CMle p eS199900030 U S Department of State Deny Release Pull Y In DCCIaSISy III PI I Exdae Esettipthn i@ 8l TATE DEPARTIY ENT OF ICLRIFIED MEMORANDUM TO J FROM SUBJECT — ARA Ambassador - Johnson August Dept of Siam RPS IPS Msrgmst p Gmfeg Dm ss H Eswad ss Dedsssify oa Cl aries A Mayer NSSM-97 Extreme Option 17 1970 — Overti row s l Downgrade ro of Allendc the In the attached memorandum we exarr ine c creole option to use if Allende is elected This option assuraes ti at government wouid be a surficiently great security threat to the U S to justiry a covert effort to overthrow him an Ailende note in the memorandum that the Ci ilean military is the only inst ument in Ci ile capable oz over 'nrowing Ai lcnde' but wc hold out little promise ti at the military would move to this cnd on its own initiative short of acts by Allende hat were ilagrantiy subversive of Chilean institutions o- directly menacing to he military itself Allende is too cautious of ti e armed forces to act in such manner in the near fu ure and we e pact that he will use his powers of appointment and promotion to effectively neutralize these forces in the long run We Our lcnowledge of the relations that conservative Chilean political and l usiness leaders have with the military is not rull enougn to let us judge whcti er these leaders could stimulate a military move against Allende We doubt however ti at the military leaders would act unless they themselves were predisposed to do so Nor do we believe that he would respond to a possible initiative by ideas anyway which as far as about overthrowing Allende we can tell has no specific for the part that the U S might play we believe that U S support would be no more than a mar inal factor in the calculatior of the Chilean military Even were we to develop our assets among the Chilean military to the point that we could ultimately suggest or try to sponsor military acti on against Allende we believe that in this case also the Chilean military must itself be already dispos to move on Aliende were our efforts to have any effect As from U S involvement with a successrui coup would bc that we would be rid of the threat posed to us by an Allende government and that moderate Chii ean forces would have demonstrated their unwillingness to see Chiie become an authoritarian MIarxist state The disadvantages howe et The advantages flowing Chilean military IIIIMIF8 goS iKI M I I of the fourth option are vravc Tncrc is little si bstant'ai pro cut that thc Chilean armed forces w wild attempt to n row A c u uv n and- there is no way to judge wucth t c attempt with U S stimulation would succccd Ir made The risk that our hand woi ld bc cup d is real Exposure in an unsuccessful coup would involve costs teat would bc prohibitively high in our relations in Chile in tn« uumisphcrc Even werc thc coup successful c posure and clscwhcre in the world would involve costs only marginally less serious in all thcsc areas - - Recommendation Jon the That you oppose adoption its prospects of success are poor an APPROVE DISAPPROVE grounds its risks prohibitively tha high This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article ‘Extreme Option Overthrow Allende’ 2020-09-15