MEMORANDUM non-log SECURITY COUNCIL NATIONAL ACTION Septetnber 14 1970 SECRET- 4ENPI'JIVE 8 1 'gas as MElVIORANDUM FOR DR KISSINGER FROM Viron SUBJECT Chile P -- Vak 40 Committee Meeting Monday --September 14 Attached is the CIA paper prepared as the basic document to beconsidered You should read it carefully especially Section I pp 2-8 outlining the significant This memo summarizes the CIA paper new developments that have occurred and my conclusions provides analyticalmmment I Summary A of the Pa er The settin the a er describes includes these major elements action is im ossible thc military is incapable and unwilling to sieze power We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup 1 Militar 2 Because of si nificant chan es in circumstances a olitical lan which Frei has contrived has some chance of success It is still a very long shot but it is the only possibility 3 The lan involves an effort to corral enou h PDC Radical votes to elect Alessandri he would then resign a new election would be required Frei would be eligible this time and would run presumably he would be elected The process is constitutional and legal if unusual and untraditional ' 4 The un uglified su ort aiid effort of Frei is central to this lan because moving the majority of the PDC congressional bloc to Alessandri The attraction to the PDC is another is the essence of the maneuver six years of political power Frei has taken the necessary preliminary steps tn position the PDC atid himself for such an effort it must be Chilean and Frei's Our support and stimulus may be crucial and resources may become But in essence we would be backstopping a Chilean effoit important 5 The U S cannot o crate this lan 6 Kerr has in fact alread encoura ed and ushed this lan if he did not participate in its creation He has already committed us to at least moral support and encouragement Therefore the issue is not whether and d we go or do not go but whether we continue this encouragement SECRET' SENS TIVE NSC DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW I Release tu full by L Salvetti Date 7 28 2000 IE O 12958 ECRE T'I'SENSITIV E ' I Zh B P ti '- 8 The ossible courses of action to support gainbit are described as and stimulate the Frei re-election 1 Authorize the Ambassador to encourage the gambit through whatever resources are available to him locally but on the most discreet basis to minimize exposure of USG's role 2 Authori ze the Ambassador to assure Frei directly thattbe USG strongly supports and encourages his efforts This might include an oral message from President Nixon to be used if appropriate 3 Parallel Ambassador's efforts with outside support to influence Frei-stimulate foreign political figures whom Frei respects to encourage him 4 Work through European Christian Democratic parties to bolster Frei's leadership and encourage the PDC leaders to contest Allende 5 Encourage the Radical Party through established assets to abandon Allende in favor of Alessandri 6 Generally keep information lines into the military and close communication to be prepared for any future eventuality The risks of exposure are appreciable ment and contacts C The and rise the broader our involve- a er asks the Committee to address the followin uestions 1 Should the Ambassador be authorized to continue to encourage and support the Frei plan but with as little risk of exposure as possible If so should he be provided with a confidential message of support from President Nixon to Frei to use at the appropriate time 2 Should his efforts be complemented through outside diploinatic and covert activities designed to encourage Frei' Should a propaganda campaign be conducted outside Chile in support of the Frei gambit 3 Should an effort be made to swing Radical votes to Alessandri Should the German Democratic Socialist Party which has close ties be encouraged to weigh in with the Radical Party in this sense 4 Should we expand and intensify military contacts to be assured requisite intelligence and stand-by channels of influence SECRET SIINSITIVEl I '1 i' ' of SECRET 'SE SITI- E II ANALYSIS The description of events and the proposals questions must be examined through the following -- What -- provide that would not otherwise What element would USG involvement be there and what difference would it make -- What are the consequences What are the dangers to the US in getting involved -- are the chances of success Why should we run of success and the consequences these risks and incur these costs at all of failure Is it really necessary Without long narrative I think a fair analysis would have to say 1 Chances of Success Frei says one in twenty Kerry says one in five No one really knows with much precision but it is clear that the chances of success are considerably less than even Z What does USG involvement add' Probably a great deal in terms of moral Now that we have already begun this to quit support and encmragement would almost surely kill the effort It may not be able to continue without our support There is less evidence that any material resources would be needed but some money may be 3 The cense uences of success It is vital to understand that it is not just a question of defeating Allende and that's it This sets in motion a number of serious problems If Allende is defeated in the run-off he and his supporters are most likely to go to the streets Widespread violence and even insurrection is a possibility He is unlikely to simply meekly run in a new election If there is a new election we would want to make sure Frei wins hence we would be drawn into further action to support his election If Frei is elected his would be an unstable government facing serious dissension Such a situation would probably require massive US economic and military assistance support SECRET SENSITIVE i I EGRETS SZNSITiIV E» II Anal sis 4 continued If the gambit fails it will disc redit the parties institutions It will give the Communists the excuse to j push Allende quickly into a radical course The restraints that would have been available to slow down or modify his actions would be gone Failure would in short guarantee a fate that may not have been inevitable J 5 The cense uences of failure and the democratic Dan ers to the US The biggest danger is exposure of US involvement This would wreck our credibility solidify anti-US sentiment in Chile in a permanent way create an adverse reaction in the rest of Latin America and the world and perhaps domestically Exposure of US involvement with an effort that failed would be disastrous it would be this Administration's Bay of Pigs major danger is that while we might begin with a limited plan of this is a slippery slope we may very well find ourselves encouragement irresistibly sucked into rising degrees of involvement at rising risks to protect the investment and find ourselves having slipped into a disastrous s it uati on A second 6 This is the crux of the issue Do the Wh the need for USG involvement dangers and risks of an Allende government coming to power outweigh the dangers and risks of the probable chain of events we would set in motion by our involvement is patently a violation of our own principles and policy Moralism aside this has practical operational consequences Are they rhetoric or do they have meaning If these principles have any from them to only meet the gravest threat meaning we normally depart to us e g to our survival What we propose tenets Is Allende a mortal threat to the US It is hard to argue this Is he a serious problem that would cost us a great deal Certainly Is it inevitable that he will consolidate his power He has a very good chance but it is far from inevitable or that if he does that he will be a success Does an Allende government start a South American dominoes the impact Unlikely of a Marxist state in the rest of Latin America is containable III CONCLUSIONS I co nc l iud e An that covert effort to'stimulate a militar possibility at this point take-over is no practical SECRET I SENSITIVE is a non-starter There ECRE1 SENSIT VE III CON CLUSIONS Co ntinued 2 We should keep our lines open and broadened into the military An opportunity may open up later but for the moment we should gather information and establish standby channels 3 Kerry has already started without killing the Frei plan 4 The 5 Our support 6 Frei track us on a political We cannot backtrack plan has some chance and it is the only chance can be important It is possible to backstop with acceptable to its success it at this point with a minimum involvement and risks 7 But there are limits to what we can do acceptably It is not a question of just adding more effort and money Our capacity to succeed is simply not a function of how much effort we put in and the greater our involvement the sharper the danger of exposure 8 therefore enter into this in the knowledge that the calculus can change to make it wiser to cut out rather than just progressively be sucked into massive and disastrous involvement to protect the investment We should We should also undergtand that this is not a limited o peration If it succeeds it opens up still more serious problems as outlined above We are almost sure to be called upon for continued support of one kind or another See 'II 3 above and success of the plan will almost surely trigger violence in Chile 10 I would recommend the followin to continue to encourage Frei to use resources at his command but with the utmost discretion and tact and with absolute minimum USG involvement I would not authorize a personal message from President Nixon we should protect the President a Authorize the Ambassador b Organize efforts from the outside -- ' i e encourage European Christian Democrats to funnel support even funds ment and ideas perhaps encourage other leaders to do so develop an outside propaganda campaign as Frei suggested SECR'ET ' SENSITIVE encourage- as ' ri EAR ET SENSITIVE III CONCLUSIONS Continued c Bevelop an internal take-over propaganda campaign to stir fear of a Communist machinations and expose Communist d Use our separate assets to work on the Radical Party German Social Democrat Party to do the same try to get the e Ask for to monitor weekly reports and establish some mechanism this carefully SECRET SENSITIVE i This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article ‘Extreme Option Overthrow Allende’ 2020-09-15