Cold War History ISSN 1468-2745 Print 1743-7962 Online Journal homepage http www tandfonline com loi fcwh20 Dealing with dictators the United States Hungary and East Central Europe 1942–1989 Malcolm Byrne To cite this article Malcolm Byrne 2017 Dealing with dictators the United States Hungary and East Central Europe 1942–1989 Cold War History 17 4 443-445 DOI 10 1080 14682745 2017 1382975 To link to this article https doi org 10 1080 14682745 2017 1382975 Published online 20 Nov 2017 Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms Conditions of access and use can be found at http www tandfonline com action journalInformation journalCode fcwh20 Download by George Washington University Date 21 November 2017 At 10 57 Cold War History 2017 VOL 17 NO 4 443–450 BOOK REVIEWS Downloaded by George Washington University at 10 57 21 November 2017 Laś zló Borhi Dealing with Dictators the United States Hungary and East Central Europe 1942–1989 Bloomington IN Indiana University Press 2016 ix 548 pp ‘Small states in the international arena are like bottles floating in the sea’ writes László Borhi in his enlightening new study ‘ T hey may surface for a moment on the wave of history only to disappear after the wave has subsided’ That may be the general experience of minor states but in this engaging account Borhi shows how Hungary frequently managed to make its presence felt during the Cold War Although the term East Central Europe figures in the title the book’s primary focus is on the interactions between two unlikely counterparts which though of vastly unequal size and power and representing opposing political camps still succeeded in finding substantial common ground The volume explores several related issues including whether the Communist states of the region enjoyed any independence in their foreign policies what influence Soviet hegemony had on their clients’ policy choices and how profoundly the United States affected events in Eastern Europe On a theoretical level Borhi raises questions about the nature of big power small state relations what is required for each to achieve its respective aims and which approaches work best particularly when dealing with dictatorships Based on years of archival research in substantially open Hungarian and American archives and written with erudition and wit – with a smooth translation – the result is a highly informative and even entertaining story Borhi’s narrative begins before most accounts of Hungary in the Cold War – in the midst of World War II when the Western Allies chose to make the erstwhile Axis member along with Romania and Bulgaria a target for Nazi occupation by leaking its intentions to quit the war If the Germans boosted their presence in East Central Europe fewer divisions would be available for Normandy It was a calculation with ‘catastrophic consequences’ for those occupied territories including ‘for the last intact Jewish community in Europe’ For the author it was an example of both the kinds of moral trade-offs big powers sometimes make and the powerlessness of weak states to defend themselves Hungary would fare better during the Cold War One major factor was the consensus among American presidents during the period – despite their rhetoric – that they lacked the power to fundamentally change the captive status of Moscow’s allies Harry Truman after the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia tried to destabilise the Soviet bloc mainly through covert means until repeated disasters forced him to back off Dwight Eisenhower’s campaign platform of ‘rollback’ which implied the same kind of approach did not last long either East Germany’s uprising in June 1953 and especially the 1956 Hungarian revolution convinced even the Dulles brothers that US actions risked an unwanted direct conflict with the Soviets by then a nuclear power By 1971 American policy had morphed into essentially the opposite – promoting stability and evolutionary transformation in Eastern Europe even if that meant tacitly accepting Soviet hegemony for the foreseeable future Even Ronald Reagan chose engagement over direct confrontation albeit with the aim of continuing to weaken the Kremlin’s hold over its satellites Hungary willingly went along for the sake of Western support ranging from economic aid to most-favoured nation status to access to technology Borhi’s account is much more detailed than a regional survey could manage Among other benefits the reader gets a nuanced picture of the policy confusion and contradictions that frustrated both governments often a function of competing institutional interests Party head János Kádár wanted to pursue various openings to the West especially Washington But while Downloaded by George Washington University at 10 57 21 November 2017 444    BOOK REVIEWS he typically found support among party ‘liberals’ the Foreign Ministry and Hungary’s business community the state security services party hardliners and segments of the press baulked out of fear of foreign penetration and ideological subversion US decision-makers were also somewhat split Those who hoped to raise trade and assistance levels with specific socialist states had to deal with Pentagon qualms over inadvertently expanding Soviet power Borhi provides plenty of insights into Hungarian politics and personalities Kádár for example was an intriguing character who came to power ignominiously with Soviet backing helped crush the 1956 revolution then implemented harsh reprisals against its participants Yet he built up an international image as a relatively enlightened and pragmatic figure which helped him cultivate relations with Western governments Borhi develops his portrait in an unsentimental way The Hungarian leader was a ‘communist true believer’ who ‘had put his comrade Imre Nagy to death’ and was intent on retaining the basic Stalinist structures of the system But he could make an American ambassador gush about him as a ‘person of historical importance’ One of Kádár’s strengths was his non-ideological outlook and his clear-eyed view of Hungary’s modest ranking in the metaphorical sea of global politics which set him apart from his colleagues ‘Readers of the deliberations of the Hungarian Politburo’ Borhi writes in typically droll style ‘may get the impression that its members were not aware of Hungary’s insignificance in international politics’ whereas ‘Kádár seems to have been one of the few who had a clear notion of his country’s place in the world often calling it a “tiny louse”’ A major question the book develops is how well or poorly the United States played its hand in Hungary Borhi’s view is balanced but on the whole quite positive The main contribution of successive US presidents he believes was to avoid reckless policies that might have led to war Eisenhower and his successors took considerable political heat for supposedly abandoning the captive nations by consistently choosing regional stability over local independence Borhi recognises the distastefulness of the choice they faced but notes that in the end American Policymakers adopted relatively nuanced approaches that effectively targeted the weaknesses of the socialist camp while at the same time avoiding serious counteractions from Moscow The events of 1956 are an example Borhi believes the Eisenhower administration for the most part took the right path by declining to provide weapons to insurgents showing a willingness to compromise and working through the United Nations All of these steps helped keep the revolution from spiralling out of control and swelling Hungarian casualties without any realistic chance for success This does not negate his significant criticisms of US actions American ignorance about Hungary produced mistakes such as concluding that Nagy was an unsuitable counterpart – not because he was a communist so was Poland’s Władysław Gomułka but because he was ‘insufficiently anti-Soviet’ This led Washington to shun communications with Nagy which Borhi argues had ‘tragic consequences’ If Nagy had been informed that the US had no plans to counter the Soviets the author implies he might not have made the dramatic public declarations that contributed to Moscow’s determination to invade Borhi also implies that US authorities were to blame for Radio Free Europe’s occasionally grossly misleading broadcasts during the revolution He acknowledges that ‘US policy was torn between activist desires and a fear of their consequences’ and he grants that ‘American propagandists were not in an easy position’ Still he castigates Washington for making ‘no effort to curb RFE’s reckless propaganda campaign’ and he goes on to suggest that the radio’s broadcasts ‘may have been tolerated because they were part of an alternative strategy one that actively encouraged armed revolt and could be plausibly denied later on’ This is one of the few assertions in the book for which there is solid contradictory evidence The several broadcasts in question were undeniably excessive but an internal inquiry at the time backed by oral testimony from RFE officials in later years point to serious organisational shortcomings and procedural flaws within RFE’s Hungarian section as the major problem – not a decision by policymakers seeking deniability Downloaded by George Washington University at 10 57 21 November 2017 COLD WAR HISTORY    445 Otherwise the author gives the United States decent grades for its general approach to Hungary Specific policies such as the Marshall Plan putting pressure on Kádár to end the post-1956 reprisals and ‘differentiation’ had significant impacts although at times Borhi argues the US was close to irrelevant when its focus shifted elsewhere Eventually he writes it was the honey trap of trade and economic assistance especially beginning in the early 1970s that encouraged Eastern Europe’s reliance on the West and ultimately led to ‘the great economic collapse that would bury the communist system’ Borhi stops well short of giving US policymakers credit for the ‘cataclysm of 1989’ however The transformation of the socialist system that ends this account was a complex process entirely unplanned and beyond the control of any person or entity He rightly dismisses President George H W Bush’s outlandish declaration in a draft of a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev that ‘Together we liberated Eastern Europe’ Gorbachev set the stage for the remarkable changes of that year Borhi concedes but in his view the main actors were those in Hungary Poland and the other East-Central European states who through a combination of courage and restraint pushed events much further than anyone anticipated So much for bottles floating in the sea Malcolm Byrne George Washington University mbyrne@gwu edu © 2017 Malcolm Byrne https doi org 10 1080 14682745 2017 1382975 William Burr and Jeffrey P Kimball Nixon’s Nuclear Spectre The Secret Alert of 1969 Madman Diplomacy and the Vietnam War Lawrence University Press of Kansas 2015 XV 415 pp William Burr and Jeffrey Kimball have written what is likely to become the ultimate analysis of the October 1969 Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS Readiness Test when the Nixon administration failed to bring about an early conclusion of the Vietnam War through a bizarre mishmash of coercive diplomacy and sheer bluff Both scholars have been working on this subject for a long time Kimball has authored several significant contributions to the historiography on the Vietnam war while Burr a senior analyst at the National Security Archive has an unsurpassed knowledge of the intricacies and nuances of US nuclear history They have combined their expertise to produce an outstanding minutely reconstructed narrative of the October 1969 secret nuclear alert and of the events that led up to it The book is based on extraordinary archival research as the authors have examined with painstaking precision all sorts of published and unpublished materials related to their topic A crucial policy choice is usually scrutinised from the different points of view of all the personalities involved and the documentary evidence is often supplemented and integrated with interviews with some of the protagonists – or confronted with their own published version of the events Such a meticulous effort enables the authors to offer an almost day-by-day account of the decision-making process in the White House As Burr and Kimball abundantly make clear both Richard Nixon and his National Security advisor Henry Kissinger held a firm belief in the need to back up their diplomacy with a robust military stance which did not exclude the use of force or the threat of force Nixon’s strategic