly that Wailes should present the credentials telephoned State to try to have the instructions amended but without success The U S Embassy in Vienna may have inspired a journalist s claim that the insurgents had seized on Wailes s imminent arrival and presentation of credentials as a hopeful sign-- another indication that the United States does not intend to permit Moscow to again extinguish Hungary s newly regained freedom The day after Wailes DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief- Records a Declass DIV WHS Date- DEC DA 20 67 arrived State changed its mind and asked him to make the presentation as soon as possible but the message arrived too late for him to do so before the Soviet attack U The situation within Hungary was grim The Legation reported that Soviet forces had returned in a rapid and systematic way Budapest was almost completely encircled Troops also saturated provincial areas and surrounded important towns military bases and air elds The Legation thought that Moscow might issue an ultimatum perhaps in the veiled form of a request for negotiations to discuss Hungary s participation in the Warsaw Pact and the composition of the government Although the government might yield in the face of hopeless odds the general p0pulace might not do so and a slaughter would ensue '38 U The government s appeal to the UN struck the Legation as a deSperate striving to nd way out Before then Hungarians had viewed that body s discussions in far-off New York as a means of applying diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union A British Broadcasting Corporation BBC journalist recalled that people he encountered were quite convinced that the United Nations would manage to put pressure on the Russians to stay out The Americans were trying to call for meetings Security Council and so on and all this was being broadcast to the Hungarian people So they had this faith that the West would not necessarily intervene directly but would at least prevent the Russians from coming back U As the sense of de5peration grew Hungarians looked to the UN for more immediate assistance On the moming of 3 November Budapest radio announced that the city s main airport had received a message from Prague reporting that an aircraft carrying 16 UN delegates would soon arrive On hearing the news a French journalist DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 SE ER ET Chiet Records Declass Div WHS DEE Ill 2111 68 went to the airport only to learn that no plane had landed l Ie nevertheless clung to the hope that the group might come the following day since one knows now that the free world is alerted An American reporter with a group of foreign journalists ordered out of the city and then forced to turn back recalled We were driving now into Budapest with the ags of 20 countries And the Hungarians thought we were the arrival of the rescue battalion We were cheered all the way Talk of a UN delegation s imminent arrival caused a stir in the Parliament building where government of cials said if the Soviets refused permission for the aircraft to land it would nd another airport In any event it would ensure that Moscow honored its promise to withdraw When the Legation informed Washington of the rumor State quickly responded that the UN had not appointed nor even discussed sending a delegation It noted that the Security Council planned to take up the Hungarian question later in the day with Lodge tabling a resolution merely calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops and not interfere in Hungary s internal affairs and also asking members to provide relief and medical assistance '40 The rumor apparently grew out of comments by the Cuban UN delegate in the Security Council on 2 November when he mentioned the possibility of sending a UN commission to investigate the situation in Hungary He said that a draft resolution should be submitted as soon as possible providing among other things for the establishment of a Security Council commission to supervise the position and to report on compliance with measures adopted by the Council to ensure the national independence and political freedom of the Hungarian peOple The next day reporting of the remarks was misleading The broadcast indicated that he had said Let the UN send a DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS 495% Da DEE 21114 ill-ESE 69 committee to Hungary which should on the spot assure the conditions for political independence in Hungary It failed to mention that no resolution had in fact been submitted much less approved RFE also asserted that the Hungarian question would most likely be transferred to the General Assembly an action the United States in fact was opposing at the time RFE was not the only source of the rumor The French Minister in Budapest told Paris that various Western radio stations carried news about the UN committee of inquiry whose arrival everyone was Information on the deteriorating military situation came rst-hand from a high government source had requested-a meeting that day with the American military attaches that nearly 5 000 Soviet tanks and 10 12 divisions were in Hungary with more units arriving He asked the Americans to bring the situation to the urgent attention of the UN delegation rumored en route to Budapestr-vho heard it had been delayed in Pozsony present-day Bratislava offered personally to y there In reporting the conversation to Washington Todd observed that if no commission were on the way a trap was likely being set to eliminate-whom he called a pillar of strength in the Air Force and strongly Though Nagy was scheduled to give a press conference in the a emoon Zoltan Tildy a member of Nagy s cabinet took his place meeting with correspondents for about 1% hours but absenting himself brie y while someone else took over When Tildy retumed he seemed in a depressed mood was vague and dodged questions He described the Hungarian-Soviet negotiations that had started earlier in the day as essentially military and suggested that new committees might be formed to discuss DECLASSIFIED IN PART E013526 OSD 1-4 636m gaiegrllitgcordssineclass DEC It 2011 70 broader subjects The Legation reported that believe it or not a correspondent whom it considered highly reliable claimed that Soviet military representatives had agreed to the complete withdrawal of troops 'om Hungary Resumption of the negotiations that evening would cover the details and timing of the withdrawal Other rumors circulated Early that evening the British Legation received word that Nagy was appealing today to the Secretary General of the United Nations to visit Hungary To reinforce the request Nagy was reportedly thinking about ying to New York as soon as possible from an air eld in Hungarian hands I43 U In Washington at this eleventh hour two strikingly different ideas were under consideration anew suggested by Bohlen was to have Eisenhower appeal directly to Premier Nikolai Bulganin to withdraw Soviet forces from Hungary Someone in State drafted the letter on 3 November reiterating the assurances that the United States was not seeking military allies in Eastern Europe but saying nothing that had not been said before It offered no speci c concessions in retum for Soviet troop withdrawal And there is no evidence that Acting Secretary Hoover saw the draft or that it was forwarded to the White House I44 U The other idea involved military action The diplomatic correspondent of the London Observer quoted a high American government official as saying that the US Government feared the Soviet Union had probably decided to drown the Hungarian revolution in blood If the fears were borne out and the Hungarians manage to hold out for three or four days the report continued the pressure on America to help militarily might become irresistible According to the report the NSC had discussed recommendations to use tactical atomic weapons on Russian lines of communication to DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 5013525 Records Dectass Div WHS DEC 1 201i 7 help Hungary The President was said to be unwilling to do this without Congressional approval which could not happen until after the election The unnamed of cial said that if the Hungarians were still ghting the day after we will be closer to a world war than we have been since August 19393 45 U Far-fetched as the story seems it may have been accurate The quoted of cial was probably the Robert Amory the agency s representative on the NSC Planning Board Years later Amory recalled that as soon as it had become clear that the Russians instead of withdrawing were pouring reinforcements into Hungary he recommended giving the Soviet Union an ultimatum to either keep their hands off Hungary or we would not be responsible for whatever happened next He wanted to interdict rail and road connections into Hungary by a surgical nuclear strike limited to Lvov in Soviet- annexed Poland and selected passes in the mountains of Russian Ruthenia and westem Rumania Allen Dulles told him to discuss his recommendation with Bowie but it apparently got nowhere In Paris the Norwegian representative to NATO expressed concern about the Observer article but US of cials told him not to take seriously speculative account of this kind Looking back 30 years later Amory conceded that the idea must appear to have been lunacy But at the time he felt that the United States enjoyed a relative nuclear strategic advantage that it would never have again 6 U Revolution Crushed False Hopes Raised Shortly after the negotiations in Budapest resumed late in the evening on 3 November KGB of cers entered the room and arrested the Hungarian representatives Around 4 o clock the next morning a massive Soviet attack on Budapest began Within a few days Hungarian resistance not only in the capital but elsewhere was effectively DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 50 13526 32 3 Records 8 Declass Div WHS SECRET DEC Il 2011 72 ended with the Soviet Union installing a puppet government headed by Janos Kadar Nagy and other members of his government who took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy were later lured out arrested and eventually executed by the Kadar regime U The General Assembly in the midst of discussing the Middle East when it received news of the attack voted to adopt Hammarskjold s plan for what was then a unique peace keeping instrument- a United Nations Emergency Force UNEF to be sent to Egypt to secure and supervise an end to hostilities It adjourned at 3 am and the Security Council met an hour later to deal with the Soviet attack on Hungary After condemning the attack Lodge submitted a resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces and creation by the Secretary General of a commission to enter Hungary which only the Soviet representative voted against In light of the Soviet veto the Security Council then transferred the question to a second emergency session of the General Assembly and adjourned at 5 25 a m Delegations represented in both UN bodies had been in almost continuous session from 3 o clock the previous aftemoon m U The establishment of UNEF for the Middle East raised hopes and reinforced rumors that outside help was on the way to Hungary One rebel ghter recalled his commander urging them to hold out a few more hours because UN troops would soon arrive The next day the commander said much the same thing adding The whole world has its eyes on us The newspapers of the West talk of nothing else Everywhere they re holding demonstrations in our favor And public opinion is insisting that help should be sent to Hungary Another person claimed that RFE had asked the insurgents to keep Unlike the UN force established in 1950 to deal with North Korea s attack against South Korea the UNEF for the Middle East in 1956 did not have troops furnished by any of the major powers DECLASSIFIED IN FULL SEEM Authority E0 13526 32 25 Re f s Eezcha a Div WHS 73 ghting until the U S presidential election and that as soon as the new President assumes his responsibilities UN troups will certainly begin to arrive A rebel radio station appealed for immediate UN help by having parachute tr00ps dropped into Western Hungary Later in the day another station addressed a long appeal to Hammarskjo'ld and the UN delegates calling them the last citadel of U An American businessman who had taken refuge in a Budapest apartment building when the attack began on 4 November recorded in his diary that Hungarian soldiers during the day asked him when the UN troops would arrive That evening as building residents listened to the General Assembly proceedings they prayed that the UN would be able to stOp the ghting Shortly after midnight Lodge s resolution condemning Russia produced shouts of joy The businessman s diary noted Much hope new Three hours later Result of UN vote brings pandemonium People hug my neck and kiss me They discuss how much time it would take for plane to y in UN delegation from New York By 6 November rumors were circulating that two U S parachute divisions were being dropped in Hungary People pointed to the businessman smiled and said American divisions 49 U Of cial Washington s immediate reaction to the attack registered shock and dismay At noon on 4 November ISA noting that the invasion was undoubtedly facilitated by the Middle East crisis recommended to Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray several reSponses it felt consistent with the policy of avoiding military con ict 1 immediately sending observers to Hungary under the UN Secretary General s authority 2 covertly encouraging protests and demonstrations in other satellite countries particularly in Poland and the Hungarian minority areas of Romania DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records Dectass Div WHS seem Date DEC 01 Zillt 336% 74 to create pressure on the Soviet anks and 3 staging a practice alert in southern Germany by the U S Seventh Army that would subtly indicate U S concern without provoking a Soviet reaction 150 There is no evidence that Gray followed up on any of the recommendations B At the Pentagon there was much hand-wringing and second-guessing At a meeting of Defense s civilian leadership the morning after Gray wondered whether our basic assumption on all Satellite planning don t antagonize the USSR#should not be reconsidered Secretary Wilson pointed out The problem is that if you stir up these people thousands get killed You have to have a plan of action Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles challenged Gray s suggestion The Soviet Union he said could not accept satellite governments that were not communist or members of the Warsaw Pact We cannot help unless we are willing to risk a full scale atomic war Gray agreed but lie thought the UN would have sent a police force to Hungary had the Suez intervention not Frustration boiled over a few days later when Beam told his committee that the United States had heaven knows taken a tremendous interest in Hungary and either explored or accomplished every possible action Roger Ernst Deputy Director of Of ce of Planning disagreed He felt soiled by US inaction To him it was quite clear that the United States had not done everything it could If the new NSC paper had been adopted on 1 November when it was scheduled for discussion he thought a better showing might have been made Speci cally if the NSC had approved the paragraph dealing with covert aid to any new democratic government that might emerge the United DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 50 13526 Chlet Records 8 Declass Div WHS Date secrequ 75 States could have carried out a far more af nnative program to save either the state of Hungary or at least a more sizeable number of The press reported that suggestions made several days before for the United States to deter a possible attack by demonstrative movements of the Strategic Air Force or cancelling military leaves had not been approved Nor did they apparently surface again at a 4 November discussion of Hungary and the Middle East that Eisenhower had with Allen Dulles Acting Secretary Hoover and other State of cials with Defense representatives notably absent Adlai Stevenson had sent a letter to Eisenhower recommending that the UN immediately mobilize large teams of of cial observers and y them into Hungary or at least the still free parts of Hungary and also into other satellite nations such as Poland that might welcome or consent to their presence That afternoon the General Assembly approved a US resolution calling for UN observers to be sent to Hungary But the participants at the White House meeting decided against sending a UN armed force to Hungary' U In the immediate aftermath it is easy to understand how UN intervention in Hungary and the Middle East became muddled in Hungarian minds As they anxiously looked for UN help a er Nagy s appeal to and with the rumor circulating of a delegation en route to Budapest there came the General Assembly s request for a peacekeeping force to be sent to Egypt and for UN observers to be dispatched to Hungary Regarding the latter the Kadar government did not reply until 12 November when it rejected the idea on the grounds that any trouble within the country was purely a domestic affairj U oecutssmeo IN FULL Authonty E0 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS Da e' DEB It 2011 SEGREZIL 76 Shortly thereafter came the suggestion that I-Iammarskjold himself should go to The government dragged its feet in responding to this request and nally rejected it too when he proposed a Speci c date 15 5 Some have contended that if he or other UN representatives had entered the country before the second Soviet attack things might have turned out differently Hammarskjold who resented insinuations that he should have tried to go sooner and that he did not appreciate the urgency of the Hungarian situation felt that these were efforts to make him a scapegoat for the revolution s failure and to de ect blame from others for their lack of action He pointed out that in the period from 28 October through the 4 November attack no Security Council member felt the situation was clear enough to propose that he go to Hungary Nor had a precedent been established for the Secretary General to act in such a situation without an enabling directive from the Security Council or General Assembly For him the Suez crisis had a time priority in the his handling of it was not by choice It was history itself Hammarskj ld maintained which arranged it that U Perhaps the British had been right in refusing at rst to join in bringing the issue before the Security Council for fear that it would only prolong the Hungarians ght against hopeless odds The prospect of UN assistance whether through diplomacy or the dispatch of troops did seem a major motive in their willingness to persevere President of the International Rescue Committee Leo Cheme who was in Budapest until just before the second Soviet attack recalled The Hungarian peeple were not waiting for American troops They were waiting for the under the illusion that it had an emergency police force which of course it did not have 159 U IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records 8 Daclass Dlv WHS Data 77 But a New York rm s interviews of refugees in Austria after the revolution suggest that the expectation of UN assistance had been an insigni cant factor see table 2 According to the way the firm categorized the answers only 5% of the 965 interviewees thought that confidence in the was the reason for expecting assistance The tabulation of answers however may be misleading Unlike other questions put to interviewees this one did not involve showing cards to elicit quanti able responses Here interviewers had to determine how to sort a wide variety of answers It is clear from the arbitrary grouping of responses that considerable overlap existed Moreover the interviews were conducted after it had become obvious that the UN could do little for Hungary By this time confidence in the body had to be low If refugees had instead been asked speci cally whether they had expected the UN to have a restraining in uence on the Soviet Union in the period leading up to the second attack or whether they had expected UN help in the form of an emergency force right after the attack positive responses probably would have been much higher U Radio undoubtedly played a huge role during the revolution From all accounts Hungarians closely followed radio reports of UN deliberations Much like intemet connectivity during violent upheavals during the early 21 st century radio provided the primary means by which the Hungarian people learned what was happening inside and DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority so 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date DEC 2011 Table 2 Hungarians Reasons for Expecting Western Aid Percent of Respondents West the only source of help 21 Foreign-western broadcasts 19 Hungary is part of anti-Communist West 18 Western propaganda l0 Hungary alone could do nothing therefore 7 we believed in Western aid RFE broadcasts 7 Hungary s con dence in the UN 5 Nagy s appeal to the West for help 1 Others 6 TOTAL 104 TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS 965 Do'yo'u '1 e unganan peop eXpeet'e' a1 rom West an S in the uprising or don t you think so 0f the 1 007 persons asked the question the 965 who said that they did expect aid were then asked question 10a What do you think led the Hungarian people to expect-such aid i Percentages based on number of cases add to more than 100% since some respondents gave more than one answer footnote in the original DECLASSIFIED IN PART gatiggriltgcords at Daclass Div WHS CIA Cl Cd Date mac at Z lt 79 outside the country A number of foreign stations beamed programs into Hungary the VOA the BBC other European outlets including Radio Madrid and Vatican Radio as well as rogue transmitters such as that of the Russian emigre NTS But by far one station has received the most scrutiny and criticism Radio Free Europe in part because it was the one most listened to and listeners may have thought everything they heard emanated from it U RFE emerged from the revolution a major villain accused of various sins primarily of giving Hungarians the impression that the West would intervene militarily against the Soviet Union It should be remembered that the station which communist governments throughout Eastern Europe and le -wing opinion in Western Europe had attacked since its establishment in 1950 had steadily improved the quality of its programming and toned down the in ammatory rhetoric that often characterized the earlier broadcasts 51 RFE may have been attacked for its role in the Hungarian revolution more for what it had been not for what it did then U That said a few Hungarian-language broadcasts contrary to guidance contained outlandish statements such as giving instructions on the making of Molotov cocktails Many programs were of poor quality Some vili ed the Nagy government prior to 30 October contrary to guidance and out of step with policymakers in Washington who were basically adOpting a wait-and-see attitude toward Nagy In an examination of 500 RFE scripts the only program identi ed that implied Western military intervention was a summary of the Observer article on the eve of the Soviet attack with a comment added by an RFE editor 1n the Western capitals a practical manifestation of western sympathy is expected at any hour 162 U ut ority Chief Records a Dectass Dlv WHS Data 80 If the output to Hungary of other stations like VOA or the BBC were examined with the care that was they might not stand up as the models of dispassionate objectivity that some claim By 1956 the difference in broadcasts to Hungary between RFE and the BBC may not have been pronounced In July the British Legation in Budapest recommended that the BBC RFE and VOA let loose simultaneously a propaganda barrage if parliamentary elections were held as planned later in the year an event it believed would represent a vast hoax It wanted the BBC to consider whether to advise the Hungarian people to boycott the elections spoil their ballots or enter the names of non-communist political parties Voters might be asked to organize a passive demonstration either before or during the voting but the Legation recognized that it would be more dangerous to bring this off in Budapest than in the Later after the revolution had broken out an American of cial complained about the sterile VOA Hungarian language programming that ignored the ghting in Budapest while the BBC carried two strong commentaries condemning the Soviet intervention and although acknowledging the dif culty in determining who had called in the Soviet troops called for the removal from of ce of whoever was responsible 164 U Was Failure Inevitable Studies of the Hungarian revolution tend to dwell on the question of whether it was bound to fail whether the participants could or should have done something differently The Soviet Union obviously had the decisive voice Whatever the West or the Nagy government did--or failed to do--after the presidium s 31 October decision to crush the uprising mattered little '65 In conversations immediately afterward with Mikoyan and East European leaders Khrushchev made clear his determination to go ahead regardless DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Date 81 of their views At this point threatening or conciliatory Western gestures would likely have had no effect U To in uence Moscow the United States needed to act before the presidium s decision Several things might have been done differently First of all Eisenhower could have hastened the consideration of the matter either by accepting Stassen s suggestion for a Special meeting or by xing tighter deadlines for the preparation of recommendations for action Instead he let the matter slide until the next regularly scheduled meeting on 1 November a delay which allowed the illusion of moderation in Soviet behavior the encouraging steps taken by the Nagy government and the intrusion of the Suez crisis to undercut the urgency for action If the NSC had come up with an attractive proposal by 28 or 29 October to be communicated to Moscow it might have altered the outcome U Exactly what the United States should have attempted is of course open to debate During the crucial early days it basically did four things 1 publicly expressed sympathy for the Hungarian people and general support for the revolution s goals 2 took the lead in raising the issue in the Security Council 3 assured the Soviet Union that it was not seeking a military alliance with Hungary or other East EurOpean countries and 4 held out the prospect of limited economic assistance to governments in Eastern Europe if they achieved a measure of independence from Moscow Implicit in the administration s response was the belief that the small chances of a successful revolution hinged on the United States taking a fundamentally hands-off position Whether the revolution was to be crushed or would ultimately prevail inaction seemed the preferred DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 50 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Date' '0 seeker a EB 0 2m 82 policy This was especially the perception after the rst four or ve days when the prospects for success improved U If the United States had talked tough and engaged even in bluf ng measures as some advocated there is no evidence that the Soviet Union would have been deterred from acting as it did However if Washington had offered a substantial concession Moscow might have been interested The approach it made was feeble Bohlen s demarche the evening of 30 October merely repeated what Dulles and Eisenhower had been saying in public It is dif cult to comprehend what they hoped to accomplish and easy to understand the apparently casual dismissal From the meager Soviet documentation available reassuring public statements about US motives in Eastern Europe by Dulles Eisenhower and Wilson as well as the hands-off policy the press said Washington and its allies favored did not seem to have factored into Moscow s thinking U Should the United States have put forward a more attractive proposal Recalling how distressed Dulles and others at State had been Murphy said that they considered every possible avenue of the solution what could be done and really none of us had whatever imagination it took to discover another solution 56 That is not true In addition to Stassen s several possibilities were preposed but there is no indication that they reached Dulles U In a perceptive commentary at the height of the revolution journalist Chalmers Roberts said that events seemed to be proving Dulles right about the way things would turn out in the satellites and vindicating the administration s encouragement of national communist governments Although the Gomulka and Nagy governments were not yet IN FULL AMggo 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS DEC 01 2011 83 Titoist forces were at work that might eventually bring about the removal of Soviet troops from the two countries a major U S objective So far he said Dulles had scrupulously avoided endorsing the rebellion against the Nagy government and had concentrated on the outside intervention Dulles knew there must be no direct confrontation from which the Soviet Union could not retreat he wanted to nd a tolerable way for the Kremlin to pull back Most of Roberts s diplomatic sources did not believe Moscow would withdraw either willingly or grudgingly unless the West-- particularly the United States- paid a fair price at the proper moment He understood that ideas under discussion in Washington included offers to withdraw US forces from continental Europe or to close bases in Spain or the United Kingdom in return for a military withdrawal from the satellites Roberts did not know of one other proposal Within the US Embassy in Vienna an informal working group recommended that the United States offer to withdraw forces from Italy in exchange for Soviet withdrawal from Hungary To enhance credibility the offer would be transmitted through the Yugoslavs Although not opposed to the idea Ambassador Thompson apparently did not pass it on to Washington U The administration did not pursue a more active policy for several reasons First its policy did not call for encouraging violent upheavals since communist forces were expected easily to crush them During the rst few days of ghting with its sources of information restricted it seemed to doubt that the revolution would succeed Secondly time seemed to be working in the long run against the Soviet Union and the local communist regimes Why should the West meddle and risk halting the trend toward greater satellite independence Third though the United States expected additional short- DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS are Ht 201 84 lived violent outbursts it did not anticipate a prolonged nationwide struggle like the Hungarian revolution It had no plans on how to respond to such an eventuality It belatedly learned its lesson and after the second Soviet attack on 4 November prepared a contingency paper in the event the Soviet Union decided to attack Poland 63 Fourth none of the major European allies or NATO as an organization supported a more active policy Since Eisenhower had as a major goal if not the most important strengthening and maintaining European unity a unilateral foray into Eastern EurOpe would have severely strained and possibly ruptured U S relations with its allies Fifth as Eisenhower explained afterward Hungary s location surrounded by communist countries and neutral Austria did not allow an easy military intervention Finally he and European leaders feared that a more active policy might result in a global war U The worry that a more active approach might lead to war with the Soviet Union seemed to bother Eisenhower more than it did others In comparing the situation confronting the Soviet leaders in Hungary with that facing Hitler at the end of World War II he may well have exaggerated their sense of desperation But the possibility of war certainly increased after the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt and Moscow s threat to send volunteers to help defend that country Adlai Stevenson was guilty of only slight rhetorical excess when he declared on 31 October that the world stood on the brink of war U Although the comparison between the Hungarian revolution and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis should not be overdrawn they both involved an extension of Soviet military power from which Moscow for reasons of prestige found it dif cult to pull back In both instances the United States had several days to weigh its options from threatening DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Cl'llei Records Declass DIV WHB DEC In Z ll military action to proposing diplomatic tradeo s If the Eisenhower administration had made a similarly bold approach to Moscow and done it quickly it might have been able to achieve the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary or at least secure a more favorable outcome This is obviously speculation eSpecially in the absence of a more substantial Soviet documentary record Perhaps nothing even imaginative measures taken early on would have worked U Stopping in mid Novembe n the last leg of a European trip Frank Wisner noted that prior to the revolution US policy toward Eastern Europe had been designed to maintain at an undiminished pace the various forms of pressure previously deemed useful to be ready to bring additional pressures to bear on the weak points as they develop and to avoid more extreme forms of provocation During his talk - th-had substantially endorsed this approach The Polish events he said were actually anticipated and taken as an assumption in the basic paper approved in the summer These events had seemingly validated our paper and our assumptions as to the probable course of developments there as did the Hungarian events up to the point when matters got out of control of the nationalist Communists who had themselves started the ght and moved swiftly to the point of explosion Bemoaning the rantings and anguished bleats of Western journalists who had been in Budapest who were far more sweeping and bitter in their denunciations of American actions and American failures than Hungarian refugees Wisner urged that the OSD 1 4 gem DIHJHS gm Mac at Date DEC 21m 86 United States not become distracted and tormented by too much self criticism for our policies of the past eight years toward the Satellites policies which were endorsed by Democratic as well as Republican administrations and which have no doubt had much to do with the development of events in the Satellite areas up to the present point 0 U The Hungarian revolution represented a possible turning point which if successful even in a limited way would have dramatically altered the course of the Cold War and likely shortened it For the Eisenhower administration however the risks of too active an involvement outweighed the advantages Its cautious response in part because of the Suez crisis managed to avert an East-West military clash whose consequences would likely have represented a far greater disaster than the snuf ng out of a nascent Hungarian democracy Eisenhower and Dulles envisaged the demise of communism over a long period of time In the end their patience earned its reward U DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records Dacia Div WHE Date DEC all 20 There is no comprehensive up to-date bibliography of English-language material on the revolution An extensive bibliography of works through 2002 in Hungarian English and other languages is in B k s Byrne and Ranier eds 1956 Hungarian Revolution 568-82 U For a review of four books in English that appeared in conjunction with the revolution s 50Ill anniversary see l Iobsbawm Could It Have Been Different U House Cte on For Aff Report of the Special Study Mission to Eumpe 5 U Hungarian and U S records and to a lesser extent British are mostly open In recent years the Central Intelligence Agency has declassi ed signi cant material on the revolution British intelligence records and those of the British mission at the United Nations during the revolution are still unavailable although records of the British Legation in Budapest are open at the National Archives in Kew The U S Legation destroyed its records when Soviet forces attacked the city on 4 November Important Soviet records mainly fragmentary notes ofpresidium meetings have been released but the Russian Government as a general policy refuses to release diplomatic cable traf c and other material of the early Cold War years U For example see Gati Failed Illusions 18-21 Sebestyen Twelve Days xxv 294-97 and Lendvai One Day That Shook the Communist World 185- 94 U Kovacs Rogers and Nagy Remembered or Forgotten 37 U DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 5013525 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS Date BEE 2m i 10 See Landa Almost Success rl Recipe For the text of NSC 5608 1 Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe 18 Jul 56 see B k s Byrne and Ranier eds 1956 Hungarian Revolution 152-56 U Regarding the Beam committee see the editorial note FRUS 1955 5 7 25 167 U Draft address 18 Oct 56 8-9 Speech 1 2756 Task of Waging Peace box 351 John Foster Dulles Papers PU U Since the draft was typed it is not possible conclusively to determine authorship Dulles usually drafted his own speeches so the language is probably his own Kramer Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland 169-74 Persak Polish-Soviet Confrontation in 1956 1290-1303 U Telcon Dulles and Hoover 20 Oct 56 10 30 am Micro lm Reel 2 Dulles Herter Telephone Conversations memo 20 Oct 56 FRUS 1955- 5 7 25 253-55 New York Times 21 Oct 56 U Murphy called Dulles that evening and said that a paper was being prepared that would be given to the President the next morning and would be sent to Dulles telcon Dulles and Murphy 20 Oct 56 6 05 pm Micro lm Reel 2 Dulles Herter Telephone Conversations The memo printed in FRUS is probably the one to which Murphy referred Tel WI-I 323 to Pres 20 Oct 56 7 15 pm Dulles Foster Oct 56 1 box 7 Dulles-Herter Series Whitman File DDEL Eisenhower Waging Peace 60 remarks upon arrival in Denver and statement on reports from Poland both 20 Oct 56 Eisenhower Public Papers 1956 978 81 U In Waging Peace 60 note 2 Eisenhower said that he received such intelligence reports daily which he DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E013526 Chief Records Declaas DIV WHS DEC 11121111 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 paraphrased but the 20 October message in the Whitman File was the only one the author found at the Eisenhower Library Another discrepancy is that the speech to which he said he appended the comment about the Polish situation was given at 12 15 pm well before he received message WH 323 Mins mtg 20 Oct 56 4 00-4 45 pm CREST NACP mins DCI with Deputies 22 Oct 56 Minutes of Deputies Meeting ibid U Memcon Murphy Spasowskipm FRUS 1955-5 7 25 256-58 Spasowski Liberation of One 338-40 U Eisenhower s brother Milton recalled a discussion about Poland with the President that he said took place the evening of 20 October but which their remarks as he reconstructed them suggest may have occurred later President Is Calling 354-55 U Transcript Face the Nation 21 Oct 56 in Branyan and Larsen eds Eisenhower Administration 665 69 U Drew Pearson Washington Post Times Herald 26 Oct 56 U Transcript Face the Nation 669 70 cited in 13 See s staff mtg 22 Oct 56 dr Minutes Aug 1 l956-Dec 31 1956 box 6 Entry 1609 Secretary s Staff Meetings RG 59 NACP U Memo Tresize for Bowie955-5 7 25 266-68 quotes 267-68 U SX-2719 USAREUR 0-2 to DeptA 26 Oct 56 dr Cables Receipt 1956 box 1 10 Entry 2020 Assistant Chief of Staff G2 Intelligence Cables RG DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Data 549 Current Intelligence Weekly Summary 25 Oct 56 pt 1 3 CREST NACP U 18 Desp 222 Warsaw to For Off 23 Oct 56 F0 417 53 Con dential Print Poland NAK U 19 New York Times 23 Oct 56 U Journalist Cyrus Sulzberger suggested to retired I General Lucius Clay that State secretly advise the new Polish Government of its willingness to provide economic aid but not do anything to embarrass it Clay agreed and said he would immediately contact the President diary entry 22 Oct 56 Sulzberger Last of the Giants 334 35 20 Address Washington DC 23 Oct 56 Eisenhower Public Papers 1956 991-97 quotes 995 U Address New York 25 Oct 56 ibid 1020 27 quote 1022 memo Elbrick for See 24 Oct 56 dr Hungary and Poland box 29 Entry 1274 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files RG 59 NACP U The memo with the remarks about Spasowskii deleted is printed in FR US 1 955 5 7 25 268-70 U 22 Tel 282 State to Belgrade 12 Oct 56 and ed note FRUS 1955-57 26 749-51 New York Times 22 Oct 56 address Seattle Washington 24 Oct 56 Department of State Bulletin 5 Nov 56 722 U 23 - OSD 1 4' L DECLASSIFIEDIN PART Authority E013526 CIA Cc chi- at Records a Declass Div was aim mac 01 2011 r I- 24 25 27 050 Mal It l' liar and Horv th Soviet Military Iratewention in Hungary 9-10 U The Legation s sharpest critic was Hungarian speaking journalist Leslie Bain See his articles published soon after the revolution Communism s Dry Rot and How We Failed In Hungary and his book that appeared in 1960 Reluctant Satellites U Major Oversight on Our Pa Kovacs Understanding or Misunderstanding and Kovacs Rogers and Nagy Forgotten or Remembered U The Legation lost telephone and telegraph contact with the outside world from the afternoon of 23 October until the morning of the For most of the day on the 24lh the staff used an open Telex line that could also handle encoded messages but it broke down and remained inoperable for several days The rst telegram DECLASSIFIED IN Authority E013526 Chief Records Doclass Div WHS 95 DEB nt 2011 SECRET 92 28 29 30 about the unrest sent on the 23 was not received in Washington until 7 15 am on the During the two-day interruption State had to rely on press accounts and reports by the government-controlled Radio Budapest Communication with Washington was broken again from 5 am on the 2S l until 2 pm on the when a single message was transmitted in the clear through the Hungarian Foreign Ministry informing State that all Legation employees were safe Regarding the communications problems see FR US 1955-5 7 25 275 6 313 3 Kovacs Rogers Nagy Forgotten or Remembered 7 and memo Leverich for Murphy 29 Oct 56 dr Hungary and Poland box 29 Entry 1274 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files RG 59 NACP U Kovacs Rogers Nagy Forgotten or Remembered 5 U In addition to the 9 Communist countries which maintained embassies in Budapest 18 non-communist countries and Yugoslavia had Legations there At the beginning of 1956 the U S Legation had 20 people with of cial accreditation the British Legation 11 and the French 9 A Budapesten akkreditatdll diplomciciai Ieslz'llet tagjainak n vsora 5-7 30-31 93-95 99-100 110-12 U The Department of State s Foreign Service List for July 1956 showed 17 people including the military attaches as accredited to the Legation U The Legation staff also included code clerks secretaries and U S Marine guards Marton Forbidden Sky 179 U Rogers First Secretary in the Legation called State s failure to have a new minister in place when the revolution broke out a serious dereliction of duty Kovacs Rogers Nagy Forgotten or Remembered 8 U See also Irving Uprising 482 U DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 150 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS Date -S-E-GFEEL q seeker - 93 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 050 1 4 Md Tels 2 11 14 State to Pretoria 6 11 14 Jul 56 tels ll 24 Pretoria to State 12 30 Jul 56 memo Elbrick for SecState 27 Sep 56 w atchd Biographic Summary dr 123 Edward T Wailes box 811 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP transcript teletype conv 25 Oct 56 FRUS 1955 5 7 25 284 U Bain How We FGailed in Hungary 26 Marlon Why Has the West Slept 27 Kovacs Rogers Nagy Forgotten or Remembered 8-9 interv Endre Marten by Martin Ben Swartz 31 Oct 85 Swartz New Look at the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 573 U -4ajor Oversight on Our Part 112 U Kovacs Rogers Nagy Forgotten or Remembered 7 U Tel 154 Budapest to State955-5 7 25 263-65 U Tel 16 Budapest to State 26 Oct 56 reel 3 Micro lm Reel C-0026 RG 59 NACP U Tel 166 Budapest to State 26 Oct 56 ibid U The message does not identify the man and notes that the other members of his group forbade him to divulge their names He left his name and phone number and said he wanted to stay in touch with the Legation Barnes informed State that it would accept any information he offered but would avoid the impression that it was negotiating with him Tel Budapest 214 to State 2 Nov 56 Reel 7352 box 290 Entry 1014 Micro lmed Messages RG 319 NACP Tel 171 Budapest to State955 5 7 25 319-20 memo Elbrick to SecState 31 Oct 56 sdmma'rized ibid 320 5 U Interv Jordan T Rogers by Thomas Dunnigan 22 Aug 06 6 FAOHP U DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority 0 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Dw WHS ate DEC 20 seem 34 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 OSD 1 4 CIA Tel 17306 CINCUSAFE Wiesbaden to CSAF I Nov 56 micro lm reel 7352 box 290 Entry 1014 RG 319 NACP The message contained Military Situation Report No 1 as of 1400 30 October from the Air Attache in Budapest CIA Hungarian Revolution and Planning for the Future 1 10 U For example McCauley Hungary and Suez 790 U states that during the IO days leading up to the second Soviet intervention on 4 November U S representatives in New York lobbied behind the scenes against any UN action on Hungary Reed ofmtg 23 Oct 56 FRUS 1955-57 25 259-60 U New York Times 25 Oct 56 tel Varga to Dulles 24 Oct 56 reel 3 Micro lm C- 0026 RG 59 NACP tel Varga to Dixon 24 Oct 56 Taylor Haraszli ed Hungarian Revolution 99-100 telcon Dulles and Lodge 24 Oct 56 6 07 pm FRUS 1955-57 25 273 U U Teleons Foster and Allen Dulles 25 Oct 56 4 37 pm and Foster Dulles and Pres 25 Oct 56 5 02 pm FRUS 1955-5 7 25 290 and 2 Memo 38 1 mtg Spec Cmte on Soviet and Related Problems 25 Oct 56 3 00 pm elcon Dulles and Lodge 25 Get 56 5 29 pm FR US 1 955-5 7 25 29 Memo Cook and Pratt for Lodge 25 Oct 56 dr Hungary 1946-Nov 1956 box 92 Entry 1030-D UN Mission Files RG 84 NACP U Tel MISUN 250 State to New York 25 Oct 56 1956 Inc Tels US Jul-Oct 56 box 17 Entry ibid DECLASSIFIED mm Authority 0 13526 Chief Records Daclass Div WHS Dt a 0 DEC 01 2014 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 Tel 403 New York to State 25 Oct 56 Master File 296-445 Oct 3 30 1956 box 48 Entry 1030-F ibid U Tel 2981 State to London 25 Oct 56 FRUS 1 955-5 7 25 292-93 tel 313 State to Belgrade 25 Oct 56 le Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U Net-v York Times 28 Oct 56 tel 3282 For Min to New York 27 Oct 56 B k s Byrne and Rainer eds 1956 Hungarian Revolution 250 U Middleton Britain Cautious in Hungary Crisis New York Times 29 Oct 56 U Tel 2290 London to State 26 Oct 56 FRUS 1955 5 7 25 303-04 For Off min 26 Oct 56 Taylor-Haraszti ed Hungarian Revolution 103-05 U Gardner Poisoned Apples 82 U Telcon Dulles and Pres 26 Oct 56 FRUS 1955-5 7 25 306-07 tel 3008 State to London 26 Oct 56 ibid 307 U Tels 417 New York to State 27 Oct 56 dr Master File 296-445 Oct 3-30 1956 box 48 Entry 1030-F UN Mission Files RG 84 NACP tel 421 new York to State 27 Oct 56 FRUS 1955-57 25 315-16 U Tel 211 State to New York 27 Oct 56 1956 Inc Tels US Jul-Oct box 17 Entry UN Mission Files RG 84 NACP Manchester Guardian 27 Oct 56 U O Connor America Takes the Initiative Observer London 28 Oct 56 U French UK and US Reps to SC Pres 27 Oct 56 Doc Security Council Official Records Eleventh Year Supplement for October November and December 1956 100 proceedings 746Ih SC mtg 28 Oct 56 4 00-9 50 pm DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Date seem 60 61 62 63 64 Security Council Official Records 1 -9 quotes 4 U The 27 October letter is also in Department of State Bulletin 12 Nov 56 757 U Proceedings 7461h SC mtg 28 Oct 56 4 00-9 50 pm Security Council O icial Records cited in 59 U Excerpts of Lodge's statement are in Department of State Bulletin 12 Nov 56 758-59 U See for example Rogers s untitled presentation at George Washington University 31 October 1986 dr Hungary 1953-56 box 492 Subject les OSD Hist U Memo of disc 3015l NSC mtg 26 Oct 56 B k s Byrne and Ranier eds 1956 Hungarian Revolution 240-43 U A sanitized text is in FR US 1955-5 7 25 295- 99 U Diary entry 26 Oct 56 Galambos ed Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower 17 2334 unsigned memo Policy with Respect to Poland and Hungary 21 typewritten marginal notation indicates the memo was prepared for the Planning Board meeting of 29 Oct dr US Policy toward Develop Poland Hungary box 16 ISA Policy Planning Staff les Ace 65A-3500 WNRC Stassen to Pres 26 Oct 56 dr Dulles Foster Oct 56 box 6 Dulles-Herter Series Whitman File DDEL also Doc CK3100439890 DDRS telcon Dulles and Stassen 26 Oct 56 3 39 pm Micro lm Reel 5 Dulles I-lerter Telephone Conversations Dulles memcon 26 Oct 56 4 10 pm dr Memos of Conversation General-S box 1 John Foster Dulles Papers DDEL U The memcon is also Doc CK310024S433 DDRS U DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Cht'ef Records a DIV WHS Date DEC ll Z tt 97 65 66 67 Stassen to Eisenhower 26 Oct 56 telcon Dulles and Pres 26 Oct 56 7 06 pm FRUS 1 955-5 7 25 306-07 tel 3008 State to London 26 Oct 56 ibid 307 U Address Dallas 27 Oct 56 Department of State Bulletin 5 Nov 56 695-99 quotes 697 U Several drafts dating as early as 18 October are in dr Speech 10 27 56 Task of Waging Peace box 351 John Foster Dulles Papers PU U Draft no 9 identi ed as Dulles s and dated 25 October also bears Eisenhower s handwritten comments and changes The quoted passage in the Speech as given replaced this passage in this draft There are great tasks of liberation to be performed We dare not be impetuous but equally we dare not seem indifferent To be at once prudent and effective will put heavy demands upon our future foreign policy See also interv Robert Amory Jr by Martin Ben Swartz 26 Mar 87 in Swartz New Look at the Hungarian Revolution 486 U Dallas address cited in 66 U The British Embassy in Washington felt that the speech re ected the administration s anxiety to diSpel any Soviet fear that the United States intends to exploit the current situation in the satellite area to the point of creating a strategic threat to the Soviet Union That anxiety was also re ected in a newspaper report that Dulles through the Yugoslav Foreign Minister had secretly signaled the Soviet Union that the United States was agreeable to a buffer zone of neutral states in EurOpe from the Baltic to the Black Sea a rumor the British Embassy was unable to con rm but which it thought consistent with US policy ltr Barker to Brimelow 2 Nov 56 Haraszti-Taylor DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority so 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Date ed Hungarian Revolution 152-53 U 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 Leighton Strategy Money and the New Look lS l 6 U Transcript Face the Nation 28 Oct 56 Wilson Pubh c Statements I95 6 3 1078-83 U Chicago Tribune 28 Oct 56 Beke Student '5 Diazy ll3 U Davis Paper DeveIOprnents in Poland and Hungary US Policy and Courses of Action in the Light Thereof 28 Oct 56 dr Europe East box 108 Entry 1272 Policy Planning Staff Files RG 59 NACP U A handwritten notation indicates that Dulles approved the paper on 29 October Another notation in someone clse s hand states that the NSC Planning Board discussed it on 29 October Paper 28 Oct 56 cited in 71 U Interv I-larold E Stassen by Richard D Challener 3 Jun 65 45-47 PU U Dobrynin In Confidence 33-35 U Tel 177 Budapest to State 29 Oct 56 FR US 1955-5 7 25 329 U Memo MWB Polandu-aHungary Pr0posals Discussed But'Not Adopted by the Board Assistants 31 Oct 56 dr Soviet Satellites in E Eur US Policy box 7 NSC Staff Special Staff Series DDELM Memo Weber to Lay et al 29 Oct 56 dr Soviet Satellites in E Eur US Policy 2 box 7 NSC Staff Special Staff Series DDEL Sm unsigned memo Policy with Respect to Poland and Hungary cited in 63 homes Very Best Men 146 U -Maj or Oversight on Our Part 124 U 050 1 4 Md DECLASSIFIED IN Authority E0 13526 Chief Records a Declass DIV WHS saeaar Date DEC 2n 99 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 Memo Guthrie for 6 Nov 56 dr 091 3 Hungary box 16 ISA Files Acc 60A-1339 RG 330 WNRC U On 6 November ISA concluded that the request had been overtaken by events and quietly dropped the matter lbid 8 9 para 24 U NSC 5616 Policy toward Developments in Poland and Hungary 31 Oct 56 dr NSC 5616 box 44 OSANSA Records White House Of ce Files DDEL U A declassi ed version with only paragraph 24 excised is on the Digital National Security Archive website Memo Radford for SecDef 31 Oct 56 atchd to memo Lay for NSC 6 Nov 56 Doc CK3100246045 DDRS U Brie ng paper for 302'Id NSC mtg Item 2 US Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary 31 Oct 56 dr 5616 US Policy toward Develop Poland Hungary box 16 ISA-NSC Files Acc 65A-3500 RG 330 Memo Weber for Lay 31 Oct 56 dr Soviet Satellites in E Eur US Policy box 7 NSC Special Staff Series DDEL SNIE 12-2-56 Probable Developments in East Europe and Implications for Soviet Policy 30 Oct 56 FRUS 1955-57 25 330-35 U lnterv Lauris Norstad by Hugh Ahmann 22-25 Oct 79 416-17 OAFH U Political Division Paper The Thaw in Eastern Europe 24 Sep 56 B k s Byrne and Rainer eds 1956 Hungarian Revolution 168-77 U Summary red NAC mtg 24 Oct 56 10 15 am NAC Records NATO tel Polto 910 Paris to State 25 Oct 56 Micro lm Reel 7334 Box 289 Entry 1014 Micro lmed Messages RG 319 NACP U DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chiel Records Declass Div WHS Date 100 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Memo AsstSecGen for Pol Affairs for SecGen 27 Oct 56 NAC Central Registry Files NATO Note AsstSecGen for Pol Affairs The Situation in Hungary 27 Oct 56 ibid Draft paper AsstSecGen for Pol Affairs Possibilities for Council Action on Hungary 27 Oct 56 ibidA copy of the paper is in F0 371 122380 Foreign Of ce General Political Correspondence NAK U and is printed in Haraszti- Taylor ed Hungarian Revolution 112-13 which mistakenly identi es it as a British Foreign Of ce draft U Tel 180 UK Del Paris to For Off 27 Oct 56 F0 371 122377 Foreign Of ce General Political Correspondence NAK U Ibid U For a summary of the discussion of Hungary at these meetings see Kecsk s North Atlantic Treaty Organization 120-22 U Ibid 131 U Tels 430 and 434 New York to State 29 Oct 56 dr Master File 296-445 Oct 5-30 1956 box 48 Entry UN Mission Files RG 84 NACP U Tels 225 and 228 State to New York 3 Oct 56 2 00 pm and 7 00 pm dr 1956 Inc Tels US Jul-Oct box 17 Entry 1030-1-1 ibid U Tel 200 Budapest to State 3 Oct 56 FRUS 1 955-5 7 25 349-50 U Telcon Dulles and Pearson 30 Oct 56 3 pm ibid 16 865 Owen notes 30 Oct 56 dr Staff Meeting Minutes 1956 box 110 Entry 1272 Policy Planning Staff Files RG 59 NACP U More than a month later on 5 December Owen DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chiet Records a Declass Div WHS Date 100 101 102 103 104 BEG-REF l ll prepared a revised version of the meeting notes ibid U It contained the following additional language regarding the Middle East It was generally agreed that as a matter of moral principle which coincided with the national interest the US should condemn the Israeli aggression against Egypt and disassociate itself from the British and French ultimatum The new section on Hungary omitted altogether the nal conclusion about Hungary s long term prospects No explanation was given as to why these changes were made Tel 992 Moscow to State 30 Oct 56 FRUS 1955 57 25 335-38 quotes 336 338 U Malin working notes presidium mtg 30 Oct 56 Declaration by the Government of the USSR on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and other Socialist States 30 Oct 56 B k s Byrne and Ranier eds I 95 6 Hungarian Revolution 295-99 300-02 U Tel 993 Moscow to State 30 Oct 56 dr Dulles Foster Oct 56 1 box 6 Dulles-Herter Series Whitman File DDEL also Doc CK3100187323 DDRS U Tel 1005 Moscow to State 30 Oct 56 FR US 1955 57 25 347-48 U See for example Swartz New Look at the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 306 523 U Malin working notes presidium mtg and atchd extract 31 Oct 56 B k s Byrne and Ranier eds 1956 Hungarian Revolution 307-09 U For Khrushchev s recollections of the meeting see Khrushchev ed Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev 3 644-61 U and Talbott ed Khrushchev Remembers 416-29 U DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chlef Records a Daclass Div WHS on M2011 seeks-T- I02 105 106 107 108 109 050 1 4 Mail 1 I CIA- ilLiCCit Mins See s Staff mtg 31 Oct 56 9 15 am dr Minutes Aug 1 1956-Dec 31 1956 box 6 Entry 1609 Secretary s Staff Meetings RG 59 NACP U lsraelyan 0n the Battle 'oms of the Cold War U Tel Serov to Mikoyan 28 Oct 56 Cold War International History Website U Regarding the presence of Oliveiras and Vest in the Legation see transcript of teletype conv955-5 7 25 284 U There is no indication of how seriously Moscow took Serov s report Lomax Hungary 1 95 6 128-29 U For background on the NTS see Dorril M16 404 24 513-15 U See also tel 0126 USARMA Budapest to CSA and CSAF 31 Oct 56 micro lm reel 7352 box 290 Entry 1014 Micro lmed Messages RG 319 NACP U lnterv William Stearman by Martin Ben Swartz 5 Jun 86 in Swartz New Look at the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 593-94 U Steanrnan who spoke German and had been working at the US Mission in West Berlin was detailed to the Vienna Embassy on 3 November Therefore his rst-hand experience primarily covers the period after the 4 November attac DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority E0 13528 Chief Records a Daclass Dw WHS Date DEC It 2011 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 050 1 4 Md mom enema - 193 Schlesinger Austrian Neapolitan-3938- New York Times U Entry 31 Oct 56 dr Diary 1953-4957 box 5 Hughes Papers PU telcon Dulles and Nixon 31 Oct 56 quoted in Lucas Britain and Suez 92 U Radio and television rpt 31 Oct 56 7 pm Eisenhower Public Papers I 956 1060- 66 quotes 1061-62 U Baltimore Sun 2 Nov 56 U Ed note FRUS 1955-57 l6 901 memo of disc NSC mtg 1 Nov 56 ibid 902 U Telcon Eisenhower and Dulles 1 Nov 56 8 40 am ibid 901 extracts memos of disc 302 d NSC mtg 1 Nov 56 ibid 25 35 8-59 ibid 16 902-16 quote 907 U Memo Elbrick for SecState 1 Nov 56 dr Hungary 1946-Nov I956 box 92 Entry 1030-D UN Mission Files RG 84 NACP U Memo Freers for Elbrick 1 Nov 56 dr Hungary and Poland box 29 Entry 1274 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files RG 59 NACP U The idea of a proclamation of Hungary s neutrality may have come from a student newspaper circulating in Budapest on 31 October which stated that we are in dire need of the friendship of the Western powers We are in dire need of an international convention in which the four Western powers would assure the neutrality of Hungary on the pattern of that in Switzerland and Austria Beke DEGLASSIFIED IN PART Authority E013526 Records Daclass Div WHS Date DEC 201' 8m 1m 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 Student '8 Diary 112 U It is not clear which four Western powers the newspaper had in mind CIA note 1 Nov and paraphrase of Budapest tel 1 Nov 56 received 3 10 p n1 dr Speeches 1956 box 4 Hughes Papers PU U See also Hughes s typewritten undated note entitled Philadelphia Speech ibid U In addition to the erroneous information about Soviet troops re-entering Budapest the press reports also mistakenly said that Soviet planes had conducted bombing raids in the ghting around air elds and that according to Budapest radio Tildy had replaced Nagy whom people blamed for the bloodshed as head of the government Entry 1 Nov 56 dr Diary 1953-1957 box 5 ibid U Address Philadelphia 1 Nov 56 9 30 pm Eisenhower Pubiic Papers I 9515 1066- 74 quotes 1068 1070-71 U Proceedings 56 51 plenary meetingGeneral Assembly Official Records First Emergency Special Session 10-12 U Telcon Dulles and Lodge 2 Nov 56 4 11 pm FRUS 1955-57 16 938 U Tel For Off to New York 2 Nov 56 Haraszti-Taylor ed Hungarian Revolution 161 tel New York 1027 to For Off 2 Nov 56 in B k s Hungarian Question on the UN Agenda 112-13 U and Haraszti-Taylor ed Hungarian Revolution 164-66 tel 2162-2163 New York to For Min 2 Nov 56 DDF I956 2 152-53 U Tel New York 1027 to For Off cited ibid DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority 50 13526 Chief Records a Declass Div WHS Date DEC 11421114 SEGRET 105 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 Ibid Lodge s report of the agreement difliered from Dixon s According to him they all agreed that the UK and France would not submit a substantive resolution nor would the United States submit a procedural one Lodge would make a speech near the beginning of the meeting the Cuban or another member would be asked to suggest after all the speeches that no further action was possible that evening and there would be a follow-up meeting the next day This would allow Lodge to consult with his two colleagues on both resolutions the following morning tel 475 New York to State 2 Nov 56 FR US 1955-5 7 25 368- 69 U Proceedings 752nd mtg 2 Nov 56 5 00-8 50 pm Security Council Official Records 1-27 U Excerpts of Lodge s statement are in Department of State Bulletin 12 Nov 56 759-61 U Tel New York to For Off 3 Nov 56 cited in 124 U Tel 475 New York to State 2 Nov 56 FRUS 1955-57 25 368-69 U Memcon Hoover and Phleger w Pres 3 Nov 56 11 10 am FRUS 1955-57 25 369 11 11 U Tel 1038 New York to For Off 3 Nov 56 in B k s Hungarian Question on the UN Agenda 1 15-1 16 memcon 3 Nov 56 quoted in ed note FR US 1955- 57 25 372-73 U change in British and French tactics at UN on 3 Nov tel 2184Paris to State 5 Nov 56 FRUS 1955-57 16 996 U Proceedings 753 1 SC 3 Nov 56 3-6 30 pm O icial Records l-23 U For an exchange of letters in 1961 between Lodge and the editor of the Hungarian DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS Date SEERET 1116 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 Quarterly which had published an article critical of Lodge s handling of the Hungarian revolution see Kovacs ed Fight for Freedom 206-09 U Tel 1050 New York to F0 4 Nov 56 B k s Hungarian Question on the UN Agenda 1 18-19 U See for example a statement by Minister of State Ferenc Farkas Peasant Party the article by Laszlo Nemeth member of the presidium of the Writers Union which was broadcast on Radio Free Kossuth and a statement by Geza Losonczy at a press conference for Hungarian and foreign correspondents all on 3 November Free Europe Committee Revolt in Hungary 79-82 U B k s 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality 486 U Tentative notes Howe Acthec staff mtg 2 Nov 56 9 15 am dr Minutes Aug 1 1956-Dec 31 1956 box 6 Entry 1609 Secretary s Staff Meetings RG 59 NACP U An extract is in the editorial note FRUS 1955-57 25 364 U Interv Llewellyn Thompson by Philip Crow 29 Jun 66 21-22 JFDOHP PU Drake datelined Vienna Hungary Alarmed by Soviet Troops Los Angeles Times 3 Nov 56 tel 199 State to Budapest 3 Nov 56 dispatched 6 50 pm 00 50 am in Budapest FRUS 1955 57 25 373 74 U Tel 219 Budapest to State 3 Nov 56 1 00 pm reel 7357 box 250 Entry 1014 Micro lmed Messages RG 319 NACP Interv Charles Wheeler nd National Security Archive website U Tel 219 Budapest to State 3 Nov 56 cited in 138 Radio Free Kossuth announcement 3 Nov 56 9 10 am quoted in Free Europe Committee Revolt in Hungary 74 Leblond in Le Dauphin Lib r Grenoble 3 Nov 56 in Lasky DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS Date seena r 1t 141 142 143 144 050 1 4 C mot 7357 box 290 Entry 1014 Micro lmedMessa es RC1 3 1 9 NACP Hungarian Revohttion 222 Wood Failed 1956 Hungarian Revolution Remembered 18 Oct 56 V0ANews c0m Marten Forbidden Sky 172 tel 196 State to Budapest 3 Nov 56 4 30 pm reel 7357 box 250 Entry 1014 Micro lmed Messages RG 319 NACP Proceedings 752rld mtg 2 Nov 56 5 00-8 50 pm Security Council O iciai Records 10-11 International Commentary No M-l Script No 5 3 Nov 56 dr Free EurOpe Committee 1956 3 box 54 C D Jackson Papers DDEL tel 70 706 Budapest to Paris 3 Nov 56 5 10 pm DDF 1956 3 161 U Granville First Domino 175 erroneously summarized the script indicating that the Cuban representative submitted a proposal to send a UN committee to Hungary Tel C-132 Army Attache Budapest to DeptA 3 Nov 56 1600 micro lm reel Tels Budapest 224 and 226 to State 3 Nov 56 Microfilm Reel 290 Entry 1014 RG 319 NACP tel 560 Budapest to For Off 3 Nov 56 6 10 pm F0 371 122380 NAK U Draft ltr nd dr Hungary and Poland box 29 Entry 1274 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files RG 59 NACP U Although it bears no drafting date the text refers to my address to the nation of two nights ago which made it clear we are not seeking military allies in eastern EurOpe but simply wish those countries to be friends who are free DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority E013526 Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS m DEC 2111 SEQ-PEEP- 103 I45 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 Observer London 4 Nov 56 U lnterv Amory in Swartz New Look at the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 484 85 Amory Hungary 20-23 tel Polto 994 4 Nov 56 le box 3136 Central Decimal Files RG 59 NACP U Manchester Guardian 5 Nov 56 U Szabo Boy on the Roo op 88 110 113 Teglas Budapest Exit 88 89 broadcasts Free Radio Dunanpentele and Free Radio Csokonya 4 Nov 56 1 12 and 4 20 pm Hungarian Revolt Hungarian Radio Stations 82-84 U Diary entries 4-6 Nov 56 Hiott Close Up Story of Last Fight 33 U Memo Eur Region ISA for Gray 4 Nov 56 dr 000 7 Hungary box 16 ISA Files Acc 60A-l339 RG 330 WNRC Livesay notes Joint Secs mtg 5 Nov 56 dr Joint Secretaries Quarter 1956 box 3 AFPC Meeting les Acc 77-0062 RG 330 WNRC Memo Ernst for I-Iarr 9 Nov 56 dr 092 Hungary box 16 ISA les Ace 60A- 1339 RG 330 New York Times 5 Nov 56 U The portion of the discussion dealing with the Middle East is described in memcon Goodpaster 4 Nov 56 FRUS 1955-5 7 16 976 77 U New York Times 13 Nov 56 U Ibid 14 Nov 56 U A press deSpatch from Vienna Los Angeles Times 12 Nov 56 of an interview Mindszenty had reportedly given on 4 November to Western journalists after taking refuge in the US Legation which quoted him as urging that Hammarskjold come to Budapest immediately is probably misleading It DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date H19 l56 l57 l58 159 160 probably misleading It may have represented remarks made well after 4 November Mindszenty recalled meeting in the Legation with American journalists on the evening of 5 November and mentioned the two most important issues they raised neither of which was a visit by Hammarskjold Mindszenty Memoirs 2l3 l4 However the memoirs of one of the journalists Endre Marlon Forbidden Sky 186 uses the same language as the Vienna 12 November dispatch and dates the interview as 4 November Having announced his intention to accompany the rst contingent of UNEF troops to Egypt they arrived together on 15 November Hammarskj ld offered also to go to Hungary to oversee distribution of UN relief supplies When the Kadar government replied that he would be welcome to come but at a later date he set the date for 16 December The government rejected that date as unsuitable and prOposed no alternative time New York Times 4 6 Dec 56 U For example see Ernest Nagy s comments in Kovacs Rogers Nagy Forgotten or Remembered 33 U Lash Dag Hammarslgold 92-93 Urquhart Hammarskjold 233-43 U Cherne s response during a question-and-answer period following his speech l958 Year of Survival before the industrial College of the Armed Forces Washington DC l4 Mar 58 IS NDUL U Johnson Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 95 U Among many other treatments of role in the revolution are Mickelsen America '5 Other Voice 91 103 Puddington Broadcasting Freedom and Gati Failed Iilusions l66-7l U DECLASSIFIED 1N FULL Authority E0 1352B Chief Records 8 Declass Div WHS Date 0 11D 161 162 I63 164 165 166 I67 168 169 For a summary of major criticisms of RFE and the Free Europe Press by US and foreign of cials US newspaper correspondents and native listeners see the paper Criticism of Radio Free EurOpe September I956 CIA-RDP78- 0277 I CREST NACP U Johnson Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 94- I 03 U Min Cepe 10 Jul 56 F0 1087 3 Budapest Legation Files NAK U Tel Dir Munich Radio Center to Dir International Broadcasting Service 25 Oct 56 FRUS 1955-57 25 276 U For example the contention has been made that the UN needlessly delayed responding to Nagy s 1 November appeal to Hammarskjold and that by acting more quickly it could have changed the outcome of the revolution Gaskill Timetable of a Failure U Interv Robert Murphy by Richard Cliallener 8 Jun 65 46 JFDOHP PU U Roberts Dulles Decision May Greatly Affect History Washington Post and Times Herald 29 Oct 56 interv John Mapother by Martin Ben Swartz 23 Mar 87 in Swartz New Look at the Hungarian Revolution 561 62 U NSC 5705 Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland 25 Feb 57 Doc CK31001 13759 DDRS U Because the paper was not declassi ed until 1996 it did not appear in the FR US volumes Regarding the paper s development and main provisions see Marchio Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objecmes DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority E0 13526 Chiei Records a Declass Div WHS Baltimore Sun 1 Nov 56 U20M I70 Memo 13 Nov 56 dr Correspondence box CL 1 Luce Papers LC U Attached to the memo is a typewritten chit FRANK WISNER dictated the on November 13 1956 the day after he returned from Some of Wisner s colleagues and friends believed that his anguish over the failure of the revolution contributed to a nervous breakdown shortly afterward and to the deterioration in his mental health and eventual suicide in I965 Hersh Old Boys 402-04 U and Thomas Very Best Man 144-52 U DECLASSIFIED IN PART OSD 1 4 - 1 Authority E013528 Chief Records 8 Declass DIV WHS Gail C DEE at 2011 O Hist Landa Bibliographies 3 draft 2 23 12 The 1956 Hungarian Revolution A Fresh Look at the U S Re5ponse IN PART Authority E0 13528 Working Bibliography Chltif Records 3 Declass Dill WHS Date DEC 04 201 OFFICIAL RECORDS AND PERSONAL PAPERS Central Intelligence Agency Washington DC oso 1 4 Md Dwight D Eisenhower Library Abilene Kansas Ann Whitman File cm C y John Foster Dulles Papers C D Jackson Papers C D Jackson Records NSC Staff Papers Operations Coordinating Board Files White House Office Files Hoover Institution Stanford California Paul Henze Papers Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Corporate Records Library Of Congress Washington DC Clare Boothe Luce Papers National Archives College Park Maryland General Records of the Department of State RG 59 Central Decimal Files Executive Secretariat Daily Summary Entry 39611 Executive Secretariat Daily Staff Summary Entry 3961 Intelligence Reports Entry 449 Miscellaneous Intelligence Reports Entry 451 Policy Planning Staff Files Entry 558 Policy Planning Staff Files Entry 1272 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files Entry 1274 NIEs SEs and SNIEs Entry 1373 Secretary s Staff Meetings Entry 1609 Retords of Foreign Service Posts of the United States RG 84 Records of the Mission to the United Nations Entry 1030 Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff RG 218 Central Decimal Classified File Entry 17 Geographic Classified File Entry 20 Chairman s File Admiral Radford Entry 51 Records of the Central Intelligence Agency RG 263 Records of the National Security Council RG 273 Records of the United States Information Agency RG 306 Records of the Army Staff RG 319 Page determlned to be Microfilmed Messages Entry 1014 at on 042014 Records of United States Army Europe RG 549 Assistant Chief of Staff G2 Cable Files Entry 2020 CREST Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool Database National Archives Kew London Foreign Office General Correspondence F0 371 Foreign Office Confidential Print Poland F0 417 Foreign Office Confidential Print Russia and Soviet Union F0 418 Foreign Office Confidential Print United States of America F0 462 Budapest Legation Files F0 1087 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Brussels North Atlantic Council Central Registry Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington DC Subject Files Open Society Archives Budapest Radio Free Europe Records Page determined to be Unclassl ed Reviewed Chief WHS Background Reports Section 3 5 Date DEC Ill 2014 Audience Analysis Reports Princeton University Princeton New Jersey Allen Dulles Papers John Foster Dulles Papers Emmet Hughes Papers George F Kennan Papers Livingston Merchant Papers Washington National Records Center Suitland Maryland Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense RG 330 ISA Files Accession 60A-1025 ISA files Accession 60A-1339 OSD Files Accession 63A-1575 Special Operations Files Accession 63A-157S Charles E Wilson Files Accession 63A l768 OSD Subject Files Accession 64A-2093 ISA Policy Planning Staff Files Acc 6SA-3500 Page determined to be Unclassified ISA-NSC Files Accession 68A-4024 Riviewed Chief RDD WHS E0 13526 Section 3 5 AFPC Meeting Files Accession 77-0062 m DEC 0 20M ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS British Diplomatic Oral History Programme Churchill College Cambridge Ramsbotham Peter Interviewed by Malcolm McBain 9 anury 2001 Cold War Interviews National Security Archive Wheeler Charles Interviewer not identified 13 May 1996 John Foster Dulles Oral History Project Princeton University Freers Edward L Interviewed by Philip A Crowl 21 May 1966 Lodge Henry Cabot Interviewed by Richard D Challener 16 February 1965 Murphy Robert D Interviewed by Richard D Challener 19 May 8 June 1965 Stassen Harold E Interviewed by Richard D Challener 3 June 1965 Thompson Llewellyn E Interviewed by Philip A Crowl 29 June 1966 Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Houston Robert B Interviewed by Horace G Torbert 14 May 1990 Rogers Jordan Thomas Interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan 22 August 2006 Stearman William Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy 15 April 1992 United States Air Force Oral History Program Washington DC Norstad Lauris Interviewed by Hugh N Ahmann 13-16 February 22-25 October 1979 PUBLISHED SOURCES U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Committee on Foreign Affairs Report of the Special Study Mission to Europe on Policy Toward the Satellite Nations H Rpt 531 #35111 Congress 1St Session June 4 1957 DOCUMENTARY COLLECTIONS B k s Csaba Malcolm Bryne and anos Ranier eds The 1956 Hungarian Revolution A History in Documents Budapest Central European Press 2002 Branyan Robert L and Lawrence H Larsen eds The Eisenhower Administration 1953-1961 A Documentary History New York Random House 1971 Cordier Andrew W and Wilder Foote eds Public Papers of the Secretarys-General of the United Nations Vol Dag Hammerskjold 1956-1957 New York Columbia University Press 1973 Donaghy Greg ed Documents Relattfs aux Relations Exteri ures du Canada Documents on Canadian External Relations Vol 23 Pt II Ottawa Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2002 Dornbach Alajos ed The Secret Trial of Imre Nagy Westport Conn Praeger 1994 France Minist re des Affaires Etrangeres Documents Diplomatiques Francois 1956 Vol Paris Imprimerie Nationale 1990 Galambos Louis et al eds The Presidency The Middle Way Vol 17 of The Papers of Dwight D Eisenhower Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press 1996 Great Britain House of Commons Parliamentary Debates Hansard Series Vol 558 London Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1956 Page determlned to be Unclassl ed Rev erred Chief RDD WHS IA E9l 13526 Section 3 5 DEC 0112011 Haraszti-Taylor Eva ed The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 A Collection of Documents from the British Foreign O ice Nottingham Astra 1995 Higgins Rosalyn ed United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967 Documents and Commentary Vol I The Middle East London Oxford University Press 1969 Kovacs Imre The Fight for Freedom Facts About Hungary New York Hungarian Committee 1966 Lasky Melvin ed The Hungarian Revolution The Story of the October Uprising as Recorded in Documents Dispatches Eye-Witness Accounts and World-wide Reactions London Martin Seeker Warburg 1957 Minutes of Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter 1953-61 1 1 Microfilm Reels 1980 Orekhova E D V T Sered and A S eds Sovietskii Soiuz in Vengerskii Krizis 1956 Goda Dokumenty Moscow Rossien 1998 Radio Free Europe The Revolt in Hungary A Documentary Chronology of Events Based Exclusively on Internal Broadcasts by Central and Provincial Radios October 23 1956- November 4 1956 New York Free EurOpe Committee 1956 Tischler Janos ed Revolucja Wegierski 1956 Polskich Dokumentach Warsaw Studiow Polskiej Akademii Nauk 1995 United Nations General Assembly O icial Records Plenary Meetings and Annex Eleventh Session 1956 - First Emergency Special Session 1 10 November 1956 Second Emergency Special Session 4 10 November 1956 United Nations Security Council Official Records Eleventh Year Supplement for October November and December 1956 Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary Supplement No 18 A5592 1957 United States General Services Administration National Archives and Records Service Office of the Federal Register Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Dwight D Eisenhower 1956 1958 Of ce of the Secretary of Defense Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Wilson 1956 3 vols Washington DC Historical Of ce Of ce of the Secretary of Defense 1958 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief RDD WHS IAW E0 13526 Section 315 Date DEC 20 Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957 Vol 9 Foreign Economic Policy Foreign Information Program 1987 Vol ll United Nations and General Intemational Matters 1988 Vol 16 Suez Crisis July 26-December 31 1956 1990 Vol 19 national Security Policy 1990 Vol 24 Soviet Union Eastern Mediterranean 1989 Zinner Paul E ed National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary February-November 1956 New York Columbia University Press 1957 INTERNET DOCUMENTARY DATABASES Central Intelligence Agency gov Declassified Documents Reference System Digital National Security Archive PERIODICALS Hungary A Budapesten akkreditalt diplomaciai testiilet tagjainak n vsora Current Digest of the Soviet Press MEMOIRS AUTOBIOGRAPHIES DIARIES Barber Noel Personal From Budapest Saturday Evening PostHand tl of Ashes A Personal Testament of the Battle of Budapest London Allan Wingate 1957 Beam Jacob D Multiple Exposure An American Ambassador s Unique Perspective on East- West Issues New York W W Norton 1978 Bohlen Charles E Witness to History 1929-1969 New York W W Norton 1969 Cable James Britain and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 International Relations 9 4 November 1988 317-33 Cavendish Anthony Inside Intelligence The Revelations of an M16 O icer London HarperCollins 1997 Page determined to be Unclassified Miewed Ohiei RDD HS lA E0 13526 Section 5 93 nu it 2011 Cline Ray S Secrets Spies and Scholars Blueprint of the Essential CIA Washington DC Acropolis 1976 David W D Hungary 1956 In As Luck Would Have It A Memoir by Leslie Fry 107-20 London Phillimore 1978 Davidson Basil What Really Happened in Hungary A Personal Record London Union of Democratic Control 1957 De Silva Peer Sub Rosa The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence New York Times Books 1978 Dobrynin Anatoly In Con dence Moscow s Ambassador to America '3 Six Cold War Presidents 1962-1986 New York Times Books 1995 Eden Anthony Full Circle Boston Houghton Mif in 1960 Eisenhower Dwight D Waging Peace 1956-I961 Garden City NY Doubleday 1965 Eisenhower Milton The President Is Calling Garden City N Y Doubleday 1974 Farrell Robert H ed The Eisenhower Diaries New York W W Norton 1981 Felix Christopher James McCargar A Short Course in the Secret War 4 1 ed Lanham Md Madison Books 2001 Fry Leslie As Luck Would Have It A Memoir London Phillimore 1978 Gati Charles Fifty Years Later Hungarian Quarterly 47 Summer Gleason Thomas R Grandpa s Memoirs of Life in Hungary Behind the Iron Curtain Cocoa Beach Florida privately published 1996 Hegediis Andras Additional Remarks by a Major Participant in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 Translated from the Hungarian Studies in Comparative Communism 18 Summer Autumn 1985 15 23 Heller Andor No More Comrades Chicago Henry Regnery 1957 Heltai Gyiirgy Reform to Revolution Detailed Interview Given by Gyorgy Heltai to an American Journalist dated 12th December 1956 and Submitted to the UN Special Committee on the Question of Hungary Hungarian Quarterly 37 Summer 1996 42- 56 Hiatt Charles Close-up Story of Last Fight Life 41 26 November 1956 33 Pa 0 determined to he Unclassified Rdi'hwed Chiei RBI was Ml 0 13526 Section 33 5 3% DEC at an Hughes Emmet John The Ordeal of Poww A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years New York Atheneum 1963 Israelyan Victor 0n the Battle elds of the Cold War A Soviet Ambassador's Confession University Park State University Press 2003 Khrushchev Sergei ediMemoirs of Nikita Khrushchev 3 vols Translated from the Russian by George Shriver University Park Pa State University Press 2004-2007 Kiraly B la K From Death to Revolution A Memoir of the Hungarian Revolution Dissent Kop csi S ndor In the Name of the Working Class The Inside Story of the Hungarian Revolution Translated from the French by Daniel and Judy Stoffman Toronto Lester Orpen Dennys 1986 Korb nski Stefan Warsaw in Exile Translated from the Polish by David J Welsh London George Allen Unwin 1966 Korda Michael Journey to a Revolution A Personal Memoir and History of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 New York HarperCollins 2006 Kovacs Peter Jordan Thomas Rogers and Ernest A Nagy Forgotten or Remembered The US Legation of Budapest and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 Miskolc Journal of International Law Liptak B la A Testament of Revolution College Station Texas University Press 2001 Malashenko Yevgeny I The Special Corps under Fire in Budapest Memoirs of an Eyewitness In Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary 1956 edited by Jend Gyorkei and Mikl s Horvath 207-90 Budapest Central European University 1999 Marton Endre The Forbidden Sky Boston Little Brown 1971 Marton Kati Enemies of the People My Family s Journey to America New York Simon Schuster 2009 Meyer Cord Facing Reality From World Federalism to the CIA New York Harper Row 1 980 Mi unovi Veljko Moscow Diary Translated from the Serbo-Croatian by David Floyd Garden City N Y Doubleday 1980 DEGLASSIFIED IN PART iritihiisli Daie DEC Ill 2014 10 Murphy Robert Diplomat among Warriors Garden City N Y Doubleday 1964 Nixon Richard M RN The Memoirs of Richard Nixon New York Warner 1978 Nowak Jan Wojna Eterze Wspomnienia Vol 1 1948 1956 London Odnowa 1986 Rhodes Anthony Hungary 1956 Journey to Budapest In Ten Years After The Hungarian Revolution in the Perspective of History edited by Tamas Acz l 77 92 New York Holt Reinhart and Winston 1966 Rice Andrea Lauer and Edith K Lauer eds 56 Stories Personal Recollections of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution A Hungarian American Perspective Budapest Kortars 2006 also at Spasowski Romuald The Liberation of One San Diego Harcourt Brace ovanovich 1986 Sulzberger C L A Long Row of Candles Memoirs and Diaries 1953-1954 New York Macmillan 1969 The Last of the Giants New York Macmillan 1970 Szabo Tamas pseud Boy on the Rooftop Translated from the French by David hughes Gloucester mass Peter Smith 1968 Talbott Strobe ed Khrushchev Remembers Boston Little Brown 1970 ed Khrushchev Remembers The Last Testament Boston Little Brown 1974 Teglas Csaba Budapest Exit A Memoir of Fascism Communism and Freedom College Station Texas University Press 1998 Urban George R Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy My War within the Cold War New Haven Conn Yale University Press 1997 BOOKS Ambrose Stephen E with Richard H Immennan Ike 's Spies Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment Garden City N Y Doubleday 1981 Andrew Christopher For the President s Eyes Only Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush New York HarperCollins 1995 and Vasilii Mitrokhin The Sword and the Shield The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB New York Basic Books 1999 Page determlnad to be Unclassi ed Revlewed Chief RDD WHS IAW 0 13526 Section 3 5 Date DEC Uh 2011 ll and Vasilli Mitrokhin The Mitrokhin Archive 11 The KGB and the World New York Allen Lane 2005 Aptheker Herbert The Truth about Hungary New York Midstream 1957 Bain Leslie B The Reluctant Satellites An Eyewitness Report on East Europe and the Hungarian Revolution New York Macmillan 1960 Barber Noel Seven Days of Freedom The Hungarian Uprising 1956 New York Stein and Day 1974 Belokov A and V Tolstikov The Truth About Hungary Facts and Eyewitness Accounts Moscow Foreign Language Publishing House 1957 Benziger Karl P Imre Nagy Martyr of the Nation Contested History Legitimacy and Popular Memory in Hungary Lanham Md Lexington Books 2008 Berecz anos 1956 Counter-Revolution in Hungary Words and Weapons Budapest Akademiai Kiado 1986 Borhi Laszlo Hungary in the Cold War 1945-1956 Between the United States and the Soviet Union Budapest Central European University Press 2004 Calhoun Daniel P Hungary and Suez 1956 An Explanation of Who Made History Lanham Md University Press of America 1991 Condit Kenneth W The Joint Chiefs of StanC and National Policy 1955-1956 V1 in History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington D C Historical Office Joint Staff 1992 Cook Blanche Wiesen The Declassi ed Eisenhower A Divided Legacy of Peace and Political Warfare Garden City N Y Doubleday 1981 Cox Terry ed Hungary 1956 Forty Years On London Frank Cass 1997 Cull Nicholas J The Cold War and the United States Information Agency American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy 1945-1989 Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2008 Czarkowska Ewa Interwencja Zwiqzku Radzieckiego na Wegrzech 1956 roku Toru Adam Marszaiek 2007 Divine Robert A Foreign Policy and U S Presidential Elections 1952-1960 New York New ViewPoints 1974 Dixon Piers Double Diploma The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon Don and Diplomat London Hutchinson 1968 Page glatennined to he unclassi ed Renewed Chief WHS 13526 Section 3 5 Date DEC It 2011 12 Dorril Stephen MI6 Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty 's Secret Intelligence Service New York Free Press 2000 Eorsi Laszl The Hungarian Revolution of I956 and Realities Translated from the Hungarian by Mario D Fenyo New York Columbia University Press 2006 Feher Ferenc and Agnes Heller Hungary I956 Revisited The Message of a Revolution A Quarter of a Century After London George Allen Unwin 1983 Finer Herman Dulles Otter Suez The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy Chicago Quadrangle Books 1964 Gaddis John Lewis Strategies of Containment A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy Oxford Oxford University Press 1982 Gati Charles Failed Illusions Moscow Washington Budapest and the I956 Hungarian Revolt Washington D C Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2006 Glant Tibor Remember Hungary 1956 Essays on the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence in American Memory New York Columbia Nniversity Press 2007 Granville Johanna C The First Domino International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of1956 College Station Texas Press 2004 Grose Peter Operation Rollback America s Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain Boston Houghton Mifflin 2000 Gyorkei Jenii and Mikl s Horv th eds Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary I956 Budapest Central European University 1999 Hersh Button The Old Boys The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA New York Scribner s 1992 Hixson Walter L Porting the Curtain Propaganda Culture and the Cold War 1945-1961 New York St Martin s 1997 Holt Robert T Radio Free Europe Minneapolis University of Minnesota 1958 Hungary Council of Ministers Information Bureau The Counter-Revolutionant Conspiracy of Imre Nagy and His Accomplices Budapest 1984 Irving David Uprising Western Australia Veritas 1986 Johnson A Ross Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty The CIA Years and Beyond Washington D C Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2010 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chiei RDD WHS IAW E0 13526 Section 3 5 Date DEC It 2011 13 Kissinger Henry Diplomacy New York Simon Schuster 1994 Kovrig Bennett The of Liberation East-Central Europe in US Diplomacy and Politics since 1941 Baltimore Johns Hepkins University Press 1973 0f Walls and Bridges The United States and Eastern Europe New York New York University Press 1991 Krebs Ronald R Dueling Visions U S Strategy toward Eastern Extrape under EiSenhower College Station Texas University 2001 Kula Marcin Paryz Londyn i patrza na Pazdziernik 1956 g Polsce Warsaw Studiow Polskie Akaderniej Nauk 1992 Lash Joseph P Dag Hammerskjold Custodian of the Brushfire Peace Garden City N Y Doubleday 1961 Leighton Richard M Strategy Money and the New Look 1953-1956 Vol in History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington D C Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense 2001 Lendvai Paul One Day That Shook the Communist World The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Its Legacy Translated from the German by Ann Major Princeton Princeton University Press 2008 Lewis Flora A Case History of Hope The Story of Poland s Peaceful Revolutions Garden City N Y Doubleday 1958 Litv n Gyiirgy ed The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 Reform Revolt and Repression 1953- 1956 English version edited and translated from the Hungarian by 61105 M Bak and Lyman H Legters London Longman 1996 Loeschner Gil The UNH CR and World Politics A Perilous Path Oxford Oxford University Press 2001 Lomax Bill Hungary 1956 New York St Martin s 1976 Lucas Scott Freedom 5 War The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union New York New York University Press 1999 Lynn Katalin Kadar Tibor Eckhardt His American Years 1941-1972 New York Columbia University Press 2007 Machcewicz Pawel Rebellious Satellite Poland 1956 Translated from the Polish by Maya Washington DC Woodrow Wilson Center 2009 Page determined to be Unclassl ed Regieued Chief ROD was IAVJ E0 13526 Section 3 5 Date DEC 20% 14 Matthews John P C Tinderbox East-Central Europe in the Spring Summer and Early Fall of 1956 Tuscon Arizona Fenestra 2003 Explosion The Hungarian Revolution of1956 New York Hippocrene 2007 Mickelson Sig America s Other Voices The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty New York Praeger 1983 Meray Tibor That Day in Budapest October 23 1956 Translated from the Hungarian by Charles lam Markmann New York Funk Wagnalss 1969 Miller William J Henry Cabot Lodge A Biography New York James H Heineman 1967 Mitrovich Gregory Undennining the Kremlin America s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc Ithaca N Y Cornell University Press 2000 Molnar Miklos Budapest 1956 A History of the Hungarian Revolution Translated from the French by Jennetta Ford London George Allen Unwin 1971 Nagy Ernest A Crisis Decision-Setting and Response The Hungarian Revolution Washington DC National Defense University 1978 Nelson Michael War of the Black Heavens The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War Syracuse N Y Syracuse University Press 1997 Nichols David A Eisenhower 1 956 The President s Year of Crisis Suez and the Brink of War New York Simon Schuster 2011 Osgood Kenneth Total Cold War Eisenhower s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad Lawrence University Press of Kansas 2006 Powers Thomas The Man Who Kept the Secrets Richard Helms the CIA New York Alfred A Knopf 1979 Prados John President s Secret Wars CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through the Persian Gulf Rev ed Chicago Ivan R Dee 1996 Puddington Arch Broadcasting Freedom The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Lexington University Press of Kentucky 2000 Radvimyi Janos Hungary and the Superpower-s The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik Stanford Cal Hoover Institution 1972 Rainer anos M Imre Nagy A Biography Translated from the Hungarian by Lyman H Legters New York I B Taurus 2009 to be Unclassi ed Resigned Chiei RDD WHS IAW 0 13526 Section 3 5 Date DEC 11 2mg 15 Ranelagh John The Agency The Rise and Decline of the CIA New York Simon and Schuster 1986 Schlesinger Thomas O Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe The Domestic Roots of Foreign Policy Vienna Wilhelm Braumiiller 1972 Schwartz Lowell H Political Warfare against the Kremlin US and British Propaganda Policy at the Beginning of the Cold War Houndmills Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan 2009 Sebestyen Victor Twelve Days The Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution New York Pantheon 2006 Skardon C Philip A Lesson for Our Times How America Kept the Peace in the Hungary-Suez Crisis of1956 Bloomington lnd AuthorHouse 2010 Thomas Evan The Very Best Men Four Who Dared The Early History of the CIA New York Simon Schuster 1995 Tudda Chris The Truth Is Our Weapon The Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D Eisenhower and John aster Dulles Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press 2006 Urban George The Nineteen Days A Broadcaster s Account of the Hungarian Revolution London Heinemann 1957 Urquhart Brian Hammarskjold New York Alfred A Knopf 1972 van Ferenc Rift and Revolt in Hungary Nationalism versus Communism Cambridge Harvard University Press 1961 Piotr The United States and Poland Cambridge Mass Harvard University Press 1956 Weiner Tim Legacy of Ashes The History of the CIA New York Doubleday 2007 Winks Robin W Cloak Gown Scholars in the Secret War 1939-1961 New York Morrow 1987 Zinner Paul E Revolution in Hungary New York Columbia University Press 1962 ARTICLES Bain Leslie How We Failed in Hungary The Reporter 24 January 1957 26-28 Communism s Dry Rot Look 21 5 March Pa 6 determined tqhe Unclassi ed R g 'ewed Chiral RDI WHS In 0 13528 Section 1 5 Data DEE Ill 2011 1E1 B k s Csaba The 1956 Revolution and World Politics Hungarian Quarterly 35 Summer 1995 109-21 The Hungarian Question on the UN Agenda Hungarian Quarterly 41 9Spring 2000 103 22 The 1956 Revolution and the Superpowers Hungarian Studies 17 The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality Cold War Histoor 6 November Cold War D tente and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution In The Cold War After Stalin s Dearth A Missed Opportunity for Peace edited by Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood 213-31 Lanharn Md Rowman Littlefield 2006 Bischof Giinter The Collapse of Liberation Rhetoric The Eisenhower Administration and the 1956 Hungarian Crisis Hungarian Studies 20 1 In The Cold War After Stalin 's Dearth A Missed Opportunity for Peace edited by Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood 233-56 Lanham Md Rowman Littlefield 2006 Borhi Laszl The Great Powers and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 Hungarian Studies 12 Spring Rollback Liberation Containment or Inaction US Policy and Eastern EurOpe in the 1950 s Journal of Cold War Studies 1 Fall Boyle Peter G The Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis History 90 October Campbell John C The Soviet Union the United States and the Twin Crises of Hungary and Suez In Suez 1956 The Crisis and its Consequences edited by Wm Roger Louis and Roger Owen 232-53 Oxford Clarendon 1989 Corke Sarah-Jane The Eisenhower Administration and Warfare Intelligence and National Security 24 3 April Deak Istvan Did the Revolution Have to Fail New York Review of Books 54 1March Deighton Anne Different 1956 British Responses to the Polish Events tine-November 1956 Cold War History 6 4 November Fry Michael G and Condoleeza Rice The Hungarian Crisis of 1956 The Soviet Decision Studies in Comparative Communism 16 Spring Summer Page detarmlned to be Unclassified iewed Chiai RDD WHS l 0 13526 Section 3 5 Date DEC Uh 201i 17 Gardner Lloyd Poisoned Apples John Foster Dulles and the Peace Offensive In The Cold War after Stalin s Death A Missed Opportunity for Peace Edited by Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood 73 92 Lanham Md Rowman Littlefield 2006 Gaskill Gordon Timetable of a Failure Virginia Quarterly Review 34 Spring 1958 161-90 Gehler Michael The Hungarian Crisis and Austria 1953 58 A Foiled Model Case In Neutrality in Austria edited by Giinter Bischof Anton Pelinka and Ruth Wodak 160 213 New Brunswick NJ Transaction 2001 Gluchowski L W Khrushchev Gomulka and the Polish October Cold War International History Project Bulletin Spring 38 39 Granville Johanna Imre Nagy Hesitant Revolutionary Cold War International History Bulletin Spring 1995 23 27 37 Hungary 1956 The Yugoslav Connection Europe Asia Studies 50 1998 493- 517 Satellites or Prime Movers Polish and Hungarian Reactions to the 1956 Events New Archival Evidence East European Quarterly 35 January 2002 435-71 Reactions to the Events of 1956 New Findings from the Budapest and Warsaw Archives Journal of Contemporary History 38 2 Radio Free Europe s Impact on the Kremlin in the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 Three Hypotheses Canadian Journal of History 39 December Of Spies Refugees and Hostile Pmpaganda How Austria Dealt with the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 History 91 January Poland and Hungary 1956 A Comparative Essay Based on New Archival Findings In Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe Challenges to Communist Rule edited by Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe 57-77 Oxford Berg 2006 Hobsbawm Eric Could it have Been Different London Review of Books 16 November 2006 Jeszensky Geza Was Failure the Only Option Hungarian Quarterly 48 Kecsk s Gustav The Suez Crisis and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution East European Quarterly 35 March The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 In The Ideas of the Hungarian Revolution Suppressed and Victorious 1956-I999 edited by Pa 3 determined to be Unclassi ed Chial R09 WHS IAIN 0 13526 Section 3 5 Date DEC 11 2511 18 Lee W Congdon and Bela K Kiraly 112-41 New York Columbia University Press 2002 La politique trang re francaise face a la revolution hongroise de 1956 Relations Internationales 122 April-June Kemp-Welch Tony Dethroning Stalin Poland 1956 and its Legacy Europe-Asia Studies 58 December 2006 1261 84 Kennan George interviewed by Joseph Alsop The Soviet Will Never Recover Saturday Evening Post 24 November 1956 33 117-18 120-21 Kir ly B la K The United Nations Organization and the Hungarian Revolution In The Ideas of the Hungarian Revolution Suppressed and Victorious 1956-1999 edited by lee W Congdon and B la K Kiraly 142-63 New York Columbia University Press 2002 Kirov Alexandr M Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary 1956 In Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary 1956 edited by Jenti Gyiirkei and Mikl s Horvath 127-205 Budapest Central European University 1999 Kitts Kenneth and Betty Glad Presidential Personality and Improvisational Decision Making Eisenhower and the 1956 Hungarian Crisis In Reexatnining the Eisenhower Presidency edited by Shirley Anne Warshaw 183-208 Westport Conn Greenwood 1993 Kovacs P ter Understanding or Misunderstanding About Diplomatic Telegrams Sent from the American British and Soviet Legations in Budapest between 23 October-4 November 1956 Miskole Journal of International Law 3 2006 14-27 Kramer Mark The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland Reassessments and New Findings Journal of Contemporary History 33 2 1998 163-214 Marchio James D Resistance Potential and Rollback US Intelligence and the Eisenhower Administration s Policies Toward Eastern EurOpe 1953-56 Intelligence and National Security 10 April Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives US Military Contingency Planning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising Journal of Military History 66 July Marton Endre Why Has the West Slept Foreign Service Journal 63 October McCauley Brian Hungary and Suez 1956 The Limits of Soviet and American Power Journal of Contemporary History 16 October Mink Andras David Irving and the 1956 Revolution Hungarian Quarterly 41 Winter 2000 1 17-28 a determined to be Unclassified agitated Chief RBI WHS E0 13526 Section 3 5 DEC at an 19 Nielsen Catherine C Neutrality vs Neutralisrn Austrian Neutrality and the 1956 Hungarian Crisis In Die Ungamkrise 1956 and Osterreich edited by Erwin A Schmidl 215-34 Vienna Bohlau 2003 O Brien Conor Cruise Discreet Biography of a Smiling Public Man Washington Post Book World 4 February 1973 3 Persak The Polish-Soviet Confrontation in 1956 and the Attempted Soviet Military Intervention in Poland Europe-Asia Studies 58 8 December Pittaway Mark The Education of Dissent The Reception of the Voice of Free Hungary 1951- 56 Cold War History 4 October Rainer Janos M The Road to Budapest 1956 New Documentation on the Kremlin s Decision to Intervene 2 Parts Hungarian Quarterly 37 Summer 37 Autumn Rawnsley Gary D The BBC External Services and the Hungarian Uprising 1956 In Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s edited by Gary D Rawnsley 165-81 New York St Martin's 1999 Spelman Franz What the Hungarians Say About Western Propaganda Harper s 214 April 1957x7044 Stykalin Aleksandr The Hungarian Crisis of 1956 The Soviet Role in the Light of New Archival Documents Cold War History 2 October 2001 13-44 Tudda Chris 'Reenacting the Story of Tantalus Eisenhower Dulles and the Failed Rhetoric of Liberation Journal of Cold War Studies 7 Fall Unwin Peter The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 A Collection of Documents from the British Foreign Of ce Slavonic and East European Review 75 3 July Wood Barry Failed 1956 Hungarian Revolution Remembered Voice of America News 18 October 2006 VOA website DISSERTATIONS AND WORKS Adair Bianca Loyalty Amidst Treachery Austrian-Hungarian Relations 1953-1956 Talk presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center Washington DC 24 October 2001 Amory Robert Jr Hungary Subjective Objective Account Talk before the Literary Society of Washington DC 15 March 1975 Page determined it be Unclassi ed Rd i wed Chief Rap i'iHs uni 0 13526 Section 3 5 at DEE at 2w 20 Central Intelligence Agency The Hungarian Revolution and Planning for the Future 23 October 4 November 1956 2 vols Cherne Leo 1958 Year of Survival Address before the Industrial College of the Armed Forces Washington DC 14 March 1958 Intemational Research Associates Hungary and the 1956 Uprising Survey Among Hungarian Refugees in Austria New York December 1956 Johnson A Ross Setting the Record Straight Role of Radio Free Europe in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 Washington DC Woodrow Wilson Center September 1956 Landa Ronald D Almost Successful Recipe The United States and East European Unrest prior to the Hungarian Revolution Forthcoming Marchio James David Rhetoric and Reality The Eisenhower Administration and Unrest in Eastern Europe 1953-1959 Ph D Dissertation American University 1990 Rogers Thomas Political Reporting in a Crisis Budapest 1956 Unpublished typescript 8 January 1964 Swartz Martin Ben New Look at the 1956 Hungarian Revolution Soviet Opportunism American Acquiescence Ph D Dissertation Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University 1988 Varga Zsolt ozsef Surprised Dailies Contemporary US Press Coverage of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution Ph D Dissertation Texas Christian University 2000 Pa 6 determlned to be Unclassi ed Regiawad Chief WHS I E0 13526 Section 3 5 2011                     National Security Archive    Suite 701  Gelman Library  The George Washington University    2130 H Street  NW  Washington  D C  20037    Phone  202 994‐7000  Fax  202 994‐7005  nsarchiv@gwu edu