- ii8AEf Inquire DOC21D Item No 511094 CDSDTG 2807362 MAR 92 HEADER RR RUEAIIA DE RUEKJCS 18557 0880730 ZNY 888 8 RULYVBAf __ bX2_ _ _ _ _ __ R 27111502 HAR 92 I FM WASHING TON DC I r TO DIA 2J ___ bXl b l 10 usc 11 RHDLDL RUEHOT RUEHBY L __ _ _ _ _ __ BT ' I CONTRO LS 8 B 8 A e T HJll 6 eeeft£ COMBINE COMPLETE POI hftiO ADDRESSES -- I I BODY SUBJ DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT ODB 27-92 UKRAINE -- NUCLEAR WITHDRAWAL SUSPENSION U - - _ 1 U THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION lS AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO NATO MEMBER NATIONS AS NATO SECRET 2 • U KEY JUDGMENTS A UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK 1 S 12 MARCH ANNOUNCEMENT OF A TEMPORARY HALT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO RUSSIA REFLECTS GROWING FRICTION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA KRAVCHUK WILL CONTINUE TO USE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE TO ENSURE CONTINUED WESTERN FOCUS ON UKRAINE TO CREATE A HORE EQUITABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND AS LEVERAGE TO PUSH UKRAINIAN POSITIONS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH AND INTERNATIONALLY ALTHOUGH KRAVCHUK WILL PROBABLY USE THE SAHE TACTICS WHEN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON REMOVAL BEGINS DIA BELIEVES THE UKRAINIAN NONNUCLEAR POLICY WILL PREVAIL IN THE LONG RUN B - ei UP TO ltbXl TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS ARE ESTIMATED TO REMAIN IN UKRAINE RECENT RUSSIAN STATEMENTS INDICATE THE JULY 1992 DEADLINE FOR THE REMOVAL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINE WILL NOT BE MET UNLESS THE TRANSFERS RESUME IMMEDIATELY DIA JUt GES HOWEVER THAT IF THE TRANSFERS RESUME BY EARLY HAY THE DEADLINE PROBABLY COULD BE MET DESPITE PRESS REPORTS THE UKRAINIANS HAVE NOT INDICATED WHEN THE WITHDRAWAL WILL RESUME BUT THEY HAVE REITERATED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE JULY 1992 DEADLINE ' SE8AEif Page 83 From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive b l i8AE EBMl 'P From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive C OFFICIAL UKRAINIAN STATEMENTS INDICATE THAT AT A MINIMUM IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND OTHER COMMONWEALTH STATES ON JOINT OR INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION MECHANISMS OR WESTERN SECURITY GUARANTEES WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE THE SUSPENSION WOULD BE LIFTED TRANSFERS PROBABLY WILL BE HELD UP UNTIL UKRAINE IS CONVINCED THAT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHDRAWN ACTUALLY WILL BE DESTROYED DESPITE THE NEGATIVE WESTERN REACTION TO THIS RECENT UKRAINIAN HOVE PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO USE THE NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENT ISSUE AS POLITICAL LEVERAGE 3 U UKRAINE VERSUS RUSSIA -- THE STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES A U POLITICAL PRESSURES ON KRAVCHUK 1 - et- PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IS ENGAGED IN A CONTEST OF WILLS WITH RUSSIA ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES WITH OUTCOMES PERCEIVED AS CRITICAL TO UKRAINE'S SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY THE NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENT ISSUE PROVIDES KRAVCHUK HIGHLY EFFECTIVE LEVERAGE IN HIS ONGOING STRUGGLE TO CRAFT A NEW MORE EQUITABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND ALSO PLAYS A PART IN THE NEGOTIATION OF OTHER CONTENTIOUS ISSUES SUCH AS CRIMEAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES CIS DEBATE OVER THE DIVISION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION'S ARMED FORCES 2 PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK HAS SHOWN PARTICULAR SENSITIVITY TO WHAT HE VIEWS AS UNILATERAL CHANGES IN CIS STRATEGIC FORCE STATUS BY RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND UKRAINE'S LACK OF ANY REAL CONTROL OVER THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS STATING THAT YELTSIN HAS NOT RECEIVED A MANDATE FROM US KRAVCHUK EXPRESSED ANGER AT NOT HAVING BEEN CONSULTED WHEN YELTSIN OFFERED HIS OWN STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES WITH CALLS FOR RADICAL CUTS BELOW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS START TREATY LEVELS KRAVCHUK ALSO EXPRESSED ANNOYANCE WITH RUSSIAN STATEMENTS THAT ICBMS HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF ALERT IN UKRAINE AND BEEN RETARGETED AND HE DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY CHANGE IN STATUS TO MISSILES BASED IN UKRAINE 3 NATIONALIST POLITICAL GROUPS IN UKRAINE HAVE BEEN INCREASING PRESSURE ON KRAVCHUK TO REVERSE HIS PLEDGE TO BECOME NUCLEAR FREE THE HOVE TO TEMPORARILY SUSPEND NUCLEAR WARHEAD TRANSFERS TO RUSSIA COULD BOLSTER WANING SUPPORT FOR HIS LEADERSHIP FROM NATIONALIST POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS KRAVCHUK'S CONSERVATIVE ADVISERS ARGUE THAT WESTERN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND INTEREST IN UKRAINE IN GENERAL WILL DISAPPEAR ONCE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED ALTHOUGH UKRAINIAN OFFICIALS PUBLICLY STATE THAT THIS HOVE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A REVERSAL OF THEIR NONNUCLEAR POLICY PRESIDENT KRAVCHUJ HAY BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING RETAINING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE ONLY WAY TD ENSURE UKRAINIAN SECURITY 5 U PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK'S STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS -- WHEN WE ELIMINATE AND DISASSEMBLE THE ENTIRE NUCLEAR SYSTEM BY 199 AS PLANNED WE WILL NOT HAVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IN UKRAINE VECHERNIY KIEV 10 JANUARY 92 -- BORIS YELTSIN SAID AT HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH THAT HE IS REDUCING THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT YOU CAN ONLY REDUCE THE FORCES WHICH YOU POSSESS IF Page 8 ll E8ftl T r i8AZI From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive HE WAS SPEAKING OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORC OF THE WHOLE COMMONWEALTH HE HAS NOT RECEIVED SUCH A MANDES ATE FROM US IZVESTIYA 21 FEBRUARY 92 -- WE WANT TO GET RID OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- OF THE ONES BY 1 JULY OF THIS YEAR AND OF THE STRATEGIC ONESTACTICAL BY THE END OF 1994 11 BERLINER ZEITUNG 10 MARCH 92 - - 11 IN SHIPPING NUCLEAR WEAP ONS OFF TO RUSSIA REPUBLIC CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT THEY WILL BE DESTROYED OR THATTHETHEY WILL NOT FALL INTO THE WRONG HANDS WE HAVE THEREFORE HADE REPEATED THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY ENSURE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATIREQUESTS THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE MISSILES 11 NEZAVISIHAYA GAZE ON OF TA 1 q MARCH 92 B U CRIMEAN INDEPENDENCE 1 FRICTIONS ARE BUILDING OVER WHAT UKRAINIANS SEE AS RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE CRIMEAN SEPARATISM WITH THE ULTIM ATE GOAL OF RUSSIA REGAINING CONTROL OF THE CRIMEA AT THE NEWS CONFERENCE DURING WHICH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK ANNOU NCED THE NUCLEAR WEAPON TRANSFER HE ALSO DISCUSSED THE CRIMEA HALT IN REJECTED TOTAL CRIMEAN INDEPENDENCE WHICH WOULD HEAN HE FLATLY UKRAINE'S BORDERS CARVING UP ITS TERRITORY • • THE CHANGING COSSACKS' INTERVENTION IN MOLDOVA IS FUELING UKRAINIAN DON THAT RUSSIA IS DETERMINED TO INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL SUSPICIONS OTHER STATES ON BEHALF OF RUSSIAN MINORITIES' PRESIDENTAFFAIRS OF KRAVCHUK TOOK ACTION ON 17 MARCH TO ENHANCE SECURITY ALONG ITS 1 ESTE RN BORDER OUT OF CONCERN THAT FIGHTING IN THE DNESTR REGIO N OF MOLDOVA COULD SPREAD TO THE ODESSA REGION IN RETURN FOR SUPPO RT BY CRIMEAN TATARS FOR CRIMEA TO REMAIN PART OF INE UKRAINIAN OFFICIALS ARE BELIEVED TO BE SUPPORTING TATAUKRA RIA'S EFFORTS TO BREAK AWAY FROM RUSSIA 2 U NEGOTIATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE A THE CRIMEA IS LIKELY TD ACHIEVE A GREATER DEGR EE OF AUTONOMY IN THE NEAR FUTURE EITHER UKRA INIAN OFFIC IALS WILL NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE CRIMEANS TO PROV AUTONOMY WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE UKRAINIAN CONSTITUTION OR AIDE CRIME AN REFERENDUM WILL BE HELD THIS SPRING POSSIBLY TO SEEK TOTAL INDEP LATTER COURSE IS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER BECAUSE THE POLIC ENDENCE THE Y OF UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IS THAT A REFERENDUM IS PRECL THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 1954 TRANSFER OF THE CRIME UDED BY AND BY THE CIS TREATY TO WHICH UKRAINE AND RUSSIA ARE A TO UKRAINE THE TREATY ESTABLISHES THE INVIOLABILITY OF EXISTING SIGNATORIES BORDERS RUSSIA'S SUPREME SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELA RECENTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 1954 TRANSFER WAS UNCONSTIT TIONS THE CRIMEAN SEPARATIST MOVEMENT APPARENTLY HAS SUFFICIENUTIONAL T MOMENTUM TO SUSTAIN SUPPORT FOR THE REFERENDUM EFFORT CRIME A PROBA BLY WILL AVOID ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH KIEV UNLESS THE UKRA INIAN TERMS ARE PARTICULARLY FAVORABLE C U DIVISION OF THE FORMER SOVIET ARMED FORCES -STRATEGIC VERSUS NONSTRATEGIC FORCES 1 -E- WHILE UKRAINE AND RUSSIA HAVE AGREED THAT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL EVENTUALLY BE WITHDRAWN TO RUSSIA THE DEBATE ON THE DIVISION OF OTHER FORMER SOVIET FORCES DEPLO YED IN THE NONRUSSIAN STATES CONTINUES THIS DEBATE IS CENTRAL TO THE ULTIMATE Page 85 liiiAEif From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive DISPOSITION OF THE BLACK SEA FLEET WHICH ALSO WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE CRIMEAN INDEPENDENCE ISSUE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CIS SUMMIT AGREEMENTS IN LATE 1991 AND EARLY 1992 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ASSETS WERE TO BE PLACED UNDER CIS JOINT CONTROL IN ADDITION TO THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEMSELVES THESE FORCES WERE TO INCLUDE MILITARY TRAINING INSTITUTES FOR THE STRATEGIC MISSILE TROOPS AIR NAVAL AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES AND EQUIPMENT AND OTHER MILITARY FACILITIES DESIGNED TO CONTROL AND MAINTAIN THE STRATEGIC FORCES UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS PRESSURING KRAVCHUK FAVOR A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE FORCES DEFINED AS NONSTRATEGIC THAT WILL BE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN UKRAINE UNDER UKRAINIAN CONTROL THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS TO DEFINE STRATEGIC ASSETS ARE COMPLICATED BY THE FRACTURED LOYALTY OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO CONTESTED MILITARY UNITS 2 NUMEROUS SERIOUS DISPUTES REGARDING LOYALTY OATHS AND STRATEGIC FORCES HAVE ARISEN WITH REGARD TO THE BLACK SEA FLEET BOMBER FORCES AND TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS IN UKRAINE RUSSIA CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR THE BLACK SEA FLEET TO BE CONSIDERED PART OF THE CIS STRATEGIC FORCES WHILE UKRAINE MAINTAINS THAT THEY FALL OUTSIDE THE AGREED-UPON STRATEGIC FORCES DEFINITION f LOYALTY OATHS AMONG PERSONNEL IN THE FLEET HAVE BEEN SPLIT BETWEEN THE TWO STATES DIA ASSESSES THAT AN ACCOMMODATION TO SPLIT THE FLEET WILL EVENTUALLY BE REACHED WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE LARGER ASSETS SUCH AS SUBMARINES AND CRUISERS GOING TO RUSSIA 3 ON 17 FEBRUARY MAJOR GENERAL BASHKIROV THE COMMANDER OF THE STRATEGIC AVIATION UNIT AT UZIN CHEPELEVKA AIRFIELD SWORE AN OATH OF LOYALTY TO UKRAINE AND WAS PROMPTLY DISMISSED BY CIS AUTHORITIES HE WAS REINSTATED BY THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN A POLITICAL STRUGGLE THAT CAUSED LOYALTY RIFTS IN THE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE UZIN AVIATION REGIMENTS WHILE THE PERSONNEL OF THE UZIN TANKER REGIMENT HAD TAKEN THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO UKRAINE THERE WERE COMPLAINTS FROM UZIN HEAVY BOMBER REGIMENT PERSONNEL OF COERCION TO FOLLOW SUIT LOSS OF CIS CONTROL OF THE MIDAS TANKER REGIMENT AT UZIN TO UKRAINE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE-HALF OF nlE ENTIRE MIDAS FLEET AND ABOUT ONE THIRD OF THE TOTAL LONG RANGE AVIATION TANKER FORCE SUCH A LOSS WOULD HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON CIS RUSSIAN LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC BOMBER CAPABILITIES ij THE CONTEST OVER THESE STRATEGIC AVIATION ELEMENTS PRESAGES STRUGGLES THAT ARE LIKELY TO ENSUE AS THE DEBATE INTENSIFIES OVER WHICH STRATEGIC FORCES CAN BE WITHDRAWN TO RUSSIA MOREOVER THE ISSUE OF WHO CONTROLS THE STRATEGIC HEAVY BOMBER REGIMENT AT UZIN WHICH CONTINUES TO CONDUCT FLIGHT OPERATIONS UNDER CIS CONTROL PROBABLY WILL BE A CONTINUING SOURCE OF TENSION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE' PROBABLY TO AVOID ANY FUTURE CONTENTION ON ITS BASING A NEWLY PRODUCED BLACKJACK HEAVY BOMBER DEPLOYED IN FEBRUARY TO THE LONG RANGE AVIATION TANKER BASE AT ENGELS IN RUSSIA RAnlER nlAN TO THE SOLE BLACKJACK REGIMENT AT PRILUKI IN UKRAINE 5 ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS 90 PERCENT OF THE STAFF AND 50 PERCENT OF THE CADETS AT THE STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCE TRAINING ACADEMY IN KHARKOV HAVE TAKEN THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO Page 86 lii REif A• From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive UKRAINE A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF THE PERMANENT PARTY STAFF AND ABOUT HALF THE CADETS ARE OF E THNIC UKRAINIAN ORIGIN THE SCHOOL'S COMMANDER WHO WAS THE FIRST TO SWEAR ALLEGIANCE SAID THAT THE PRIMARY BENEFIT WAS UKRAINE'S GUARANTEE OF SOCIAL AND LEGAL PROTECTION FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL MOREOVER THE SCHOOL HAD RECEIVED NO CIS SUPPLIES OR FUNDING SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE ACADEMIC YEAR 6 - i ' THE LOYALTY OF THE PERSONNEL IN THIS FACILITY COULD PRECIPITATE PROTRACTED AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE CIS WHICH HAS ALREADY DEFINED TRAINING FACILITIES FOR STRATEGIC MISSILE TROOPS AS 11STRATEGIC AND THEREFORE UNDER CIS JOINT CONTROL RUSSIA PROBABLY WILL CONTEST THE KHARKOV ACADEMY'S SUBORDINATION TO UKRAINE BASED ON THAT AGREEMENT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IS UNLIKELY ON THE QUESTION OF WHICH SUPPORTING ASSE TS CAN LEGITIMATELY BE VIEWED AS THOSE EXCLUSIVELY FOR STRATEGIC FORCES AND WHICH CAN BE DEFINED AS NONSTRATEGIC IN THE NEAR FUTURE ij U IMPLICATIONS FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WITHDRAWALS lllXll B UKRAINE THROUGH ITS CONTROL OF THE RAIL SYSTEM WITHIN ITS BORDERS POSSESSES THE CAPABILITY TO INTERFERE WITH THE REMOVAL OF TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC WARHEADS AND MISSILE AIRFRAMES FROM ICBMS BASED THERE ACCORDING TO ONE UKRAINIAN OFFICIAL SHIPMENTS OF STRATEGIC COMBAT EQUIPMENT TAKE PLACE UNDER CENTRAL JURISDICTION WITH LICENSES ISSUED BY OBLAST EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES IN ADDITION THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OFFICERS' UNION IN UKRAINE CLAIMS THAT ITS MEMBERSHIP OF OVER 70 000 SOLDIERS IS SUFFICIENT TO MONITOR ANY ATTEMPTS TO COVERTLY TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT OF UKRAINE C RUSSIA APPARENTLY HAS CONTINGENCY PLANS IN THE EVENT UKRAINE REFUSES TO RESUME THE NUCLEAR WEAPON TRANSFERS SHORTLY AFTER KRAVCHUK'S NEWS CONFERENCE THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE NUCLEAR LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION OF THE CIS STATED IF WORSE CAME TO WORSE THE WEAPIIIS CAN BE DESTROYED WHERE THEY ARE IN UKRAINE •11 I @ l 1 D AN ESTIMATED 50 PERCENT OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN TO RUSSIA AT THE TIME OF THE SUSPENSION LEAVING UP TO Kl TACTICAL WARHEADS AND OVER bXl STRATEGIC WARHEADS IN UKRAINE l OF WHICH ARE DEPLOYED ON BALLISTIC MISSILES THE ioGGRiT Page 87 iiiQRiiF MAJORITY OF THE TACTICAL WARHEADS REMAINING IN UKRAINE ARE ASSESSED TO BE AIR LAUNCHED AND NAVAL WEAPONS AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY HAVE STATED THAT GROUND FORCE-RELATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE THE FIRST ITEHS REMOVED FROM TH N - b 5 From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive U IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS A• i CURRENTLY 130 SS-19S AND 46 SS-24 HOD 2S ARE BASED IN UKRAINE AT TWO DIVISIONS DERAZHNYA AND PERVOHAYSK NO ACTIVITY SUGGESTIVE OF MISSILE AIRFRAME OR WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN DETECTED AND NO ACTIVITY HAS IiJiCATID PREPARATIONS FOR THE TRANSFER OF WEAPONS LAUNCHERS tb A RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN CLAIMED THAT ICBMS IN UKRAINE HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF ALERT AND THAT THEIR WARHEADS HAD BEEN DETACHED 1 l b l I B KRAVCHUK HAS CONSISTENTLY DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN THE 130 SS-19S AND THE 46 SS-24 HOD 2S BASED IN UKRAINE WHILE STATING THAT THE 130 SS-19S WOULD BE DESTROYED OVER A 7-YEAR PERIOD AS REQUIRED BY START HE HAS DEMURRED ON THE FATE OF THE REMAINING 46 EXCEPT TO SAY HE FAVORS DESTRUCTION OF ALL MISSILES KRAVCHUK HAY BE EQUIVOCATING ON PLANS FOR THE SS-24 HOD 2S UNDER THE BELIEF THAT RUSSIA WANTS TO RETAIN THE OPTION TO TRANSFER THEM FOR REDEPLOYMENT ON ITS OWN TERRITORY WHILE HE HAY INTEND TO DISCUSS THE FATE OF THESE SYSTEMS IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA ANY REDEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TO RUSSIA WOULD BECOME A SERIOUS POINT OF FUTURE CONTENTION WITHIN THE CIS C IN LIGHT OF UKRAINIAN CONCERN WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WITHDRAWALS TO RUSSIA KIEV IS LIKELY TO SIMILARLY INSIST ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR UKRAINIAN PARTICIPATION IN ELIMINATING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ICBM AIRFRAMES BASED ON ITS TERRITORY UNDER START THE UKRAINIANS' ASSERTIVENESS IN THE STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTION ARENA IS LIKELY TO INCREASE BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERN THAT RUSSIA ALONE IS SPEAKING FOR CIS CONTROLLED FORCES 6 U PROSPECTS FOR DESTRUCTION IN UKRAINE A - e - THE MINSK AGREEMENT STIPULATED THAT DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF UKRAINE AND BYELARUS UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES OF THE CIS lCRAVCHUK'S SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TRANSFERS WAS APPARENTLY MOTIVATED IN PART BY A LACK OF ASSURANCE THAT RUSSIA HAD THE RESOURCES OR WAS ACTUALLY COMMITTED TO DISMANTLING THE WARHEADS HIS ASSERTION THAT NUCLEAR WARHEADS SHOULD BE DISMANTLED IN SPECIAL FACILITIES TO BE BUILT IN UKRAINE HOWEVER IS CLEARLY PROBLEMATIC AND UNREALISTIC B UKRAINE DOES NOT HAVE THE TECHNOLOGY FACILITIES OR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO DISASSEMBLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD REQUIRE MASSIVE FINANCIAL AID FROM THE WEST AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION FROM RUSSIA TO DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY TO DISASSEMBLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS A DISMANTLEMENT FACILITY WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST 6 TO 8 YEARS TO CONSTRUCT AND WOULD COST BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN r l iiEiQRiiF Page 88 Dl Dff ff use u t From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive ADDITION FOR THE UKRAINIANS TO DISASSEMBLE THE WEAPONS THEY HUST HAVE ACCESS TO THE MANUALS AND EQUIPMENT USED TO FABRIC ATE THEM THESE ITEMS WOULD HAVE TO BE PROVIDED BY RUSSIA THE DISMAN TLEMENT PROCESS WOULD PROVIDE THE UKRAINIANS ACCESS TO DETAILED RUSSIA NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN INFORMATION ONCE GIVEN THE FACILITIES NAND TECHNOLOGY TO DISMANTLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE UKRAINIANS WOULD THE TECHNOLOGY AND MATER ALS TO MANUFACTURE THEM THE RUSSIANSHAVE HIGHLY UNLIKELY TO BE AMENABLE TO SUCH ASSISTANCE IN LIGHT OF THEARE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY'S IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY AND THE RESULTING INTENSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN TRANSFER C COMMONWEALTH OFFICIALS HAVE STATED THAT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DISMANTLE 4 000 TO 8 000 NUCLEAR WARHEATHEY D YEAR HOWEVER THIS CAPABILITY CANNOT BE CONFIRMED - - - - b l b l 111 b l 7 U OUTLOOK A -toe AFTER PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK SUSPENDED WEAPON TRANSFERS TO RUSSIA BYELARUS ALSO NOTED THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE VERIFICATION PROCESS WHILE BYELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN WILL EXPRE GREATER INTEREST IN JOINT CIS VERIFICATION MEASURES THEY SS ARE NOT LIKELY TO TAKE ACTIONS THAT WOULD IMPEDE THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEA R WEAPONS AS AGREED AN AIDE OF THE RUSSIAN ATOMIC ENERGY MINISTER REPORT STATED THAT ONLY THOSE MATERIALS CREATED AS A RESULT OF DISMAEDLY SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL CONTROL HE CLAIMED THAT NTLING FACILITIES USED TO DISMANTLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE A STATE SECRET AS A RESULT WHETHER ANY RUSSIAN CONCEPTS FOR JOINT VERIFICATION WILL MEET UKRAINIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERSIGHT AND CONTRO L REMAINS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE B• UKRAINIAN MISTRUST OF RUSSIA IS DEEP AND THE POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN DISPUTES IS HIGH SOME UKRAI NIANS ARGUE THAT ONLY IF UKRAINE RETAINS A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WILL THE WEST INTERVENE TO MEDIATE SUCH CONFRONTATIONS PRESIDENT KRAVCH PROBABLY PREFERS TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE HIS NONNUCLEAR POLICY AS UK LONG TERM GOAL BUT WILL MANIPULATE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE IN AN ATTEMA PT TO GAIN WESTERN SECURITY ASSURANCES AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 8 U THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION AS OF 23 MARCH 1992 9 U CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES 9t OAET Page 89