IMPACT OF CUBAN-SOVIET TIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE SPRING 1980 HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MARCH 26 27 APRIL 16 17 AND MAY 14 1980 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 82-7130 U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON 1980 30-1 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS CLEMENT J ZABLOCKI Wisconsin Chafrman L H FOUNTAIN North Carolina DANTE B FASCELL Florida CHARLES C DIGGS Ja Michigan BENJAMIN S ROSENTHAL New York LEE H HAMILTON Indiana LESTER L WOLFF New York JONATHAN B BINGHAM New York GUS YATRON Pennsylvania CARDISS COLLINS Illinois STEPHEN J SOLARZ New York DON BONKER Washington GERRY E STUDDS Massachusetts ANDY IRELAND Florida DONALD J PEASE Ohio DAN MICA Florida MICHAEL D BARNES Maryland WILLIAM H GRAY III Pennsylvania TONY P HALL Ohio HOWARD WOLPE Michigan DAVID R BOWEN Mississippi FLOYD J FITHIAN Indiana WILLIAM S BROOMFIELD Michigan EDWARD J DERWINSKI Illinois PAUL FINDLEY Illinois JOHN H BUCHANAN JR Alabama LARRY WINN JR Kansas BENJAMIN A GILMAN New York TENNYSON GUYER Ohio ROBERT J LAGOMARSINO California WILLIAM F GOODLING Pennsylvania JOEL PRITCHARD Washington MILLICENT FENWICK New Jersey DAN QUAYLE Indiana JOHN J BRADY Jr Chief of Staff SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICA N AFFAIgS GUS YATRON Pennsylvania Chairitanu DANTE B FASCELL Florida BENJAMIN A OILMAN New York BENJAMIN S ROSENTHAL New York TENNYSON GUYER Ohio CARDISS COLLINS Illinois ROBERT J LAGOMARSINO California GERRY E STUDDS Mnssachusetts ANDY IRELAND Florida GO NF FmtEDN IA Sibcominittee Staff Director J lnwR Fox llitioity Staff Consultant M THFW H Mos R Subcommittee Staff Aasociatc NA xcy A AGRtS Staff Assistant II CONTENTS WITNESSES Wednesday March 26 1980 Edward M Collinq Vice Director for Foreign Intelligence Defense Pl aT Intelligence Agency--------------------------------------2 Martin J Scheina Analyst for Cuban Affairs Defense Intelligence Agency-----------------------------------------------4 Thursday ' farch 27 1980 Lt Vol Rafael E Martinez-Boucher Chief Latin American Branch Defense Intelligence Agency ---------------------------------27 Wednesday April 16 1980 Robini Kent analyst Office of Political Analysis National Foreign Assessment Center Central Intelligence Agency-----------------45 Randolph Pherson analyst Office of Political' Analysis National Foreign Assessment Center Central Intelligence -------- 46 Robert J English Chiefof U S S R -Eat EuropeanAgency-_ Division Office of Political Analysis National Foreign Assessment Center Central Intelligence Agency --------------------------------------46 Russell Swanson analyst Office of Political Analysis National Foreign Assessment Center Central Intelligence Agency---------49 Thursday April 17 1980 ----Myfes Frechette Country Director for Cuban Affairs Department of State -------------------------------------------------58 John 1 Blacken Country Director for Central America Department of State-----------------------------------------------74 Robert V Warne Country l irector for Caribbean Affairs Departmentof State--------------------------------------------74 Wednesday May 14 1980 Luis Aguilar professor Department of History Georgetown University - - 89 Villiam M LeoGrande professor School of Government and Public Administration American University -------------------------92 I 2 3 4 APPEN IXES Questions submitted in writing by Subcommittee Chairman Gus Yatron to Edward M Collin Vice l irector for Foreign Intelligence i efen e Intelligence Agency ----------------------------------Questions submitted in writing by Subcommit tee Chairman Gus Yatron to Robin Kent Randolf Pherson Robert English and Russell Swanson and responses thereto ----------------------------Reprint of Associated Press article published April 1 1980 in the Richmond Times-Dispatch Navy to Send Iydrofoils to Duty in Caribbean -----------------------------------------------Reprint of Washington Post article by Ernesto Betancourt published May 13 1980 entitled Behind the Cuban Tragedy ------------- M 113 118 120 121 IMPACT OF CUBAN-SOVIET TIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE SPRING 1980 WEDNESDAY MARCH 28 1980 HousE OF RRmESENTATVES CoMmrr ON FOREIoN AFAIR SuotBCMIrrE oz INTR-AMRUCAN AFFAIRS Washington D C The subcommittee met at 2 45 p m in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building Hon Gus Yatron chairman of the subcommittee presidin Mr Y TwO The subcommittee will now come to order Today the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee will meet in executive session on the impact of Cuban-Soviet ties in the Western Hemisphere Our briefings by the Defense Intelligence Agency will be divided into two sections The session today wil be confined to Soviet activity in Cuba and the use of Cuban military forces in Africa and other parts of the world Tomorrow we will go into the political aspects of Cuban-Soviet influence in the hem isphere concentrating on changes which are taking place in Central and South America This annual update by DIA will give the subcommittee an insight into Soviet activities in Cuba including the presence of a Soviet combat brigade the upgrading of military equipment and its capabilities the extent of Communist activities in the hemisphere and other developments in Central America the Caribbean and South America Over the years we have seen the increased level of military and economic support of Cuba by the Soviet Union The hearings also have been a barometer for us to gage the successes or failures of Cuban foreign policy in the hemisphere Cuba has made some inroads particularly in Jamaica Grenada and Nicaragua although Castro has reportedly had some problems at home The subcommittee is indicating its continuing concern by holdin these hearings Due to the sensitive nature of the information to be given the Defense Intelligence Agency has asked that these hearings be held in executive session It is the Chair's intention to again request that DIA declassify as much of the testimony as possible for publication so that the public can have maximum benefit of information on this important aspect of our national security and foreign policies Our witnesses today are Dr Edward 31 Collins Vice Director for Foreign Intelligence Defense Intelligence Agency and Mr Martin J Scheina analyst for Cuban Affairs Defense intelligence Agency - 1 2 They are accompanied by Lt Col Ralph Martinez-Boucher Mr Gary R McClellan Mr David C Yorck Dr Ramon da Pena and Major John C Crenshaw all of the Defense Intelligence Agency I would-like to entertain a motion from the floor that we go into executive session Mr GILMAN Mr Chairman I move that the committee now go into executive session Mr YATROX The motion has been made Do I have a second Mr FAscEL Second Mr YATRONX It has been moved and seconded that we go into executive session For the purpose of taking classified testimony under the rule the rollcall is automatic and the clerk will now call the role Mr FRrEDMAN Mr Yatron Mr YATRON Aye Mr FRIEDMAN Mr Fascell Mr FASCELL Aye Mr FRIEDMAN Mr Rosenthal No response Mr FRIEDMAAN Mrs Collins No response Mr FmREDMAN Mr Studds Mr STUDS Aye Mr FRrED3M - Mr Ireland No response Mr FRIEDMAN 'Mr Gilman Mr GILMAAN Aye Mr FRIEDMAN Mr Guyer No response Mr FRIEDMAN Mr Lagomarsino Mr LAGOMARSINO Aye Mr YATRON There are five members voting aye A quorum being present we are now in executive session Will the clerk determine that all who are present in the room have the appropriate clearance Dr Collins it is a pleasure to welcome you back Please proceed with your opening statement STATEMENT OF EDWARD M COLLINS VICE DIRECTOR FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Mr COLLINs Mr Chairman honorable members of this committee on behalf of Lieutenant General Tighe the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency I want to express my appreciation for the opportunity to have our representatives appear before you again this year As in recent years our presentation will be in two parts The first will concentrate on Cuba and the Soviet presence there and the second will concentrate on changes which are taking place in Central and South America In Cuba the most significant development in the past year was the confirmation of the presence of a Soviet combat brigade Soviet support to the Cuban military has continued at a high level over the past few years Since 1978 deliveries of military equipment have exceeded security deletion and the total value of military equipment provided since 1960 now approaches security deletion 3 This upgrading of Cuba's weapons systems coupled with experience gained in Africa higher emphasis on training and the increased pro fessionalism of the reserve represents a significant improvement of Cuba's military capabilities In manner similar to the support it provides to the military the Soviet Union is keeping Cuba afloat economically As reporte last year the Soviet Union is paying above-the-world-market prices for Cuban sugar and nickel and supplying virtually all of Cuba's petroleum at a bargain rate Despite this assistance Cuba's economy is quite depressed and discontent is growing Internationally Havana is continuing to carry out a very active foreign policy One of the most significant Cuban advances has been in Central America Cu 'an security deletion assistance to the Sandinista National Liberation Front were very influential factors in helping to oust Nicaragua's President Anastasio Somoza Additionally Cuba's post revolution aid to Nicaragua and Grenada has helped to strengthen Cuba's influence in these two countries In Africa Cuban troop presence remains at approximately 35 000 Some 20 000 of these troops are in Angola where they maintain the government in power Finally Cuba is continuing its policy of aid to Third World countries primarily by supplying civilian technicians whose numbers are now approaching 13 000 The second part of the presentation will be concerned with matters affecting other parts of Latin America Initially we will examine the impact of recent and ongoing political and military changes in-Central America and the Caribbean Within this context we will also address the illegal movement of arms in the Central American area and the evidence of outside influence and support We will illustrate that Soviet influence in the hemisphere outside of Cuba is growing at a modest but steady pace and seems to parallel a diminution of U S presence in the area Political instability in the region remains a serious problem generated by chronic economic and social ills and by the activities of leftist elements Terrorism persists as the political expression of extremists of both the left and right in many areas and while not as widespread as a few years ago it is contributing to the instability in Central America and is making a resurgence in parts of South America i Serious programs of military modernization are being advanced i most of the countries but especially by those whose governments are controlled by the military Even those states which are reverting to civilian control are concerned about updating their arms inventories and to do so are turning primarily to European sources At this point I would like to introduce the members of my party Mr Martin Scheina will give the first presentation He will be 0relowed tomorrow by Lt Col Rafael Martinez-Boucher I am also accompanied as the chairman has said by r Gary McClellan Dr Ramon da Pena and Maj John Crenshaw today Mr Yorck I believe is not here in his place is Mr William Byrne It is my sincere hope that these presentat ions will be useful We will attempt to answer the committee's questions and supply any additional information which you may desire You are well aware of course that the charters which govern our activities restrict us to the collection and evaluation of foreign intelli- 4 gence concerned primarily with military-related matters Consequently1 questions that you may have that are outside our areas of responsibility will have to be referred to other agencies but we will make every effort to satisfy your requirements As in the past most of the material contained in these presentations is classified and considered sensitive Therefore the overall classification is secret We stand ready however to sanitize the transcript for publication in the open record if that is your desire With your permission Mr Chairman we will now begin with Mr Scheina Mr YATRON Thank you very much Dr Collins Now Mr Scheina STATEMENT OF MARTIN 1 SCHEINA ANALYST FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Mr SCHEIMA Thank you Mr Chairman Gentlemen good afternoon Today's Cuba briefing will be divided into two parts The first portion will examine developments on the island over the past year I will speak about the Soviet brigade including its location size composition and probable missions Additionally we will look at the Cuban Armed Forces and Soviet deployments in Cuba Included in the domestic section will be information on Cuba's projected nuclear powerplant economic problems and the impact the latter is having on discontent in Cuba In the international portion of the brief I will outline Cuban efforts to improve its international standing in the Third World Cuba's military and civilian posture overseas will also be covered The most significant development since our briefing before your subcommittee last April was the confirmation in August 1979 of the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba As you recall from that briefing it was mentioned security deletion Security deletion additional intelligence security deletion enabled the intelligence community to more accurately determine the probable size composition and location of the units in question With this information in hand security deletion The Soviet brigade has a personnel strength of approximately security deletion It is- divided into security deletion maneuver elements security deletion motorized rifle security deletion and security deletion armor security deletion Additionally it has security deletion artillery security deletion Estimated equipment totals for the brigade include security deletion tanks some security deletion armored personnel carriers security deletion Because the Soviet brigade is security deletion it has the expected complement of related service and service support units Security deletion Mr GILMAN Mr Chairman may I interrupt for a moment Mr YATRON Without objection Mr GILMAN When was that determination made that indicated it was- security deletion I Mr SCHEINA Security deletion Mr GILMAN When did you make a determination that it was security deletion 5 Mr SOHEINA Security deletion Mr GIL A Was thatbefore the issue blew up in the papersI Mr SOHPJNA Security deletion Mr GILMAN You had made a determination that it was not se- curity deletion Mr SCHEINA Security - deletion Mr GILMAN How did the administration describe it when this issue came to the forefront I Mr SCHEINA I am not sure if I really know sir Mr GILMAN -It is my impression that they described it as being security deletion Mr LAo0MARSI1NO When the President made his speech as I recall he said that the Russians were not telling the truth about the mission that it was a combat brigade but that we did not think it would be used as a combat brigade or something like that I did not follow it frankly Mr GILMAN Do you recall how the administration felt Mr SCHEINA No sir unfortunately I do not Mr GILM N Is this a combat brigade Mr SCMEIXA It is a combat brigade It is a brigade that has combat capabilities yes sir Mr GILMAN Is it used for that purpose Well sir it is believed that that is so security deletion It would be a defensive combat mission yes sir Mr SCHEINA Mr GILMAN Thank you Mr Chairman I am sorry to interrupt your presentation Mr SCHEINA That is quite all right sir Security deletion Mr YATRON Without objection Mr SCHEINA Thank you sir Security deletion AMr LAGOMAR5IxO Excuse me Where is this located Mr SCHEINA Security deletion The Soviet Union has continued its high level of military support to Castro Soviet arms to Cuba since 1960 now total security deletion Deliveries to Cuba during 1978 amounted to security deletion -the highest yearly total since 1962 In 1979 the total decreased to an estimated security deletion However this is still the second highest amount since the year of the missile crisis-1962 The 1978 and 1979 figures combined with those of the two previous years show that on the average the monetary value of the annual deliveries has been about twice as high since the Cubans intervened in Angola There are several reasons for the increased deliveries It is known that some Cuban equipment was transferred to Angola to support Cuban troops and the forces of the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola MPLA It is probable that Moscow agreed to replace this equipment with similar or larger numbers of more modern arms In addition to some of the older equipment shipped from the island Moscow sent directly to Angola and Ethiopia new vintage weapons which had not been previously Mentified on the island The Cubans demonstrated a high degree of proficiency in the operation of these arms thus probably making Moscow willing to deliver similar equipment to Cuba itself Finally it seems probable that Moscow has agreed to give the Cubans some newer weapon systems in recognition of the Cuban accomplishments in Angola and Ethiopia In the past year Cuba has not received any weapon systems whioh had not been introduced in previous years Nevertheless follow-on were noteworthy years received priorNavy of systems deliveries its second Fo0 Cuan year the in of this provided In January trot class submarine This is based security deletion which wil be described later in the briefing Also the navy received its third and fourth Turya hydrofoil torpedo boats and two more 08A i guided missile patrol boats This brings the total of OSA's delivered to 12 It is possible that in the future a newer generation of craft security deletion may be delivered to Cuba The Cuban Air Force received security deletion additional Mig-21 Fishbeds- security deletion Also in 1979 the air force took delivery on security deletion AN-26 Curl short-range transports Mr LAGOmARiSINO Were there not also some Mig-2Vsl Mr SCHEINA Sir that was the 1978 delivery We had a squadron of actually Mig-23's The NATO term for Mig-27 and Mig-23 is identical the Flogger However it is the model which determines whether it is 27 or 23 and those which we have in Cuba are 23's and I will be moving into that in thc air force section Moving onto the armed forces the Cuban Army security deletion It is expected that security deletion should enhance the combat capabilities of the Cuban Army security deletion This is also attributed to the high importance which the Cubans place on their reserves which spend security deletion days a year on active duty and the large number of reserves who have served in Africa The Cuban Air Force or DAAFAR continues to be organized into four elements An air force element a surface-to-air missile element an air defense artillery force and an air surveillance force with about 16 000 personnel The air force has slightly over security deletion Mig fighter aircraft divided into security deletion all-weather fighter squadrons and security deletion day fighter squadrons The most modern aircraft in the Cuban inventory is the Mig-28 Flogger-which arrived in mid-1978 We now assess the Cubans to have security deletion Mig-23's which probably include security deletion of the F model export ground-attack variant and security deletion C-model trainer This map depicts the radius of a fully loaded Flogger F on a round trip mission As you can see it can reach portions of the southeastern United States Mexico Central America and the western islands of the Caribbean Cuba now has a total of security deletion AN-26 Curl shortrange transports The AN-26 is DAAFAR's l rimary aircraft for airborne operations With an operating radius of security deletion with full payload the security deletion AN-26's have the capability to airdrop a maximum of security deletion troops in portions of F'lorida portions of Belize all of Jamaica Haiti and the Bahamas and most of the Dominican Republic In the last year surface-to-air missile protection of the island has security deletion During the past several years Cuban airfields security deletion have beei undergoing improvements These projects are probably being carried out security deletion to upgrade the revolutionary armed forces Security deletion 7 Improvements at Cuba's lesser important airfields have generally been in the area of runway lengthening resurfacing and the addition of new aircraft parking facilities Airfields receiving these types of improvements are at security deletion In the past Soviet pilots have been assigned to Cuba when the Cuban Air Force has had insufficient personnel to perform its mission of air defense of the island Security deletion Since last year's brief the Cuban Navy has received a second Foxctrot diesel-powered attack submarine Two additional Turya hydrofoil torpedo boats and two additional OSA If missile attack boats were also delivered in the past year These deliveries are consistent with the the ongoing program to gradually update the Cuban fleet However because of the large number of older craft the pace of modernization is expected to increase in the next few years During the past year the first Foxtrot submarine was security deletionT The presence of the FoxtrotM enables the Cubans to conduct such exercises without having to depend upon visiting Soviet submarines for realistic ASF training security deletion r SCHEINA Concerning Soviet naval ship deployments to Cuba this program began in 1969 By 1978 19 had taken place averaging 2 per year These have generally been composed of two or three major service combatants which were accompanied by a replenishment oiler Approximately half of the deployments included one or two submarines During recent years ship deployments have paid port visits to Havana and Cienfuegos and conducted operational transits of the Gulf of Mexico The average number of lays the task groups spend in the Caribbean has been about 40 and the longest-91 days-took place in late 1978 Soviet naval air deployments began in 1970 and by 1978 a total of security deletion had taken place Between 1970 and 1974 there were between security deletion yearly These flights increased to security deletion in 1977 and security deletion in 1978 It should be noted that during 1977 and 1978 security deletion of these flights used Cuba as a stopover for transit to Angola These operations are performed by pairs of TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft which fly from the security deletion in U S S R to Jose Marti International Airport Bear D flights have historically been associated with U S NATO and Soviet exercises transits of U S ships to and from the Mediterranean and international tensions such as the Angolan and Ethiopian wars During 1979 there was only one Soviet naval deployment to the Caribbean this was carried out in August by a Kre8ta-I1 class guided-missile cruiser a Krivak-I1 guided-missile frigate and a replenishment oiler The ships which entered the Caribbean by the Mona Passage-west of Puerto Rico-operated in the area for about a week The task force departed the Caribbean without visiting Cuba-the first time this has happened Security deletion Mr SCHEINA Since last year's brief there was only security deletion deployment of TU-95 Bear D naval aircraft to Cuba This brings the total since 1970 to security deletion flights The total for all of 1979 was only security deletioni the lowest yearly number since 1973 and security deletion of these flights went on to Angola 8 There have been no flights thus far during 1980 The decline in the number of flights is probably a rehection of security deletion Moving on to tiLe economy since the revolution in 1959 Cuba has been heavily dependent on the U S S R and Eastern Europe for trade and economic aid to underpin its underdeveloped one-crop economy As you may be aware Cuba is dependent upon sugar for 85 percent of its export earnings However since 1975 the level of this dependency has increased rapidly Cuba's inability to provide more for its economy from its own resource is primarily attributed to economic mismanagement and reliance on sugar for export earnings in conjunction with very low world sugar prices In the period from 1961 through 1976 total Soviet economic aid provided averaged $473 million annually or about $1 3 million per day During this period the assistance was in the form of repayable economic credits and to a lesser degree subsidy payments on sugar petroleum and nickel that are grant aid By 1975 world sugar prices as well as nickel prices the country's other major export plummeted to levels not anticipated by Moscow Cuban exports to the free world dropped while sales were made to the U S S R to obtain the subsidized price As the world price has moved lower the level of Soviet subsidies has grown For the period from 1976 through 1979 total aid averaged approximately security deletion billion annually or about security deletion million per day security deletion the 1961 and 1975 level During 1979 alone aid totaled more than security deletion billion or almost security deletion million per day In contrast to low prices for Cuban exports prices for oil have increased dramatically since 1974 Virtually all of Cuba's security deletion barrels per day of crude oil are imported from the Soviets a heavy financial burden on Moscow In addition to fuel other Soviet goods provided as aid include various items from trucks to potatoes Such an outpouring of goods for subsidized Cuban sugar and nickel is keenly felt in the shortageplagled U S S R where lines for foodstuffs and other goods are common In addition there are up to security deletion Soviet technicians involved in development projects in Cuba At this time planning is underway for the next 5-year planl 19811985 which is structured to coincide with the next Soviet plan Preliminary indications are that due to Cuba's chronic problems and faltering economy security delet ion Further Soviet credits supposedly repayable for major industrial development projects are also expected In addition to these aid programs Cuba will attempt to negotiate guarantees for certainlyproducts at favorable prices under its bilateral clearing account barter trade with the Soviets If only economic considerations are taken into account Moscow might be' inclined to reduce its aid support but overriding political and strategic considerations will make this virtually impossible In recent months there has been an increasing number of reports of discontent in Cuba This appears to be caused by Cuba's lagging economy Shortages are reported to have reached such a level that a black market of almost all consumer goods is flourishing Additionally Cubans are displeased with the establishment of a privileged 9 class of top Communist party officials high level bureaucrats military officers and foreign diplomats Many Cubans feel that a major contributing factor to economic problems is overseasmilitary involvement Security deletion It is questionable whether the Soviets would support the Cubans to the tune of security deletion billion a year if the Cubans had not sent troo ps to Angola and Ethiopia The dissatisfaction has been exacerbated by the 100 000 Cuban exiles who visited the island during 1979 There is a striking difference between their apparent wealth and the poverty of the Cubans who did not leave the-isfand Security deletion Because of the increased dissatisfaction the Cuban Government reports that crime is on the increase The Government has been conducting a security crackdown Because anti-Communist groups have been more active Disgruntled Cubans have crashed into foreign embassies in efforts to gain asylum Also once again fleeing to Guantanamo is a popular route to escape Castroism In 1978 only security deletion Cubans jumped the feice to the U S Naval Base However last year the number climbed to security deletion The forecast for the near future does not appear to be good for the Cuban people This is because portions of the sugar and tobacco crops Cuba's two largest agricultural exports are diseased Security deletion this year's tobacco crop could be virtually wiped out by disease During late 1979 and early 1980 the Cubans carried out a high-level governmental consolidation which is directed at ivducing discontent To crack down on the black market and reverse increased crime Ramiro Valdes Menedez-a hardliner-was appointed as the new Minister of Interior It appears that this program has had little impact on antigovernment activities Nevertheless Castro does not appear seriously threatened from within In previous years we have briefed the subcommittee on the agreement of the Soviet Union to provide Cuba with a nuclear powerplant This facility which is projected to have an 880-megawatt capacity is to be constructed in security deletion Cienfuegos Construction was first expected to be begun in the late 1970's Security deletion Several Eastern European countries and security deletion are also on the waiting list and it is believed that they will receive their plants before Cuba For this reason it is not believed that the Cuban facility will 'be begun until the security deletion and probably will not be completed until the security deletion Because the plant is being constructed by the Soviets it is expected to comply with international atomic energy agency safeguards Moving on to Cuba's international policies Havana was the site of the sixth summit meeting of the nonalined movement NAM in September 1979 Concurrently Fidel Castro became the chairman of the movement and legitimized his position as a recognized spokesman for the Third World It appears that under Castro's leadership the NAM will assume a militant stand not unlike that which it followed when Algerian President Boumedienne was its chairman During the September meeting Castro was able to successfully challenge efforts by more moderate states to moderate the policies of the NAM In fact the movement 10 placed Egypt on a 2-year probation for its efforts to improve relations with Israel Security deletion ' Specific measures accomplished at the meeting by Cuba included the NAM's call for Puerto Rican independence indirect endorsement of Cuban policies in Africa and the indictment of the United States and other Western states for allegedly supporting South African apartheid As noted last year Havana had been expected to scale down its activities in Africa in order to appear more moderate prior to and during the NAM meeting In fact Cuban activity in Africa remained at about the same level During late 1979 and early 1980 Havana conducted an all-out campaign to gain one of Latin America's two seats on the United Nations Security Council Throughout the voting Cuba was unable to obtain the needed two-thirds majority vote Because of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan Cuba lost its support and Mexico presented itself as a compromise candidate' and won the seat Security deletion Mr SCHEINA Moving to overseas involvement the number of Cuban military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa has remained at about the same level as last year approximately 35 000 men President Fidel Castro retains high interest in Africa and continues to see himself as a leader of the revolutionary Third World Cuba continues to station about 19 000-21 000 military personnel in Angola Their primary mission is to maintain the MPLA government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos in power For the Cubans the last 2 years have been increasingly frustrating as neither the MPLA nor the combined MPLA-Cuban military operations have been able to eliminate the forces of Dr Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNITA Cuban disenchantment has also mounted as South Africa has successfully stepped up its air attacks against the Cuban supported insurgent forces of the SouthWest Africa People's Organization SWAPO which operates out of Southern Angola Security deletion Despite these frustrations Castro sees continuing benefits for Cuba by staying in Angola Because of their high visibility the Cubans contfinue to gain prestige among Third World revolutionaries They also have obtained military experience and by supporting Moscow's objectives have acquired advanced weaponry Moreover for both Moscow and Havana continued presence in Angola has i iven them a base for further entry into other parts of Southern Africa As such they used- Angola as a training area for insurgents and as an arms depot that has allowed them to rapidly resupply insuirents onerotinq in other parts of South Africa Finally the Cubans maintain the MPLA government in power Moving to Ethiopa Cuban presence there reached a peak of 17 090 in the spring of 1978 hut after helping the Ethiopians defeat the Somali Army in the Ogaden Cuba's forces have been slowly reduced to about 12 000 Currently the Cubans maintain about security deletion combat troops Security deletion Other troops in Ethiopia serve primarily as advisers In relation to the Eritrean uprising Cuba is in a difficult position During the reign of Emperor Haile gelassie Havana backed the Eri- 11 treans but now in deference to President Mengistu and Soviet policy Cuba has cut off this support Castro has limited the activity of Cuba mainly providing logistic support and guarding key locations However because of Cuba's economic and ideological ties to radical Arab States especially Iraq Castro has not committed combat troops against the Eritreans Moreover Castro sees the Eritrean terrain as favoring the insurgents and judges that attacks on well-fortified Eritrean positions would most likely result in an unacceptable high number of casualties In the case of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia the Cubans as well as the Soviets have provided support to back the Zimbabwe Africa People's Union ZAPU and security deletion the Zimbabwe Africa National Union ZANU Security deletion It is believed that they will take a wait-and-see attitude for the foreseeable future In addition to the countries mentioned the Cubans have approximatel 1 000 personnel in 11 other African countries which are shown here In these countries the Cubans serve primarily as advisers They also train guerrillas for operations in neighboring countries and serve as bodyguards In the Arabian Peninsula DIA estimates that the current number of Cuban military personnel in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen PDRY is security deletion The Cubans serve as advisers with the PDRY security deletion There have been allegations that Cubans fought alongside South Yemen forces in the March 1979 border clash with North Yemen Security deletion it is believed that the Cubans served as advisers security deletion Cuban presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and nearby Ethiopia is a matter of concern because of their proximity to the oil-producing regions In addition to the large number of troops overseas there are some 13 000 Cuban civilians as well It should be noted that among the Cubans overseas civilians as well as military there are intelligence arms covert operations personnel communist organizers etc Over 7 000 Cuban civilians are in Angola The Cubans worldwide appear to be concentrating on areas in which the Cuban revolution has had its most success These are education rural development and public health While the overall expertise of these advisers is not as high as those of Western technicians they are sufficiently qualified to be of significant assistance to recipient countries In1 the past year the most significant increases in the number of Cuban civilians overseas took place in Libya Iraq and Nicaragua The latter country I will treat in detail under the Latin American section With regard to Iraq and Libya there are approximately security deletion and security deletion Cuban civilians respectively performing mainly coi struction projects It is likely that Havana is receiving direct payment and special loan consideration for these services Mr YATRo - I was going to ask that you conclude at this point so that we are able to take a 10-minute recess We have a vote on the floor Whereupon there was a short recess taken Mr YATRON The subcommittee will resume its hearing Mr Scheina I am sorry for the interruption 12 Mr ScoarA Thank you sir Moving on to Ltin Ameiica Cuba's support for radical governments and revolutionary movements increased notably during 1979 Political social and economic problems in the Caribbean and Central America provided Cuba with ample opportunities which Havana has exploited Cuban long-term investment in the Sandinistas paid handsome profits when in July this previously insignificant insurgent movement was able to topple the Somoza government in Nicaragua Cuba has nurtured the Sandinistas for nearly two decades and as their activities gained impetus in 1978 this low profile assistance dramatically changed Security deletion 1 It is very doubtful that the Sandinistas could have achieved victory without Cuban support Since July Cuba has provided a large amount of assistance to the new government There are presently an estimated security deletion Cuban military advisers working with Nicaraguan forces Cuban civilian advisers numbering approximately security deletion are working at the national and local levels This includes about security deletion teachers most of whom instruct throughout the country in primary schools and conduct literacy programs The remaining Cuban civilians are medical personnel road construction workers and technicians assisting with agriculture economics fishing and construction projects Moving to the northern tier of Central America Cuba cooperates with guerrilla groups in El Salvador and Guatemala and with the Communist Party in Honduras In both El Salvador and Guatemala the dissident forces are represented by several groups Havana's principal efforts have been to encourage the international factions to increase their amount of cooperation fSecurity deletion Moving on to the Caribbean Cuban support to Grenada has been quite active in the past year On March 13 1979 Grenadan Prime Minister Sir Eric Gairy was ousted by Maurice Bishop Bishop and members of his political party the New Jewel movement had had dealings with the Cubans Security deletion Since shortly after the coup Cuba had provided military equipment security deletion In addition there are an estimated security deletion Cuban military personnel in Grenada who have been training Grenada's security deletion army On the civilian side an estimated security deletion Cuban advisers have worked in Grenada since the coup assisting the Government and working in education agriculture medicine and political indoctrination In November Prime Minister Bishop announced that the two countries had formalized a pact under which the Cubans would provide $10 million in heavy construction equipment and supplies plus 250 workers to build an international airport It should be noted that Cuban involvement in Nicaragua and Grenada however has caused a few of the eastern Caribbean states to be more cautious toward Cuban intentions Examples of this are security deletion and to a lesser extent security deletion The highest level of Cuban activity in the region is in Jamaica Relations between the two countries have improved steadily since Prime Minister Michael Manler and Fidel Castro first met while enroute to the 1973 Nonalined Conference in Algiers Since then the two leaders have developed a close personal relationship and Manley is said to be very much under the influence of Castro 13 There have been reports that the Cubans carry on intelligence gatherings and other activities in Jamaica with the apparent knowledge and acquiescence of Manley In fact Havana's ambassador to Kingston Ulises Estrada is known to have served as deputy chief of the Americas Department of the Communist Party the organization responsible for revolutionary activities in Latin America Security deletion Mr SC IIEUA There is a large Cuban civilian personnel in Jamaica Approximately 350 are construction laborers who are working on hospitals microdains sports installations and a series of six schools There are some 40 Cuban medical people working in Jamaican hospitals In addition to these there are diplomatic and intelligence personnel Since 1975 about 1 000 Jamaicans between 18 and 35 years have been trained in Cuba As of late 1979 there were 375 participating in this program In conclusion I would like to show you a slide of Cuban worldwide objectives as stated in our 1976 briefing to your joint committee We can use this as a report card to grade the degree of success the Cubans have had in carrying out their foreign policy It appears that the Cubans have been working quite well toward achieving these goals Cuban presence overseas is now approaching 50 000 as Havana has people in many areas of tile world Cuban involvement overseas whether it be civilian or military has brought success in obtaining all of these objectives In Africa support for Angola and Ethiopia show that Cuba is not only a surrogate of Moscow's foreign policy but additionally a competent partner In the last year especially Cuban influence in Latin America has grown Havana has taken major steps in bringing Nicaragua Grenada and Jamaica into its sphere of influence In conjunction with Cuban advances overseas the military ha sundergone a significant upgrading In the last several years the Cuban Armed Forces have graduated from what was a defensive force to one which with Soviet assistance can deploy a large number of troops to distant conflicts on short notice To a lesser extent the Cubans ire now able to serve as an important regional military actor in the Caribbean area Mr Chairman this concludes my briefing I would be happy to en- tertain any questions that you and t'he members may have Additionally I would like to say that we would like to take a few minutes for an opportunity to bring you security deletion Mr YATRON All right I want to thank you very much for an excellent briefing Mr Scheina and I thank-you too Dr Collins Do you want to do this after the questioning or do you want to do it now Mr SCHEINA We would have to clear the room now so I think it would be best to do it after the questioning Mr YATRON All right In reference to your opening statement Dr Collins you said terrorism persists but not as widespread as a few years ago However last year's testimony showed a significant increase in terrorism Would you care to comment Mr COLLINS I think I would prefer to ask Colonel MartinezBoucher to help me out on that 62-713 0 - 80 - 2 14 Colonel MArTINzz-BocHZR The statement is valid from the point of view that terrorism persists in certain areas that we are not referring to For example in Colombia terrorism is very very serious We have noticed a greater resurgence during the past year Of course we are referring to changes that have occurred from 1978 to 1979 Terrorism remains at a relatively high level but that tempo remains pretty level Tomorrow I will touch on that Mr Chairman We will point out the areas where we have noted an increase in terrorism Mr YATRON Thank you Colonel Martinez-Boucher Mr Scheina on page 4 you noted that there is security deletion However does the brigade have such security deletion capability Mr SCHEINA There would be the possibility of using Cuban equipment not presently belonging to the brigade '%r YATRON Security deletion Air COLLINS Security deletion Mr YATho Security deletion Mr COLLINS Security deletion M r YATRO N Could you tell what security deletion the Turya hydrofoil and the OSA-Il patrol boat Mr SCHEINA Yes sir Security deletion Mr YATRON Is there any chance of Cuba getting them Mr SCHEINA I think sir in the future it is possible In this area it is more or less speculation on our part We have seen some upgrad- ing of the Cuban forces and this could be a logical progression in this modernization program Mr YATRON With the Cubans possessing over security deletion Mig aircraft is it the best equipped air force in Latin America I see the colonel shaking his head yes Colonel fARTINEZ-BOUCHER I would say they are probably the best equipped force in Latin America today Mr SCIIEI NA If I could add one thing to the Colonel's statement the Cuban Air Force is primarily composed of fighter aircraft Most of them are defensive some with a limited offensive capability There are other air forces which have a better or larger long-transport ele- ment than the Cubans do But as far as defending the homeland I would say the Cubans would be the best yes sir Air YATRON Would you consider such strength which is the approximate strength carried by the Nimitz class aircraft carrier a threat to the United States Mr COLLINS I would say it is a very modest threat The only real threat are the security deletion Mig-23's The other aircraft are not a threat The Mig-23's themselves in any conventional types of role would be a very-modest threat In any nuclear role you would not expect them to be used because the other capabilities are so much greater than the Soviets have Mr YATRONX Mr Lagomarsino Mr LA0OMARSIN O Thank you fr Chairman Security deletion Mr COLLI-NS Security deletion Mr LAOOMARSI NO Is there any evidence or do you see any indica- tion that the Soviet combat brigade has any possible role in attempting a takeover of the Guantanamo Naval Base Mr SCH EIN-A I would say this is extremely unlikely because of the presence of the brigade in western Cuba and the location of Guan tanamo in eastern Cuba Additionally it had been decided that if the 15 Guantanamo Base were to be overrun that the Cubans have a large number of forces in eastern Cuba which I am sure would be deployed security deletion Mr LAOOMARSYNO We would certainly have advance notice if they did start to move in that brigade It is a long way from there as I understand Mr SCHFI NA Yes sir Certainly if they attempted to move the brigade we should be able to detect the movement especially from one end of the island to the other Mr LAGOMARSINO I know this is not in your exact line of work but you might have run into something with regard to it earlier today some of us met with the families of some of the Americans who are being held prisoner in Cuba mostly for the last 2 years or less than the last 2 years We were told that many of them had been seized in international waters that they were not violating any law other than that alleged one that is trespassing Do you have any information on those I mean without getting into all the details of the people but just a general run down I Mr SCHEI A We really do not have any information in that area We feel that probably the question would be better put to the State Department than ourselves Mr LAGO3ARSINO I was going to ask you about this I notice that you referred in your testimony to the fence jumpers at Guantanamo Now the number security deletion and I guess it is already pretty high for this year Mr SCHEINA Yes sir Mr LAOOMARSINO I think that is a very significant thing more so than it might sound to an uninitiated person because that means they have to traverse a clear area on the Cuban side they are shot at and it is not an easy thing to do So that would lend pretty strong evidence that things are not very good economically Mr SCHEINA That is correct Mr LAGOMARSINO I am still somewhat confused about the difference between a Mig-23 and a 27 Mr SCHKINA Yes sir The designator Mig-27 has been assigned to one model of the family which is called the Flogger aircraft That is the Mig-27 Flogger-D This is an aircraft which is used by the Soviet Air Force and plays a ground attack role The Mig-23 Flogger which the Cubans have is an export version The Mig-23 family contains a number of models but the one that is not in the family is the Mig-27 Flogger-D the domestic ground attack model The Cubans have the export ground attack which is the Mig-23 Flogger-F model Mr LAGOMA RSINO It is a 23 and not a 27 Mr SCHEINA Yes sir It is a 23 and its capabilities are security deletion Mf r LAGOMARSINO Apparently there is some confusion about that on the military side too because we were in Key West and received a briefing and we were told they did have Mig-27's Mr SCHEINA I will have to talk to the people at Key West Mr LAOXAPAINO It does not really make a heck of a lot of difference because as I understand it the Mig-23 that the Cubans have is a ground-attack model Mr ScHUNA That is right --itis a ground-attack aircraft 16 Mr LAGOMARSINO An interesting thing-I was in Guantanamo a week ago this last weekend-was that the Marine colonel who is in charge of ground defense in Guantanamo told me in response to my question Did you have any evidence that any of the troops that are manning that frontier bride around Guantanamo have had African experience I and he said security deletion Mr SCHEINA Security deletion Mr Mr Mr Mr YATRoN Are you throughI LAGOMARSINO Yes YATRON Mr Guyer GUYER Mr Chairman thank you very much I am sorry I missed part of your testimony I know you spent a great deal of time and research in this area I would have made a very poor prophet because when I first heard of Castro at the time he appeared on the Ed Sullivan program a good many years ago he was heralded as the George Washington of Cuba Now had I been a betting man I would have bet he would not have lasted 4 or 5 years One of the great astonishments to me at least is his durability Do you have any feeling or any particular wisdom in the area as to why he is that important to the Soviet Union He certainly is the most costly relative that ever came to dinner This has gone on for a good many years Is he part of a long long long term program or is it because he happens to have that peculiar locale situation of proximity to us that makes him valuable Mr SCHEINA Sir certainly the proximity situation makes Mr Castro extremely valuable Because of the proximity we feel that the Soviets believe that they can provide security deletion billion a year not only because of proximity but because of the activities which the Cubans are providing overseas the combat role which they are playing in Angola and Ethiopia The Soviets and the Cubans have consummated a very what you might call effective marriage where the Cubans are providing the troops and the Soviets are providing virtually all the equipment Despite the investment they are making they have been able to make strides throughout the world quite a few in Africa and possibly we may be seeing some in Latin America in the future Mr GuYER He never seems to be a puppet ruler though When you see or hear Mr Castro he always seems to be dominant I wonder if the Soviets have given him that kind of latitude that he is not really one of their outlying provinces that he really is almost a partner In fact you have indicated that his aspirations of being the Third World leader may help explain that Do you have any comment on that Mr COLLIN-S If I could refer first to your previous question you asked if there was some long term design in this I think I would say that there is This goes all the way back to 1920 and Lenin's theory of the party and a variety of things But after the first flush of revolution in Europe wore off the Communists really decided that the road to revolution lay in what we now call the Third World They base this on Lenin's theories that the capitalist world depended on raw materials and what he called superprofits from the colonies 17 Consequently there has been a consistent effort to remove Western influence from the what were then colonies and the former colonies In connection also with Lenin's theory the party had to be largely clandestine and it had to be guided by professional revolutionaries If you look at how the Castro brothers got their training they were trained in Mexico by a professional revolutionary When they went to Cuba the third member was a professional revolutionary and the son of a woman who had been an Argentine professional revolutionary Although the party has changed a lot and the executive committee of the Communist international has now been incorporated in the international section of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the objective has not changed From their standpoint of morality they are trying to establish just governments wherever unjust governinents exist in the world And consequently they are willing to spend a lot of money to do it It is very difficult for us to grasp the fact that the money does not mean that much to them if they are achieving their objectives Now I would have to add to all of this that this is not a rigid blueprint that they are pretty flexible on how they apply i1mr GuYER May I ask you we have the benefit of aving your testiMony experience and deep research How much of what you have told us actually gets to the President and to the Secretary of State I am sure it is available but is there credibility Would they receive the same testimony Mr COLLINS I do not think we can answer that because there are really three channels of intelligence in the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency largely supports the President and the National Security Council Now we of course and State provide a great deal of information and they have access to anything that we do The State Department is supported by INR within the State Department and the Department of Defense and the JCS are supported by us So I would say that each of these organizations is probably receiving a little bit different interpretation of events Mr GUYER It must be most discouraging when you do your homework so well and then it seems that it does not reach either the proper sources or if it does they do not give it the attention and priority For example the first report we had on the brigade was a very benign report Nobody was a bit alarmed about it It was very casual It was just regarded as almost unmeaningful and yet it takes on different proportions as you hear it presented from a different viewpoint I would hope we have a little better success in the correlation of our information without being out of school Security deletion I am confident that we do need a better channeling of information to the proper sources At the decisionmaking level neither you nor us are always in that capacity but I think this is eminently important and I have said repeatedly that the Soviets have never abandoned their goal which took on only one new dimension Their goal has always been No 1 world encirclement No 2 internal demoralization No 3 nuclear 18 which only came in the nuclear age But they have never abandoned that one objective We do not seem to be getting the message that the people they use and work with are also going in that general direction Would you agree with that Mr SCIMINA Yes sir I would agree with that 100 percent Mr GUYER Thank you Mr YATRON Mr Lagomarsino Mr LAGOMARSINO Mr Chairman we went into this before in another hearing but one of the things that real1V is frustrating to me and again I will repeat this for the benefit of my colleagues who were not in attendance at the hearings that the chairman of our full committee held with regard to the role of the CIA and I know it has to be many nany more times frustrating to the people who have to operate within the parameters of this business is how the stories get out to the public about how ineffective the intelligence community is how they did not warn about what happened in Iran how they did not warn what was going on in Nicaragua and so on and so forth We find in many of these instances that in fact they did that information was put in the hands of whoever received it and it was either ignored put on the back burner or who knows what- and in some cases to add insult to injury at least in one case the director of the CIA was publicly chastised for not furnishing information that he apparently had actually furnished Of course the intelligence community for two reasons cannot really do much about it No 1 it is confidential information they cannot release it And second they would be in the position of arguing with their commander in chief or at least someone up in the order o command So I do not know but I think you are right Mr GUYER I do not know of a single incident in American history or world history for that matter where a vital war hot or cold was ever won without the intelligence contribution That can go back into the Bible from then on until now Mr LAoo-ARSr o Let me say that if we had had in World War IT the kind of leaks that we have today it might still be going on If the Japanese and Germans knew we had broken their code I think it would have been a fairly simple thing for them to develop a new one I do not think they would have stayed with that one It would have made it a much more costly endeavor and lasted a lot longer time That is something that we can and should be telling our constituents that specific example because that is now out in the open Mr GUYER I would not be hurt if I were not party to some of the information or most of it because I have a feeling that it is like trying to get out of a book club You can get out of Russia quicker than you can quit a book club If we had to wait on Congress to resolve these emergencies we just never would Let's face it we are not expedient bodies We would make horrible SWAT teams I can tell you that Mr LAGOKARSINO In the testimony today and I have heard a lot of this before not all in one place and not so well coordinated but we were well aware at the time it was happening not just in retrospect about the Cuban role in the Nicaraguan revolution were we not Mr CoLu S Yes sir -blackmail 19 Mr LooxARsixo Was not that information furnished to the State Department Mr CoLLaIs Yes sir Mr LAGoM ASINO Yet in spite of that some rather high officials in our Government not to be named said the Cuban role in the Nicaraguan revolution was minimal or some such word like that Mr COLLINS I could possibly explain how that view could be held because I have heard it so much That is the conditions for a revolution were very very ripe You also had help from security deletion I think it is our view and I would certainly urge my colleagues back here to say whether they agree or not that the Cuban arms and possibly some other help like Cuban intelligence and that type of thing were probably crucial to the operation I do not know whether they would agree Colonel MARTINEz-BoucHER No question about it Mr LAGOwMARSINO The question is could they have done it without it I Colonel MA rINzz-BOUCHER No they could not have done it with- out it Mr LA0OARSINO That is hardly minimal Another thing too I understand that one of the key things that happened in Nicaragua right before the success of the revolution was the consolidation of the three branches of the Sandinistas' movement and I cannot remember the name of them the three into one unified command I understand also and this is not very far away but to switch to El Salvador that Castro has been at least partially successful in doing the same thing there Colonel MARTINEZ- BOUCHER Castro was instrumental in bringing the Sandinistas together which was essential to their victory Castro has made very strong efforts to bring together the groups in El Salvador and he is trying to do the same thing in Guatemala This is an indispensable process because so long as his groups- are not working together they are not able to defeat the existing government One of the basic steps is to unify those forces and Castro and his people have been effective One of the conditions in providing assistance to these groups is that they come together as a group as one unified group Mr MCCLELLAN Castro has been beating this point very hard at least since the mid-1970's 1974 1975 time frame and it has proven successful Mr GUYER We have had enormous difficulty getting people on the ground in Cuba is that true that most of our intelligence has to come from other sources due to the fact that he runs a pretty tight ship Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER Security deletion Mr GuYER It is very hazardous as I understand Mr LAOO31ARSINO I understand that we have excellent technical information as far as movement of airplanes and so on Mr SCHEINA Security deletion Mr LAGOMARSINO That is a good question Mr SCHEINA If you want I will address it Would you address it Mr YATRON Would you pleaserepeat the question Mr LAGOMARSINO 20 Mr LAOMABSINo The question is if our intelligence capability is so good how come we did not know about the Soviet combat brigade until we did Mr SCHEINA Security deletion Mr COLLINS Security deletion Mr LAGOMARSINO Back to the prior big flap when the Mig-23's were first discovered and or announced Fidel Castro himself asked our congressional delegation why the United States was so exercised about the presence of Mig-23's in Cuba when to quote him You have known for 6 months that they were here before you said anything about it Mr SCHEINA Well sir we addressed this question last year too We feel that President Castro's statement that the Mig-23's had been on the island for 6 months security deletion Mr LAGOMARSINO I am not sure there is a discrepancy in the time I gathered from what I heard before that the administration was advised of what you just told me and that that was some time before the public announcement was made Mr MCCLELLAX There was still a discrepancy Security deletion Mr GUYER Was not one of the holdups the fact that the number of people did not change so much as the names they gave them we were waitingfor the word brigade to emerge Mr LAGOMARSINO I was talking about the airplanes Mr GUYER The number of people though had not varied considerably it was what you wanted to call them When you started calling them brigades then our ears kind of went up like an antenna and we started looking a little bit more closely Mr SCHEINA Security deletion Mr GUYER No more questions Mr YATRON Mr Scheina for what purposes other than military is the AN-26 Curl aircraft being used in Cuba if any Mr SCHEINA This is a transport aircraft and it can be used for transporting civilians as well as equipment Security deletion Mr YATRON What types of missiles are the security deletion surface-to-air missile sites equipped with Mr SCHEINA There has been a change in the text Your copy says security deletion it was actually security deletion of these sites are equipped with the SA-2 missile which is a medium to high-range altitude missile And security deletion sites are equipped with the SA-3 which is a low to medium-range missile also an older missile It has been in the Soviet inventory for 15 maybe even more years Mr YATRON Are the missiles first line or second line or vintageI Mr SCHEIN-A They are still being used in the Soviet inventory However the Soviets have developed follow-on missiles with improved capabilities but they are still quite an effective missile Mr YATRON Do you have any information which would indicate that the Soviets are planning to deploy the Backfire bomber to any of the Cuban improved air facilities Mr SCHEINA This is a question that has been extensively asked of my organization We have done quite a bit of research and security deletion The Cubans do have security deletion airfields which have sufficient runway length to satisfy the needs of the Backfire bomber security deletion 21 Mr YATRON There were somenewspaper reports that they were extending the runway I believe at Cien fuegos Mr SCHEINA Security deletion And since there are already Security deletion airfields in the country which can handle the Backfire what is the need of extending one particular airfield for that aircraft Mr YATRON Security deletion Mr SCHEINA Mr YATRON - Security deletion Security deletion Mr SCHEINA Security deletion Mr GUYER Could I ask what is the speed of the Backfire f How much takoff strip does it have to have in footage to get off the ground Mr SCHEINA If you give me just a second sir I will get that for you Mr GUYER I would be surprised if you had it there Mr COLLINS The maximum sea level speed is mach security deletion which is around security deletion knots and the maximum speed at altitude is mach security deletion which is security deletion meters or roughly security deletion feet Mr SCHEINA The runway length sir I have consulted with our Soviet airshop and they say it is somewhere in the area of about security deletion feet Mr GuYR Security deletion Mr YATRON I will have to be excused for a few moments Mr Lagomarsino will you chair the meeting please Mr LAGOMARSINO Does anybody on the staff want to ask any questions Mr FRIEDMAN Yes Don't you have any Mr LAGOMARSINO Not right now Go ahead Mr FRIEDMAN IS it a possibility that the improved Cuban naval facilities could be used to service Soviet nuclear submarines Mr SCHEINA Security deletion Mr FRIEDMAN Security deletion Mr SCHEINA Security deletion Mr FRIEDMAN You mentioned the mismanagement of the Cuban economy Is that a failing of individuals or of the system Mr COLLINS I think that we could say that we do not know of any socialist economy that works well So one would think that the system is partially at fault But probably there are failings of individuals as well People are trying to manage enterprises that they have no real experience with Mr FRIEDMAN Do you see the possibility in the near future of the Soviet Union denying Cuba's ever-increasing requests because of its own economic problems Mr COLLINS I do not see that as likely because there is evidence going back 15 years that the Soviets are dissatisfied with the Cubans' work habits their economic performance a variety of things but they continue to put up the money Mr FRIEDMAN On the subject of the discontent mentioned in your testimony how does this discontent manifest itself Mr SCHEINA It has been manifested in one very popular way which has been graffiti There has been quite a bit of graffiti in the Havana area Of course another one is the number of people trying to escape the island in addition to the people who have jumped the fence at 22 Guantanamo There have been some small boats the Cubans have tried to hijack to get out of the island There have been statements security deletion that people in Cuba are dissatisfied with the system but of course would not dare voice this openly They are very circumspect about who they talk to Mr FRIEDMAN Have there been any reports of any covert or overt antigovernment activitiesI Mr SCHEINA No large scale organized activities nothing to go beyond what I guess we could call malicious mischief Mr FRIEMN How about a slowdown in production is that evident Mr ScmINA Production has always been rather slow Whether the speed of production has decreased even more it is hard to say Mr FrEaMAN Is the Cuban public aware of losses and casualties that they have suffered in the overseas activities I know we have asked it in prior years Is it more out in the open now or is it still being shielded Mr SCHEINA Well sir the only way that this information becomes available to the Cubans is when it touches them at home when a neighbor down the block did not come home from Angola or Ethiopia or he comes back in a lame condition The Cubans do not publicize any information regarding losses with the exception of trying to pay tribute to maybe selective individuals for political reasons The mass media in Cuba is controlled by the Government and they do not i- ant to jeopardize the efforts overseas by providing fuel to the people who might take it as a reason to not want to serve overseas Mr FRIELMAN Could you give us an update on such losses and casualties since our briefing last year Is there any indication of anything Mr SCHEINA Security deletion Mr LAGOMARSINO While we were in Guantanamo there was a reort that there had been not the level of a riot but a demonstrationbelieve it was in Guantanamo City one of the cities north of the bay-when they had brought some bodies back from Africa to bury Are you aware of that Mr SCHEINA Security deletion Mr LAGOMARsiNO Do they generally bring the bodies back as far as you know Mr SCHEINA Security deletion We know that the Cubans do have graveyards in Angola and a number of people have been buried overseas In addition to that a number of the Cubans are sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe where they have received rehabilitation for debilitating injuries But that is true some are brought home to the island Mr COLLINS Might I add that their practice is to send their casualties to hospitals in Eastern Europe rather than back to Cuba for hospitalization Mr LAOO31ARSIN-O Are you familiar with the Tuesday February 26 article by Jack Anderson entitled Kremlin Stirs a New Crisis in Cuba Mr SCHEINA Yes sir quite familiar with that Mr LAGOMARSiNO Could you tell us what in there is accurate and what is not Mr SCHEINA Unfortunately I do not have a copy If I could look at yours I would have the opportunity sir 23 Thank you Concerning the first point on doubling of the Soviet brigade in Cuba security deletion Mr LAoo ABsmio Even if that were true the advisers have not increased lately is that correct Mr SCHENA Security deletion Concerning the Backfire bomber I addressed that before security deletion With regard to Soviet fighter pilots we have pointed out that in the past there have been Soviet pilots who came to Cuba to fill in for Cubans overseas but security deletion Concerning the Soviet denial of combat status of the brigade I guess it depends on what one considers a combat unit If you say the unit has not been in combat does that make it not a combat unit Certainly given the troops and the perceived level of expertise these troops have and the equipment they have and certainly for their size they would be a potent combat force Mr LAGOARSINO The Russians would be very disappointed if it was not a combat force Mr SCHziKA They would feel they were not getting their money's worth sir Mr LAGOMARSINO As a matter of fact is it not true that they have never denied that it is a combat unit Mr COLLINS I think they did deny to the State Department that it was a combat unit I would have to check back from last year but I believe they said it was a training unit Mr SCHEINA Security deletion j The statement that the Soviets have been sent to Cuba to release the Cubans for overseas activity security deletion the presence of the brigade appears to go back well before the massive Cuban involvement overseas Here again I do not think the Cubans would think it a fair trade for them to have in Ethiopia and Angola alone some 33 000 combat troops to be replaced by 3 000 combat troops on the island I thinkthey feel a 10-for-I exchange would not be a fair trade I think I have touched on the major items there Mr LAGomARSINo Just to follow up in a March 18 article by Jack Anderson he says Spy satellites have spotted a suspicious looking building at Punta Movida near Cienfuegos It closely resembles the kind of structure used in eastern Europe for storage and maintenance of nuclear missiles Punta Movida Is also being connected by railroad which raises the possibility that nuclear submarines could be serviced at the huge shed Do you have any information on that Mr SCHINA I would be glad to talk about that Security deletion Mr LAOONARSINo Do you have any further questions Mr GuYER I have no further questions Mr LAGOMARSINO Mr Fox Mr Fox Yes sir if I might I wanted to ask you a general question Given the tremendous amount of Soviet equipment that they have in Cuba and the fact that so much of it is not useful for a longrange offensive capability it seems to far exceed their domestic needs In addition such equipment is not going to prevent the United States from taking action against them So what is the logical conclusion for 24 the potential use of this massive amount of armament I Certainly the transport planes and the submarines could not be used let's say in Africa or some other distant foreign adventure Mr SCHEINA It is possible and in fact in the conclusion of the briefing I indicated that the uban military role has been evolving from a strictly defensive mission to one with some offensive capabilities As far as for areas well outside of the Caribbean they have to rely upon either the Soviets for providing arms overseas or for transporta tion or they have to rely on their own commercial airlines-and merchant marine However within the Caribbean region the Cubans are developing a limited offensive force-the submarines the Mig-23's and the AN-26 aircraft--to build up this capability One however must view these capabilities as being quite modest at this point Security deletion Cuban troops is not a massive number and the deployment of such aircraft to air drop troops to any place in the Caribbean region security deletion Mr Fox That is why it seems a bit unusual that they would have spent such a large amount of money to develop this kind of resource base for the limited targets available and the range capability that the weapons provide Mr SCHiEINA In support of at least the AN-26's it can be said the Cuban transport arm of the air force is rather aged Before the AN26's were delivered it was considered that it was a very aged arm and that maybe modernization was not in line Mr Fox If I might I had a couple of other items I wanted to discuss In a report from Madrid by the EFE wire service there was a story on February 8 of this year regarding an air incident near the Domrinican border with Haiti between a couple of U S airplanes and a squadron of four Mig's from Cuba The report indicates that there was some air contact not fighting but at least scrambling and chasing evolved in the incident I was wondering if you had any information regarding that Security deletion M SCHEINA report Colonel MARTixEz-BOUCI ER Security deletion every so often the Cuban Air Force will scramble their fighters In fact just recently they forced aircraft with U S registry to land in Havana This has happened several times Security deletion Incidents of this nature occur every so often I think you were talking to some of the families of people that have been taken that way Quite often these people are involved in the traffic of marihuana from Central America or from Colombia and through Florida They do get stopped by the Cubans because they fly into the Cuban air space as I suppose they have all the right in the world to do Mr SCHEINA The Cubans are quite possessive of their territorial sea or air lines Security deletion Mr Fox I do not know whether you are going to get into this tomorrow but there have been several reports about Cuban training missions located in various spots in the Caribbean Grenada is one which supposedly some people were sent from St Lucia to be trained in Grenada by Cubans Reports coming from Trinidad and Tobago indicate that Cubans have been training their citizens in Grenada and also have been trying to infiltrate the islands by using false Venezuelan passports 25 Is this something you are going to touch on tomorrow or are you prepared to give us an overview of their activities in the Caribbean Colonel MARTIEz-BoucuER I think that we already touched today on the fact that there are Cubans training the Grenadan army in Grenada that there are Cubans I would say intelligence working in Jamaica Other than that we are going to be touching on the fact that we have had Nicaraguans we haveliad Hondurans we have had Salvadorans that have been trained in Cuba Security deletion Mr Fox One recent article reporting on the airbase that Cuba is helping to build in Grenada suggested that it might play some future strategic role for the Soviets The suggestion is that it would be large enough to handle the Backfire or other type of long-range combat aircraft Do you see any validity to that kind of an argument Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER No I do not think it is valid at all Mr FRIEDM3AN Are you saying you see no military use for that airport Mr SCHEINA I would like to say one thing If the airfield is going to handle international civilian air traffic it very likely may have a runway which is of sufficient length to handle the Backfire We are saying security deletion feet and I think if you are familiar with most of your international airfields they are security deletion or more Here one problem is that the present state of construction we do not know what the airfield is going to have what the capabilities are going to be I think it probably willbe quite a while before we really know what the length of that runway is going to be Mr Fox You mentioned in your presentation that one of the areas with the greatest Cuban involvement is in the island of Jamaica Given the fact that they are in the process of beginning a campaign followed by an election sometime later this year is there any evidence of increased Cuban activity which might in any way be related to influencing the outcome of that election Colonel MIARTINEZ-BouCHER Let me answer that one Security deletion Mr LAGOMARSINo An embarrassment I know that gutsy news- paper there the Gleaner has surely pointed that out and it has publicly named the Cuban ambassador Mr Estrada as the cause of a lot of their problems Mr SCHEINA Security deletion Mr LAGOMARSINO Also I see that Cuba is now criticizing the CIA for trying to destabilize the Manley government Mr SCHE NA That is not unusual Mr YATRON Would you gentlemen prefer that we recess until tomorrow and then we can submit some of these questions to you in writing or do you want to proceed so you can tell us some of the other information that you have available Mr COLLINS As you wish Mr Chairman We are perfectly pre- pared to proceed if you wish to do so Mr YATRON I think because of the lateness of the hour we should recess today until tomorrow at 2 o'clock The subcommittee now stands in recess continuing in executive session Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 4 50 p m to reconvene on Thursday March 27 1980 at 2 p m IMPACT OF CUBAN-SOVIET TIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE SPRING 1980 THUMRSAY MARCH 27 1980 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CoxMITrEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCO MITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS Washigton D A The subcommittee met at 2 p m in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building Hon Gus Yatron chairman of the subcommittee presiding Mr rATRoN Good afternoon The subcommittee will come to order Today the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs will continue its hearings on Soviet-Cuban relations and the impact on the Western Hemisphere Yesterday we heard testimony describing the Soviet activities in Cuba and the deployment of Cuban troops in Africa and other countries Today we will concern ourselves with the political effects of Soviet-Cuban influence with emphasis on the current situations in Central and South America and the Caribbean Our witnesses today are Dr Edward M Collins Deputy Director for Intelligence Research Defense Intelligence Agency and Lt Col Rafael E Martinez-Boucher Chief Latin American Branch Defense Intelligence Agency Gentlemen we will reconvene the hearing at the point where we recessed yesterday Having so voted we are still in executive session If the staff has determined that all of those who are present have the appropriate security clearance we will proceed Mr Collins you may proceed sir Mr COLLINS I believe we will hear Colonel Martinez' presentation at this time Mr YATRON Colonel STATEMENT OF LT COL RAFAEL E MARTINEZ-BOUCHER CHIEF LATIN AMERICAN BRANCH DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Colonel MAMRINEz-BOUCHER Good afternoon Mr Chairman Gentlemen the second part of our briefing will deal with political and military changes in Central America and the Caribbean during 1979 We will specifically address the impact that the Nicaraguan revolution has had on El Salvador Guatemala and Honduras We will examine the arms flow in Central America highlighting the role that Cuba has played 27 '1-_ 28 This will be followed by an analysis of the growth of Soviet and Cuban influence in the area contrasting this development with what Latin Americans perceive as the erosion of U S influence in the region We will touch on the arms transfer and conclude with a discussion of the problem of political instability and an update on terrorism The year 1979 marked the 20th anniversary of the Cuban revolution and two decades of what Latin Americans consider to be a gradual but clear erosion of U S influence in Latin America Many Latin Americans perceive events last year in Cuba Nicaragua and even tiny Grenada as further evidence of this trend which carries dangerous implications for the future The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua last July is perhaps the most dramatic and significant event in the region in recent years This event not only may have marked the beginning of the first social revolution in Latin America since the Cuban revolution in 1959 but also brought Cuba back into the business of exporting revolutions in the Caribbean basin a strategy that it had not actively pursued in Latin America since the ill-fated Bolivian adventure of Che Guevara in 1967 At that time that policy had been grudgingly abandoned in the face of what Cuba and the Soviets determined was U S resolve not to let another Cuba take place in the hemisphere Its readoption in Nicaragua was seen by many as clearly a probing action to ascertain whether the United States still had such a commitment in the post-Vietnam era The Sandinistas were a small group of Castroite insurgents that had been badly mauled by the Government forces over the years Since they had never shown much promise Cuban aid had always been meager Until 1974 the Sandinistas had little hope for victory But their successful operation that year increased their prestige and apparently convinced Castro that the situation was ripe for revolution With the assistance of security deletion -which had differing reasons for seeking the overthrow of the Somoza government-Cuba provided training funds arms and advice to bolster the Sandinistas until they became a viable core around which other anti-Somoza forces coalesced -Borrowing a chapter from the Spanish Civil War sympathetic leftists from neighboring countries joined the Sandinistas Many Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas went to Nicaragua to fight against Somoza believing that reciprocal aid would be furnished afterwards Somoza's downfall had a ripple effect in Central America Flushed with success or inspired by the example guerrillas in El Salvador renewed their efforts holding to the Nicaraguan experience as a general blueprint Cuba again indicated its willingness to cooperate security deletion Several highly motivated and financially self-sufficient Marxist insurgent groups were already operating in the country Furthermore the economic and political structure of the country was perhaps even more inequitable than that of Nicaragua The circumstances provide Cuba with a perfect opportunity to influence the outcome of the conflict or at least ingratiate themselves with the potential victors at little financial or political risk Guerrilla training for Salvadoran cadres has been provided in Cuba arms have been furnished and steps taken to enlist the cooperation of all leftist forces in El Salvador and surrounding countries to support the insurgency Security deletion 29 Cuba has maintained a low visibility in its support placing enough distance between itself and the indigenous guerrillas to give it a measure of plausible denial Its ability to do so is increased by the relative self-sufficiency of the Salvadorans Cuba consequently finds itself playing a support and advisory role in the case of El Salvador different from the more prominent position it exercised in Nicaragua The Salvadorans have made it abundantly clear that they neither seek nor will accept any leadership other than their own The fact that they need limited assistance from Cuba and are confident that they have a winning formula allows them to deal with the Cubans with a certain degree of equality The war in El Salvador is largely locally grown While the armed struggle has received the greatest amount of attention and there may now be as many as security deletion armed and trained guerrillas in El Salvador their greatest achievements have not been in military engagements The disruption of the country's economy by means of massive civil disturbances strikes and takeovers of farms and factories has had most damaging effect The threat of anarchy and a total collapse of the economy is as great a danger as that posed by the growing strength of the guerrillas Security deletion At this point I would like to add a word about the assassination of Archbishop Romero The death of Archbishop Oscar Romero could easily provide the spark to set off a civil war in El Salvador Thus far the populace has acted with shock and apprehension and apprehension that a bloodbath is about to begin Numerous bombs have been set off each night and some shooting has taken place There has not been so far any widespread demonstrations Regardless of who perpetrated the crime Romero's death can only work to the advantage of the extreme left whether they are able to fully exploit the opportunity is still uncertain Unless they do so within the next few days they may lose the opportunity to wrap themselves in the Archbishop's mantle The embassy in El Salvador reports that in death the Archbishop has become even more important than he was in life Security deletion Colonel MARTINEz-BoucHiEn Returning to Central America Guatemala comes after El Salvador security deletion Many of the-same political economic and social pressures prevalent in El Salvador also exist in Guatemala including an oligarchy that has resisted virtually all reform efforts Dissidents here were also given a shot in the arm by the Nicaraguan victory Insurgent activities have increased since then both in frequency and intensity however the government forces are still very much in control Security deletion The other likely target for serious Marxist insurgency over the longer term is Honduras the poorest country in the region While the potential for revolution exists the pressure for change is not nearly as strong as in El Salvador and Guatemala Security deletion Their theory appears to be that once Honduras is surrounded by leftist governments it will be relatively easy to topple 62-713 0 - 80 - 3 s0 Although political social and economic problems are at the roots of the insurgency in Central America military hardware continues to be indispensable to insurgent groups-therefore it would be useful to examine the flow of armament in the area During the Nicarguan civil war once popular support had built up around the FSL arms were the single greatest need of the Sandinistas and one which the Cubans were readily willing to supply At that time a wide variety of weapons including recoilless rifles mortars and antiaircraft guns were flown into Nicaragua from Cuba by way of security deletion The ease with which they could be introduced made it possible not only to bring in a large quantity of arms but also some heavy infantry weapons not normally associated with guerrilla warfare in Latin America As part of the Sandinista strategy small arms were handed out to any prospective anti-Somoza recruit regardless of whether there had been any previous commitment to the Sandinistas This required a large number of weapons far more than the Sandinistas could provide from their own resources Since then the weapons traffic from Cuba coming into the region had been reduced to a steady but important trickle Part of the reason is that the most active insurgent groups in the area are now the Salvadorans who have amassed a sizable war chest by means of kidnapings and bank robberies As a result they can buy most of the arms they need Part of these they buy in-country and some they pick up through representatives abroad Automatic weapons however are harder to come by and Cuba is the suspected source of most of these Security deletion Under the circumstances it is not at all surprising that the largest guerrilla group in El Salvador openly boasts that it has enough weapons to arm all of its 60 000 members and sympathizers Security deletion In Guatemala insurgents have had to rely on their own resources for weapons Most of what they have h-as been obtained locally or from their representative abroad security deletion In both El Salvador and Guatemala the weapons are western in origin with Israeli UZI submachineguns German G-3 rifles and Madsen submachineguns being some of the favorites Unlike Nicaragua no weapons manufactured in Communist countries have surfaced in El Salvador Guatemala or Honduras Security deletion Colonel MART1NXz-BoUcHEB As we conclude this review of events in Central America let me emphasize that Cuba's support for the Nicaraguan revolution security deletion Cuba is now attempting to increase its influence in Nicaragua security deletion The Cubans appear to bemoving cautiously in Central America however they are being pulled by the impatience of local Marxist groups that lave their attention focused primarily on local conditions rather than the options for U S global reaction which is of far greater concern to Cuba and their Soviet patrons Security deletion and seems to be moving toward the Cuban camp has not been lost on our friends or enemies The Marxists seem to have concluded-perhaps tentatively-that as long as an area is not considered vital by the United States support for insurgent efforts can be given without fear of retaliation Furthermore there are sev- 31 eral other countries in Central America and the Caribbean where the conditions are at least as exploitable as they were in Nicaragua under Somoza Developments in the Caribbean attracted a great deal of attention during the past year This attention is centered on the events that followed the overthrow of the Gairy government in Grenada by the New Jewel Movement-a Marxist group with Cuban connections-and in the economic and political situation in Jamaica where Prime Minister Manley struggled to retain power with the help of Cuba and the Soviet Union We were concerned then and remain concerned today with the possibility that the new Caribbean island nations may fall prey to Cuban influence Grenada is such an example You have already heard testimony describing Cuban involvement in that island Today Grenada-may be considered to be a member of the-Soviet-Cuban camp It for example voted against the General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian intervention in Afghanistan At the same time the radicalization of Grenada Cuban activities in the region and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have awakened the fears of moderate leaders in the Caribbean and given them ammunition against leftist elements The recent electoral victories of the conservative ruling party of St Vincent and of a conservative coalition in Saint Christopher-Nevis may be partially attributed to these events In Jamaica during 1979 Manley continued to seek economic assistance from the Soviet Union with disappointing results Manley's 5-day official visit to Moscow in April was the major public event in Soviet-Jamaican relations since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1975 but although Manley hailed the visit as a significant breakthrough in bilateral relations Jamaica actually gained little and in fact may even incur losses As a result of the visit a trade agreement was signed that guaranteed Soviet alumina purchases at the existing 50 000 tons annually through 1984 in exchange for Soviet goods The Jamaican Government however has to purchase the alumina at ever-increasing prices as well as pay the shipping costs to the U S S R Throughout 1979 Jamaica's economy continued to deteriorate and the Government remained incapable of finding any solutions Taking advantage of Manley's mismanagement of the economy and of increased public suspicions of Cuban activities in the country Edward Seaga leader of the opposition Jamaica Labour Party launched a blistering attack against the Government and its relations with the Soviets and Cubans In June 1979 he named intelligence officials at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in a speech alleging that they were in close contact with the special branch the intelligence arm of the Jamaica Constabulary Force He also charged that the ruling People's National Party had established links with the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and Cuba Other opposition politicians quoted in the independent press followed these revelations by charging that the Prime Minister and other members of his government were in close contact with Soviet and Cuban intelligence personnel and that Manley and others in his party were in collusion with various Soviet and Cuban groups to lead Jamaica further along the path toward Marxism 32 As political pressure mounted and the economic problem became more intractable-Manley could not meet the IMF conditions to obtain desperately needed assistance-the Prime Minister was forced to call for elections possibly to be held as early as October of this year We believe that this brief respite from leftist inroads in the Caribbean basin will be of very short duration This area remains plagued by deep-rooted economic and social problems that seem unsolvable Moderate forces and democratic institutions in the region will survive only if economic and security assistance is provided DIA is convinced that despite Cuba's domestic problems Havana remains determined to exploit the social and economic ills of the region not only to preserve the gains it has achieved up to now but also to pursue the goal of becoming the regional power We will continue to see Cuba and the indigenous Marxist groups in the Caribbean and Central America piobing further They apparently believe that they can operate in the area with a greater degree of impunity than they had in the past Future developments will not depend only on Cuban and Soviet initiative and internal problems but also on U S responses and the Latins' perception of such responses Mr Chairman I would like to move now to South America and the growth of Soviet influence in that area Mr YATRoNq Without objection Colonel MA NEz-BouCIIER The United States has traditionally enjoyed a position of ratinfluence throughout Latin America However in recent years there has been a gradual but significant erosion of that influence which has been manifested in several ways The Soviets have attempted to exploit this situation More and more Latin American countries are developing policies and taking positions that are often at variance with ours-the Sandinistas' victory in Nicaragua is seen by some Latins as a victory of communism over U S interests the Argentines' and Brazilians' nuclear programs thwart U S efforts to minimize nuclear proliferation and Mexico increasingly challenges U S initiatives Related to the foregoing and a reflection of this process is the growing influence of the Andean Pact and the increased tendency especially among the larger countries to pursue new foreign policy initiatives that are not compatible with our own interests Latin Americans see the lessening of U S military ties with their countries as a sign of lack of U S interest in the area The great majority of Latin governments continue to be controlled by their armed forces The military's dissatisfaction with any given set of arms policies influences governmental perceptions and decisions that may have little or no relation to military issues The Soviets have attempted with limited success to exploit these perceptions and have been very forthcoming with their offers of arms The U S S R has also used diplomacy trade and technical assistance to further its interests Their approach has been flexible and has been aimed at several countries disregarding the political coloration of the government in power Hydroelectric development projects in such conservative countries as Argentina and Brazil are two good examples of this 33 In the area of diplomacy Moscow has expanded the number of diplomatic ties in the region from 7 in 1969 to 17 at the present time Within the last 6 months they have established diplomatic relations with Nicaragua and Grenada Soviet trade both in arms and in commercial goods has grown at a relatively rapid pace Since 1970 trade with the region has increased over sixfold Commerce has been an easy tool since the Soviets have been willing to import much more from Latin America than it has sold in the area An excellent example of this situation is Argentina Ten years ago trade between the two countries amounted to only $40 million By 1978 trade between the two countries amounted to $486 million and the Soviet Union had become Argentina's largest trading partner Although this trade declined 20 percent last year the U S S R was still Argentina's second largest trade partner Since 1977 Argentina has accumulated a trade surplus with the U S S R amounting to $1 billion Where this type of relationship is not feasible as with weapon sales to Peru the Soviets have sought expanded trade by granting low prices and liberal credit Soviet technical assistance though still small also is increasing During the 1970's Latin America accounted for 0nly security deletion percent of the total economic aid extended by'the U S S R to less developed countries While small this represented a security deletion percent increase over the pre-1968 figures Almost all aid has been associated with high-visibility projects such as irrigation and port development in Peru a tin smelter in Bolivia and hydroelectric development in Argentina Brazil and Uruguay Outside of Cuba Soviet influence in Peru is by far the most pronounced in all of Latin America Prior to 1968 the Soviet presence was nonexistent but that year the United States suspended military sales to Peru and the Peruvians turned first to Western Europe and then to the Soviet Union for military hardware Moscow's massive offerings of military equipment not readily available elsewhere at extremely generous terms drew a positive response from the Peruvians and set the stage for the arrival of Soviet advisers and the training of Peruvian military personnel in the Soviet Union A quick comparison 6f the Soviet military role in Peru with that of the United States in security deletion is very revealing There are almost as many Soviet advisers in Peru security deletion as there are American military personnel security deletion Soviet military sales to Peru in security deletion exceeded U S sales to all of Latin America that year security deletion This was true security deletioni and 1980 may prove to be the same A lthoug' Soviet aid to Cuba and Peru is very significant military assistance to the rest of Latin America is still virtually nonexistent Soviet inroads in other countries however can be expected as Latin American countries continue their quest for arms Accelerated modernization programs fueled by continued territorial disputes and sustained by military governments provided the dynamics behind the arms acquisition programs in the region Expenditure for arms although not significant by world standards increased in the region in 1979 in comparison to previous years This is if we disregard the aberration of 1978 when one country security deletion 34 Guyana and Grenada were the other two countries in the region that contracted or received military hardware from Communist countries in 1979 Security deletion Non-U S free world military assistance to Latin America for 1979 totaled security deletion in deliveries and security deletion in new contracts The top supplier in 1979 was France with deliveries of security deletion and contracts for security deletion France was followed by Israel Italy and the United Kingdom In a new development Brazil became the fifth most important supplier with security deletion in deliveries and security deletion in contracts The security deletion in Latin American contracts for free world material in 1979 were a little over security deletion the value of contracts for 1978 and the security deletion The leading contractor for military assistance during 1979 was Chile with agreements worth security deletion This was Chile's biggest contract year ever and exceeded Argentina's 1979 purchase which totaled security deletion The third largest purchaser in 1979 was one of Latin America's poorest countries-Bolivia security deletion We shall now project a series of viewgraphs that list the major items of equipment purchased from the free world by Peru Chile Argentina Bolivia and Paraguay Peru's security deletion agreement with the U S SJR is primarily for the purchase of security deletion Her free world purchases include security deletion Chile's primary purchases for 1979 consisted of security deletion Chile also purchased security deletion In addition she purchased over security deletion Argentina continued to acquire most of her equipment in France During the year Argentina contracted security deletion The Italians were security deletion Argentina's second most important supplier and contracted to sell security deletion Bolivia's primary purchase during 1979 was security deletion Paraguay s big purchase for 1979 was for nine Brazilian-built MB326 jet attack trainers for which they paid $40 million Argentina was her second largest supplier and provided security deletion The aircraft purchase from Brazil represented the Paraguayan Air Force's entry into the jet age Although of Italian design they are built actually assembled in Brazil under license from the Aeromacci Co From here Mr Chairman I would like to move on to the problem of political instability in the area It is obvious from what we have already testified that the past'year has not seen much improvement in the political stability of Latin America In relative terms South America has fared somewhat better than the rest of Latin America Strong military governments in that region offer a partial explanation Nevertheless the past year witnessed severe political turbulence to include a coup in Bolivia and the first nonconstitutional change_ of government in Surinam since its independence in 1975 These developments were balanced by the assumption of power in Ecuador of a civilian government and the continued efforts of the Peruvian Government to transfer power to civilians in 1980 Brazil also continued to pursue the democratization process despite labor unrest and political opposition to President Figneiredo's polit- 35 ical reform programs Even in Argentina there seems to be some k interest in returning political power to civilians It would be a mistake however if these actions were interpreted to mean that the military has decided to return to the barrack To the contrary the military will likely remain the ultimate political arbiter in most of these countries Their reasons for doing so will vary widely ranging from purest nationalism to ill-disguised self-interest Attention today is focused on two countries-Bolivia and Peru Bolivia has longben noted for frequent and abrupt changes in government Since 1978 when the Banzer government decided to allow the civilians to return to government the country has been ruled by five presidents-three gained power through coups d'etat and two by way of congressional appointments Lydia Guiler the present interim President heads a government that is not expected to last until June when the nation is scheduled to hold its third presidential election in less than 2 years Economic problems personalism institutional and self-interest and real or imagined fear of communism give form to Bolivian politics These elements are not expected to change now or in the near future and political instability will remain a serious problem until a strong man emerges from one of the contending institutional factions The political prognosis for Bolivia is dismal We are slightly more optimistic where Peru's Government is concerned We believe that thePeruvian military leadership remains committed to the return of the country to civilian rule provided an acceptable candidate wins Elections are now scheduled for May 18 and the installation of the new government for July 28 Security deletion Finally we must address Surinam After 5 years of independence and democracy the Republic of Surinam experienced its first nonconstitutional change of government The February 1980 coup was foreshadowed by more than security deletion with the Arron government The immediate catalyst of the coup was the trial of the NCO union leaders who were found guilty of rebellion The NCO's had no trouble in assuming power One of their first acts was to create a national military council to provide the basis for a new government A new cabinet has since been appointed Security deletion Now I would like to talk a little bit about terrorism One factor which continues to impact on the political stability in many Latin American States is terrorism While terrorism does not of itself threaten the viability of any Latin American country except for El Salvador its presence serves to reveal a level of considerable frustration for elements of the population Or it may indicate that a particular country has been targeted by-extremist elements who do not expect to have an opportunity for ascendancy in the political arena One favorite terrorist tactic has been the seizure and occupation of embassies Beginning this year in January with the tragic takeover and burning of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala which resulted in 39 deaths there has been an alarming trend of embassy takeovers in Latin America In El Salvador both the Spanish ana Panamanian Embassies were seized and in Mexico a peasant group occupied the Belgian and Danish Embassies for 6 days 36 Militant Panamanian students briefly seized the Salvadoran Embassy in Panama and currently of course the Dominican Embassy in Bogota Colombia continues to be held If the terrorists occupying the Dominican Republic Embassy achieve their goals we can expect to see the continued use of this new tactic in the future Guatemala has seen a pronounced increase in terrorism in recent years Extreme leftist elements which had been fairly quiescent since the late 1960's resurfaced in 1976 While their insurgency was concentrated in the rural areas they also increased the tempo of terrorist acts in the cities-the 1979 assassination of the Guatemalan Army Chief of Staff being an example The victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua has further encouraged the Guatemalan insurgent groups and terrorists acts have increased since the summer of 1979 Although the insurgents do not yet present a significant threat to the Guatemalan Government the possibility exists that increased terrorism will result in overly repressive countermeasures which in turn wilt alienate a much larger segment of the populace In South America some of the major insurgent groups of the recent past such as the Uruguayan Tupamaros and the Argentine ERP People's Revolutionary Army have been virtually eliminated other groups such as the Argentine Vontoneros have held on Despite the loss of most of its capabilities in late 1976 and early 1977 the Montoneros have retained the ability of making and planting highly sophisticated bombs During 1979 they conducted a series of bombings that were reminiscent of their heydays The Montoneros do not constitute a serious threat at the present time but they can expect to continue to be a security problem for the Argentine Government In Chile the long-banned MIR Movement of the Revolutionary Left an important supporter of the late President Salvador Allende is security deletion The Chilean press has credited the MIR with 47 bombings in 1978 and 80 in 1979 So far the MIR's bombings have been directed at the destruction of property rather than at people and as a result there have been few casualties Terrorism just like political instability is merely a symptom of the deep-rooted political economic and social problems of Latin America It would be naive to expect that the conflicts that plague the region will disappear in the near future or that our enemies will not exploit them--it would be well to face the fact that the problems are chronic and that future changes will most likely work to our disadvantage Mr Chairman that concludes my presentation Mr YATRON Thank you very much Colonel for an excellent briefing To your knowledge is there any evidence that the Romero assassination was committed by paid assassins Colonel MARTINEz-BOUCHER The indications we have is that it was a very professional job a security deletion The terrorists are good but they are not that good So I think that we could make the assessment that it was done by a professional Mr YATRoN Do you have any idea where the professional could have come from I 37 Colonel MARIrNEz-BOUCHER We have no indications of whether he was a rightist or a leftist Both the left and the right could very easily obtain a professional Mr YATRON Are the guerrillas from neighboring countries participating in the El Salvadoran insurgency as they did in Nicaragua Colonel MARTINEz-BOUCHER At the present time we have some indications that some security deletion This is the only indication that there are some in the country However there is no doubt in our minds that security deletion facilitating the movement of weapons from Honduras into El Salvador Security deletion Mr YATRON Would you comment on the possible flow of arms frpm Honduras to El Salvador and the need to provide security deleti n Colonel MARnNn-BoucnEml There is no question in my mind that there is a need to improve the training of the Honduran Army in trying to regain some control I should not say regain some control but be able to control the border area a little bit better because right now as I mentioned in the briefing there is great facility moving arms through that frontier Mr YATRoN Do the insurgents in Guatemala have a war chest to purchase arms as their counterparts did in El Salvador Colonel MARTINEZ-BouCHE R No they do not Is that correct Mr McCLELLAN Basically Colonel MARTINEz-BouGHER As far as I know they do not have war chests that the Salvadorans have Mr YATRON Security deletion Colonel MARTINEz-BOUCHER We do not know really Mr YATRON If I understand your testimony is the U S hesitancy to supply security assistance to El Salvador and Guatemala interpreted by the Cubans and the Soviets as an unwillingness to defend our areas of traditional influence Colonel MArrINEz-BOUCHER I would not specify El Salvador and Guatemala I think that the perception is more general and is not necessarily tied up with whether or not we provide military assistance It might be related to other U S policies that Latin Americans do not care for that create a situation security deletion Mr YATRON Are the dissidents in Honduras expecting to receive similar assistance from El Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgents in return for the alleged support that they are now providing Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER We believe that insurgency in Centrl America is not restricted by national boundaries We believe that the insurgent movement is well coordinated by the Cubans and that it includes elements in all the countries Security deletion We know that the Cubans provide technical assistance they provide training and they are the driving organizational force behind the entire insurgency movement in the area Having said that I would go back to my presentation and indicate that it does not always work the way the Cubans want In the case of El Salvador the Salvadorans tend to be somewhat more independent Security deletion Mr YATRON Thank you Mr Gilman Mr GamAN Thank you Mr Chairman With regard to the arms trafficking in Central America have you at any time found any relationship between arms trafficking and narcotics trafficking We have 38 received some reports that some of the narcotics traffickers have been utilizing the funds for trafficking in weapons Do you have any information with regard to that Colonel MA Nrzz-Boucmm I have no evidence of that But I would like to refer this question to either Mr Da Pena or Mr McClellan to see if they have any information concerning that Mr MbcCLELLAN My background or my information would indicate not I have seen no connection between drug trafficking and the terrorist or insurgent activities in these areas at all Mr Gn LN Have you received any information regarding drug trafficking in El Salvador Guatemala or HondurasI Colonel MARMNEZ-BOUCHEM We have not sir because it is not within our charter to deal with drugs Once in a while of course it might crop up in one of our reports but normally we do not deal with drugs Mr OILMAN I recognize that you do not deal with it What we are trying to find out is if there is any relationship between the trafficking in arms and the trafficking in narcotics Colonel MARInNEZ-BOUCHER We have no evidence of that sir Mr McCLELLAN Salvador Guatemala and Honduras the middle and central American area sir is not noted for its drug growing or trafficking Mexico and Colombia are the biggest areas Mr GILMAN Security deletion Mr McCLEwLAN Yes Mr GILMAN This is also the case in Panama where a lot of the arms trafficking takes place Have you been able to pinpoint a source of financing for the insureents for the arms trafficking I Where are they getting the funds I Colonel M Imz-BoucHER In the case of El Salvador they have acquired most of their funds through kidnapings and through bank robberies A kidnapping might net them several m lion dollars So they have the money Mr McCrxTu Tw It has been very lucrative for the Salvadoran terrorists Mr GILMAN What about the other countries Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER In the other countries they are trying- to follow the same blueprint Security deletion Mr GLMAN What is the source of their armaments Where are they purchasing them I oonel MAnnmzz-BoucnER Well in many of these countries you will find that the guerrillas are armed not with standard military _equipment but with hunting equipment they have rifles and handguns It was not until last week for example that El Salvador which has been experiencing this tremendous insurgency problem decided to impose restrictions on the possession of arms There is another factor also El Salvador is a country that is violence prone You can say everyone has _ a gun in his house Local acquisition of weapons is very easy They do purchase weapons from the outside I remember last year for example when the Sandinistas were fighting Somoza that some of the weapons were purchased in the United Sttes security deletioni So there is a multitude of sources that they use The financing is their own because and I thi k we have mentioned this several times security deletion 39 Mr GILMAN Have there been any Cuban weapons earmarked in any of these countries Have you been able to find any Cuban source for any of the weapons in El Salvador Guatemala or Honduras Colonel MAmI-mzZ-BoucHqR Security deletion What I am saying is the Cubans do not want to leave their trademark behind For example there must be thousands of U S weapons in Cuba that were left there from 20 years ago They can get those weapons and provide them to the guerrillas and they can be just as effective or they can get them through other sources Security deletion Mr GILMAN Security deletion Colonel MARTINEZ-BoucHER Security deletion Mr GILMAN Security deletion Colonel MARTINEz-BoUCHER Security deletion Mr GILMAN Security deletion Colonel MARTINz-BOUOHER I do not Anw Mr GILMAN Security deletion Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCiHER Security deletion Mr GILMAN Security deletion Colonel MARTNEZ-BoucHER Not that I know of sir Mr GILMAN Security deletion Colonel MAMRINEZ-BoUCHER Security deletion Mr GILMAN Security deletion Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER I do not know Mr DA PENA Not to my knowledge Mr GILMAN Security deletion Mr DA PENA No Mr GILMAN Security deletion Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER Yes sir there has been a significant amount of training There have been Salvadorans Hondurans Nicaraguans of course Guatemalans trained in Cuba Mr GILMAN What is the extent of any Soviet presence in Central AmericaI Colonel A Ez-BOUCHER There are Soviet diplomats in Costa Rica and Nicaragua Mr GILMAN What about El Salvador Honduras and Guatemala Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER Not to my knowledge I believe not Mr GILMAN Is there any East German presence Colonel MARTINEZ-BouciER No Mr GILMAN I would like to reserve an opportunity for further questioning Mr Chairman and relinquish the balance of my time Mr YATRON Colonel and Dr Collins we would like to recess for about 10 or 15 minutes We have a vote Whereupon there was a short recess taken Mr YATRON Thank you gentlemen for waiting We will reconvene our briefing and hearing at this time I would like to call on our colleague Mr Lagomarsino who has some questions Mr LAGOMARSINO Thank you Mr Chairman There were some press reports yesterday that appear to quote Ambassador White in El Salvador as mentioning anti-Castro Cubans having some role to play perhaps in the assassination of Archbishop 1omero Are you aware of an such report or fact of that nature Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER No I am not Mr LAGOMARSINO From what you said earlier I gather we have absolutely no information as to who carried out the assassination 40 Colonel MARTINEz-BoUCHER That is true Mr LAGOMARSINO On page 3 of your statement you say The first priority of the Cubans and the Sandinistas was to consolidate FSLN control over Nicaragua Do I take it from that that you are saying that the Cubans are involved in the actual plan or whatever you want to call it here in Nicaragua itself I Colonel MARTINEz-BoucHER Of course the Cubans were the driv mg force if we could call it that behind the Sandinistas Once the Sandinistas defeated the Nicaraguan national guard they had to consolidate their position in the country Of course the Cubans have played a very important role in that regard as well You might remember from yesterday's testimony that they have provided not only technical assistance in the field of education and agriculture and road construction but they have been very much involved in training the military the Sandinista army Security deletion Mr LAGOMARSINO You say on page 5 that arms have been furnished and steps taken to enlist the cooperation of all leftist forces in El Salvador and surrounding countries to support the insurgency Security deletion Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER That is an affirmative sir Mr LAoOmARsINo I was going to ask you about the U S arms that found their way into Nicaragua security deletion but you already discussed that Now with regard to your statement on page 13 you repeat essentially the same thing in several other places as well you say the Marxists seem to have concluded perhaps tentatively that as long as areas not considered vital by the United States support for insurgent efforts can be given without fear of retaliation Is that an intuitive feeling on your part on the part of the Agency or do you have actual information that things like that have been said Colonel MARTINEz-BoucHEt It is based on what has actually oc- curred in Central America Security deletion They took advantage of it and they exploited the situation to the fullest Mr LAOoMARSI1sO You mentioned the vote of Grenada against our position on the Afghanistan invasion Can you speculate or do you have any actual information as to why Nicaragua abstained on that particular vote Colonel fuRNz-BoucHER Anything I would say would be speculation I guess that I could say that they did not support the Soviet position fully because they were in the process and are still in the process of trying to get U S aid Surely if they had voted in support of the Soviets I have no doubt in my mind that many people in Congress would not have taken that very lightly Mr LAooWRSINo Then on page 18 it goes back to the question I was asking a little earlier about perceptions and so on You say Future developments will not depend only on Cuban and Soviet initiative and internal problems but on U S responses and the Latins' perceptions of such responses We discussed a moment ago the perception of the Cubans as to what we have done and not done and how that may well have affected what they did in that area 41 What is the perception of other countries in the area Colonel IAliNE'-Boucmn I can be almost precise Security deletion Mr LAoxA SIzo Security deletion Colonel fAmRiEz-BoUCHER Security deletion Mr LAGOMASINO Security deletion Colonel MARTINEz-BOUCHER No we have no evidence of that At best we could say that security deletion Mr LAGomARSINo Security dAetion Colonel MARTINEz-BouoHER Security deletion Mr LAooxAniNo Security deletion Colonel Mn -Boucuxm We have received some indications t that effect yes Mr LAooMAnRio Recently Colonel MATiNEz-BoucHER Within the last month Mr IAOoMmsINo Security deletion - Colonel MARxnNE-BoucaER Securitydcletion Mr IAGoAaizo Security deletion Colonel MARTINEZ-BouciiE LSecurity deletion Mr MCCLELLAN Security deletion Mr LAGOMARSINO Security deletion Mr MCCLL N No Mr LAGOMARSINO Security deletion Well we could go on a long time Mr Chairman but perhaps we better stop here Mr YATRON Thank you I would like to ask a few questions and then we will adjourn and go into our private session Colonel MARTINEZ-BoU CHER All right Mr YATRON Is there any evidence of a military confrontation in Jamaica to strengthen Manley's regime before he has to hold elections Colonel MARTINEz- BoucHER We do not anticipate that that will occur The armed forces in Jamacia have not been co-opted as such by Manley We suspect there is going to be a great deal of turbulence in the country because the economic situation is so serious and also we believe that Manley would do all he can to stay in power Mr YATRON Re erring to the testimony on Jamaica and the claims of the opposition leader Edward Seaga is it truth or is it rhetoric In your statement on page 16 I believe you quoted Mr Seaga Colonel MARTINEZ-BOUCHER Security deletion Mr YATRON Would you care to comment on why Prime Minister Manley would enter into the Soviet alumina deal which is not really heavily in favor of Jamaica when that country is in such bad economic conditionI Colonel MARTINEZ-BOuCIIER It does not make any sense to us either but it is something that I suppose goes back to the Jamaicans saying Well I have gained some concession from the Soviets The price of alumina is going up and he Manley established that there would be a fixed price He agreed to pay for'the shipment and we know that the co t of the shipment is going to go up so I do not see any advantage that they could have gained from it Mr YATRON Is the Peruvian Government pleased with the quality and maintenance of the Soviet equipment that they have been buying I 42 Colonel MA iNEz-BoucHnm The Peruvians are basically happy with their equipment They are somewht security deletion However recent reports tend to indicate that the Soviets have agreed to provide them with security deletion I would say that perhaps in the future there would be greater satisfaction on the part of the Peruvians in that area Mr YATRoN Security deletion Colonel MARTiNEZ-BoucHE Security deletion Mr YATRoN On the same concept can you tell us of the high cost of maintenance of French Mirages and other foreign equipment maintenance costs as compared to our equipment Colonel MAtTIKRz-BoucHER I em afraid I cannot answer that question Mr Chairman Mr YATRoN We would like to submit some additional questions to you for written responses I am going to request that we adjourn the meeting for the day We want to thank you gentlemen for giving us the benefit of your expertise We have another rollcall to respond to and we will come back and talk to you briefly at that time in the private session The subcommittee stands adjourned Whereupon at 4 p m the meeting was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair IMPACT OF CUBAN-SOVIET TIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE SPRING 1980 WEDNESDAY APRIL 18 1980 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ComMITTEz ONw FoREIN AFFAS SuBcoM rm'F ow INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS Waghington D C The subcommittee met at 2 p m in room 2255 Rayburn House Office Building Hon Gus Yatron chairman of the subcommittee presiding Mr Y ATRON Good afternoon The subcommittee will come to order The Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs will continue its hearings on Soviet-Cuban Ties in the Western Hemisphere We previously heard testimony from the Defense Intelligence Agency describing Soviet activities in Cuba the deployment of Cuban troops in Africa and other countries and the political effects of SovietCuban influence on the current situation in Central and South America and the Caribbean Today the Central Intelligence Agency will provide insight on the unrest m Cuba and the extent of overt and covert activities of Cuban and Soviet intelligence forces in the hemisphere Our witnesses today are Mr Robin Kent Mr Randolph Pherson and Mr Russell Swanson all analysts from the Office of Political Analysis National Foreign Assessment Center of the Central Intelligence Agency Also we have Mr Robert J English chief of the-U S S R -East European Division Office of Political Affairs and Mr Craig Schopmeyer analyst of the Office of Strategic Research with the-National Foreign Assessment Center of the CIA Due to the sensitive nature of the information to be given the Central Intelligence Agency has requested these hearings to be held in executive session It is the Chair's intention to again request that the CIA declassify as much of the testimony as possible for publication so that the public can have maximum benet of information on this most important aspect of our national security and foreign policies I would like to entertain a motion from the floor that we go into executive session Mr LAGOMARSINO I so move Mr Chairman Mr YATRON It has been moved and seconded that we go into executive session for the purpose of taking classified testimony Under the rule the rollcall is automatic and the clerk will now call the roll Mr FRUEMAN Mr Yatron Mr YATioz Aye 43 44 Mr FRIEDAN Mr Fascell Mr FASCELL Aye Mr FRIEDMAN Mr Rosenthal Mr ROSENTHAL Aye Mr FRIEDMAN No response Mr FRIEDMAN No response Mr FRrEDMAN No response Mrs Collins Mr Studds Mr Ireland r FRIEDMAN Mr Gilman Mr GILMN Aye Mr No FREDMAN respond Mr Guyer Ar FRIEDMAN Mr Lagomarsino Mr LAGOmARSINO Aye Mr YAThON There are five members voting aye A quorum being present we are now in executive session In the interest of time I will also entertain a motion from the floor that we continue in executive session tomorrow when we will have witnesses from the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation Mr FASCFL So moved Mr YATRON It has been moved and seconded that we continue in executive session tomorrow for the purpose of taking classified testiniony Under the rule the rollcall is automatic and the clerk will now call the roll Mr FRIEDMAN Mr Yatron Mr YATRoN Aye Mr FRIEDMAN Ur Fascell Mr FASCELL Aye Mr FR DMAN Mr Rosenthal Mr ROSENTHAL Aye Mr FRIEDMAN Mrs Collins No response Mr FREDMAN Mr Studds No response Mr FRIEDMAN Mr Ireland No response FRIEDMAN Mr Gilman kr Mr GILMAN Aye Mr FRIEDMAN Mr Guyer No response r FREDMAN Mr Lagomarsino Mr LAGOMARSINO Aye Mr YATRON There are five members voting aye A quorum be- ing present we will remain in executive session tomorrow °Will the clerk determine that all those who are present in the room have the appropriate clearance Gentleman it is a pleasure to welcome you Please proceed with your opening statement Mr FASCELL Mr Chairman let me identify and corroborate Mr Jerry Desantiana State Department on my staff Mr YATRoN We welcome Mr Desantiana Gentlemen you may proceed STATEMENT OF ROBIN KENT ANALYST OFFICE OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Mr KzNT Mr Chairman if it meets with your approval the approach we would like to follow today is for myself to give a brief overview of Cuba's motivations and general tactics in the region and then Mr Pherson will talk more specifically about what the Cubans are involved in Central America Then Mr English will speak on Soviet activities in the region and finally Mr Swanson will speak on the Cuban economy Mr YATEON Without objection Mr KENT Thank you Mr Chairman Cuba's aggressive behavior in foreign affairs is caused by Fidel Castro's firm commitment to revolution as an ideology In his view the ills of the world are caused by imperialism and capitalism He firmly believes that revolution is the only solution to these ills and he sees his role as being the revolutionary leader of the Third World against the forces of imperialism This outlook puts him in direct conflict with Western states particularly the United States Castro uses a wide variety of tactics to achieve his objectives He uses cultural contacts commercial contacts security deletion He uses normal diplomatic interaction he uses foreign economic assistance programs he also uses support for guerrilla organizations military advisers to friendly governments He can use any or all of these in some combination Cuba has experienced a number of successes in Central America and the Caribbean in the past year and Grenada and Nicaragua are the prime examples of this Cuban influence in Grenada has rapidly increased since the coup there in March 1979 The most recent example of that is the large airport project that the Cubans are heavily engaged in constructing Nicaragua is a far more important victory for the Cubans and that is evidenced by the large number of Cuban advisers and teachers that are in that country and the heavy investment that Cuba has devoted to assisting that country However Cuba has also experienced some problems in the region and elsewhere For example Jamaican Prime Minister Manley is a close friend of Cuba but is experiencing political troubles in his own country security deletion Another setback that the Cubans have experienced in recent months is the loss of the election for the U N Security Council seat The second one would be the impact of Afghanistan on Castro's efforts to assume an important role as leader of the nonalined movement Cuba as you are well aware also is experiencing severe economic problems at the present time and the most recent problem that Castro is now experiencing is the refugee situation in the Peruvian Embassy I would now like to turn it to Randy to talk on the Central American situation 62-713 0 - 80 - 46 STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH PHERSON ANALYST OFFICE OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Mr Pmatsoi Just briefly I would like to go over what the ituation is what the Cuban objectives are and what they have accomplished in Central America As Robin has indicated Latin America and Central America in particular is a prime objective of Cuban foreign policy They think they can make the most revolutionary gains there It is an area ripe for revolution Security deletion is also very much interested in making sure that a revolution in these countries succeeds Security deletion they have already progressed with a revolution in Nicaragua Securiy deletion To look specifically at some of thee countries and what has been accomplished and what is hoped for I would like to start with Nicaragua and then go to the three northern tier countries with just a couple of sentences Basically the perspective is that Cuba sees itself as the arsenal the training center the adviser and the catalyst for revolution in these areas and it is buildinfr on the Nicaraguan experience where it now is the dominant foreign influence Security deletion On the civilian side it has more advisers in Nicaragua than any other country in the world with one exception and that is Angola It has 1 200 teachers in Nicaragua over 300 medics over 200 construction workers also advisers working on security deletion agriculture fisheries It is also training 1 200 secondary students in Cuba It has brought them to the Isle of Youth formerly the Isle of Pines It-has plans for another 600 to come when another school is built It has consolidated or is hoping to consolidate the revolution there and it is focusing primarily on the internal situation in Nicaragua In El Salvador'it thinks it has the best prospects Looking from the Cuban perspective I think El Salvador would probably be the next one to fall Security deletion In Guatemala the military is stronger security deletion it probably ranks in Cuba's perception as the number'two target behind El Salvador Security deletion Honduras still has a lon way to go You have a very strong polarization of the right and the left i'n that country Security deletion That concludes my remarks and I will turn it over to Mr English STATEMENT OF ROBERT 1 ENGLISH CHIEF OF U S S R -EAST EUROPEAN DIVISION OFFICE OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Mr Ez0ouSn Traditionally the Soviet Union has been less active in Latin America than in any other place in the Third World in terms of general activities economic aids and credits and just general presence Within Latin America they have been the least active except for Cuba in the Caribbean and Central America 47 What they have done of course 'is supported liberation movements in their propaganda outlets They have encouraged local Communist parties to join road political fronts wherever they thought favorable conditions existed for such an arrangement but they have not made a serious investment of time or energy on their own This is largely because it was generally recognized by the Soviets that the Western Hemisphere was within the U S sphere of influence and the likelihood of gaining any significant positive results in Latin America the Caribbean Central America were remote particularly when the risk of confrontation with the United States was a very strong possibility Events in 1979 the coup in Grenada the revolution in Nicaragua unrest in El Salvador may have changed Soviet perceptions I think we see signs that these events have colored Soviet thinking and that they now estimate that perhaps there is something to be gained by making some additional investments I think they are impressed by the advances that Cuba has made in the area which of course ultimately is financed by the Soviets and I think in view of the state of United States-Soviet relations that they feel they have less to risk by being a little bit more assertive in this part of the world Nevertheless their activity still is quite limited by any kind of measurement particularly when you measure it against other areas in the less developed world Soviet economic assistance to Latin America for example is at the bottom of the list compared to other regions of the less developed world Nevertheless it is on its way up and there has been a great deal of contact between Soviet officials and officials of this region compared to past decades For example a high level delegation from Nicaragua has just recently completed a visit to the Soviet Union The delegation included the Nicaraguan defense minister the planning minister the fishing minister and a host of others We do not know precisely what sorts of agreements were concluded but it is reasonable to believe that Moscow did give some assurances of following through and giving additional support directly to the new Government in Nicaragua We do know that Aeroflot is supposed to begin transiting and using Managua in mid-1980 We do know that there is a fishing agreement and we also know that this same delegation went to East Germany as well as the Soviet Union From past experience we know that East Germans act as a surrogate for the Soviet Union in the Third World although the Cubans of course are more active in this sort of activity in the Western Hemisphere The East Germans have already established a diplomatic presence in Nicaragua as has the Soviet Union and we would expect to get reports fairly soon that the East Germans are training the Nicaraguans in such things as police control and public administration The actual military training probably will be left up to the Cubans but of course it will all be supported and financed by the Soviet Union In Jamaica the Soviets have had a diplomatic presence I believe since 1975 and it was upgraded to ambassadorial level in 1978 They have a relatively good relationship with Prime Minister Manley Security deletion 48 We do know that there is a KGB presence in Jamaica security deletion I would have to say that Jamaica and Nicaragua are the cornerstones of increased Soviet activity and interest in the Caribbean There has not been much else really small things such as the Mexican defense minister visiting the Soviet Union last September security deletion In Grenada as far as we can tell the coup occurred there from local circumstances The Soviets had nothing to do with it or the Cubans either as far as I know The Soviets have not done much to try and capitalize on that They do not have a diplomatic presence there They will probably try but they do not appear to be terribly anxious All of this costs a great deal of money and Cuba is a very heavy subsidy for the Soviet Union I am fairly certain that they would not like another economic weight similar to the magnitude that Cuba puts on the Soviet Union I think the Soviets for the near term in any case are delighted with the course of events which have taken place during 1979 I think they are hopeful that these events will gain more momentum I think that they look upon this as a justification of the way the world is goingthe world revolution as they like to refer to it I believe that they are hopeful that they probably will not have to do a lot themselves to contribute to it However each time that there is some kind of a limited success as in Nicaragua I think at that point they will weigh in and make it clear that they are prepared to keep whatever group as long as they have some kind of leftist credentials in power That recent visit that I mentioned of the Nicaraguan Government delegation was hosted by two high level Soviet party officials Kirilenko and Ponomarev Ponomarev is also on the secretariat as is Kirilenko but Ponomarev's job on the secretariat is in charge of the nonruling Communist parties He is the kind of official that would host a visit by the Italian Communist Party What I am saying is that the Soviets are treating the Nicaraguan administration as if they were already part of the Marxist community Nevertheless they also recognize that there are constraints on their ability to expand their influence in this part of the world not the least of which is the United States Relations with the United States will always maintain a certain amount of precedence in the Soviet view and there are limits to what they will do in this part of the world to advance the revolutionary momentum Another constraint is the fact that there is a lot of instability in this region and the Soviets are uncomfortable with instability They like things very ordered and well run The fact that Manley for example is facing very stiff opposition in the election that is coming up the fact that there are coups and countercoups with great regularity in this part of the world makes them in their final judgment hesitate to put too much investment in some of these new regimes that might sprout out But in the case of Nicaragua since it has been successful they feel that they owe it to the image that they want to maintain throughout the world in terms of supporting the revolutionary movement of giving them as much assistance as they possibly can now preferably through the Cubans preferably through the East Germans but directly if necessary as long as a relatively stable government is in place 49 We might stop here now and hear about the economics of the region from Mr Swanson Mr YATRON Mr Swanson STATEMENT OF RUSSELL SWANSON ANALYST OFFICE OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Mr SWANSON Mr Chairman at the same time that Cuba is pursuing an increasingly aggressive foreign policy in the Caribbean Basin and in Central America and is touting its development policy as a model for the Third World Cuba is facing perhaps its most serious socioeconomic challenges since the consolidation of the revolution in the early 1960's The economy is generally stagnant The agricultural sector which is the backbone of the economy has been hit by a series of natural disasters The all important sugar sector has been struck by sugar cane rust which has affected about 25 percent of the crop As a result production this year is likely to drop about 1 million tons below that of last year that is from 8 million tons to 7 million tons Th6 tobacco industry which is Cuba's fourth largest export revenue source has been decimated by blue mold As a result the Cuban cigar industry has been closed down totally and Cuba has been forced to import tobacco for domestic consumption The fishing sector which has been one of the few economic successes of the Cuban revolution experienced a 25 percent drop in outputlast year because of reduced access to traditional fishing waters primarily because of the increased adoption and enforcement of the 200 mile economic zone by many countries Other agriculture which is primarily in the hands of theprivate sector continues to suffer from a lack of price incentives an davailability of credits and other agricultural inputs such as fertilizer et cetera Industrial production is seriously constrained by limitations on raw materials and intermediate goods most of which have to be imported The expansion of industry itself is impaired by a lack of domestic investment as well as a lack of foreign investment These restrictions primarily reflect an ideologically-based economic development policy which restrict private foreign investment and private domestic investment and by import capacity constraints due to a lack of foreign exchange Security deletion The implications of the economic stagnation and deteriorating economic situation are two-fold Domestically they could result in the existence of overt unemployment for the first time since the early days of the Castro takeover the Cuban labor force is now growing at about 3 percent per annum while the economy itself is growing very little if at all This is likely to lead we believe to growing popular discontent the manifestation of which we now see in the fact that 10 000 Cubans recently sought asylum at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana in a period of 48 hours when the opportunity presented itself We believe that there are many more than the 10 000 perhaps several hundred thousand who would like to leave if they had the opportunity 60 Internationally because of the serious lack of hard currency earnings and restricted import capacity from the West we are likely to see the Cubans driven more deeply into the Soviet camp in terms of e onomic dependence As Mr English said the Cubans are now obtaining approximately $3 billion a year in Soviet grants and subsidies and economic development aid and there is every indication that that is likely to increase over the years At the same time however this could have adverse implications for their bilkteral relations with Moscow in that it comes at a time when the Soviet Union is beginning to experience serious economic difficulties of their own particularly in the area of petroleum Mr YATRON Thank you Mr Swanson Are there any other comments Mr KENT I think that concludes our prepared remarks Mr YATRON We thank you all very much for participating I would like to ask Mr English could you provide us with information on any Latin American countries that are being used as a staging area for intelligence activities in the United States Mr ENGLISH In the United StatesI Mr YATRON Yes Mr ENoLiSH No sir I am not acquainted with any evidence that would corroborate that statement They obviously have a presence in Mexico and it is conceivable that they could be operating against Americans who are traveling in Mexico but I cannot recall any incident that occurred that would verify that Mr YATRON Mr Pherson would you care to comment on the up-comin elections in Honduras Mr masoN Can you comment on that Mr KENT No Mr YATRoN Maybe you could provide something for the record on that at another time 1 Mr Kzwr Generally our area of expertise here is on the Cuban side of the question Mr YATRON I believe one of you made a statement earlier regarding the activity in El Salvador Honduras and Guatemala Would you care to comment on whether you believe the Cuban-Soviet objective in Central America now aimed at El Salvador and in the longer run at Honduras and Guatemala is this really being targeted for Mexico I Mr KENT Maybe we can both speak on that Bob you might want to speak from the Soviet point Security deletion Mexico is the only country that did not break diplomatic relations with Cuba when the embargo and the sanctions and the period of isolation were imposed on Cuba by the OAS Cuba remembers this and frequently refers to it in their propaganda or news statement rSecurity deletion Mr Prostes Just to add a point building on that fact the relationship is as Mr English noted the Mexican defense minister did go to the Soviet Union and East Germany and he also stopped off in Cuba I The material referred to is of a sensitive nature and will remain on file in the subcommittee osm 51 for talks Security deletion one possibility is that they worked out an arrangement where President Lopez Portillo will be going to Cuba on aSeci-i state visit in July -y-deletion Mr YATzN That causes a great cooperation between countries Mr PHRSON Well that is because of the relationship that now exists Mr YATRON Can you tell me how many DGI agents are stationed in the Western Hemisphere Could you give us a breakdown Mr KENT I do not have those figures at the top of my head We could probably go back and do Fome research and perhaps submit a response Mr YATRON That would be fine Also if you could tell us how many KGB agents in the Western Hemisphere 2 Mr KENT Do we have that at all Mr ENOLISH Suspect KGB agents is probably the way it will come out Mr YATRON We would like to know what the focal point of their activities are in the hemisphere and if you could describe any overt or covert activities Are there any links to major territorist groups such as those from Germany Italy and Japan Mr KENT Security deletion Mr YATRON Thank you Mr Gilman Mr GILMAN Thank you very much Mr Chairman There have been some reports that there has been some talk of the development of another canal through Nicaragua Has there been any information about Cuban interest or Soviet interest in the construction of such a canal Mr KENT I have seen nothing from the Cuban viewpoint that indicates that they have an interest or an involvement in such an enterprise Mr ENGLISH Nor from the Soviet point of view Mr GILMAN Security deletion Is there any direct involvement by the Costa Rican officials or Panamanian officials in any of the changes of government in Salvador Guatemala or HondurasO Mr PHEnSON Security deletion Mr GILMAN Security deletion Mr KENT In Nicaragua Mr GILMAN In Nicaragua or in any of the other countries Mr KENT Security deletion Mr GILMAN Do either the Cubans or the Soviets have a presence in Costa RicaI Mr KENT The Cubans have a consulate don't they Mr SWANSON Yes Mr ENOjsH The Soviets do but it is not very active Security deletion Mr GILMAN What about in Panama Mr ENoLIsH No diplomatic relations in Panama Mr GILMAN How about the Cubans 2 Due to the sensitive nature of the response supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency it will remain on file in the subcommittee office 52 Mr KENT The Cubans are quite active in Panama Security deletion Mr YATRON Excuse me Could you just yield I would like to ask a question When we were in Costa Rica I thought that President Carazo said that he threw them out of the country Is that correct Mr SWANSON There were a couple of Soviet diplomats that were declared persona non grata last summer because of their alleged involvement in labor unrest in Costa Rica but they did not sever diplomatic ties Mr GILMAN Security deletion 1 Mr SwANsoN fSecurity deletion Mr GILMAN Security deletion Mr SWANSON Security deletion Mr GILMAN Is there extensive trade of that nature Mr SwANsoN There is a growing trade Security deletion Mr GILMAN What products principally do they deal in Mr SwANsoN Security deletion Mr GILMAN Security deletion Mr SWANSON Security deletion Mr GILMAN Are we selling them any military equipment Mr SWANSON No Security deletion 1 Mr GILMAN You mentioned that East Germany had some presence in Nicaragua How substantial is that Mr ENGLISH I mentioned that It is relatively new Diplomatic relations have only been established I believe in the past 6 to 8 months I do not know the numbers that are there now They are probably still coming in just as the Soviet diplomatic mission is still filling out The Soviet Ambassador incidentally that had been appointed was the Ambassador to Ecuador He is just simply being transferred The East Germans will probably continue to come in Their foreign minister went to Nicaragua last September early on to demonstrate a certain amount of support for the revolution I cannot estimate right now though how many are there or how many are going to come I would expect not only East Germany but some of the other East European states will probably follow suit Mr GILMAN Does East Germany have a presence in any of the other Central American countries Mr ENGLISH For many years they had very little diplomatic rep- resentation throughout the world because of the divided Gormanys but more recently since the United States recognized East Germany this has expanded somewhat They now have a diplomatic presence in about 15 Latin American countries Mr GILMAN Speuritv deletion Mr PHERSON rSecurity deletion Mr GILMAN Security deletion Mr Pi noS rSecurity deletion Mr GLMAN Security deletion Mr PHERoN rSecurity deletion Mr GILMAN Security deletion Mr P ERsoN rSecuri'ty deletion Mr GILMAN Spcuritv deletion Mr PmxsoN Security deletion Mr GILMAN Have we traced any arms shipments from Cuba into Salvador 53 Mr PHERSON Security deletion Mr GILMAN Have we identified any of the arms in Salvador as- being Cuban arms Mr PHRsow Security deletion Mr KENT Security deletion Mr P ON Security deletion Mr SWANSON Security deletion Mr GILMAN Yes Mr KzNT Security deletion Mr GILMAN No PLO presence in Central America Mr KNT Security deletion Mr GILMAN Security deletion Mr PHERSON Seci-rity deletion Mr GILMAN Is there a PLO office in Nicaragua at the present time Mr KENT I am not sure of that There might be We can check on that for you Security deletion The following statement was submitted for the record At the present time the PLO does not have an office in Nicaragua Mr GILMAN Security deletion Mr KENT Security deletion Mr GILMAN We have been able to pinpoint that Mr PHERSON Security deletion Mr KENT Security deletion Mr GILMAN I have just one last question Have you been able to tie in any of the gun trafficking to the narcotics trafficking in Central America Mr KENT With the Cubans Mr GILMAN With any of the groups in Central America Mr KENT That is a question that is really outside of our area of expertise Mr PMRSON Security deletion Mr GIL N Security deletion deletion Mr PERSON Security deletion Mr GIM AN Security Mr PHERSON rSecurity deletion Mr GILMAN Thank you Mr Chairman Mr YATRON Thank you Mr Gilman We have a vote on the floor so I would like to request a 10 minute recess Whereupon there was a recess taken Mr YATRON We can resume the hearing and when Mr Lagomarsino comes back then I will acknowledge him at that time I am interested in a number of electronic intelligence collecting trawlers that are operating in the Atlantic and the Caribbean Do you have any data on this type of information Mr SCHOPMEYER ' Security deletion Mr YATRON Do you have any data or any number of the fishing boats or scientific mapping ships such as the ones operating out of Argentina in the Antarctic Mr SCHOPMEYER No I do not Mr YATRON Mr Lagomarsino are you ready to ask some questions Mr LAGOMARSINO Yes Mr YATRON Mr Lagomarsino Mr Sehopmever is an analyst Offlee of Strategic Research National Foreign Assessment Center Central Intelligence Agency 84 Mr LAGoMAsINo Does the agency have a reading on what Prime Minister Manley is likely to do in Jamaica Let me ask the question a little differently Some people are concerned that Manley might well try to take over by less than legitimate means should he lose the election that he has scheduled or perhaps not even hold the election Do we get any kind of reading like that at all Mr KENT Security deletion I think the best way to answer your question is to direct it to our Jamaican analyst and see if we can get a response over to you that is probably a lot more authoritative than anything I could say Security deletion Mr LAGOMARSINO You do not think that they would respond if Manley as the head of the Government asked them to come in and help put down insurrection or however you might describe it Mr KENT Security deletion Mr LAOOMARSIN0O With regard to that we have said that we would not stand for a Cuban invasion but I do not think anything has been said that would cover exactly that kind of a situation Mr KzNT Security deletion but again I will direct that question to our analyst Mr LAGONARSINO Prior to the recess we had a briefing by DIA on much the same grounds that you have been going over earlier One of the things they told us security deletion Mr PHERSOmN Security deletion Mr LAGOMARSINO What they said as I recall was that security deletion Mr PHERSON Security deletion Mr LAGOMARSINo Are you the proper people to ask about the capacity of the South American navies to counteract any kind of a Soviet or Cuban naval power in the Southern Atlantic or Pacific Mr SCHOPMEYER No OK That takes care of that Could you comment on whether or not there is any Soviet or has been any Soviet presence in the area other than Cuba Mr KENT Soviet naval presence Mr LAGOMAR5INO Mr LAOOMARBINo Yes Mr SCHOPMEYER Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean and the South Atlantic has been minimal since late last summer They had a task group that was in the Caribbean briefly in August but left after an unusually short tour They did not stop at any ports on that particular deployment Mr LAGOMARSINO They did not go into the South American portion Mr SCHOPMEYER No Mr LAOOMARSINO Mr Gilman asked you about Soviet presence in Costa Rica What is the size of the Embassy there I guess you were talking about the diplomats who have been expelled What is the size of the Russian Embassy Mr ENGLIBh We were chatting about this during the recess I gather that there is a rumor that there are as many as 150 Soviets there which seems to me to be way out of line Our latest information indicates that there are 24 Soviets in the Russian Embassy in Costa Rica and that includes administrative personnel 55 Security deletion The Soviets are relatively solid in Jamaica and their presence there is somewhat larger than in Costa Rica Mr LAGO1MARSINO How about in Nicaragua Mr ENGLISH Nicaragua is just being established The ambassador is arriving from Ecuador although he may be there by now It is still fleshing out and I suspect it will be fairly large but I do not know what it is yet The East Germans are established there as well Again they are filling it out Mr LAGOMARINO You were talking about East German presence in Nicaragua We had a report earlier that the East Germans were helping the Nicaraguans establish their labor union policies Is that correct Mr ENG I That seems in character with the sort of activity they do in the Third World Mr LAGOMARSINO Could you give us a reading of what the organized labor situation is in Nicaragua right now Mr ENoLISH I cannot Maybe one of these gentlemen can Mr PiERSON The Cubans are also providing some assistance to labor Nicaraguan labor leaders are training some in Cuba and the best we could say is that they are trying to set up a structure which would parallel the Cuban model Mr LAGOMARSINO Is there evidence that they are trying to force out other unions I understand they have their own Sandinista labor union and there have been in the past I guess labor unions from their standpoint on the left and on the right and that they have put a lot of pressure on the CAUS which I guess is a left labor union Do you have any evidence that they have harassed the-AFL-CIO affiliated union of the CAUS Mr PHERSON I cannot speak authoritatively on that Mr KENT I think that would be better for us to check with our people back at the building and see what we can find for you on that Mr YATRoN What is the nature of the activities of the Cuban DOI agents in Jamaica Mr KENT Security deletion Mr YATRON Isn't the present Cuban Ambassador a former Deputy Chief of the Americas Department of the Community Party which is the organization responsible for revolutionary activities in Latin America Mr KENT Yes sir We were talking about this during the break also He did hold that position He still essentially is a key official from that department and that department is directed by Manuel Pineiro who was a key official in the direction of the Cuban revolutionary offensive in Latin America during the 1960's Security deletion Mr YATRo Could you tell us how many KGB agents are in Jamaica and the nature of their activities Mr ENGLISH Security deletion Mr YATRON Can you tell us what they are doing and the nature of those activities I Mr ENGLISH Security deletion Mr YATRox Has the People's National Party established links with the Soviet and Cuban Communist Parties Mr ENOLISm You mean formal links of some kind Mr KENT Well there are frequent visits between the two countries by officials Cuban party officials who may also coincidentally hold 66 Government positions and equally PNP members come to Cuba Whether those are best described as party links which has a very specific meaning in Communist terms it is not clear I think it is more diffuse than that It tends to be a bilateral relationship that sort of cuts across those kinds of definitions Mr YATRON Are there any indications that Cuban or Soviet intelligence agents are anticipating a role in the upcoming elections Mr KENT Security deletion Mr YATRoN I understand that violence has been reported throughout Kingston because of the campaigning of Michael Manley and Edward Seaga Are Cuban and Soviet agents in any way inciting political activities or political violence Mr KENT Security deletion Mr YATRON In your judgment is the Cuban presence in Jamaica a political asset or liability to Manley Mr KENT That is an interesting question The opposition party is certainly playing up the Cuban involvement and trying to use it to its own advantage Security deletion Mr YATRON Are the Jamaican people aware of the magnitude of the Cuba presence Mr KENT Probably they are As I understand it the Jamaican media played up to a considerable and accurate degree the nature of the Cuban intelligence connections with PNP -officials Mr YATRON There was a recent report on March 25 that the Jamaican People's National Party has set up an economic intelligence unit to receive and investigate reports of sabotage and adverse propaganda Are there any Cubans involved in the operations of this unit Mr KENT I do not know I think we should probably check that Mr YATRON We will submit some other questions and request that you provide the subcommittee with written responses for the record Mr KENT OK Mr YATRON We want to thank you gentlemen for appearing here today The subcommittee will recess in executive session until tomorrow at 2 p m Whereupon the meeting of the subcommittee was adjourned at 3 45 p m to reconvene on Thursday April 17 1980 at 2 p m IMPACT OF CUBAN-SOVIET TIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE SPRING 1980 THURSDAY APRIL 17 1980 HousE oF REPBESENTATIVES AFAms CO mmrEE ox FoR SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS Wahingto n D The subcommittee met at 2 p m in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building Hon Gus Yatron chairman of the subcommittee presiding Mr YATRON Good afternoon The subcommittee will come to order Today the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs will continue in executive session its hearings on Soviet-Cuban ties in the Western Hemisphere To round out the picture previously drawn by witnesses from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency we have witnesses today from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the State Department I want to welcome our witnesses Mr Edward J O'Malley Inspector-Deputy Assistant Director of the Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Mr Myles Frechette Country Director for Cuban Affairs of the Department of State Mr Frechette is accompanied by Mr John D Blacken Country Director for Central America andMr Robert W Warne Country Director for the Caribbean both of the State Department Due to the sensitive nature of the information to be presented the FBI and the State Department have requested these hearings be held in executive session It is the Chair's intention to again request that they declassify as much of the testimony as possible for publication so that the public can have maximum benefit of information on this most important aspect of our national security and foreign policies Mr O'Malley if you would like to summarize your statement we can then proceed with questions Testimony given by Mr O'Malley was not declassified by request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Mr YATRoN We want to thank you very much Mr O'Malley Mr Nolan and Mr Brandon for appearing here and giving us the benefit of your views Mr O'MAtaxY Thank you very much Mr YATRON There could be some other written questions submitted by other members of the subcommittee who were not able to be here today If that is the case we would appreciate your written responses Mr O'ALLEu Surely 57 58 Mr YATROx Thank you very much Now we will have Mr Frechette Mr Warne and Mr Blacken Mr Frechette we welcome you If you would summarize your statement we can then follow with questions STATEMENT OF MYLES R R FRECHETTE COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr FRECHTIE Thank you very much Mr Chairman I welcome this opportunity to review with you the impact of Cuban-Soviet ties on the Western Hemisphere When ny predecessor Wayne Smith testified before this subcommittee in April 1978 he concluded 1 that while Cuba's hands were not altogether clean in the hemisphere its clandestine activities within neighboring states had declined markedly since the 1960's 2 that both Cuba and the Soviet Union seemed content to play a waiting game in the hemisphere but 3 that we could not be complacent about Cuba's future role because should significant opportunities present themselves Cuba could move back toward a more aggressive posture Since that testimony 2 years ago there have been several noteworthy developments some favorable to U S interests others unfavorable I would like to review these briefly before responding to any questions you might have With me are Robert Warne the Director of Caribbean Affairs and John Blacken the Director of Central American Affairs They are both prepared to answer any questions you might have on developments in specific countries in these regions Two years ago our major concern with res ect to Cuba- was the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola and Ethiopia That concern has not diminished Cuba still has about 20 000 troops in-Angola and 12 to 15 000 in Ethiopia To this have been added two concerns closer to home growing Cuban willingness to become involved in the Caribbean and Central America and Cuba's increasingly close relationship with the Soviet Union After several years with Cuban preoccupation with Africa we are seeing a resurgence of interest in Latin America The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the New Jewel Movement coup in Grenada have brought into power in the Caribbean basin two new governments favorably disposed toward Cuba It is doubtful that the Cubans anticipated the speed with which these changes took place But they moved quickly to extend assistance to maintain their influence Cuba has also grown increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance The Soviet economic subsidy to Cuba has doubled over the past 2 years to more than $3 billion in 1979 The Soviet Union has also been helping upgrade the Cuban Armed Forces by deliv ring modern military equipment to Cuba Given the experience of the 1962 missile crisis we monitor arms deliveries to Cuba closely to insure that they represent no threat to the United States At the same time the Cuban economy has experienced severe setbacks calling more sharply into question Cuba's viability as a development model for the rest of the Third World and stimulating increased emigration from Cuba The thousands of Cubans who have crowded 59 into the Peruvian Embassy in Havana in a desperate attempt to leave the island provide a grap ic illustration of popular discontent with the dismal failure of the Cuban economy Cuba's drive for Third World leadership and bid for a seat on the U N Security Council have been sidetracked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan While there has been some limited progress in our bilateral relations Cuba's aggressive foreign policy has prevented any significant progress- toward normalization This does not mean that our policy of seeking to open constructive lines of communication was mistaken On the contrary we continue to believe that there is no possibility of resolving our differences unless we are at least willing to talk Our dialog has cost us little and yielded some significant benefits The Cubans and the Soviets remain ready to exploit targets of opportunity in the hemisphere They see any erosion of U S influence as a net gain for themselves So far however they have avoided taking too many risks probably out of fear of provoking a strong U S reaction Our most effective response to this challenge would be to increase our own efforts of assistance Most countries in the region badly need economic and technical assistance of one form or another We have the capability to meet at least some of their needs Cuba by contrast has very little to give It is worthwhile to keep in mind that even those states which are friendliest to Cuba-Jamaica Nicaragua and Guyana--have carefully kept the door open to the West They may admire certain aspects of the Cuban model but pragmatism and nationalism dictate against replicating it Our policies are designed to address critical short-range economic problems in the region We are encouraging greater cooperation and interdependence among the island-states of the Caribbean In Central America we recognize that change is inevitable where traditional patterns are in many respects unjust and unsuitable We are adapting our policies and using our many links to these societies to help the process of change already underway to be less violent and take more democratic forms than they would otherwise In addition we have made clear to all parties that we take our security interests in the Caribbean most seriously The President has already announced concrete steps in this regard including increased surveillance of Cuba expanded military maneuvers in the region and the establishment of a full-time Caribbean joint task force headquartered in Key West Cuba has shown it can move quickly to take advantage of targets of opportunity Nevertheless the United States has the resources and the determination to meet the challenge The poignant picture of thousands of Cubans jammed shoulder to shoulder inside the Peruvian Embassy in a desperate attempt to flee their homeland is a vivid reminder that the future does not belong to Castro's Cuba That concludes my summary statement fr Chairman The statement that I submitted to you is entirely unclassified and can be quoted in toto Mr Frechette's prepared statement follows 60 Prepared Statement of Myles R R Frechette Country Director Cuban Affairs Department of State Mr Chairman I welcome this opportunity to review with you the impact of Cuban-Soviet ties on the Western Hemisphere When my predecessor Wayne Smith testified before this subcommittee in April 1978 he concluded 1 that while Cuba's hands were not altogether clean in the hemisphere its clandestine activities within neighboring stat9s had declined markedly since the 1960s 2 that both Cuba and the Soviet Union seemed content to play a waiting game in the hemisphere but 3 that we could not be complacent about Cuba's future role because should significant opportunities present themselves Cuba could move back toward a more aggressive posture Since that testimony two years ago there have been several noteworthy developments some favorable to US interests others unfavorable I would like to review these briefly before responding to any questions you might have With me are Robert Warne the Director of Caribbean AffairE and John Blacken the Director of Central American Affairs They are prepared to answer any questions you might have on developments in specific countries in these regions 61 Two years ago our major concern with respect to Cuba was the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola and Ethiopia That concern has not diminished Cuba still has about 20 000 troops in Angola and 12-15 000 in Ethiopia To this have been added two concerns closer to home growing Cuban willingness to become involved in the Caribbean and Central America and Cuba's increasingly close relationship with the Soviet Union The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the New Jewel Movement coup in Grenada have brought Into power in the Caribbean basin two new governments favorably disposed toward Cuba It is doubtful that the Cubans anti- cipated the speed with which these changes took place But there are signs that Cuba has been reassessing the prospects for revolutionary change elsewhere in the hemisphere and that after several years of Cuban preoccupation with Africa we are seeing a resurgence of interest in Latin America Cuba has also grown increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance tk re has been no significant divergence of interests between the two At the same time the Cuban economy has experienced severe setbacks calling more sharply into question Cuba's viability as a development model for the rest of the Third World and stimulating increased emigration from Cuba to the West Cuba's drive for Third World leadership and bid for a seat on the UN Security Council have been sidetracked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan While there has been some limited progress in our bilateral relations Cuba's 62-713 0 - 80 - S 62 aggressive foreign policy has prevented any significant progress toward normalization Involvement in the Caribbean and Central America Since the failure of its attempts to export revolution in the 1960s Cuba has followed-a two-pronged approach toward Latin America It has shifted emphasis to strengthening Its relations with non-rightist governments attempting to push them leftward while still maintaining ties to leftist revolutionaries in those countries with governments it considers to be reactionary During the 1970s Cuba's approach has been cautious flexible and sophisticated The Cubans now demonstrate a capacity to tailor their activities to local political realities and to make allowances for national and regional differences This approach has paid some dividends for Cuba in the Caribbean basin where many states have entered a difficult period of economic-and political transition In Nicaragua the Cubans had long maintained ties with the Sandinista movement but until the FSLN offensive of last year had generally limited their support to training asylum and money During 1979 however as the Sandinistas' prospects for success brightened Cuba stepped up its support by clandestinely sending arms Despite this support the Sandinista movement was and is basically an indigenous movement with historical roots in Nicaragua While Cuban support was important to the FSLN it was but one element in the equation which produced Somoza's downfall 63 Since the Sandinista victory Cuba has moved quickly to assist the new Nicaraguan government building on existing ties to key Sandinista leaders The total Cuban presence in Nicaragua is now at least 2 000 and Includes --about 200 military and security advisers --at least 1 200 teachers who began arriving in late October 1979 and --several hundred medical specialists construction personnel and advisers-on agrarian reform the media labor and cultural instruments In addition some 600 Nicaraguan students are studying at a Cuban secondary school at the Isle of Pines In Grenada the Cubans may well have had foreknowledge of the coup that brought Naurice Bishop and the New Jewel Movement t power it but there is no evidence they engineered After the coup however th Cubans moved quickly to offer assistance which the Bishop government has been all too eager to accept Cuba has provided arms and sent military advisors most of whom have since departed to train the new Grenadian army cians It has also sent a few civilian techni- Recently 250 Cuban construction workers began arriving to build a new airport for which Cuba will provide much of the material Havana may well have in mind making Grenada a showcase of Cuban-aided development in the region but it is doubtful the Cubans have the wherewithal to succeed alone in this effort Elsewhere in the region the Cubaris probably see El 64 Salvador as the most promising target for further revolutionary gains They have counseled the Salvadoran leftists to seek unity before provoking a direct confrontation with the junta It appears however that the leftists have not followed this advice Cuba's principal contribution so far has been training and advice Cuba also maintains ties to leftists in Guatemala and Honduras but apparently believes the prospects for radical change there are less promising Cuba still has good relations with the two countries which until last year were its closest friends in the Caribbean basin Jamaica and Guyana Since 1975 Cuba has provided Jamaica with assistance in improving Kingston's water supply constructing housing and schools and modernizing agricultural and fisheries techniques Cuba has sent doctors and other medical personnel to staff Jamaican hospitals and has trained several hundred Jamaican youths in Cuba to become construction workers There are also reports that Cuba is providing training to some Jamaican security officials Cuban assistance to Guyana has been of a similar nature although smaller in scale However Cuba's relations with the Burnham government are complicated by its desire to main- 65 tain influence with the major opposition to Burnham Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party In late 1979 Cuba and Guyana terminated their fisheries agreement reportedly because the Guyanese believed Cuba had failed to live up to its end of the agreement In the Eastern Caribbean Cuba has balanced low-key encouragement of legitimate leftist groups with open cooperation with established governments There is little doubt that the political climate offers opportunities Havana may be able to exploit to increase its influence at the expense of the U S However Cuba's official presence in the Eastern Caribbean excluding Grenada is still limited to several Prensa Latina and Cubana airline representatives The Soviets have also increased their involvement in this hemisphere expanding their trade technical assistance and diplomatic presence The Soviets have been particularly interested in South America although they have recently added embassies in Nicaragua and Grenada Both Jamaica and Nicaragua have expressed interest in receiving Soviet economic and technical assistance So far the Soviets have provided little although there is a possibility the recent Nicaraguan mission to Moscow may change this The Soviet-Cuban Relationship Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union has several 66 facets Havana depends on Moscow for about two-thirds of its total trade Soviet economic support to Cuba exceeded $3 billion in 1979 a two-fold increase from two years ago The bulk of this assistance consists of subsidies on sugar petroleum and nickel As President Castro explained in an unusually candid speech to the National People's Assembly on December 27 sugar 1979 the price paid by-the Soviets for Cuban is on a sliding scale -n 1979 they bought Cuban sugar at the equivalent of 44 cents as compared to the world market price of about 10 cents Similarly the Soviets sell Cuba petroleum at about half the market price three to four million tons of sugar Since Cuba exports to the Soviet Union each year and receives neariiy all its petroleum from the Soviets these price differentials are crucial to the Cuban economy The need to maintain this enormous subsidy without which Cuba would be forced to reduce sharply its already austere standard of living remains a constant concern to the Castro regime For the past several years the Soviet Union has been helping upgrade the Cuban armed forces by delivering modern military equipment to Cuba Unlike other Soviet military clients Cuba pays nothing for this equipment This armed forces modernization program strikes a tender nerve in the U S even though most of the types of equipment Cuba has received so far were provided earlier to other Soviet clients Given the experience of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis we monitor arms deliveries to Cuba closely to ensure that they 67 represent no threat to the United States Several developments have aroused particular interest In 1978 the Soviets delivered HiG-23s more sophisticated aircraft than Cuba had previously received Since certain versions of the MiG-23 are configured to carry nuclear weapons we carefully studied the aircrafts' characteristics and raised the transfer directly with the Soviets before concluding that they did not constitute an offensive threat to the U S Similarly we have been monitoring for some time the construction of a new naval facility at Cienfuegos consisting of deep-water piers and naval support-type buildings We have no evidence the Soviets are involved in the construetion or will be ultimately operating the facility So far it has been used by the conventional non-nuclear submarines delivered however the new by the Soviets to Cuba It would not be surprising for Soviet naval vessels to make a port call at facility during future deployments to the Caribbean Another facet of the Soviet-Cuban relationship is the presence in Cuba of a Soviet combat brigade The unit which consists of 2 600-3 000 men may have been in Cuba for some time but we were unable to confirm its presence until last fall Here again we were confronted with something which while not a security threat to the US was a cause of serious concern More recently the costs to Cuba of its dependence on the Soviet Union have come into sharper focus hoped to use Cuba's Castro had three-year term as president of the Non- 68 Aligned Movement NAM to project himself as leader of the Third World Havana spent lavishly in playing host to the September 1979 NAM summit The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not only ended Cuba's bid for a seat on the UN Security Council but also has undermined Cuba's ability to exert influence within the Non-Aligned Movement Cuba's was placed in such an uncomfortable position by the intervention that when Cuba's Ambassador to the UN finally spoke out on the subject he was careful to couch his support for the Soviets not as a defense of the invasion but as an attack on the United States and imperialism DeepeningEconomm c Problems in Cuba Cuba's deepening economic problems have shown the Cuban people and the world that the Cuban economic model which resembles some aspects of the Soviet model offers few solutions to the problems of underdevelopment The Soviet economic subsidy to Cuba exceeds U S assistance to all of Latin America while Cuba's population is less than one-twentieth of Latin America's Despite this huge subsidy the Cuban standard of living as mentioned before is austere and deteriorating Massive infusions of Soviet aid have kept the economy afloat but Just barely 80 sugar crop by blue mold Sugar cane rust has hurt the 1979- The tobacco industry has been severely damaged Castro admitted in his December 27 speech that the Soviets delivered only 28% of the lumber they had agreed to supply to Cuba in 1979 This has brought construe- 69 tion to a standstill exacerbating the already extremely tight housing situation Virtually all basic consumer necessi- ties are strictly rationed and rations for some items were out back in 1979 The thousands of Cubans who have crowded into the Peruvian Embassy in Havana in a desperate attempt to leave the island provide a graphic illustration of popular discontent with the dismal failure of the Cuban economy In light of Cuba's curtrqn4teconomic difficulties the Castro government will probably go to great lengths to maintain Soviet assistance at least at the present level Beyond this the Cubans are beginning to introduce material incentives in an attempt to increase labor productivity and are continuing to seek increased trade with the West The Castro regime's prospects for earning hard currency to finance purchases from the West are extremely limited however This is one reason the Cubans continue to be interested in improving relations with the United States They see a lifting of the trade embargo as one means of easing their economic squeeze It also explains their interest in more tourism from the United States even at the risk of increased domestic discontent arising from greater exposure to the West Still Cuba has proven unwilling to sacrifice its aggressive foreign policy to improve relations with us relations but apparently not at the It wants better cost of abandoning its position at the forefront of those seeking revolutionary change 70 U S -Cuban Relations Over the past three years we have taken a number of steps to open constructive lines of communication between Cuba and the U S We negotiated the opening of Interests Sections in Washington and Havana and have lifted the ban on U S travel to Cuba granted visas to selected Cuban citizens to visit the U S and permitted the resumption of charter flights between the two countries We have also signed fishing rights and provisional maritime boundary agreements and held two rounds of Coast Guard talks in Havana and Washington The Cubans for their part have taken some encouraging steps particularly in the human rights field But this has not been matched by any change in Cuba's foreign policy As a result we have emphasized to the Cubans that there can be no significant progress toward normalization until we see convincing evidence of a Cuban turnaround in Africa including troop reductions At the same time we have also- taken steps to protect our security interests closer to home This does not mean that our policy of seeking to open constructive lines of communication was mistaken On the contrary we continue to believe that there is no possibility of resolving our differences unless we are at least willing to talk Our dialogue with Cuba has cost us little and has yielded some significant benefits For example the Cubans are coope- rating with us in search and rescue operations and drug traffic interdiction in the heavily traveled waters between Cuba 71 and Florida We have had greater success in securing the release of American small craft and their crews that stray into Cuban waters Between November 1979 and March 1980 46 American citizens inadvertently entered Cuban territory without authorization 32 were released fairly promptly after questioning 14 were arrested 4 Our consular officers at the U S Interests Section are able to provide assistance to Americans in Cuban jails This has become increasingly important because there are now more than forty Americans in Cuban jails The Cuban government has permitted all single- source Americans and dual nationals to depart Cuba with all members of their households even those of Cuban citizenship The Cubans have also released most American political prisoners Indeed one of the members of this subcommittee Congressman Ben Gilman contributed a great deal of time and effort toward securing the release of four American political prisoners last fall The Cuban Government has taken other unilateral steps which probably would have been impossible before we opened lines of communication to Cuba In late 1979 President Castro announced that he would release almost all Cuban political prisoners and allow them to leave the island with their families So far about 3 900 political prisoners have been released And for the first time since the early 1960s the Castro government now allows Cuban-Americans to return to the island for family visits Tens of thousands of Americans of Cuban extraction have benefitted from these steps 72 Heeting the Challenge The past two years have shown that the Cubans and the Soviets remain ready to exploit targets of opportunity in this hemisphere They see any erosion of U S influence as a net gain for themselves So far however they have avoided taking too many risks probably out of fear of provoking a strong U S reaction The Soviets have traditionally focussed their attention on South America The Cubans however see the Caribbean basin as an area ripe with opportunities for extending their influence They are becoming more active in the region now that their African involvement has leveled off Former Assistant Sdcretary Viron Vaky discussed at length before this subcommittee on September 11 1979 the factors that make many countries in the Caribbean basin vulnerable to Cuban influence More recently this was discussed by Deputy Assistant Secretary John Bushnell in his March 25 1980 testimony before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Appropriations Cuba's success in exploiting any emerging opportunities will depend in large measure on our response and that of others in the hemisphere Our most effective response to Cuba's attempts to extend its influence in the Caribbean basin would be to increase our own efforts of assistance Most countries in the region badly need economic and technical assistance of one form or another We have the capability to meet at least some of their needs Cuba by contrast 73 has very little to give It is worthwhile to keep In mind that even those states which are friendliest to Cuba--Jamaica Nicaragua and Guyana--have carefully kept the door open to the West They may admire certain aspects of the Cuban model but pragmatism and nationalism dictate against replicating it Our policies are designed to address critical shortrange economic problems in the region We are encouraging greater cooperation and interdependence among the islandstates of the Caribbean In Central America we recognize that change is inevitable where traditional patterns are in many respects both unjust and unsuitable We are adapting our policies and using'6ur many links to these societies to help the processes of change already underway take less violent and more democratic forms than they would otherwise In addition we have made clear to all parties that we take our security interests'in the Caribbean basin most seriously The President has already announced concrete steps in this regard including increased surveillance of Cuba expanded military maneuvers in the region and the establishment of a full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at'Key West Cuba has shown it can move quickly to take advantage of targets of opportunity Nevertheless the United States has the resources and the determination to meet the challenge The poignant picture of thousands of Cubans jammed shoulderto-shoulder inside the Peruvian Embassy in a desperate attempt to flee their homeland is a vivid reminder that the future does not belong to Castro's Cuba 74 Mr YAmoN Without objection we will have it included in the record Thank you very much Mr Frechette for an excellent statement On the subject of security interest which you mention on page 14 would you consider the cooperation of all Latin American governments necessary for protecting our security interests in the hemisphere from Soviet and Cuban influence I Mr FRwctErrr Mr Chairman I am not sure that the cooperation of all of them is necessary but certainly the cooperation of a number of them would be useful As you know one of the problems we have had in recent years in dealing with the Cuban threat in the hemisphere and the Soviet threat is that frankly many Latin American governments are simply not excited or as excited as we are about the threat It is very difficult to pursue any kind of a hemispheric policy when most of the countries in the hemisphere really are not that concerned Mr YAThON Mr Blacken would you comment on the upcoming election in Honduras I STATEMENT OF JOHN D BLACKEN COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr BLA KEN Yes Mr Chairman The Honduran Government is going through a process of returning to civilian rule It has been a military government for 8 years These elections are a step in that process They are to elect a constituent assembly which in turn will draft a constitution We hope that they will defer any election of a president until a subsequent step although it is entirely possible that this group could decide that it will also indirectly elect a president That is a question mark There is one other thing There are two parties which will be permitted to participate in those elections The Christian Democrats have been excluded Mr YATRON Which are the two parties Mr BLACiKEN The Liberal Party and the National Party Mr YATRON Mr Warne could you give us an election update for the Caribbean area STATEMENT OF ROBERT W WARNE COUNTRY DIRECTOR - FOR CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr WARNE I will be delighted to Mr Chairman There are two elections immediately on the-horizon concerning the Caribbean One is an unspecified date in Jamaica where the current government the Manley government of the People's National Party has called for an election sometime this year possibly as early as July or August The date has not yet been set They are currently working with the Electoral Commission to prepare themselves for that election The date should be announced in the foreseeable future The other election is the election in Antigua a small dependency at the present time of the United Kingdom Antigua has scheduled an election for April 24 We anticipate from all signs that this will be a democratic election and will go forward with the parties competing for their shares of the parliamentary seats It is quite possible after the election that Antigua will make some 75 decision regarding its independence fiom the United Kingdom That remains to be seen -ITh'oseare the tWo elections immediately on'the horizon Mr YATmON Mr Frechette do you see 'any signs of a resurgence 6f Cuban interest in LAtin America despite its own problems at home Mr FREcirmnr Certainly Mr Chairman As I pointed out in my statement there is no question that within the last 2 years the Cubans have perceived the situation in Latin America in general but in the Caribean and Centrl America in particular as going their way in other words economic social and political problems in those areas indicat that they have-some s6it of role to play This is a matter of great concern to us because we have noted that after many years of having abandoned in effect fooling around in this area they are now trying to exploit opportunities but without taking too many risks Mr YATRoN Could you give us some examples of Cuba tailoring its activities to local political realities Mr FRwCiirrm Certainly Mr Chairman In Peru and Venezuela the Cubans are extremely effective in maintaining links with all the political parties other than those of the extreme right with which they will have nothing to do They have good contacts in the press andin influential sectors in the society I was stationed in Venezuela until August of last year and I can tell you from personal experience that the Cuban Embassy down there was extremely capable and well connected They were able to make Cuba's message reach throughout the elites of Venezuela Mr YATRON Does anybody else want to comment on that Mr BLACKFEN Just another example of the same thing During the contest last fall in the U N for the Security Council seat between Colombia and Cuba the Cubans sought to use the Colombian press and certain sympathetic groups in Colombia to undermine the Colombian Government's determination to pursue that candidacy Mr YATRON How many military advisers are stationed in Nicaragua both Cuban and Soviet if anyI Mr FEcirrm7rE Mr Chairman there are several hundred but about 200 I believe is the figure that I have Mr BLACKEN Two hundred military Mr FzCHvrra Two hundred military certainly Now there are several hundred civilians acting in the fields of agriculture labor security and education We have at least 1 200 teachers in Nicaragua at least 1 200 There may be more but I think that is a safe figure Mr BLACKEN The global figure is about 2 000 total Mr FRECHurE All in all yes Mr YATRoN Do you have any evidence of Cuban foreknowledge of the coup in GrefiadaI Mr FRECHETrE We believe that the coup leaders in Grenada did notify the Cubans that they were going to do it That is the extent of it They got the message through somehow Perhaps Mr Warne would like to get into more detail on that Mr WARNE We have no specific knowledge that the Cubans were actively involved in the preparations for the New Jewel Movement coup on March 13 1979 There were some indications that perhaps they were aware of these plans There was no evidence that they were actively involved beforehand in actually organizing and arming these elements 76 Mr YATRoN What types of arms and how many Cuban military advisers were sent to Grenada after the coup Mr WARNE The Cubans responded very rapidly to the coup and to the efforts of the New Jewel Movement to welcome them in Immediately after the coup they sent in a number of military trainers to help organize a para-military force Security deletion We believe that they have helped in the training of about 1 500 to 2 000 paramilitary forces that now exist in Grenada Many of these trainers we believe have now left although probably a small cadre still remains in Grenada Tne Cubans have continued to have a very active involvement in Grenada but primarily on the economic and social side at this present time They have now entered into an agreement to build a new jet about port with the Grenadan Government This jet poft will entail hundred several as well as Cubans the of kind in aid $10 million of technicians The Cubans are providing cement for example and technical expertise as well as actual construction workers to assist in the building of the jet port They also have a number of doctors educators and others working in Grenada at this time They also have a very active embassy Theya now have an ambassador resident in Grenada ho is adopting quite high silhouette for example he took quite an active role in the recent March 13 celebration of the so-called revolution of the Grenadan Government Mr YATRoN On page 4 would you explain why you think it is doubtful that the Cubans have the wherewithal to succeed in making Grenada a showcase of Cuban-aided development Mr FRFcHrETF Certainly Mr Chairman It is very simple They do not have any money to make available for projects The mostInthey the can do is to provide manpower and some equipment or goods so Cuba in cement produce do they airport the and case of Grenada they are making available cement The one thing that Cuba has to bring to bear to its aid programs around the world is manpower Cuba does have disguised underemployment and unemployment For the next 10 years at least Mr Chitrman Cuba will have an excess of working-age male population Cuba at So in a certain sense it suits Cuba to have people abroad has about 35 000 troops inAfrica and the present time as you know 15 000 civilian personnel around the world it has perhaps another Some of these are actually reimbursed for their services For instance in hard construction batallions in Iraq and in Libya are reimbursed Angola in advisers civilian the of Some countries those by currency Cuba to are also reimbursed in hard currency So there are some advantages to the Cubans in terms of unemployment in having their people abroad But again I return the one thing Cuba does not have is money to makc available to help in the Caribbean That is where we believe we havu the edge We have No 1 a higher level of technical expertise to offer and we have money the one thing the Cubans really lak I might add that the Soviets also do not make money available generally for aid programs The last thing the Soviets will commit is money Mr YATRoN Mr Lagomarsino Mr LAGOMAMINO Thank you Mr Chairman Could you tell us how many Nicaraguan students are now studying in CubaI 77 Mr FRECHuIr There are 600 to the best of our knowledge Mr LAGOMARSINO Where did I see 1 20 Mr FRECIMM-E It is 1 200 teachers we believe Cuban teachers in Nicaragua Mr LAGOMARSITNO No I think it was-the other way around too that the original contingent was 600 on the Isle of Youth and I hard there was another 600 Mr FRECHETFE I am not familiar with those figures sir Mr LAUOMARSINO You said earlier that you thought one of the reasons the Cubans were becoming active again in this area is because they perceive they can do so with little risk I am paraphrasing but essentially that is what you said as I understand it Is that correct Mr FRECHE'rF No sir What I said was that they perceive economic social and political conditions in the area as being ripe for exploitation and I said that they would be active wherever they perceived that the risk is not too great They fear the United States and they will not push us too far For example in the case of Nicaragua they were able to get much of their arms and other assistance in using security deletion The fact that security deletion themselves on their own had decided to give assistance to the Sandinistas provided an excellent cover for Cuban efforts Now I might say those governments security deletion were aware that they were being used as a front for Cuba I do not mean to suggest that the Cubans hoodwinked them in any way But the fact that other countries in the area were giving help to the Sandinistas provided if you will an excellent cover for the Cuban activity The United States could not object too hard to the assistance of the Cubans when in fact security deletion were doing the same thing Mr LAGOMARSINO Did not the State Department atleast for a while maintain that Panama was not shipping arms to Nicaragua Mr FREcHETTE I took over this job in August 1979 Mr Lagomarsino I do not know Do you know John Mr BLACKEN I do not know Mr LAGOMARSINo During the debate on the Panama Canal implementing legislation as I recall the State Department's position was that there was not very good evidence that arms were being shipped from Panama or at least with the knowledge of the Panamanian Government Mr FRcHm-mr It is possible at one point in time not to know something and then to know it a month later for sure Mr LAGOMAmINO And also it is a convenience sometimes not to know when you have legislation pending that you want passed I understand that very well With regard to Jamaica how many Cubans are present in Jamaica do you know that Mr WARNE Mr Lagomarsino we do not have an exact figure as to the number of Cubans but it is a very large group of Cubans mainly Cubans who are working in technical assistance agricultural educational and health activities We would estimate that there are several hundred Cuban technicians and others that are present there They also have a very active embassy Their ambassador Mr Estrada has a very high silhouette and is very politically active and has been very aobive with the militants of the People's National Party in promoting party activities 62-713 0 - 80 - 6 78 MrLAooz0s0XRo Are there any CubAns involved in the military or security aspects of Jamaica I Mr WARNE Mr Lagomarsino we believe that there probably are yea There probably are intelligence agents involved with Jamaican authorities in various activities Mr LAGoxARsINo Some people speculate that No 1 perhaps Manley will not actually go through with an election if it appears that he could be defeated and No 2 I have even heard some speculation that perhaps he might try to take over the country and impose a one-party if you will dictatorship Mr WARNE That is a possibility but I do not believe that it is the greatest possibility Mr Manley is a dedicated democrat I believe who would like to carry through elections However there are elements in his party who have authoritarian views and he is being pushed several ways As you know in February he announced that he would call early elections sometime this year as soon as the Electoral Commission could prepare the electoral list and other requirements to go ahead with elections It is our belief that probably that is Mr Manley's intent to hold elections although there is a possibility that with social unrest with deterioration in -the economy which is certainly occuring at this time that that situation could change and he might turn to another direction although we are certainly counseling him and other elements there that the democratic solution is the best one Mr LAGoMARSI8O I understand that President Carter in his Caribbean speech whenever that was said he would- not permit Cuban invasions Mr WARNE That was April 9 Mr LAOOMARSINo Of this year Mr WARNE Which speech are you speaking of the October 1 one Mr LAGOMARSIXO I think I am talking about the October I one where he said among other things that we would resist and oppose any Cuban invasion Was that not part of it Mr Fpxcrn rr No that was Soviet the use of Cuba for any Soviet adventures in the hemisphere Mr LAGoOMARsINO He did not refer to a Cuban adventure Mr FcHm-re The speech on October 1 sir was in specific reference to the Soviet brigade and he was addressing primarily security deletion the Soviets He said we would not permit Cuba to be used by the Soviets for any invasions or adventures in the hemisphere Mr LAGOARSINO How do we tell if it is for the Soviets or Cuba Obviously sir we would oppose a Cuban Mr FREcln rT adventure Mr LAGOMARSINO I will have to go back and look at that Mr FREcHrm Obviously we would oppose the Cubans also but I believe in that speech he made specific reference to the Soviets I would like to if I may make one clarification There is not toc much evidence that the Jamaican Armed Forces are that closely tied with the Cubans but I believe there is more evidence that the security services have close ties with the Cubans Is that not correct Mr WARN There are two security forces in Jamaica You first have the Jamaican defense force which is essentially their military arm and then you have the Jamaican constabulary which is the police- 79 related activities To the best knowledge we have both are relatively professional and independent and tionpolitical Certainly the defense force is professional and nonpolitical Also there are other security elements in the Jamaican Government There are linkages we believe between the security element and the Cubans How active and the extent of that involvement are a matter of speculation Mr LAGOMARSINO I take it from what you said and from my recollection of the President's speech that if the Cubans invadedHaiti which would seem to be the most likely because they have the most antipathy for Haiti from what Mr Castro said or Jamaica or any other country that we would assist that country in resisting that invasion Mr FPECIIm'rE Not only we but any invasion by Cuba of a neighboring country would bring into play the Rio Treaty the InterAmerican system and the OAS Mr LAGOMARSINO I do not have too much faith in that I hope we would not wait until we had all of the signatories Mr FRdHErrm Certainly not I just wanted to indicate that there are treaty obligations which give us certain rights and abilities to do certain things I Mr LAGOMARSINO Let's imagine a scenario where Mr Manley or some leader in the region although I think that he woul4 be the most likely at this point if anything ever happened invited the Cubans in as an occupying force if you will What would be our reaction to that Mr FPucHar That would pose a very difficult problem Mr LAOOMARSINO Very tough Mr FREC m'rE Very difficult indeed Mr WARNE That is a hypothetical question Mr Lagomarsino and it is awfully difficult for us to predict ahead I can assure you that you have to be very concerned over that situation and we would act appropriately Mr LAGOMAlSINO Do you have any evidence of the Cubans giving military training to the people from El Salvador Guatemala or Honduras in Cuba at the present time Mr FRFcHff'rE They have done that over a number of years Mr Lagomarsino Their links with leftist groups in Central America and in other parts of Latin America go back many many years As I pointed out in my statement despite the fact that during the 1970's they tended to concentrate more on legitimate relationships with governments they continue to maintain their links with leftist groups And the kind of links they maintained were occasionally giving them some money occasionally asylum occasionally some training Mr LAoOARSINO That is continuing as far as you know Mr FRwCHm-im Yes sir Mr LAGOMARsINO Do we have any evidence that the Cubans are involved in the training of any guerrillas or terrorist groups in other countries Mr FRwzTEm The Cubans provide training to people from many countries Mr Lagomarsino They do that in Cuba they do it in other countries and they do it in the country from which those people come They do it for instance in Africa 80 Mr LAGOMARSINO How about in Central America Do you have any evidence of that Mr FRxcciinrrE I am sorry Mr LAooJmusro The Cuban training of terrorists in any country in Central America Mr FREonmrr In recent years of terrorists per se no sir Now of revolutionaries that is something else Mr LAGOMARSINO OK revolutionaries Mr FPRHomrrr There is a distinction in the sense that I do not Ltlieve the Cubans are interested in the Japanese Red Army type of activity They are however interested in wars of national liberation and they are prepared to give training to people for that Yoa must understand that in past years they have given some training for instance to the PLO which has later carried out terrorist activities But our best information is that the Cubans themselves do not believe that terrorist activities per se is the way to go Mr LAOMARSINO Is there any evidence that Cubans are involved in any training of revolutionaries in Nicaragua El Salvador or Guatemala Mr FRECHi1rF In Nicaragua Mr LAOMARSINO Yes Mr FPEcmnirE Not that I know of but maybe Mr Blacken knows Mr BLACKEN They have advisers in Nicaragua We have no hard indications but I think we believe that there are some advisers also with the guerrillas in El Salvador In Guatemala I do not know Mr LAGOMARSINO DIA told us 3 weeks ago 4 weeks ago that they have evidence that security deletion The CIA said they believe that that is probably true Do you have any information on that Mr FRECHE rE Not specifically no sir Mr BLACKEN Our information indicates that the largest amount of guerrilla training takes place in El Salvador itself although there are some outside It could be there is some in Nicaragua and we believe there is some in Cuba Mr LAOOMARSINO Thank you Mr YATRON What details do you have on setting up a conduit to transfer arms to Salvadoran guerrillas through Honduras Mr FRcwHcrr We have some evidence sir that the Cubans have been working with security deletion to establish some conduits but I think that I should warn that we have very little evidence to substantiate that arms have actually flowed through those conduits But we do know security deletion they have been trying to set such a thing up I should point out that for the moment to the best of my knowledge no Communist weapons have been found in El Salvador They did turn up Communist-origin weapons in Nicaragua but so far none have shown up that we know of in El Salvador Mr YATRON Do you perceive a cooling of relations with Guyana Mr FPECHEEr Yes sir there is a cooling of relations at least to some extent manifested by the ending of the fishing agreement As you know Guyana does pose a problem for the Cubans because they want to maintain contacts with Mr Cheddi Jagan's party They consider themselves closer ideologically with Mr Jagan and his party than they do with Mr Burnham They have never to my knowledge 81 really convinced themselves that Mr Burnham is a genuine revolutionary They believe that Mr Burham came to power in part because we helped him Mr YATRo N Are we doing anything to take advantage of the situation Mr FREcHT'rE Mr Blacken was in Guyana My guess is that that is a little hard to do but perhaps he would like to address that Mr BLACKEN Mr Warne also can correct me on this but basically in 1976 our relations with Guyana were strained and very low I think since 1977 the end of that period they have improved considerably We are providing economic assistance to Guyana now in a greater degree than we were before I think the relationship has improved significantly over the past 4 years Mr WARNE I would agree with that I think our relationship has improved with the Guyanese Government although we are maintaining our flexibility We perceive the Government as still an authoritarian instrument They have postponed elections and have not set a definite date for when they might hold elections We certainly would encourage a democratic process there - As a result we are working with the Burnham government providing financial assistance andcooperation in other areas particularly in the information area but we do remind them of human rights violations as well as our desire to see the electoral process go forward Mr YATRON In the eastern Caribbean excluding Grenada where you have stated that there is a limited Cuban official presence do you view the Prensa Latina and the Cubana Airline representatives as important tools of Cuban policy or are they just conduits for information Mr FRECHErrE Certainly the Prensa Latina people are very active in winning over people to the Cuban point of view After all that is one of their major roles not only dispensing news but also propaganda In my experience the Cubana reps are more often exactly what they say they are--airline people-but they also on occasion have carried out intelligence missions It is very difficult to tell A man does not have to be a professional intelligence officer to carry out intelligence missions Mr YAToN On the Soviet-Cuban relationship do you see the Soviets continuing their support at the same level as in the past or will it be reduced Mr FRECHEr You mean to Cuba sir Mr YATRON As in the past yes Mr FREcuEirE No we see this as probably increasing Mr Chair- man From the early 1960's until about 195 Soviet assistance in economic terms was about $1 million per day From about 1975 to 1978 that went up to close to $4 million a day In 1979 it was $8 million a day close to $3 billion for the whole year Now that is quite aside from military assistance which is given to Cuba free It is grant aid and since 1960 the Cubans have received almost $2 billion worth of Soviet arms free Mr YATRON That security deletion million a day is a figure that was given to us before by the Defense Intelligence and also the CIA Mr FnRcHzrm I thiik we are all agreed on that Mr Chairman 82 Mr LAGOARSIO Will the gentleman yield Mr YATRON Yes Mr LAOOMARSINO Does that count the money that is paid directly to Cuba for its maintenance of its troops in other countries Mr FPrcinrr No sir Mr LAGO ARSINO That is in addition Mr FwnuHrr That is in addition That does not come from the Soviet Union I am sorry I misunderstood your question The Angolans pay or the Libyans pay or the Iraqis pay for Cuban civilians who give their assistance But in many countries their groups whatever they may be doing--7 medical technicians teachers military advisers palace guards security advisers-are there for free the Cubans are tremendously flexible in their foreign aid program They will work out any kind of a deal that can be worked If the country will provide for instance food and lodging they will take it It can be worked out They are extremely flexible There is no foreign aid program There are no strictures There are no legislative amendments There is no congress The Cubans can do whatever they want to virtually overnight I did not imply any criticism Mr Chairman Mr LAOOMARSizrO Fidel is like the big bear He sleeps wherever he wants to Mr FRECenrrE That is right Mr YATRON You cite the failure of the Soviets to deliver the full amount of lumber agreed to which has created additional housing problems Is there any indication of less support of the Cuban economy or is there anot her reason Mr FRECHErrE Mr Chairman we think that it was caused by the same kind of problem that the Cubans have--that these centrally directed economies really do not work and that the Soviets just like the Cubans miss their production goals There was a speech made on December 27 by Fidel Castro which I have mentioned in my statement in which he goes on at some len h-and I must say very amusingly-to point out that in the Socialist group within which Cuba now finds itself you pretty much take what your partners give you It is a division of labor As he points out the fact is they need sheets and mattresses and that sort of thing but since all their friends have to give them is TV sets they take TV sets Then he suggested that 10 000 Cubans might go to Siberia to cut the lumber that Cuba needs And in fact there are indications that the Cubans are putting together such a lumber-cutting brigade Mr YATR O Since we are helping to prop up the Cuban economy with increased tourism has any thought been given to halting these trips I FRPCHm-r Pr No sir one of the steps that was taken at the beginning of the process toward normalization was to allow tourism of Americans Among other things as you know the Supreme Court has held that we cannot restrict or withhold passports for travel to certain countries We felt that it was useful for Americans to go and see Cuba firsthand Freedom to travel is one of the freedoms which we endorse in general Freedom of communication We endorse that as a general policy of the United States V 83 Now as a result of the steps toward normalization Fidel Castro in 1978 said that Cuban-Americans could return to Cuba to visit their relatives This is the first time since 1962 that this had been possible We estimate that 120 000 Cuban exiles have been to Cuba since that began They have left in Cuba probably $110 million in foreign exchange of a'help to Cuba We feel that that is useful for two reasons one humanitarian with the idea that these poor people who have been separated for 20 years from their relatives can see them again and two we believe that their presence in Cuba has an unsettling effect It is the best propaganda there is It is not directed It is spontaneous It is natural Mr YATRON You state on page 11 Our policies are designed to address critical short-range economic problems threatening several countries What are the long-term policies that address the same issues Mr WARN3E Mr Chairman perhaps I should turn first to the Caribbean and I will let Mr Blacken pick up on Central America Our long-range policies I would say are four- or fivefold First and foremost we are promoting development in the long-term both political social and economic and that means that our desire is to reinforce the constitutional democratic traditions that exist in the Caribbean to strengthen the democratic process and to hopefully move these countries toward a continuation of the Westminster parliamentary system or other form of democratic institution Second and as important is identification of the basic human needs in these islands to help them diversify their agriculture economies to help them develop an industrial base and technical capability so that they can sustain development They have been impacted very severely by the increased oil prices Many of them are not going to realize real rates of growth this Tear They suffer from acute levels of high unemployment and in the ongterm the only way that these problems can be solved is through'increasing their productivity and the capability of using their resources Third we would like to see a diversification of these economies We see at the present time that many of the economies are unable to get away from monoculture or one or two exports of commodities They need to develop their own internal agriculture They need to diversify their exports and they need to go into areas where they can export and earn foreign exchange This will reduce their dependency on external aid Fourth we would like to see them develop regionally in a cooperative framework through the Caricom the Eastern Caribbean Common Market through the activities of the multilateral lending agencies particularly the Caribbean Development Bank We are providing help in this area through a multilateral framework which we helped initiate the Caribbean Group for Development in Economic Cooperation in which we have brought together some 31 countries and 15 international institutions to raise financing to assist in project development and immediate balance-of-payments needs to help these countries develop The hallmark of that program is regional cooperation in a multilateral framework Our ultimate goal of course is to have close relationships with these countries through sound development programs in the full 84 extent of the word-political economic and social We believe we are accomplishing that with the support of the Congress We have substantially increased our financial assistance to the Caribbean but much more needs to be done We have just started the process Mr YATRON Mr Blacken Mr BLACKEN Much of what Mr Warne has said is also applicable to Central America There is one crucial difference and that is that many of the political structures-the socioeconomic structures of Central America-date back for a long time Until recently they had not changed We had oligarchies in charge linked to the military and basically a status quo has remained In the past we have been identified with the status quo It has become very clear that it cannot be maintained much longer Central America is in a transition period and it is a difficult and in some ways a dangerous period for us because basically there are changes going on changes that are very difficult to control and influence yet we feel it is in our interest to try to contain it in the sense of helping change and reforms-the basic necessary economic and social reforms-take place to allow people of the area to participate more fully in their own governments in the election of their governments and in their economy We are engaged in this certainly in El Salvador right now In fact security deletion I think until last October security deletion as far as the Cuban position toward El Salvador was concerned it was one of waiting and watching what they considered a favorable thing In October the junta took over and it has announced in the last 2 months significant agrarian reforms and banking reforms in order to get land to the people who have been farming it I think the Cubans and the extreme left in El Salvador are extremely worried about this They no longer are waiting They are now trying to disrupt these reform programs and they are making a very strong effort to disrupt this both internally and through groups that they influence outside They are trying to discredit the junta with liberal and other groups in the United States as well to undermine this policy that we have of supporting the change and supporting the junta So we are in a difficult and sensitive period in Central America Mr YATRON Mr Lagomarsino Mr LAOOMARSINO I just have one question I certainly support the idea of supporting the junta in El Salvador I think it is the only way there is to go Let me make a comment and then I will ask a question It appears to me that it is one thing to support reforms that somebody else carries out it is another thing for us to insist on a particular reform Did we do that in El Salvador Mr BLACKEN Not insist on a particular reform There were times when the junta different elements of the junta had hesitations When they have asked us I think we have said that this is very advisable that it is necessary to go ahead with the reform Mr LAOOMARSIN0O Dbid we say Unless you go ahead we will chop you off Mr BLACKEN No I do not think we have said that There is one thing On the matter of human rights we have made it very clear that our support-particularlv we have a small military 85 program with trucks and communications equipment--and we have made it very clear that this kind of support would continue only as long as they are able to control violence and certainly restrict any violence that might be coming from the government Basically they are fighting a war against the left So it is a very difficult thing to say who is doing what to whom but that reducing violence is a clear part of our policy Mr YATRON Is there any drug traffic flowing through Cuban waters You say in your testimony that they are cooperating in search and rescue operations in drug traffic interdiction Is there any activity at all f Mr FRECHEmT Through those waters Mr YATRON In Cuba Mr FRECHETrE Yes sir Cuba sits right astride the traffic routes from South America coming north The small boats go through the Yucatan Straits and the Windward Passage so Cuba sits right astride this and has been helpful to us has given us some cooperation in narcotics interdiction As a matter of fact the U S Coast Guard basically stakes out those two passages and sits there on patrol In addition the Drug Enforcement Administration has carried out an operation security deletion to help track some of these airborne drug traffickers into the Florida area It was a tremendously successful op eration This was last October I understand they have another one p amed coming up soon Mr YATRON In which eastern Caribbean countries has Cuba balanced low-key encouragement of legitimate leftist groups with open cooperation of established governments Mr WARNIE It is hard to identify a specific country Mr Chairman where that specific description would fit The Cubans are active throughout the region I think that their policy is one of trying to come out of the isolation that they have in the Caribbean at the present time to extend a more active role throughout the region I think they are tailoring their response to the needs of each country Maybe the best way I can answer that is just by illustration of activities in one or two countries to give you some idea St Lucia for example which is a newly independent mini-state had a recent election in July and had a more progressive government come forward at least in some senses of the word In that case I believe the Cubans offered assistance to the government The government has not been particularly responsive at least that is to the best of our information security deletion They continue to have dialogue with the St Lucian officials at every opportunity They certainly want to cultivate them but they do not have an overt effort in the sense of a major aid program or military training They have offered for example programs in home construction But to the best of my knowledge those offers have not been accepted They would exploit the opportunity should it exist that if that government wanted to turn toward a more cooperative approach more involvement in the military area I think the Cubans would be responsive But at this time the St Lucian Government has decided not to do that 86 Barbados might be another example where you have a stable democritically elected government that is doing very well economically The Cubans really have had a minimal involvement but they do have a Communist or strong militant left wing group and we believe the Cubans have been active in financing that group perhaps helping them establish a newspaper and some campaign activities but a limited involvement Those two illustrations I think would point out the types of ways the Cubans are trying to respond to opportunities both among those who are sympathetic in the political spectrum and also with established governments Mr YATRON Are these governments aware of Cuba's encouragement of these particular leftist groups Mr WARii Often I believe they are yes but not necessarily of clandestine activities where there might be payments of funds to a militant leader who might be running for office I am not sure that they are aware of that I do not believe they are but they are generally aware of Cuban activities In some cases we have exchanged views on these activities Mr YATRoN How much indoctrination do the Jamaicans training to be construction workers receive in Cuba Mr WARNE I am not sure Indeed there is indoctrination Indoctrination is exposure to a very carefully tailored situation to try to persuade them of the benefits of the Cuban society Frankly Mr Chairman I think the bloom has come off of the Cuban model I think the events that recently have occurred of economic hardships have demonstrated throughout the Caribbean to many of the people who are broadminded that the Cuban model has some major shortcomings and indeed is not necessarily the best model to follow in all elements of economic activity Mr FRECHE-rE Perhaps I should note Mr Chairman that in Cuba there is a sizeable popu action of Jamaican origin These people are not always English-speaking but a lot of them are So it is not difficult for the Cubans although they are not English-speaking to make contact with those Jamaicans who go over there for training Mr YATRON Would you care to comment further on the significance of Ulisas Estrada counseling Manley on his campaign strategy Mr WARNE I was struck Mr Chairman by Mr Estrada's very high silhouette in Kingston It continues to be very high In fact lie spoke out publicly in criticism of the independent press slanderous comments which he thought were directed against him and others I think it has been damaging and counter-productive in my own view He obviously is not an astute diplomat He has been involved in political activities He probably has damaged the Cuban cause and indeed has set himself up to be criticized by the opposition party for interfering in domestic politics Indeed the independent press has also made these comments I find it very surprising and rather inept Mr YATRoN I understand at one time he was a very high official in charge of revolution in the hemisphere Mr WAtNE That is correct It is my understanding that he is involved in political action 87 Mr YATRoN On page 12 you mention that Cuba has released most American political prisoners I was under the impression that the four Americans released last fall were the only remaining political prisoners that were left there Mr FRECHmE'r No sir There are two who also have Cuban citizenship The Cubans take the position that anybody who has dual nationality that is Cuban and something else is only a Cuban So we have those two people whom we consider American citizens but who are considered by the Cubans as Cuban citizens Therefore they will not talk to us about them they will not give us access to them This is a problem that we have in Cuba In addition we probably have at least nine and possibly more persons of American citizenship who are considered Cubans by the Cubans They are there on common criminal charges either under detention or are serving sentences Mr YATRON I have one final question You state on page 13 that Cuba has become more active in the Caribbean basin now that the African situation has stabilized Should Cuba experience instability in Africa could that attract their attention away from the Caribbean basin Mr FREcHrrE It is possible of course Mr Chairman To some extent the Cuban situation in Africa is now slowed down tremendously The Cuban troops in Angola are no longer engaged in front-line operations They are basically sitting in garrisons guarding the major cities basically keeping the MPLA in power It is not the Cubans who are fighting the UNITA forces of Jonas Savimbi it is Angolans In Ethiopia the Cubans do have a brigade stationed in the Ogaden but they are no longer fighting the Somalis They are not involved in the fighting directly against the Eritreans Let's not forget that at one time the Cubans supported the Eritreans They are not involved in that now They have been very careful What they do do is allow Ethiopian forces to fight by shall we say performing rear line activities garrison duty that sort of thing So in Africa basically I will not use the words bogged down but things have quieted down tremendously In the Caribbean they see opportunities to exploit and we have seen this increasing willingness to become involved It is possible that if things heated up in Africa that might slow down the Cubans in the Caribbean but it is not automatically true that if it heats up in Africa it will slow down in the Caribbean There is not that direct cause and effect relationship no sir Mr WARNE I would agree with that Mr Chairman I really do not see the Cubans tapering off their activities in the Caribbean There are too many volatile opportunistic situations existing there and I think as long as those opportunities exist I think they will continue to try and exploit those opportunities as they come along They want to get out of their isolation in the region Mr YATRON Mr Lagomarsino do you have any more questions Mr LAOOMARINo No thank you Mr YATRONr I want to thanks you Mr Frechette Mr Warne and Mr Blacken You have been excellent witnesses We appreciate you coming before the committee and should any of the members who were 88 not here today h ave any questions that they would like to submit in writing we will send them to you We would appreciate your written responses Mr FRzcmnr Thank you very much Mr YATRoN Thank you very much for coming here today The subcommittee stands adjourned Whereupon at 3 5 p m the meeting of the subcommittee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair i IMPACT OF CUBAN-SOVIET TIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE SPRING 1980 WRDNESDAY MAY 14 1980 Hous OF REPRESENTATIVES Comxrmx ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS Washington D C The subcommittee met at 2 p m in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building Hon Gus Yatron chairman of the subcommittee presiding Mr YATRON Good afternoon The subcommittee will now come to order Today the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs will conclude a series of hearings on Soviet-Cuban relations and their impact on the Western Hemisphere The unrest and instability in Central America and the Caribbean has placed a greater concern on the role of Soviet-Cuban influence in the hemisphere than in previous years In the four previous hearings we have heard testimony from the Defense Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence A ency State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation alrof which took place in executive session It is the subcommittee's desire to provide the public with a wellrounded presentation of Soviet-Cuban influence Toward that end today's witnesses are well versed on Soviet-Cuban relations and will represent the academic community's contribution to the hearings The witnesses today include Prof Luis Aguilar of Georgetown University and Prof William M LeoGrande of American University Gentlemen we are pleased to have you here today If you will summarize your statements your prepared remarks will appear in their entirety in the record We can then proceed with questions Professor Aguilar would you like to begin sir STATEMENT OF LUIS E AGUILAR PROFESSOR DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Mr AOUILAR Thank you very much Mr Chairman I am very grateful for the opportunity to be here I have to apologize because there was a communications gap and I sent my testimony too late to be as good as I wanted it to be So instead of summarizing I would like with your permission to indicate what is for me the most essential part of the present problem The historical background of these Soviet-Cuban relations I am almost sure we all know began by a series of contacts in 1960 Then from 1962 it reached its highest moment in terms of military danger 89 go with the missile crisis But from the very beginning-and that is the point I am going to stress-we have to know the difference between Soviet interests and Castro's or Cuba's interests The Soviets seem to be much more concerned with strategic valuesI am referring mainly to the Caribbean-while Castro's policies seem to be more interested in expanding Castro's influence and prestige in the entire Western Hemisphere From 1962 to 1968 without too much Soviet support Havana embarked into a continental campaign of revolutionary efforts By 1968 the guerrilla campaign that Havana had promoted in Latin America had resulted in failure Simultaneously the economic situation in Cuba was in such poor condition that Castro was forced to begin what has been called the Sovietization of Cuba that is Soviet pressure on the Cuban Government increased as Cuba's economic dependence on Russian aid mounted In 1968 Mr Castro had to applaud the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia almost broke relationship with China and tried to follow the pattern of what is known as the institutionalization of the revolution After the failure of the 10 million ton sugar crop in 1970 Cuba became almost totally dependent on Soviet assistance The price that Cuba had to pay for this economic aid which has been growing all these years became evident in 1975 when Castro sent troops to Angola and to Ethiopia providing the Soviet Union with troops or human elements that could do in Africa and in the Western Hemisphere what the Soviets could not do directly So we have two basic trends which slowly because of Cuba's economic disaster became one By the middle of the 1970's Cuba was in no condition to pursue an independent policy and had to follow Russian directions The Soviets are aiming basically at weakenin the American position and strengthening their military position Only when it is convenient to those objectives they back Castro's attempts to expand Cuba's influence Castro Is always trying to maintain the good image of the Cuban model le has sent advisers technicians to Jamaica to Grenada to Dominica help to the Sandinistas As I have said those aims could coincide at times with those of the Soviet Union but we could be confronted with a deep crisis in Cuba I think that this is a moment where there is a possibility a strong possibility that Soviet interests and Castro's interests are not coinciding I think there is again a possibility that the mass exodus of Cubans from the island that Castro's confession of economic problems-of almost disaster magnitude--in Cuba that the irresponsibility shown in sinking two boats in the Bahamas two patrol boats could be a proof that Mr Castro is losing his control over events and by alarming neighbor countries he has ndangered his position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union He is perhaps becoming more of a burden than an asset The Soviets could be considering a change in Cuba's high command-and I said that in a progra n which Professor LeoGrande and myself shared some days ago-it is conceivable that there is a power struggle inside Cuba because the Soviet Union could be searching and looking for a more dependable more efficient more reliable type of leader that would follow a pragmatic Socialist way and not the egotistical revolutionary if you want romantic tendencies of Mr Castro 91 I I would say that this crisis is unfolding now and the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisptere should be ready to try to use that crisis to restore Cuba to a democratic system or at least to slow down Soviet influence in the Caribbean Mr Aguilar's prepared statement follows PREPARE STATEMENT OF Luis E GUXLAB PROFESSOR DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY GEoRoETowN UNIVERSITY The impact and the perspective of Soviet Cuban relations can be better perceived through a brief historical glance at their evolution in the last two decades A little more than twenty years ago respective Soviet and American spheres of national interest where no hostile regimes would be tolerated were clearly defined When a leftist government in Guatemala flirted with the Soviets in 1954 American Intervention provoked its collapse Two years later Russian tanks crushed Hungary's attempt to break Soviet ties Mutual respect for those spheres of influence seemed so well established that when in 1960 Fidel Castro began transforming Cuba into a socialist state an alarmed Cuban Communist party urged caution while the Soviet Union which was testing American response in Berlin prudently refrained from any military commitment Apparently the Kremlin could not believe a socialist regime would survive ninety miles from the United States In 1961 the expected American blow was dellvr d Lacking among many other things organization and deprived of militar - support the Bay of Pigs invasion became a classical example of a perfect failure As a result Castro's international prestige soared U S image was shattered and an emboldened Soviet Union installed missiles in Cuba Kennedy's firm stand forced the removal 6f the missiles but at the price of guaranteeing that no anti-Castro action was to be taken or permitted Thus the U S tolerated a dangerous tilting of international balalice the Soviet's sphere remained intact the Americans have been deeply penetrated An amazing situation followed Under the tacit protection of U S power Castro mounted a formidable anti-U S campaign posing as a heroic David an image which conveniently forgets that David Castro was shielded by an agreement between Soviet and American Goliaths Castro promoted guerillas in the Continent exhorted all Latin-Americans to break Yanqui imperialism and maintained relentless ambitious anti-American propaganda American reaction to this barrage was in general as extraordinary as the situation itself No positive action was taken to face Cuba's challenge On the contrary scores of journalists exaulted the positive aspects of the Cuban Revolution academicians strove to be invited by a regime which had suppressed academic freedom liberal senators embraced Castro and assured the American public of Fidel's friendly intentions and Washington kept an open attitude toward Havana The usual answer to any criticism of this policy was a bland But what can little Cuba do against the most powerful nation in the world Helped by increased economic and military Soviet support Castro built the most impressive military machine of all Latin America and escalated his campaign into global proportions By 1970 the failure of the guerilla campaign in the continent and increasing economic problems in Cuba had forced Castro to yield more and more to Soviet pressure The enormous amount of -Sovieteconomic assistance had to be repaid in the international arena Extremist by nature Castro became more anti-Israel than the Palestinians and more anti-American than the Soviets Thousands of Cuban troops were sent to Angola and Ethiopia to save or aid faltering socialist regimes and Cuban subversive and secret organizations were put under Soviet control In the Western Hemisphere Soviet pragmatism appears to have overcome Castro's initial revolutionarism Cuban-Soviet activities had been largely concentrated on the Caribbean area Cuban presence and influence expanded in Guyana and Jamaica Castro's advisers' sponsored a successful coup in Grenada stirred trouble in Dominica and are allegedly training St Lucia's troops for a possible takeover in that Island Sandinistan victory has opened a new base of operations for the Cuban-Soviet alliance More than two thousand Cuban volunteers are in Nicaragua and Cuban oriented groups are increasingly active in El Salvador where a civil war now appears almost inevitable Even democratic Costa Rica had been forced to take action against Cuban agents 92 And as current chairman of the nonaligned nations Castro is trying bard to inject good doses of anti-Americanism Into that organization All things considered little Cuba has done exceptionally well Cuban-Soviet relations are today facing a deep crisis The mismanagement of Cuba's economy and Castro reluctance to follow the Soviet suggestion of institutionallhation of the revolution had created a mass exodus of Cubans and an International situation which is quite negative for the propaganda of the Cuban model In the Caribbean Careful plans of slow penetration of the area had been jeopardized by those events and by Castro's apparent eagerness to use military force as demonstrated by the recent incident of sinking to Bahamian boats Inside Cuba the economic situation and the demoralization of the population seemed to have reached new depths Simultaneously Soviet price to keep the island economy from collapsing had Increased It is quite possible that according to Soviet perspective Castro has become more of a burden than an asset If that Is the case the reshuffling of the high political and military positions in the Cuban government Castro's desperate attempts to create an internatiqunl incident in the Caribbean and new repressive methods apply In Cuba could be the signs of a dangerous internal struggle for power We should keep In mind that Afghanistan has once more demonstrated that failure is a dangerous word in the Soviet dictionary There are forces inside Cuba which the Kremlin consider more reliable and efficient than Fidel Castro The United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere should be ready to take positive measures if a dramatic struggle In Cuba opens the door for a pushing back of Soviet influence and a reestablishing of the balance of power which existed twenty years ago At any rate the present situation with Its formidable propaganda possibilities should be exploited to the maximum Mr YATRON Thank you very much for a very concise statement Professor Aguilar Professor LeoGrande would you like to proceed STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M LEOGRANDE PROFESSOR SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AMERICAN UNIVERSITY Mr LEOGRANDE Let me begin by thanking you Mr Chairman and the subcommittee for giving me the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon on a subject which has been and will no doubt continue to be one of great importance for U S policy in the Western Hemisphere Cuba has consistently pursued three foreign policy objectives since the revolution in 1959 First and foremost the survival of the revolutionary government in the face of hostility from the United States and from most of the rest of the hemisphere Second the economicdevelopment of the Cuban economy and third proletarian internationalism- that is support for leftist governments and political movements abroad Cuba's suspension from the inter-American system and its resulting diplomatic and economic isolation in the hemisphere threatened all three of these objectives At the same time Cubas alinement with the Soviet Union in the early 1960's provided a counterbalance to the hostilities that Cuba faced in the Americas Soviet military assistance gave Cuba the arms it needed to defend itself against the possibility of a direct intervention by the United States and also against the paramilitary attacks launched by the Cuban exile community-attacks launched primarily from the United States but also from the territories of other nations in the hemisphere Soviet economic assistance made it possible for the Cuban economy to survive the economic embargo placed on Cuba by the United States 93 and also the economic sanctions adopted by the Organization of American States in 1963 Cuba's principal objective in the Western Hemisphere is the same today as it was nearly two decades ago-to break out of the diplomatic and economic isolation imposed upon it in the early 1960's While the objective has not changed Cuba's strategy for attaining this objective has evolved to fit changing international circumstances During the 1960's Cuba faced nearly unanimous opposition in the hemisphere and sought to break its isolation by promoting revolutionary movements to overthrow those Latin American governments which were hostile to it This militant strategy reached its zenith in the late 1960's when Cuba started to export revolution throughout the hemisphere offering material support indiscriminately to virtually every existing guerrilla group no matter how small The period of exporting revolution climaxed in 1967 when Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia while trying to create a guerrilla base for continental revolution It should be noted that Cuba's policy during this period was not undertaken in cooperation with the Soviet Union On the contrary the Soviets opposed the Cuban strategy as unrealistic and moreover detrimental to the larger Soviet goal of fostering peaceful coexistence with the United States While this policy difference between Cuba and the Soviet Union created strains in bilateral relations between those two countries the Soviets were not able to restrain the Cubans in an area which Cuba regarded as essential to its basic national interests The failure of the strategy of exporting revolution combined with changing international conditions have led Cuba to revise its approach to hemispheric relations That revision occurred in the early 1970's Latin America's guerrillas had proven to be no match for the counterinsurgency forces created under the Alliance for Progress By the early 197'0's 'however the solid front of hemispheric hostility toward Cuba had begun to crack Chile Argentina and Peru all abandoned the Organization of American States sanctions and most of the rest of Latin America was moving toward a normalization of relations In an effort to reinforce these developments Cuba adopted a conciliatory policy toward its neighbors establishing normal state-tostate relations with any government that was willing to do so Inevitably this new diplomatic strategy for breaking Cuba's isolation required a sharp reduction in aid to guerrilla movements in the hemisphere Since 1972 Cuba has provided very little material assistance to such organizations Cuba's current policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean is basically the same policy as adopted in the early 1970's Cuba's bilateral relations with its neighbors-apart from relations with the United States which really have to be considered separately-can be divided I think into three maior categories One Countries with which Cuba has normal relations ranging from reasonably warm relations with countries such as Mexico to merely proper relations with countries such as Argentina Tw LContries with which Cuba has no formal relations so that the bi --teral relationship is still one of open hostility--countries such as Chile Uruguay Guatemala El Salvador Honduras 62-713 0 - 80 T 7 94 Three Countries with which Cuba has close friendly relations Grenada and and in particular Nicaragua Guyana Jamaica In the case of those countries with which Cuba has normal relations Cuban policy is to continue pursuing the sort of conciliatory diplomatic strategy it has pursued over the last decade At thu moment however this situation is extremely volatile The incident at the Peruvian Embassy and the flood of refugees that we have seen since that incident has put considerable strain on Cuba's relations with the Andean Pact nations particularly Venezuela and Peru It is unclear at this time whether bilateral relations with those two countries are goin to be able to survive the current crisis In the case of those countries whose relationship with Cuba is still one of overt hostility Cuban policy has changed somewhat in the last 18 months Prior to the Nicaraguan revolution the Cubans did not believe that there were any significant prospects for revolution in the hemisphere This belief was a legacy of the failure of attempts to export revolution in the late 1960 s and was one of the reasons behind the reduction of aid to guerrillas in the 1970's The Nicaraguan insurrection however convinced the Cubans that at least in Central America the prospects for revolution were better than they had believed Consequently Cuba has begun to provide limited military assistance to revolutionary movements in that area They provided assistance to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and are currently providing some assistance to the left in El Salvador However all indications are that the amount of aid being provided is quite small Cuba has maintained a low profile in aiding these movements essentially for two reasons First the Cubans do not wish to undermine the overall conciliatory approach which they have taken toward the rest of the hemisphere and second they do not wish to provoke an intervention by the United States in Central America While Cuba will probably continue to aid revolutionary movements in Central America it is unlikely to escalate that aid substantially and there is virtually no chance that the Cubans will intervene directly anywhere in the Western Hemisphere The newest dimension of Cuban policy concerns those nations with which Cuba has developed close and friendly relations The warm relations which Cuba now has with Nicaragua Guyana Jamaica and Grenada are based upon a degree of ideological affinity between Cuba and these countries That is each of these nations is attempting to pursue some sort of socialist path of development and therefore feels a certain kinship with Cuba even though none of them has adopted Cuba's Marxist-Leninist model of socialism Cuba has sought to build upon this ideological kinship by offering to all of these states programs of economic assistance in the fields of health education and construction While Cuba has sent a few military advisers to at least some of these countries the military dimension of Cuban assistance programs is clearly overshadowed by its economic dimension It seems to me there are two major observations that emerge from this survey of Cuba's current policy First that the military component is very small compared to the diplomatic and economic initiatives which have been taken over the past few years Second that the role of the Soviet Union in determining Cuba's hemispheric policy is smaller still For the Soviet Union Latin America is a geopolitically marginal area For Cuba it is not Thus Cuban policy in this part of the world responds first and foremost to Cuban national interests This is as true today as it was in the 1960's What sort of challenge toes Cuban policy pose in the Western Hemisphere for the United States Since Cuba's major initiatives have been diplomatic and economic rather than military the challenge to the United States is likewise diplomatic and economic rather than military There is no doubt that Cuba seeks to reduce the hemispheric influence of the United States but I believe if we meet a political challenge with a military response we will only make Cuba's task easier Such policies as expanding our military presence in the Caribbean or providing military assistance to repressive regimes in Central America do not enhance American prestige they undermine it They detract from the impressive diplomatic gains we have made in Latin America through our human rights policy and the conclusion of the Panama Canal treaties They revive in Latin America fears of U S interventionism-fears which art today more potent than fears of Cuban subversion The best policy for the United States is one which combins a commitment to social and economic development with a respect for the right of each nation to choose its own social and political system Specifically we must avoid allowing our preoccupation with Cuba to distort our policies toward other nations Many Latin Americans would like to maintain coixlial relations with both Cuba and the United States When the United States threatens reprisals against a nation that creates friendly relations with Cuba as Secretary Kissinger did in the case of Jamaica we insult the national pride of our neighbors demolish our own prestige and leave the diplomatic field open to the Cubans Let me conclude with a recommendation which given the current situation will no doubt be a bit surprising and perhaps politically unpopular I believe it is in the best interest of the United States to once again begin the process of trying to reach a normal state of relations with Cuba-not as a favor to the Cubans but because such a policy is in the best interests of the United States It is in the best interest of the United States for a whole variety of reasons which if members of the subcommittee would like we can go into in the question period Thank you very much Mr YATRON' Thank you Professor LeoGrande for a very interesting statement You emphasize that Cuba is interested in economic development of the island and has adopted a conciliatory policy toward its neighbors In that light would you care to comment on last Saturday's attack by Cuban Air Force airplanes on the Bahamian patrol boat Mr LEoGRANDE I believe that the attack was probably an error I do not believe that a military attack on a Bahamian naval vessel was authorized by senior Cuban officials Whether the Cuban forces actually made a mistake and thought it was a pirate vessel or whether the action was taken at the initiative of lower-level military officials I am not in a position to know The Cubans would have literally nothing to gain by provoking a military confrontation with the Bahamas 96 Mr YATRON It is my understanding that it had proper markings Mr LFoGRANi That is what we read in the press reports I have no way of knowing any different Mr YATRON I note that 2 000 refugees a day are arriving from Cuba Would that indicate that the economic development in the island in the past 20 ywars has been a success or a failure I Mr LEOGRANDE to talk about the success or failure of economic development we would have to begin by talking about what its goals were But trying to be more responsive to your question there is no doubt that at the moment the Cuban economy is facing a severe crisis The economy is in a recession partly for reasons which are beyond the control of Cuban authorities partly as a result of failures of their economic planning system It is a confluence of factors which have put the economy in a very sorry state at the moment There is no question that economic difficulties have been a catalyst for the wave of refugees that we have seen over the last few weeks Mr YATRON Would you consider Cuba's foreign policy a success Mr LEoGRANDE I think from the Cuban point of view it certainly has been a success overall The one area in which they have not had much success as of yet is normalizing relations within the Western Hemisphere They have had much more success in their relations with the Soviet Union which they have managed -'ery successfully from their point of view They have had great success in their attempts to improve their prestige in the Third World and to reach an influential position in the nonalined movement They have had great success in their policy of trying to promote the development of revolutionary movements and friendly governments in Africa In all of those areas Cuban foreign policy has been very successful Mr YATRON How would the United States benefit from normalization of relations with Cuba Mr LEOGRANDE I think we benefit from normalization in a number of ways Some of them are relatively small some are not so small There is a certain amount of economic trade to be done between the United States and Cuba Most importantly from the point of view of the United States Cuba could become a major supplier of nickel Nickel of course is a scarce mineral and Cuba would be our natural trading partner for that Another advantage which sometimes gets overlooked or treated as a minor advantage-I think is not so minor-is the humanitarian dimension of normalizing relations During the period 1978-79 the Cuban community in the United States entered into negotiations with the Cuban Government and was able to gain a variety of concessions from the Government with regard to the release of political prisoners allowing for the reunification of families and allowing exiles to visit the island These are humanitarian gains and I think they are important ones There are further gains to be made in those areas We are in fact seeing some of them right now It would be much easier for us to arrange some sort of orderly evacuation of refugees from Cuba if we had normal relations Moreover we would be facing a much less difficult and sensitive situation with regard to the nearly 400 Cubans who are now in the U S interests section in Havana if we had normal relations 97 Because we do not have normal relations tile United States by international law really lots not lhave the right to give those people political asylu1i So w face a very very difficult situation with regard to them Concerning more significant Alvantages for the United States the Cubans over the past few years have become a very influential force in the Third World TIhey are the chair of the nonalined movement and will be until the next Nonalined Summit Conference They have many friends in the Third lVorld and in Africa in particular It is not in the best interest of the U united States to have a policy of hostility toward a nation which has become so influential in and is such a spokesman for the Third World I think that our interests with regard to that whole area of the globe would be better served if we Iiad a normal diplomatic relationship with the Cubans Mr YATRON Thank you very much Professor LeoGrande Professor Aguilar you state that the Soviet's tremendous amounts of assistance to Cuba are paid back thm'oiglh the international arena Would this ap pll to the Western Iemisphere Mr AOUmmAm Not for the moment no As I said the Soviet interests seem to be concentrated in the Caribbean I only agree with my colleague on one point and that is that the Soviets consider Latin America as a peripheral-zone-of interest-with one exception the Caribbean There is oil in Venezuela oil in Mexico the Panama Canal and Cuba So the Soviets do give a lot of importance to the Caribbean Now in that area if you will allow me to expand that answer because I have to to make it clear Mr YATRON Without objection Mr Aomr %R The picture that I hate received from my colleague LeoGrande is of a small peaceful nation being attacked by almost everybody trying to improve the lot of its people anti full of cordiality toward other'nat ions Let's comment in passing that he used a term which Castro has always rejected because it is a capitalistic term to export revolution One does not export or import revolution that is a business terminology But let me point out this fact to the committee the three first invasions that Cuba lauieoied against nations in the Caribbean were launched much before any aggression against the Castro revolution had taken place There were two attempts to invade the Dominican Republic one expedition sent to Panama and one to Nicaragua in the year 1959 At that time relations with the United States were cordial and no one had attacked Cuba It was the initial proclamation of Castro himself that he was going to help revolution everywhere So there you find a nation that from the very beginning is trying to intervene in the affairs of other nations As a matter of fact early in 1959 they insulted the President of Costa Rica when he visited Havana in spite of PMtzadeh tgneres military aid to Castro sent when he was still fighting in the mountains When the President was talking defending a policy of moderation they took away the microphone and insulted him Afterwards Cuba attacked Venezuela And then when these nations reacted Castro's propaganda would offer the picture of Poor little Cuba being surrounded by hostility 98 The second part of Professor IeoGrande's testimony maintains that in an effort to break the diplomatic isolation il osed on Cuba Castro began to export guerrillas to other countries Ido not really understand how you can break isolated diplomatic relations by'sending guerrillas If you send guerrillas you alienate the governments and sometimes the people of those nations This is one of the reasons why there were so many military coups in the 1960's in Latin America Unfortunately the'answer o'f many nations to Castro's challenge was togive full power to their armed forces The third is that Professor LeoGrande seems to touch lightly the economic dependence of Cuba to the Soviet Union Now according to even pro-Castro economists Cuba depends today more heavily on Soviet aid than site ever did on the United States The entire effort of the revolution was to create an independent Cuba and now they depend more on the Soviet Union than ever on the United States Thiat is why I wrote that Cuba had passed from the Platt amendment to the Platoff amendment Actually you cannot dismiss that basic fact Cuba cannot be presented as a sovereign government capable of making independent decisions Quite the contrar the reality of Cuba's economic dependence on the Soviet Union has'produced political dependence And the extent of Cuba's economic disaster can be measured by the regime's recognition that many of the most important economic goals of the revolution have not been achieved The tobacco crop has almost entirely collapsed The sugar crop is about 30 to 35 l ercent below the quota The workers lack enthusiasm Cuba needs austerity and sacrifices and more economic aid That economic aid comes from the Soviet Union and from the Soviet Union come also all the political pressures which that economic aid entitles them to exert Finally-not finally but two more points-he says that Cuba is giving only small aid to the nations in the Carribbean Sure it is a small aid But what do you have to send to Grenada or to Dominica Those are small nations and little aid carries great weight We must keep in mind that this aid sometimes appears rather strange I have noticed some measures of criticism in Grenada or in Dominica because the Cubans are building an international airport How is that airport going to help the poor people in Orenada The answer is tourism But tourism has to come from the imperialist ' United States And also an international airport could have at any moment a military value So it is rather curious that in this case this small economic aid is given not to agrarian reform not to expand the economy but to build an international airport It is a small help but it's possibilities make it a symbolic one The last point-and this is going to be I promise the last pointhas to do with the advantage that the ITnited States is going to receive from reestablishing relations with Cuba In that sense it is always forgotten that Mr Castro himself more than four times has blocked any open or friendly attitude coming from Washington This is not only a problem of Washington saying Well now we want to receive Cuba back among us and then Castro will accept it as a turbulent boy coming back to the fold No Mr Castro many times has said he does not want diplomatic relations He wants economic aid--economic aid because he is in economic need What the United States has to ask itself is how much 99 economic aid should be given to a regime that has consistently proclaimed total hostility toward the 'nited States and everything the I'nited States represents Mr YATR O Until- this time we have heard only that Castro may have had some foreknowledge of the coup in Grenada However you state that Castro's advisers sponsored the coup On what do you base this claim Doctor Mr AGUILAR Well this direct knowledge comes only from interviews and reading some articles In this kind of situation open and direct evidence is difficult to find For example I believe we can all agree that the government of President Arbens was toppled in Guatemala with the direct intervention of the CIA Now on what do we base that On nothing more than testimonies declarations or accusations I have interviewed certain people and there have been certain declarations and certain applause a certain relationship that gives me the conviction that they had a direct involvement in that coup Mr YA'TRO Can you identify some of the forces inside Cuba which the Kremlin considers more reliable than Castro Mr AGUItAR The answer must be very speculative I would say that the danger for Mr Castro comes from people like his brother Raoul and more clearly-from the members of a new generation There is a generation gap growing in Cuba I would look at the young officers and technicians that have been educated in the Soviet Union Romania and Bulgaria and who are now 35 or 40 and who find no political opening for them There are several groups of technicians that are discontent frustrated because the Politburo or the elite in power in Cuba has not changed in 21 years After 21 years no new names have appeared in the elite that rules Cuba So there is a generation pushing there that has been trained in socialist countries and could provide a more efficient and more let me say traditional socialist direction Mr YATRON Congressman Lagomarsino Mr LAGOMARSINO Thank you Mr Chairman Mr LeoGrande I like Professor Aguilar could not find much to agree with you on today But I would like to ask you specifically about the prestige that Cuba has in the Third World Is your analysis of the prestige Cuba has based on the present circumstance or as it was say prior to Cuba's loss of the Security Council seat That one thing alone would indicate to me that Cuba does not have the kind of prestige that you seem to say it does Mr LEOGRANDE There were two events in the last few months which have certainly lone damage to Cuba's overall prestige in the Third World The first was complaints among some of the nonalined countries as to how the Cubans handled the arrangements for the Sixth Summit of Nonalined Nations which was held last year in Havana The second was the position that the Cubans took on the United Nations General Assembly vote concerning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Without actually endorsing the invasion the Cubans nevertheless voted against the resolution condemning the Soviet intervention Cuba's loss of prestige due to those events was reflected in the fact that it ultimately lost the Security Council seat But we should not let those two setbacks lead us to the conclusion that Cuban prestige in 100 the Third World is low that would be a mistaken conclusion Cuba is still chairman of the nonalined movement and these two events have not destroyed the good will that Cuba built tip very carefully over the previous decade Mr LAOoMARS NO I wonder what the reading would be on Cuba's prestige today with the thousands of people leaving Cuba and with certainly the perception that if they were allowed to do so probably millions would leave Mr LrOGRANDR Well we will have to wait and see how the rest of the Third World reacts Let me add though that I do not think millions would leave The Cuban Government has adopted the policy that anyone who wants to l-ave can leave We have not seen the end of it yet so we do not know how many people ultimately will become refugees But I believe the estimate from the State Deplartment that about a quarter of a million may leave are probably correct Mr LAOMARSINO With regard to that I would be if I were living in Cuba and I wanted to leave I would be very very careful about telling anybody A year ago when some of us were in Cuba we went to a church and talked to two couples a younger couple and an older couple The older the man was an architect Just that morning several hours before that we had been told by the Cuban Interior Department that anybody who wanted to leave could leave and he added in sort of an aside if they met the conditions The architect said that he had applied to leave 14 years before and never heard anything back The younger man was a draftsman and told us he had applied to leave I think it was about 10 years go The next day lie was not a draftsman any more lie was a weed hoer He lost his house His wife could not get a job and he had never heard anything So I would suspect that a lot of people in Cuba will not even apply to leave until they see which way the wind is blowing because they might want to leave but they sure would not want to go into a labor battalion or in a labor camp So I do not think very many people are yet ready to take Castro's word for that Why do you think the Cubans are leaving Mr LEOGRANDE I think a variety of factors feed into it No doubt the catalyst for this exodus has been the economic problems Cuba has had over the last year In addition there has been some difficulty arising from the visits to Cuba by people in the Cuban exile community in the United States and other Latin American countries 110 000 of whom went back to Cuba to visit last year Many of them brought consumer goods as presents for their families and that created a rather sharp contrast between the standard of living in Cuba which of course is still a very poor country and the United States That had the effect of aggravating discontent over the state of the Cuban economy Another factor has been the recent crackdown by the Ministry of the Interior on the black market The black market has been growing over the past year and the crackdown put black marketeers into a difficult situation very suddenly Therefore their activities had been more - r less tolerated now they are not being tolerated In short there are a whole variety of factors contributing to the exodus we are seeing 101 Mr LAGOF ARSTNO On page 5 you refer to the amounts of Cuban aid to the Ceintral American countries as quite small What do you consider small What are you talking about Mr LFoGRANDE Let me use Nicaragi ia as an example In the case of Nicaragua the material assistance Cuba provided was no more than a few crates or a couple of small plane loads of arms The principal assistance that Cuba rendered to the Nicaraguan revolutionaries was putting them in touch with international arms merchants so that they could acquire arms on the international market and also helping the various factions of the Nicaraguan left mediate their disputes so that they could present a united front against the Somoza regime Cuba will continue I am sure to provide that kind of assistance to revolutionary movements in Central America But I do not believe that tie Cubans are going to become as involved in promoting revolution abroad as they were in the late 1960's when they saw it as a means of overthrowing governments hostile to them anc creating governments that would be friendly In those years that was their principal strategy for breaking their isolation in the hemisphere I have no doubt that their principal strategy for breaking their isolation now is to try to create normal state-to-state relations with as many governments as they can Mr LAGOMARsINO I can put you in touch with some governments in the area that do not exactly agree with what you have just said Mr LEoGRAMN- As I outlined in my testimony there are unquestionably some governments in the hlemisplhere with which Cuba's relations are no better today than they were in 1965 Mr LAGoMARsIN-o You also say on age 6 that Cuba has a kinship with Nicaragua Guyana Jamaica and Orenada even though none of them has adopted Cuba's Marxist-Leninist mtxlel of change How would you define Cuba's Marxist-Leninist model of change Mr LEoGRA DE A very rapid socialization of the economy that leaves very little of it in private hands and the creation of a one-party political system in which that one party is a vanguard party organized along Marxist-Leninist lines and so on and so forth Mr LAGOMARSINO You do not'think any of these other countries have done that Mr LEoGRANDE No I do not Mr LAooMAJsrNo Not even Grenada Mr LEOGRANDE No not as yet Mr LAoofA RssIo Do you think that if Mr Manley had his way he would like to go more in the direction of Cuba Mr LEoGRAN-DE I am not an expert on Jamaican politics but Mr Manley's political and economic position is so difficult at the moment that I suspect that he is more concerned with tile very shortrun than he is with such longrun questions as that M r LAGOMARSINO You criticized Secretary Kissinger in the case of a Jamaica statement I would respond to that by pointing out that I think our Government was insulted by some of the statements made by some of our present-day representaties-Mr Andrew Young and Mr Sam Brown who as f recall after visiting Jamaica made the statement or at least were reported as having made the statement that they 102 preferred Mr Manley's economic system to our own I think that does more damage than anything Mr Kissinger might have said about something that was true But that is just my own opinion Professor Aguilar on the last page of your statement the last sentence as a matter of fact you say that At any rate the present situation with its formidable propaganda possibilities should be exploited to the maximum Can you tell us what you would suggest as to how we might exploit this possibility or the situation Mr AoUmlAR Well I think that for many people coming out of Cuba it is sort of unbelievable that while Cuba is always promoting its system as a model for all of Latin America no propaganda counteracts this false image They cannot understand why there are no radio programs coming from the United States telling the Cuban people for example how many troops are in Angola what is the real result of the sugar crop why the failure of tobacco That is a powerful weapon to'be used against the regime It is not a matter of telling any lies but of asking valid questions and telling the truth Why are Cuban troops in Ethiopia How many Cuban soldiers have died in Angola And then gives names and facts Second a true picture of Cuba should be offered to the Latin American countries Mr Castro was very eager to avoid the Cuban refugees from arriving in any Latin American country He wanted them to come to Miami to New York or to Alaska or to the North Pole because he cannot afford to have these Cubans arriving in San Juan Costa Rica or Venezuela with poor clothes proclaiming the harsh reality of Cuba Again one of the motives one of the essential motives to leave Cuba one of the most noble reasons to leave Cuba is the decision to be free to be able to speak to talk to say I do not agree with this or I do -not like this Among the many Cubans who reached San Jose Costa Rica there was a young mechanic who simply began to shout Soy libre soy libre He did not say I do not have shoes or a coat or a cigar or coffee He just said I am free Now those photos in San Jose destroy the image of the Cuban model as has been presented so efficiently in all of Latin America I think that the United States should cooperate with the Andean Pact with the Andean nations and try to reach a relocalization of Cubans in Latin America providing means to spread in the continent their declarations and reports to send students to Latin America show the Cuban youth escaping from Cuba Four of those who have come out of Cuba are writers One of them was at least for a while a famous writer in Cuba Ile even received a prize in Cuba I would interview this man and publicize what he has to say to all of Latin American media Mr LAGO3ARSINO I agree I think that makes a lot of sense I would suggest that perhaps one reason Mr Castro is allowing as many refugees to come here as distinguished from other countries in the area is because as far as I know we are the only country in the Western Hemisphere who has laid down an absolute pledge that we would not invade or allow the invasion of Cuba Mr AoMA Perhaps I think he is more concerned with the other impact 103 Mr LAooMARSINo I think you are right I think the presence of refugee Cubans in other countries woul have a tremendous impact and adverse reaction Mr AoUILAR To give you an example in Peru today the leaders of the Communist Party have been questioned several times What do you think is happening in Cuba According to all reports the Communist leaders have refused to answer For the first time in Peru the left the Communist Party is on the defensive saying Well we do not have anything to say We have to wait and see Let's wait for more information to answer this question Mr LAGOMARSINo Let me ask Mr LeoGrande another question too You said if we had relations proper diplomatic relations with Cuba that the present situation of the people in the American Interests Section would not have occurred How do you distinguish that from Peru They definitely had proper diplomatic relations Mr LEOGRANDE I did not say it would not have occurred but rather that it would be a lot easier to resolve The difficulty with the situation we have now is that because we do not have normal diplomatic relations the United States cannot grant political asylum to those people Since we cannot we are stuck with them in our Interests Section and we have no easy way of resolving it The Cubans are now saying that in order to enter into negotiations on how to resolve that problem and how to resolve the problem of the flow of refugees the Cuban Government wants to discuss all the bilateral issues between Cuba and the United States Mr LA0O3OARSINo Thank you Mr Chairman Mr YATRON Professor LeoGrande in your view the people who are seeking to leave Cuba would you consider them economic refugees or political refugees Mr LEOGRANDE There are some of each but I think they are primarily economic refugees The large number of people who are seeking to leave now have been motivated by the decline in the economy These people were almost certainly disaffected or discontent with Cuba before the economic problems became severe But there have been so many refugees who talk about economic deprivation and the desire to improve their economic situation that I think it is primarily an economic motivation Mr YATRONN Would you care to comment on that Professor Aguilar fr AOULAR I would point out that in a totalitarian state it is very difficult to separate the economy from the political issues It is always sort of amusing to see that when there was a good sugar crop in Cuba the Government never said The economy is fine They said The Socialist system has obtained a victory in the sugar battle If the sugar crop was poor then they blame a hurricane or isolate the episode as an economic factor Economic victories are political victories economic failures are only economic In Cuba dissatisfaction with economic conditions could become a political issue If you dare to proclaim in a group The situation here is terrible then you become an enemy of the regime You are criticizing the regime 'he economic reason has immediately evolved into a political issue and a political crime 104 Let us mention for example the case of one of the recently arrived Cuban writers who because he complained of the represion of homosexuals--not even economic condition--was sent for 2 years to a rehabilitation farm I do not know how successful that rehabilitation farm would be in Socialist Cuba but the fact is he was sent for 2 years to a sort of prison So could we say this was a sexual cause No in a totalitarian state this is a political crime Consequently his complaint resulted in harsh punishment So these people say Yes we have no food no clothes no nothing that is economic dissatisfaction but if you make a public protest you are in trouble and you are facing a political sentence Mr YATRON Professor LeoGrandeI Mr LEOGRANDE If we use the current policy definition of a political refugee then a political refugee is someone who faces or would face political persecution and is therefore given asylum Most of the Cubans who are coming here now are not people who face persecution they were not political dissidents or political activists That of course is one of the primary difficulties we face in our ref- ugee policy because given the character of the Cuban refugees it is very difficult to draw a line between them and the Haitian refugees or refugees from Mexico or from any number of other countries Mr YATRON How about the mob violence against the people who are seeking to enter the United States Mr LEOGRANDE I do not know what to make of that to be honest with you I know Wayne Smith and have great respect for him In his opinion the violence at the Interests Section was intentionally staged by the Government The Cuban Government denies that it was intentionally staged and says that it was simply spontaneous To be honest with you I do not know The filn reports show that there were Cuban police on the scene and that they certainly were trying to break up the riot but whether the Government originally provoked it I do not know I will say this however Many of the demonstrations that have been going on around Havana and much of the harassment of people who are seeking to leave has not been organized by the Government It is in fact spontaneous One of the indications of this is that the Government has been trying for the past week to get its most fervent supporters at the local level to stop these acts of violence against the people who want to leave Mr AGUILAR May I add a note to that When Mr Castro said in a speech Let the scum of this nation get out of here he was given a sort of signal to his partisans lie was saying that these people should be or could be insulted or humiliated by anyone because the leader the maximum leader had already expressed his opinion on these peoAs soon as he ordered the Committees of the Defense of the Resoution Stop the demonstration the demonstration stopped I tend to believe that these automatic actions and reactions are not quite spontaneous Mr YATRON Professor LeoGrande you state on page 2 that Cuba's second foreign policy objective is the economic development of the island and third is the support of leftist governments If this is true why has Cuba foresaken trade opportunities with the West in favor of its African venture Ile 105 Mr LEOGRAND There is no question that the principal cost of Cuba's policy toward Africa was to halt the normalization of relations with the I'niited States and to slow the process creating wider economic relations rot only with the United States but with other Western countries I think the reason that they chose to follow the policy they did in Africa and thereby foresake the possibility of those economicgains was that they felt they had more to gain in international influence and prestige by their activity in Africa than they had to gain economically by normalizing relations with the U nited States In a sense what it came town to was this Were they willing to give up what proved to be a very very successful policy in Africa for a few hundred million dollars worth of trade with the United States The answer was no This was a situation where two of Cuba's principal foreign policy objectives were in conflict to some extent and they had to give one a higher priority Mr YARoN You also state on page 7 that U S foreign policy should respect the right of each nation to choose its own social and political system Would you consider a Cuban-supported revolution as an expression of the right to self-determination Mr LEoGRANDE It depends entirely upon whether the Cuban support is the determining factor or whether it is really a peripheral issue The Nicaraguan case is a good example The Cuban support for the Sandinistas was truly of marginal consequences in the outcome of that insurrection I believe that insurrection did in fact reflect a process of self-determination by the Nicaraguan people Mr YATRON Would you anticipate the continuation of Cuba's aggressive foreign policy despite the stagnation of Cuba's economy Mr LioGRANDF I think the Cubans will continue to pursue the same sort of policy that they have been pursuing in Africa In Latin America I think they will continue to pursue a policy very similar to the one they are n6 iv putsuing-that is the sort of three-tiered policy of modest support for revolutionary movements economic assistance for governments that they regard as friendly and an attempt to maintain proper state-to-state relations with those governments that are willing to maintain them Mr YATRON Thank you Professor Aguilar what changes if any would you suggest in American policy toward Cuba in the event of an internal power struggle Mir AGUILAR Wow That lepends on how between whom If it is a power struggle between Fidel Castro's forces and the more pro-Soviet forces I would say do not do anything abstain because this is a power struggle that will weaken the regime anyway Now if it is a case like that of Hungary in 1956 I would say then you should intervene because that is the expression of the Cuban people and you should try to help a popular rebellion against a dictatorial regime--even in a small way as Cuba lid with Nicaragua Mr YATRON You note Castro's successes in Central America and in the Caribbean I would like to know what impact has the refugee situation and the attack of a Bahamian patrol boat had on these successes 106 Mr AouiLAR Well I think the picture of Cuba-I always hesitate when I say Cuba because I prefer to refer to it as Castro's revolution -I think the image of Cuba has suffered somehow I was a little bit puzzled by this idea of a great success in Angola A great success for whom What benefits has Angola brought to the Cuban people Perhaps a great success for the Socialist world but not for Cuba or for C tstro But to speak of closer areas there has been a growing opposition in Jamaica against this pro-Cuban policy There have been criticisms in Guyana because of the affairs of Afghanistan I would say that because those events and the evidence of Cuba's economic failure Castro's image Las suffered no doubt-I have no doubt about it-a series of setbacks that have even cooled off people in Jamaica Grenada or Dominica c e Mr YATRON In your opinion what is the top priority of Cuban foreign policy Mr AGUILR In that area Mr YATRON Yes Mr AouiLAR Well to weaken the prestige-if there is any left sorry to say--of the United States in that area To increase Cuba's image as a friendly nation a nation which is only sending advisers To promote radical governments anti-American regimes which would later follow a Soviet pattern Also to gain allies in the area either through governments or through creating enough pressure on certain governments as to follow a sort of friendly attitude toward Cuba Mr YATRO-N Mr Lagomarsino Mr LAGOMARSINO Professor with regard to the statement that Mr LeoGrande made about Nicaragua Guyana Jamaica and Grenada not adopting or following Cuba's Marxist-Leninist model of change do you have any comments you would like to make about that Mr AoUILAR Well I think that they all have learned a lesson I could present that lesson in more scientific terns but let me use a sort of common language The sobering lesson that Cuba has rovided for these nations in the C iibbean is that it is illusory to thIink that b establishing a socialist regime you gain immediate access to Soviet ai They have learned that the Soviet Union and the Kremlin is not ruled by Socialist boy scouts who give aid to anybody who proclaims himself a Socialist They have seen what happened to Guyana Guyana sent an economic delegation-I think it was 2 years ago 3 years ago maybe less than that-to Moscow After 4 days the Soviets couching their words in Marxist terminology told them The road to Socialism is long and arduous you have to work for it Consequently they are now less inclined to move rapidly toward an official proclamation of Socialism Mr Castro himself has learned this lesson We should remember that when he visited Chile in 1971 he advised Allende Slow down and do not take Chile out of the American zone of economic influence The eople in Grenada or in Dominica or in Jamaica know this and are ess willing to move toward an open break with the United States by proclaiming a Socialist regime As a matter of fact recently I asked a top representative of Dominica How can you talk about your goals of reaching a Socialist regime while at the same time you want and need American tourism 107 Isn't that a contradiction Do you expect that tourists from American imperialism are going to be a source of economic power for a regime which would Ix essentially anti-American Ile answered Well that is a dilemma that we will face in the future It was a very cautious answer Caution seems to be the present policy of those regimes Mr LAGOMARSINO Mr LeoGrande if we were to follow your suggestion or your recommendation that we normalize relations with Cuba do you feel it should be done without conditions Mr LEoGRANDE We need to open the process of negotiation There are a variety of bilateral issues between the two countries issues upon which the United States wants Cuba to make concessions and vice versa I think we need to sit down with them and begin to negotiate those issues Mr LAGOMARSINO Well as I understand it it has been made clear to Mr Castro time and again that there are several conditions that we feel are necessary For example that he pull his troops out of Africa that he stop exporting revolution in Central and South America that he somehow account for the properties of Americans that were exappropriated in Cuba As far as I understand it he has just said no to all these conditions Mr LEOGRANDE Unless I am mistaken the United States has not made the compensation issue a precondition for negotiations The United States has said though that a sizable withdrawal of Cuban military forces from Africa is a precondition for resuming the normalization process If we maintain that as a precondition there will be no normalization of relations Mr LAGO3iARSINO So you do not think we should make that a condition Mr LEoGRANDE I do not I do not think there should be any precondition on either side Mr LAGO MARSINO So we treat people in Africa as second-class citizens insofar as revolutionary activities from the outside Mr LEoGRANDE No I do not see how that follows Mr LAOO rARSI-No The people in Angola would probably disagree with you some of them Mr LFoGRANDE What I am saying is this The process of normalization ought to be begun with no preconditions on either side We ought to sit down with Cuba put the issues on the table and try and work through them Mr LAGO31ARSINO Shifting hemispheres wculd you say the same thing about Vietnam Mr LFOGRA NDE Yes and the same thing about Angola as well Although I do not see that we have many differences with Angola except for the fact that the Cubans are there Mr LAGOMARSINO I have no further questions Mr YATRON Thank you Gentlemen we have a vote on the floor of the House I would like to respectfully request we take a recess for about 10 minutes at which time we will resume the hearing Whereupon a short recess was taken Mr YATRON The subcommittee will resume its hearing Professor LeoGrande do you see any advantage or disadvantage to U S foreign policy s' a result of President Carter not having responded more harshly to the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba 108 - Mr LEOGRANDF No in fact that whole incident came out as badly as it did because the administration overreacted in the first place At the time U S reconnaissance satellites saw a large-scale military maneuver being conducted by Soviet troops and reported that to the White House The White House then jumped to the conclusion that this maneuver was being carried out by a Soviet brigade implying that these were regular Soviet combat troops apartfrom the military advisory group that the Soviet Union has in Cuba The administration also jumped to the conclusion that this must be some sort of a new military initiative on the part of the Soviet Union in Cuba Upon retrospect it turned out that the intelligence we had could not sustain either of those conclusions The intelligence community could not rule out the possibility the strong possibility that these Soviet troops had been in Cuba ever since the missile crisis It could not rule out the possibility that these troops were part of an advisory mission coming together to conduct maneuvers as part of the training process As a result what was characterized as an unacceptable situation suddenly became acceptable and the United States looked very bad If the administration had not initially overreacted by jumping to conclusions about the character of those inulitary personnel the whole incident could have been avoided In short it was a minor thing which was blown out of proportion we looked bad for blowing it out of proportion and then not having an adequate response Mr YATRON With Castro the head of the nonalined movement what would be your expectation in terms of where Castro is planning to lead the movement in western hemisl heric affairs Mr LEoGR%iND In western hemispheric affairs the role of the nonalined movement is likely to be fairly restricted most western hemispheric countries are not members of the nonalined movement But there is no doubt that the Cubans would like to see the nonalined movement move to the left In particular that means to adopt a political position which sees the movement as an ally of the Soviet Union In the economic realm the Cubans would like the nonalined movement to reach a consensus that its economic interests lie more with the Socialist camp than with Western countries Let me say though that I think the Cubans are not going to have a great deal of success in accomplishing these objectives The final declaration which came out of the sixth summit that was held in Havana last September represents the consensus within the nonalined movement The Cubans argued for positions in that document which were considerably more radical than the final document that was actually produced The result was that the Cubans realized the movement s consensus would only allow so much in the way of change toward a more radical position Cuba's attitude as a leader of the movement since then has reflected their acceptance of the fact that they have to live with the existing consensus even though it is not as radical as they would like Mr YATRON Do you foresee Soviet assistance bringing Cuba out of its economic stagnation or will the situation continue to deteriorate Mr LEoGRANDE The Soviet Union is committed at this point to providing whatever economic assistance the Cuban economy requires Whether it will require more or less in the intermediate run is very difficult to predict The natural conditions which have caused the cur- 109 rent recession that is to say the loss of the tobacco crop and the partial loss of the sugar crop should be rectified in a year or two The Cubans are trying to remedy the managerial difficulties they have had over the last 5 or 6 years or even longer but whether they will have any success in that is difficult to predict Mr YATRON On page 7 you state that we must not let our preoccupation with Cuba distort our policies toward other countries Would you care to comment on the claim that many of our policies toward other countries are a result of Cuba's preoccupation With refueling revolution Mr LEoGRANDE Let me return to the Nicaraguan example Before Somoza left Nicaragua the policy of the United States was to try to create some sort of moderate post-Somoza government which would prevent the Sandinistas from coming to power The reason was not so much that the Cubans were involved supporting the left but rather that the United States simply felt that a Sandinista government would not be in our best interests The involvement of the Cubans in Nicaragua and in the hemisphere generally has become in some ways almost an obsession on the part of the United States-an obsession which makes it very difficult for us to weigh what is in our best interest bilaterally with particular countries The Nicaraguan case is in some ways an excel tion after Somnoza left I think that the policy the administration has pursued with regard to Nicaragua since Somoza left has been a good one Even though the aid package has yet to be finalized nevertheless I think the administration has had good intent The result is that we have been able to maintain cordial relations with Nicaragua now for almost a year after Somoza left power If we go back to 1959 a year after Batista had left and the revolutionary government had come to power in Cuba United States relations with Cuba were absolutely horrible So I think that we have done a good job since Somioza left in Nicaragua The Angola case is another interesting one The United States has literally no bilateral disputes or hostilities with Angola other than the fact that there are Cuban t roops there The result is that we are not interested in normalizing relations with Angola even though the Angolans are not only interested but anxious to improve relations with the United States and with the West generally They would like to avoid falling into economic del endency on the Soviet Union But because Cubans are in Angola we are unwilling to make any overture to that country Tihe result is that we condemn them to realining themselves economically with the Socialist camp because they have no other alternative Mr YATRON Professor Aguilar would you like to comment on the assertion that Cuba has adopted a conciliatory diplomatic approach toward most of the nations in the hemisphere Mr AOUILAR If that-policy is coml ared with what Cuba was doing in the 1960's and early 1970's I would agree with that Cuba is no longer proclaiming AVe are going to transform the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the continent which meant we are going to revolutionize the whole continent all governments that are not revolutionaries are our enemies That was Cuba's official position in the 1960's If you compare that policy with Castro's attitude in 1971 when he visited Peru and hailed Col Velasco Alvarado as a revolutionary leader and it was quite a surprise to see Mr Castro shaking the hand 62-713 0 - 8%j - 8 110 of an ex-gorilla---not guerrilla gorilla-who had recently defeated Castro oriented guerrillas that was quite a change Part of it I would say was a result of Soviet influence The Soviets are much more pragmatic As Professor LeoGrande has said the Soviet Union never really approved or openly backed the guerrillas Those students and priests going to tli mountains to fight for nebulose causes and with undefined programs were-ot-onsidered reliable by the Soviets After the 1970's Cuba became more orthodox following more closely the Soviet pragmatic approach A flexible conciliatory policy toward Latin America was initiated Remember that when in the 1960's a very numerous Soviet commission was visiting Colombia to sign a commercial treaty the Colombian Government arrested all Communist leaders in the nation At that time Mr Castro expressed his anger and complained that the Soviet Union was sacrificing the Colombian Communist Party to mere economic interests But since then the situation has changed Castro can no longer criticize the Soviets In that perspective yes I agree Mr ATrvye Do you think it is likely that Cuba will increase its assistance to revolutionaries in Central America Mr AGUILAR Well I would like to agree again with my colleague I do not think that the United States should consider that the concept of revolution was invented in Cuba or that the economic and social problems of Central America and the Caribbean are a result of Havana's conspiracy or the Soviet Union's Those problems are there and can be expected And unless the United States pays full attention to the region before it explodes before the usual 'What do we do after Guatemala becomes revolutionary the danger will increase You should be paying attention to what is happening in Guatemala now to the poor economic conditions to the lack of social justice to the repressive government they have and do something about it now Or slowly a revolutionary situation will grow And then the Cubans surely will come to profit from the situation because that is their metier as the French say their Socialist duty I would say that ihis should be the U S policy not to wait until the situation gets hopeless Try to help the democratic or the social changes before the Cubans can exploit the situation Mr YATRON Do you anticipate that either Grenada Nicaragua Guyana or Jamaica will eventually adopt the Cuban Marxist-Leninist model of development Mr AGUILAR Well Mr Chairman I have a book published on Marxism in Latin America Before I began doing research I had a sort of clear idea what was a Marxist-Socialist government When I finished the book I found myself very confused because today socialism has acquired an undefined connotation Mozambiqute is a Socialist nation Grenada is perhaps moving toward socialism Cuba is Socialist but China is also Socialist And the Chinese are saying that the Soviets are imperialists or traitors to socialism I do not know how to answer that question I would sav that if the question is put in this sense are these governments going to move toward one party system toward state control of the economic re- sources toward elimination of opposition then my answer would be on the affirmative Yes that seems to be the trend I hope that it does not happen but at least many powerful elements in those nationsare moving toward those goals 111 Mr YATI-ON In your view do Latin Americans have a greater fear of U S interventionism or Cuban subversionism Mr AGUILAR That depends on what part of Latin America we are talking about I am sure that the Argentinians have no fear of Cuban intervention or Brazil or Chile The closer you get to Cuba the higher the risk and the fear of some kind of Cuban intervention In terms of American intervention or let me say U S intervention frankly I do not think that there is any nation in the world today that is afraid of American intervention Mr YATRON Professor LeoGrande on page 6 you cite the fact that Cuba's foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere is overshadowed by their economic initiatives and the role of the Soviet Union is very small In the same light would you say Cuba's policies are the exact opposite of this in Africa within military initiatives overshadowing economics and the desires of the Soviet Union being the major factor Mr LEoGRAN DE You have to distinguish among specific countries Certainly in Angola and in Ethiopia the military dimension of Cuban involvement is the principal dimension In the large number of other countries to which Cuba provides assistance programs of various sorts economic assistance tends to be predominant With regard to whose interests are advanced by such programs in both Angola and in Ethiopia you have a convergence of interest a partnership between Cuba and the Soviet Union The Cubans could not be there without Soviet military assistance and the Soviets could not be there without the Cubans being willing to cooperate with them The convergence of their interests makes it possible for them to build such a partnership Mr YATRON On what do you base your statement that Latin America fears U S interventionism more than Cuban subversion Mr LEoGRANDE Let me begin by qualifying my comment restricting it to most Latin American countries If we are talking about Central America it would not apply But the wave of Cuban revolutionism in the late 1960's was a failure The governments of the hemisphere proved quite capable of containing the guerrilla movements which the Cubans supported-to the point that the Cubans moved away from that policy I think most governments in the hemisphere have ceased to fear the kind of exporting of revolution which Cuba engaged in during the 1960's With regard to the United States I think that no action the United States has taken in the post-war period did more damage to our prestige and relations in Latin America than the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic At the time the Organization of American States was convinced by our Government to endorse the intervention but in retrospect there is no doubt that it harmed our relations rather than helping them I believe there is now considerable fear in Latin America that the United States may react to political instability in Central America with some response similar to the Dominican intervention That would necessarily bring forth from virtually every government in the hemisphere condemnation of U S interventionism We must understand-as I am sure you do-that the issue of U S interventionism in the hemisphere has a very very long history 112 It is one of the most sensitive issues in our relations with the hemisphere perhaps second only to economic issues Mr YATRON Do you have anything you want to add to this Professor Aguilar Mr AGUILAR No except perhaps just a footnote I cannot visualize the military Government of Chile to give one example condemning American intervention in Central America to avoid a leftist government from reaching power I tend to believe that not many military regimes would condemn the United States for that kind of intervention Also condemnations could be real and passionate or only rhetorical The United States could receive a lot of rhetorical criticism Mr YATRON Gentlemen I have no further questions Some of the other subcommittee members may have some questions to submit to you in writing If this would be the case we would appreciate your written responses Mr LEOGRANDE Certainly Mr YATRON I want to thank you both very much for giving us the benefit of your expertise It has been a very interesting hearing The subcommittee stands adjourned Whereupon at 3 40 p m the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at the call of the Chair APPENDIX 1 QUESTIONS SUB3I1IED IN WNTRITING BY SUBCOM3fMITTEE CHAIRMAN YATRON TO DR EDWARD M COLLINS VICE DIRECTOR FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Gus ACTION IN ANGOLA Mr YATRON Although you stated you had no reports of casualties a report appeared March 29 19S0 in the Washington Star It referred to action in Angola stating As proof of their growing strength Savimbl's forces have Just turned back a Cuban offensive aimed at opening the Benguela railroad and Castro's censorship hides the heavy casualties from the Cuban people Would you care to comment Mr COLLINS Security deletion DOMESTIC DISCONTENT IN CUBA Mr YATRON Would you comment on the effect of the security crackdown on domestic discontent In Cuba Mr COLLINS Security deletion BLACK MARKET AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN CUBA Mr YATRON In your opinion why has the high level government consolidation had little impact on the black market and criminal activity Mr COLLINS Security deletion CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA Mr YATRON With Castro as chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement do you anticipate that the Cuban military activities in Africa will continue a moderate appearance Dr COLLINS Castro has stated on numerous occasions that Cuban military activities in Africa are on the side of the progressive forces and against neocolonial forces Security deletion CUBAN PRESENCE IN YEMEN Mr YATRON Do you believe Cuban presence in Yemen is a possible first step toward active Soviet presence Mr COLLINS As you know the Soviets began regular naval deployments to the Indian Ocean in 1968 and since that time have made port calls in Aden Today the Soviet make frequent use of both naval and air facilities in South Yemen The importance of these facilities has grown considerably since the lou of access to facilities in Somalia in 1977 Security deletion CUBAN INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA Mr YATRON Cuba has reportedly encouraged guerrilla forces in Central America to unite in the same fashion as in Nicaragua Have they had any success Are they promoting this type of unity in the Caribbean Mr COLLINS Security deletion CUBAN ACTIVITY IN TIlE GRENADA COUP Mr YATRON What evidence if any is there of Cuban activity in the Grenada coup other than the New Jewel movement having 'dealings with the Cubans Mr COLLINS Security deletion 113 114 CUBAN MILITARY-ADVIsEas IN AFRICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Mr YATRON You refer to Cuba as an important regional military actor in the Caribbean area Do you see the possibility of transferring their role in Africa back to this hemisphere in the near future Mr COLLINS Cuba has the ability to simultaneously provide large numbers of military advisers and combat troops in both Africa and the Caribbean The degree to which the Cubans become militarily active in the Caribbean depends to a large degree on what they perceive the U S reaction would be to Havana's involvement MODERNIZATION OF CUBAN EQUIPMENT Mr YATRION On the subject of modernizing their equipment have the Cubans obtained additional ground assault helicopter gunships since last year Mr COLLINS Security deletion SOVIET ARMS FLOWS Mr YATRON Is there any evidence of Soviet arms flowing from Cuba to Cen- tral America and the Caribbean Mr COLLINS Security deletion SUBMARINES IN CUBA Mr YATRON Last year you said one submarine would be a quite minor threat Now that Cuba has two Foxtrot subs does that upgrade them to a minor threat Mr COLLINS It is difficult to quantify just what level of threat one two or more submarines pose Certainly by Increasing the number of submarines the threat increases By receiving additional submarines the Cubans can have more patrols or exercises However given the fact that these ships are relatively new to the Cubans there Is a question as to how quickly they can fully master the operation of this weapon system CUBAN INFLUENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN Mr YATRON You state on page 17 that the respite from leftist inroads into the Caribbean Is only temporary and Havana Is determined to exploit the social and economic Ills of the region Do you anticipate Castro will use similar methods in the Caribbean as he has in Central America Mr COLLINS Castro will do anything that he has to do to increase Cuban influence in the Caribbean There is no rigid blueprint for success In some countries the Cubans wili attempt to unify all militant opposition and to undermine government control when possible In other areas the Cubans will attempt to improve state-to-state relation which has been the general practice thus far In the Caribbean Beyond these generalized concepts however there will be no structured pattern Cuban participation in Nicaragua and El Salvador has differed and further Inroads into the Caribbean will also undoubtedly vary SOVIET AR s Mr YATRON Would you comment on why the Soviets sell arms to military governments which are diametrically oppoe'ed to coin niuism and frequently repress communist organization or political parties Mr COLLINS Thus far the Soviets have not sold rirms to military governments in Latin America which are diametrically opposed to communism The Soviets initially sold arms to Peru when the military government was led by Gen Juan Velasco who was sympathetic to the left including the Peruvian Communist Party PCP Security deletion Since August 1975 however the government has been controlled by more moderate military officers who have been less sympathetic to the leftists The Soviets nevertheless have continued to sell arms security deletion SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN PERU Mr YATRON Are you able to tell us bow close the cooperation is between the Soviet Fmbassy personnel and Soviet military advisers stationed in Peru Mr COLLIN S Security deletion 115 SOVIET EQUIPMENT Mr YATRON How receptive has the Peruvian Government been to the reality that with Soviet equipment comes Soviet advisers Mr COLLINS The Peruvian Government knows the Soviet advisers are needed to instruct in the use of and provide maintenance for equipment especially for the more complex weapons systems security deletion It would appear therefore that the military government is willing to accept Soviet advisers in order to obtain the equipment it wants It could be considered a marriage of convenience The Soviets have long wanted to expand their influence in South America and have now gained a toehold in Peru The Peruvian military government wants and has obtained military hardware FINANCIAL T RMs ON THEIR NONMILITARY PROJECTS Mr YATwoN What type of financial terms do the Soviets offer for their nonmilitary projects such as the tin smelter in Bolivia the hydro-electric projects in Argentina Brazil and Uruguay and the irrigation and port development projects in Peru M COLLINS Soviet economic aid to Latin America has been in the form of lines of trade credits tied to purchases of Soviet equipment The primary countries involved have been Argentina Bolivia Brazil Colomlla Peru and Uruguay The development projects involved have largely been highly visible in a political sense and are in the public ector As outlined below the credits provided have been primarily for hydro-electric construction except in the case of the Bolivian tin project These credits are of a commercial nature in that they are to be repaid and are tied to purchases of Soviet equipment needed to complete the various projects Soviet willingness to extend these trade credits is partially motivated by the extremely unfavorable balance of trade that exists with Latin America Liberal credit extensions encourage these countries to import a modicum of Soviet products that would not be desired on their technical merits Consequently these credits are liberal in that they are extended for a period of 12 years at 2 to 3 percent interest The credit repayment helps to offset significant Soviet imports of agricultural products and tin It also enables the Soviets to place technical advisers in the host country but the number has always been small in relation to other world regions The greatest part of Soviet economic credits to Latin America have been for hydro-electric power development projects Security deletion GOvERN MENT Mr YATRON I have concerns about the stability of the government in Bolivia Would you comment further on that aspect and the March 13 report of a plot there to destroy airplanes military combat and transport trucks and an ammunition dump Is there any Cuban connection that has been ascertained Mr COLLINS There are many good reasons for concern about the stability of the Bolivian Government The administration headed by Mrs Gueller has managed to remain in office for nearly five months security deletion The domestic political situation is quite unstable and the economic scene is dismal Bolivia is fighting an inflationary spiral and has a huge U S $3 billion foreign debt Since previous regimes were reluctant to impose economic restrictions on the populace the current government has been forced to implement an economic austerity program to insure that Bolivia continues to receive the international monetary assistance on which it depends The continuing civil unrest is a result of this stringent program security deletion STABILITY OF BOLIVIA PERU'S PURCHASE OF 16 ADDITIONAL SU-22 FITTEB Fs Mr YATRoN Would you consider it sabre rattling that Peru has purchased 16 additional Soviet fighter bombers with firepower equal to the French Mirages of neighboring countries Mfr COLLINS Security deletion 1 GUYANA Mr YATRON What are your expectations in Guyana where elections have been postponed twice while a new socialist Constitution is written 116 Mr CoLLtis The new Constitution bill was approved by the President of Guyana on February 20 1950 It will remain in abeyance until Parliament is dissolved The National Assembly is expected to be dissolved by October 26 1980 and the Constitution will be promulgated within seven days of the dissolution The bill provides for the current Prime Minister Forbes Burnham to assume the office of Executive President as if he had been elected and to remain in that office until the person elected President in the next following presidential election takes over Elections are called for within three months of the dissolution of the existing Parliament The new Constitution created a presidential republic and vastly expands the President's powers at the expense of the Prime Minister and the National Assembly The President is head of government as well as state The Prime Minister becomes an adviser to the President Security deletion For the past years Burnham has been losing support even in his own party The economic crisis bringing with it a sharp decline in living standards and public services and the apprehension aroused by Burnham's success in obtaining authority to change the Constitution security deletion has intensified political opposition GRENADA'S ARMED Coup ' Mr YATRON Would you comment on the significance of the pledge of unity reported March 14 in which leaders of Jamaica Nicaragua and Grenada that would place the United States policy under increased strain Mr COLLINS On March 13 19 0 Grenada celebrated the first anniversary of the armed coup which brought the New Jewel Movement to power The only Caribbean leader to accept the invitation of Prime Minister Bishop to attend the ceremonies was Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica The Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega also attended Reportedly the three underlined the need for the Caribbean and the Americas to unite to fight imperalism-the common enemyand to try to solve such problems as high unemployment and poverty This type of rhetoric replete with anti-U S euphemisms is frequently trotted out by leftist leaders for public consumption What Is of particular interest here however is the fact that no Caribbean leader other than Prime Minister Manley attended the celebrations One could infer that most other Caribbean governments were not wholly in tune with the new pro-Cuban revolutionary regime in Grenada and wanted to keep their distance Such statements from these leaders are both predictable and unexceptional and are not likely to impose new strains on U S Carribean policy CUBAN PLOT Mr YATRo As I read your testimony are you stating the Cuban plot has shifted to develop popular complaints into revolutionary situations Isn't it your thought also that Cuba is supplying seed money and training rather than a large number of people Mr COLLINS There is no one Cuban strategy for expanding its influence A variety of methods are used depending on local conditions in the target country The exploitation of popular complaints has been a very important method used in Nicaragua El Salvador and Guatemala with varying degrees of success Between 1967 and 1978 Cuba generally used other means to advance its regional interest but Nicaragua presented it with a propitious set of conditions that Cuba felt warranted the readoption of this approach This does not mean that Havana has limited itself to this one approach or even that this is the preferred method It does Indicate however that Cuba is flexible in pursuit of-its goals and fostering revolutions Is one of the techniques that has worked under certain conditions Security deletion CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO NICARAOUA Mr YATRON In Jamaica you mention the Cuban Ambassador Is a former deputy chief of the Department of the Americas of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba Isn't the Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua Julian Lopez also a former section chief of the same Department of the Americas Mr COLLINS Security deletion 117 CuBAN TRAxNINO OF JAMAICAN AND NICAUOUAN YOUTHS Mr YATRON How many Jamaican youths are training in Cuba and have returned to form a so-called Trojan Horse to spread Cuban influence rather than use their vocational training How many Nicaraguan youths are undergoing similar training in Cuba if you know Are you aware of the number of KGB agents assigned to Jamaica Mr COLLINS As of September 1979 a total of security deletion Jamaican Brigadistas were known to have received training in Cuba with another security deletion currently undergoing training for a total of security deletion LIBYAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO CARIBBEAN ISLANDS Mr YATRON Would you comment on Libyan financial assistance to several Caribbean islands What is the extent of such funds and what is the significance Mr COLLINS Security deletion According to Jamaican newspaper reports the Libyan Government had agreed to lend Jamaica U S $50 million for three years at an interest rate of 13 percent repayable in one lump sum of U S $75 million at the end of the period Up to this date however Jamaica has received no money from Libya and there is some belief that the loan may have been contingent upon Jamaica reaching an understanding with the IMF This is unlikely at this time Security deletion During a press conference on January 17 190 after returning from the Middle East Prime Minister Maurice Bishop stated that Grenada will receive U S $10 million primarily for the airport construction project as a result of his visits to Algeria Libya and Syria It is thought that Libya pledged U S $4 million of the total amount No other information about these loans has yet been publicized security deletion DISPUTE OVER BEAGLE CHANNEL Mr YATRON Is the Argentine-Chile dispute over the Beagle Channel close to solution or is there a chance of a military confrontation Mr COLLINS Security deletion APPENDIX 2 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED IN WRITING BY SUBCOMMIIrEE CHtAIRMAN Gus YATRON TO ROBIN KENT RANDOLPIH PIIERSON ROBERT ENGLISH AND RUSSELL SWANSON AND RESPONSES THERETO Question How many KGB personnel are there in the Western Hemisphere particularly in the Caribbean and Central America and especially in Jamaica Answer Security deletion Question What is the size of the Russian Embassy in Costa Rica Were some Soviets expelled from Costa Rica recently When Why Answer As of September 1979 there were 9 Soviet diplomats and 15 administrative employees at the Russian embassy in Costa Rica The 1st and 2nd secretaries were declared personae non grata In August 1979 The secretaries were accused of being involved in the Limon strike Relations have cooled President of Costa Rica believes Soviets are again Involved in labor strife but there have been no more expulsions since August 1979 Question I read a report which states that the Soviet embassy in Managua has a staff of one hundred personnel Why does such a small country have such a large diplomatic staff from the Soviet Union Answer Soviet Ambassador German Shlyapnikov arrived in Managua 16 April 1980 As of 16 April 1980 the Soviet embassy staff level was about 40 personnel The staff is still working out of the Intercontinental Hotel There is no confirmation that the number of personnel may grow to nearly 100 1 The East Germans have diplomatic relations with 18 Latin American countries to include Argentina established June 25 1973 Bolivia established September 18 1973 Brazil established October 22 1973 Colombia established March 23 1973 Costa Rica established January 9 1973 Ambassidor resident in Mexico Cuba established Januiary 12 1963 Ecuador established July 23 1973 Grenada established October 9 1979 Guyana established April 17 1973 Jamaica established March 21 1977 Mexico established June 5 1973 Nicaragua established July 20 1979 Panama established January 28 1974 Ambassador resident in Mexico Peru established December 28 1972 Suriname established August 3 1978 Uruguay established December 24 1972 Venezuela established July 24 1973 St Lucia established March 15 1979 2 The following is a breakdown of individuals associated with the East German Embassies according to our files Argentina 4 diplomatic representatives 5 commercial representatives I press representative 16 administrative support total Buenos Aires-26 Bolivia 1 diplomatic representative 3 commercial representatives I administrative total La Paz--5 Also Ambassador to Peru resides in Lima Brazil 5 diplomatic representatives 4 commercial representatives I support total Brasilia-10 8 trade mission representatives Rio de Janeiro 21 trade mission representatives Sao Pauk 9 representataIves from mixed trading companies Sao Paulo Colombia 4 diplomatic representatives 4 commercial representatives 9 administrative support total Bogota-17 Costa Rica 1 diplomatic representative also ambassador to Mexico resides in Mexico Cuba 12 diplomatic representatives 1 military attache 3 commercial repres ntatives 2 press representatives total Havana-18 Ecuador 3 diplomatic representatives 2 commercial representatives total Qul to-5 I diplomatic representative alqo ambassador to Cuba and JamaicaGuyana resides -in Cuba 2 commercial representalIves total Georgetown-3 Jamaica 1 diplomatic representative also ambassador to Cuba and Guyanaresides In Cuba 118 119 Mexico 8 diplomatic representatives 1 military attache 17 commercial representatives I press representative 6 administrative support total Mexico City33 Nicaragua 1 diplomatic representative no further information Panama 1 diplomatic representative also ambassador to Mexico and Costa Rica resides Mexico City Peru 5 diplomatic representatives 1 military attache 3 commercial representatives 2 administrative support 3 Carl Zeiss Co in Lima total Iima-14 Uruaguay 3 diplomatic representatives 2 commercial representatives total Montevideo-5 Venezuela 5 diplomatic representatives 2 commercial representatives 4 administrative support total Caracas--11 Grenada and St Lucia have not yet exchanged representatives No further information on Nicaragua and Suriname is available 3 The East Germans have confirmed publically that they would provide basic and advanced treating for Nicaraguan trade union officials in the GDR This type of aid has been extended by the East German Labor FederationFDGB-to trade union organizations of oth r Latin American countries A FDGB official presented a solidarity consignment worth M1 million $300 000 to the Nicaraguan Government during his visit to the country in late September 1979 A Nicaraguan delegation visited the GDR March 27-April 2 1980 A series of General Cooperation Agreements were signed to include a trade agreement covering long-term bilateral trade and providing for the formation of a mixed commission to develop bilateral economic relations 4 Poland Bulgaria Romania Albania Hungary Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have all agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Nicaragua At present there is no evidence to indicate that these countries have established resident embassies in Managua APPENDIX 3 REPRINT OF APRIL 1 1980 AssocIAuw PREss TIM ARTICLE IN THE RICHMOND -DsPATonH From the Richmond Times-Dispatch April 1 19801 NAvY TO SEND HYDROFOULS TO DuTy xN CARIBBEAN NORFOLK AP -The Navy said yesterday it plans to station its fast hydrofoil missile patrol boats in Key West Fla in a further show of U S strength in the Caribbean The first of the ships to be placed in service the USS Pegasus will be transferred from its home port to Key West Aug 1 Others will join the Pegasus after they are built The action is based on a Navy decision to increase the use of Navy facilities at Key West This officials say is in keeping with continued interests in the waters around Cuba It also is a part of President Carter's response to the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba The response included the establishment of a joint military task force in Key West The Pegasus built by Boeing in Seattle is capable of speeds of 55 miles per hour and has a range of 600 to 1 200 miles It is 132 feet long carries a crew of 21 and is armed with eight Harpoon antl-ship missiles The vessel completed its first operational assignment recently with other Atlantic Fleet ships and earned high marks officials said Initially the fleet of hydrofoils was designed for high-speed missile attacks against enemy surface ships in close-in waters The Mediterranean or Baltic Sea were considered the probable assignment areas But in the past few months the Navy began considering the advantages of such a vessel in the areas surrounding the Guantanamo Bay U S Naval Station in Cuba as well as in northeast Caribbean ports The vessels are descendants of the World War II PT boat and the Navy be lieves there is a need to increase their numbers The skipper of the Pegasus Lt Cmdr James W Orvis said in an interview recently that the Pegasus performed better than even some skeptics had thought For that reason- it may have rewritten the orders to the Caribbean Two other Pegasus-class hydrofoils will join the group in the summer of 1981 and the remainder over the following three years 120 APPENDIX 4 REPRINT OF fAY 13 1980 WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE BY ERNMMr BETANCOURT ENTITLED BEHIND THE CUBAN TRAGEDY 1 For weeks now we have been exposed to the tragic spectacle of thousands of Cubans desperately trying to flee the island The human aspect of this tragedy has been aggravated by Carter's hesitation as well as by Castro's frantic maneuvering and viciousness Little can be added to the human side of the story Faces and events speak more eloquently than words But there is a meaning behind these events that could confront the United States with an opportunity that transcends the boundaries of Cuba and the refugee issue Underneath the braging and the orchestrated mass demonstrations Castro is running scared The Soviets may move to free themselves from the discredit he is heaping upon the socialist model among Third World leaders They may be concerned with a Caribbean Afghanistan Furthermore these events show that Castro has lost touch with Cuban public opinion The action that unleashed this situation was Castro's decision to allow visits by exiled Cubans Instead of treating them contemptuously as worms Castro's press called those who had fled the island members of the community in exile His main concern was to earn desperately needed foreign exchange Overconfident as all beneficiaries of absolute power are Castro could hardly expect that move to bring so many headaches upon his regime The 100 000 Cubans who visited the island in 1979 had an eye-opening impact on those who had stayed behind The contrast in life styles awakened memories among the old who could remember It also opened new vistas to the young who supposedly were thoroughly indoctrinated by the regime The impact was not limited to the appeal of abundant food clothing and electronic gadgets but went to the deeper issue of freedom There is a stronger appeal in being able to speak to travel and to live and work where you want And most important people want to be free of fear To say this does not belittle the importance of material conditions These mass visits coincided with a disastrous situation in the Cuban economy the collapse of the tobacco crop forced the closing of cigar and cigarette factories idling 27 000 workers The sugar crop this year is also a failure Consumer goods shortages are appalling The so-called Soviet assistance does not seem to alleviate these hardships In the presence of an increasingly educated population it is easy to understand the Judgment of those who want to leave Cuba under Castro is unable to offer the good life or the pursuit to happiness Charisma is no longer enough to keep the population's support for the regime In a speech last December Castro made a pessimistic review of the economic situation Earlier his brother Raul minister of defense had blamed the revo lutionary leadership-meaning Fidel-for the economic mess Castro took over direct supervision of the Ministries of Defense Interior Culture and Health-a strange approach to improve the management of the economy More likely he was trying to prevent a Soviet move to replace him or to regain control of the police and military from pro-Soviet elements In January 1980 Celia Sanchez Castro's Sierra Maestra secretary and lifelong companion died This provoked speculation in diplomatic circles in Havana that she was killed in a shootout between Fidel and Raul Since Raul is known to be the Soviets' preferred Castro it is not too farfetched to infer that Soviet pressure is a cause of tension among the core leadership in Havana Pressure for what We can only speculate The Soviet 'Union cannot be too happy with Castro's failure to use his position as chairman of the non-aligned 1 Copyright the Washington Post 121 122 movement to ease its embarrassment over Afghanistan In fact Castro couldn't even attend President Tito's funeral At a time when the Soviets see opportunities in the Caribbean Central America Africa and the Middle East to capitalize on a favorable military balance of forces Castro's clumsy handling of the Peruvian Embassy incident has introduced an unnecessary and most damaging distraction What has happened undermines of rationalizatons used by the Soviet Union to justify its expansionism in the Third World Rather than Cuba's being seen as a model for the wave of the future questions are being raised in Mozambique Jamaica Guyana Costa Rica Peru and other quarters about the workability of the Cuban experiment No wonder Castro wants all the refugees to come to the United States instead of going to Latin America There they could help destroy the myth of his success in building a new happier society The use of goon squads at the U S Embassy against those wishing to leave and the announcement on May 1 of the creation of a militia seem to reflect Castro's distrust of the Cuban armed forces It is not that they may be unwilling to act against the people that point has not yet been reached although it may come as it did in Hungary in 1956 Probably Castro needs a force less influenced by the Soviets to protect himself from a fate similar to that of Hafizullah Amin in Afghanistan In the event of disintegration of the Castro regime what should our position be We must be prepared to face the eventuality of a Soviet move to replace Castro in order to keep Cuba within the communist camp Even if severe repression is required the Soviet military leaders are unlikely to accept quietly the loss of such a crucial strategic position Following usual Soviet practice Castro's adventurism could be blamed for the regime's failure Under such circumstances could the Soviets rely on the Cuban armed forces in Cuba Ethiopia and Angola That is doubtful Once events are unleashed the hatred of the Cubars for the Soviets will make the regime highly unstable As in Hungary Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan Soviet forces may have to used That is the moment for which we had better start preparing contingency plans and one hopes under a more determined leadership than we have shown recently Granted this is a very hypothetical interpretation of the meaning of the Cuban exodus But we should not 'ignore it Guilt over Vietnam Chile and Watergate has made many lose sight of the strong appeal of a free society It is that kind of attitude that leads people to think that communism is Irreversible but not even Brezhnev believes that If he did the Brezhnev doctrine would not have been necessary The writer now a development consultant here was Fidel Castro's Washington representative during the Cuban revolution 0