C0 612 694 1 · • Se efe·t 6 i V J 1· A Portion redacted by DIA per 10 USC424 Refer to NGA for review No other DIA objection to declasslfloaUon subject to the resulle of NGA review and the results of concurrent CIA review JDC 29 Aug 13 018 28-91 Oct obe r 1991 - r 1 ii Defense lnt ell ige nc ' t - MQSQ AH- J llfl HEL IAH A N oo B JEcT 10N To • DECLASSIFICATION ANO ORD RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT• DATE 13-Ma -201 4 Nuc lear We apo ns in the Non-Russian Republics and Bal tic Stat es U f SfNF- -1 ffJ If nucl ear weapons are ultimately cons olid ated in Russia tacti cal nuclear war head s are likely to be the first wea pon s rem oved from the othe r repu blics but stra tegi c wea pon s prob ably will rem ain for som e time ·· •' Nuc lear Wea pons Outs ide the Russ ian Repu bdc SJNF 'Wllil The USS R has mos t of its nucl ear stoc kpil e in the Russian Republic along with all facilities to deve lop manufacture and assemble nucl ear wea pons Nevertheless it is cun-ently Dist ribu tion of Nuc lear War head s in the Non beli eved to have som e 1 800 nucleRr wea pon s - abou t 2S percent of its stockpile - in the non- Russ ian republics and Baltic state s Of these abou t 2 40 0 weapons are on land- or sea-b ased strat egic missiles The remaining 5 400 consisting of both strategic and tactical -Russian Republics and Baltic State s O Thousand 4 0 1 3 0 7 1111 1 ••1 ctH M•t t11tlflet'1 tl••• Ukraine l azakhstan ByeloMSla • includes Baltic states DECLASSIFIED IN FULL lttthority EO 13526 Chl ·Records Declass Div WffS Date MAR 2 3 2016 Cleeelfta1 hi m mate I C Q DA- eeeAC TJiCU FORN ffihiN I et Secret '· t M -'J 'i'I From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive • • Secret From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive ECR iJNUFCititjlii4111 IEC f 'Nf WNj Aleksandrova National Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Site Ukraine Six large depots· - national stockpile sites - are located in the non-Russi ln republics Each is capable of storing hundreds of nuclear weapons The non-Russian republics and Battie states also contain 80 direct-support laciltlies which generally store fewer than 100 nuclear weapon s apiece DE LASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Dfv WH Date MAR 2 3 2016 Secret r -Sec1·et l DEClASSlflED IN PARlAuthority EO 1351 f Cbief Records Declass J w S Date MAR 2 3 2016 nucle ar warhe ads and bomb s are sprea d amon g 86 stora ge sites in the non-R ussia n republics and Balti c states 0Stt -3 3 b 1 UNCLASSIFIED Withdrawal Status • S ' 1F ' VN7 DIA belie ves that by mid-1990 in respo nse to ethnic unres t in the south ern Cauc asus the USSR withd rew all nuclear weap ons from Azerbaijan and Arme nia and some but proba bly not all weap ons from Geor gia indic ate one storage site in Eston ia was recently deact ivated This is the first confi rmed step towa rd eliminating nucle ar weapons from the newl y indep enden t Balti c stales Despite central gover nmen t claim s lo the contrary however no concl usive evide nce suppo rts the cotnplcte remo val of weapons from these slc les The large st concentrations of nuclear weapons outsi de the Russian Repu blic are in Ukraine Belor ussia and Kazakhstan Currently DIA has no indic ation s that a majo r withdrnwal of nuclear weap ons from these or other non-R ussia n repub lics has be un f 1 'F WHJ Sovie t SS-25 ICBM Two divisions of road-mobile SS-25 s are located In Byelorussla 3 From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive -- S 6JFfl' 'Nj Mozy r S5-25 Nucle ar Weapons Storage Site Byelorur s a Storage bunkers are design ed to deter forced entry Thay aro protec ted by multiple fences and In many cases senso r systems Company-sized units protect direct- suppo rt sites like this one white battalion-sized units guard the larger national stockpile sites •i I Se or et I I wit hdr aw n If thi s spa ce is not ade qu ate or if ope rat ion al req uir em ent s dic tat e im me dia te access to we apo ns the cen tra l go ver nm ent ma y be for ced to use no nst and ard fac ilit ies for tem po rar y sto rag e ES NJi Wtst Sin ce the late-Augu st cou p att em pt lea de rs bo th at the nat ion al level an d in the rep ub lic s ha ve ma de con flic tin g pub lic sta tem ent s ab ou t the ult im ate sta tus of nu cle ar we apo ns Th e iss ue is sti ll bei ng deb ate d Th e cen tra l go ve rnm en t pro bab ly wo uld wi thd raw nu cle ar we ap on s if • It pe rce ive s tha t we apo ns ou tsi de the Ru ssi an Re pu bli c are at ris k of una uth ori zed sei zur e • It fai ls to rea ch an agr eem ent wi th the rep ub lic s on dep loy me nt an d con tro l of the we ap on s tafNP WNt If the cen tra l go ver nm ent ult im ate ly wi thd raw s all nu cle ar we apo ns to the Ru ssi an Re pu bli c the ris k of an un aut ho riz ed sei zur e would be gre ate st du rin g tra nsf er op era tio ns ou tsi de the sto rag e sites However the mi lita ry will tak e eve ry pre cau tio n to ens ure tha t the we apo ns are mo ved safely It will hav e to coo rdi nat e hu nd red s of sho rt- and lon g-d ist anc e tra nsf ers at a tim e wh en conditions are uns ett led Su ch a lar ge com ple x logistics and sec uri ty op era tio n will req uir e car efu l pla nn ing and at lea st sev era l mo nth s to acc om pli sh • It rea ch es an agr eem ent wi th the rep ub lic s for tra nsf err ing we apo ns to Ru ssi a - 4 -4S ffi'UN Un aut ho riz ed sei zur e of nuclear we apo ns from a sto rag e or mi ssi le- lau nch sit e in the no n-R uss ian rep ubl ics wo uld be ver y difficult wi tho ut hel p fro m a large org ani zed armed force or fro m dis loy al ele me nts wi thi n a sit e Th e US SR's eff ect ive pro tec tio n me asu res inc lud e rob ust phy sic al security str ict com of inf orm ati on abo ut nu cle ar we partmentation apo ns and per son nel reliability pro gra ms S lF 'V 1t f If we ap on s are ult im ate ly con sol ida ted in Ru ssi a tac tical nu cle ar wa rhe ads are lik ely to be the first we apo ns rem ov ed fro m the oth er rep ub lic s bu t str ate gic we apo ns pro bab ly wi ll rem ain for som e tim e Th e 22 nat ion al sto ck pil e sit es alr ead y in the Ru ssi an Re pu bli c pro ba bly hav e eno ug h cap aci ty to sto re most if no t all we ap on s tha t mi gh t be U Qu est ion s an d comments ma y be addressed to Directorate Fo r Scientific an d Technical Intelligence D ST 98 l-2 51 2 Co mm eri cal 20 2-3 73 -27 12 AU TO VON 243-2712 This Br ief contains information as of I Oc tob er 1991 os 5 u s c § 552 b 3 i 1ov s c '- l'1 OHice of the Secretary of Defen U L S _ Chief ROD ESD WHS • Date DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 ' ' AA lo b Authority EO 13526 Declassify - - - Deny in Ful l - - Declassify P 'T l ' 5 'U l H l b t •f1'lJ S l ll Reason _ - l ' ' MOR l -M- J S-4 1 ' Cbief Records Declass Div WHS Date MAR 2 3 2010 4 S ec From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive A Nuclear Security Risk