From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive JAMES A BAKER I I I also became the foundation for mobilizing U S support to Russia and the other new independen t states Its specific provisions included the repeal of Cold War legislation that impeded economic cooperation with Russia encouragemen t of the American private sector to develop business ties with Russia and the expansion of our technical assistance and exchange programs But any one of these was less important than the fact that the act provided a focus for our efforts during an election year in which the President was being criticized by some for being too much or an internationalist At the time l argued that the Freedom Support Act was defense by other means-tha t is by helping to build democracy and free markets we were creating the political foundations for a lasting peace I still believe that and even if we can't remake other societies in our image as perfect democracies the more democratic we can help them become the better or course the announcem ent on April l was just the beginning of a long campaign to win support for the act which included major speeches by the President and me and an intensive lobbying effort by Bob Strauss whose intervention with congressional Democrats was critical in ensuring the act's passage that summer From Four Nuclear Powers to One The START Protocol On the security side of the equation I spent most of the spring of 1992 managing two different yet interrelated nuclear issues The START agreement which the President had signed with Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1991 had been a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union When the USSR had collapsed Russia had become its successor state in legal terms but in practice strategic nuclear weapons remained on the soil of three other republics Ukraine Kazakhstan and Belarus We had a vital interest in ensuring that only one nuclear power emerged from the breakup of the former Soviet Union We had begun this revolution with one nuclear power on that strategic space and did not wish to see a proliferation of nuclear countries when the dust settled Moreover despite the Commonwealth the political disputes between Russia Ukraine and Kazakhstan were real and we definitely did not want to see states with these kinds of conflicts end up in uneasy nuclear standoffs with one another In addition the President was committed to go beyond the START agreement and push through another round of deep cuts in nuclear forces The President complemen ted his September 27 1991 initiative on tactical nuclear weapons with a strategic nuclear proposal which he unveiled in his State of the Union speech on January 28 1992 He announced that the From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive 658 P O L l T I C S O F D I P L O M A C Y 659 United States would take several unilateral steps such as ceasing production and deployment of the Midgetman missile and shifting a substantial portion of the bomber force to conventional roles but the most important aspect of the speech concerned force levels While START would reduce U S nuclear warheads from roughly 13 000 to 9 500 the President proposed in his State of the Union a START II agreement to reduce warheads to roughly 4 700-a fifty percent reduction below START levels and equivalent to the United States' levels in 197 l before the first strategic arms control agreement had been signed The forces in the former Soviet Union would drop to equally low levels But most important the President resurrected his de-MIRVing initiative which I had floated with Shevardnadze in Windhoek Namibia in the spring of 1990 If the President's proposal were accepted MIRVed ICBMs would be eliminated thus leading to a far more stable nuclear balance At roughly the same time President Yeltsin was coming forward with his own arms control initiative that also included a series of unilateral steps As a small sign of the new era we had entered the presidents previewed their proposals with each other beforehand during the Soviet era both initiatives almost certainly would have been released publicly first Yeltsin proposed even deeper cuts to a level of 2 000 to 2 500 warheads He argued that all MIRVs were the root of evil-from the point of view of threats to stability as he put it in a letter to President Bush on January 27 1992 He managed to get to such levels by a proposal to eliminate all MIRVed missiles both land-based ICBMs and sea-based SLBMs Unfortunately since we relied heavily on SLBMs Yeltsin's proposal would have had the effect of radically changing the U S force structure and shifting us away from the stabilizing triad of bombers ICBMs and SLBMs that had been the hallmark of the U S nuclear deterrent for decades While I discussed ways to bridge the gaps between the two proposals on my visits to Moscow in January and February my sense was that we were not going to make much progress on START II until we first resolved the proliferation problem with Ukraine Kazakhstan and Belarus While the members of the Commonwealth had signed an agreement on strategic forces on December 30 1991 it was becoming clear by March that political disagreements among Russia Ukraine and Kazakhstan were quickly making that agreement irrelevant The Russians and Ukrainians had been sparring over the disposition of the Black Sea fleet President Kravchuk had required an oath of loyalty from all military personnel based in Ukraine and then on March 12 Kravchuk suspended the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia On March 18 two days before a Commonwealth Summit I held my first meeting with the new Russian Ambassador Vladimir Lukin He told From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive T H E JAMES A BAKER Ill me that the deputy foreign ministers from the four states had met and had come to an agreement that would allow us to implement the START agreement's provisions although you can never know with our Ukrainian brothers warned Lukin On START II he told me Some way needs to be found to avoid negative effects here and in Russia Yeltsin cannot give the impression that he is dismantling everything '' But whatever agreement had been reached at the deputy minister level clearly didn't find its way to the heads of state The Commonwealth Summit dissolved in acrimony without the sides even addressing the nuclear issues It became clear to me that we would have to solve the problem for the four or risk losing the START Treaty The Un -Group-the senior interagency arms-control body in the government below the level of principals-had already begun developing options The most elegant solution was to have the four sign a protocol to the START Treaty which would have the legal effect of making Russia the successor state to the Soviet Union while Ukraine Kazakhstan and Belarus became non-nuclear weapons states consistent with the NPT On April 7 I called Andrei Kozyrev and broached this idea with him From our perspective l began substance is more important than form We have a small window for START ratification by our Congress and if the four of you can't find a solution among yourselves then I'd like to invite you to Washington to settle this 'Tm not sure that will be necessary Kozyrev replied I've spoken with Anatoly Zlenko Ukraine's Foreign Minister He now wants to settle the issue and will come to Moscow But a week later Kozyrev called and stated bluntly l don' t have very good news We were still dead in the water as the April l l meeting among Kozyrev Zlenko and their Kazakh and Belarussian counterparts had resulted in no resolution of the issue Moreover this technical arms-control issue was becoming increasingly politicized On a previously scheduled visit to show our support for Ukraine Dennis Ross Ed Hewett and Paul Wolfowitz the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy found the Ukrainians increasingly wary of the Russians The Russians see themselves as the Center and the Russians still have the mentality of empire were the kinds of statements they heard from the Ukrainian leadership Kiev was also fixated on the symbols of The gruup named the Un-Group because nu one was supposed to know of its existence included Reggie Bartholomew and Jim Timbie from State first Arnie Kanter and later John Gordon from the NSC Doug MacEachin from the CIA Vic Alessi from the Energy Department Steve Hadley lrom DOD and from 1he JCS the Chairman's assistam first Howard Graves then John Shalikashvili and finally Barry Mccaffrey From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive 660 T H E P O L I T I C S O F D I P L O M A C Y 661 frame discuss the prop osed proLater that day I called Presi dent Krav chuk to told Krav chuk that I woul d tocol I outli ned the conc ept over the phon e and er a draft so the Ukra inian have our charg e in Kiev Jon Gunde rson deliv initia tive very realistic and Presi dent could revie w it Krav chuk called my You r appr oach is very consaid he'd call back the next day whic h he did rnme nt is read y to take into struc tive he said It show s the U S gove ved Ukra ine supp orts the cons idera tion the positions of all coun tries invol com men ts on it but these are form and cont ent of the protocol I have a few not matt ers of principle Bela rus and Kaza khsta n With one dow n or so I thou ght I turne d to Shus hkev ich of Belarus who On April 19 I spok e by telep hone to Stanislav Cher noby l disas ter had quite foresaw no prob lems with the proto col The a seve re avers ion to anyunde rstan dably led the Bela russi ans to acqu ire thing nucle ar v of Kaza khsta n In a I also spok e that day with Presi dent Naza rbaye v had tried to find a rbaye lette r to Presi dent Bush a few days earlier Naza ed Kaza khsta n to beco me a thir d way with regard to the NPT He want nonp rolif erati on pact He tem pora ry nucl ear powe r for purp oses of the khsta n to join the NPT as a had linke d the lengt h of time it woul d take Kaza nucl ear weap ons state s full non- nucl ear state to secur ity guar antee s from ity guar antee s had been notab ly the United State s I told him that secur that the Unite d States had addre ssed in the origi nal NPT nego tiatio ns and Secu rity Council assistance formally decla red its inten t in 1968 to seek U N nucl ear powe r 1 told Naza rif any non- nucl ear state were threa tened by a woul d reite rate it in term s of baye v that we stood by this comm itme nt and Kaza khsta n notin g that he hope d Naza rbaye v was rathe r cagey than king me and he also elliptically said that our spec ial relat ionsh ip woul d cont inue- but al geopolitical role He ende d he felt certa in I recognized Kaza khsta n's speci ence the Russ ian leade rby urgin g me to use Ame rican diplo macy to influ bloo d may be shed civil war ship If Russ ian chau vinis m is not checked e and Kaza khsta n migh t migh t erup t all the reforms could go up in smok get involved he conc luded From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive want ed to be a party to the inde pend ence and that mean t that Ukra ine START Treaty to rema in stalled so l With out Ame rican inter venti on we were going 16 Kozyrev agree d with sent a mess age to Kozyrev and we talke d on April re to the NPT as nonadhe d our prop osed proto col in whic h the three woul the remo val of all strategic nucle ar weap ons state s and woul d comm it to seve n years the START time nucl ear weap ons from their territ ories with in JAM ES A BAK ER Ill I decided that we weren 't going to make much progress with either the Ukrain ians or the Kazakhs until their political needs were met We were fortun ate that we had schedu led Kravc huk and then Nazarbayev for meetings with the Presid ent in Washi ngton in May Yeltsin would come in June for a full-fledged summ it The political symbolism of being received at the White House would certainly help the Ukrain ians' psycho logical need to demon strate their indepe ndenc e as well as Nazarbayev's desire to exhib it our speci al relatio nship To reinforce both we drafte d joint statem ents for the Ukrain ians and Kazakhs to illustrate the close ties they had to America I felt that if we could get the Ukrainians pinned down on the START Protocol that would give us the leverage we neede d to get the Kazakhs to agree as well By obtain ing a comm itmen t to non-n uclear status by Ukraine Belarus and Kazak hstan we would in turn addres s one of the most seriou s securi ty challenges in the region as well as meet our object ive that only one nuclea r power surviv e the break up or the Soviet Union Furtherm ore it would streng then the domestic positio n of Yeltsin and the democ rats agains t rabid nation alists and provide furthe r impetu s for Russian reform and the expansion of U S -Russian coope ration during the summit Moreo ver Moscow clearly was not going to act to reach agreem ent on START II until this aspect of START itself was solved As a conse quenc e from April 28 throug h May 4 I spoke to Zlenko eight times as we haggled over the protoc ol and the side letter of assura nces that would go along with it Initially the Ukrainians had two sets of proble ms The first related to the Ukrain ian Rada its parlia ment Kravc huk was unwilling to make a legally bindin g comm itmen t or agree to a date certain for elimin ating nuclea r weapo ns becau se he felt that these were decisions for the Rada Second Ukraine wante d securi ty guaran tees and wante d the elimin ation of nuclea r weapo ns on the territo ry of the forme r Soviet Union to be under intern ationa l contro l While Zlenk o and I worke d throug h the draft protocol and side letter I came to feel a high degree of uncert ainty about wheth er any issue we had suppo sedly resolved had truly been put to bed There was a certain amou nt of play in the Ukrainian formu lations and I was nervo us that we might never close the negotiation On May I for examp le Zlenko added the phrase territ orial integr ity to the side letter a clear refere nce to the dispute then under way with Russia over the Black Sea fleet and the Crime a I elimin ated that but we still didn't have compl ete agreem ent To ensure I didn't lose the Russians I called Kozyrev on May I and again on May 2 I explai ned to him that we were now worki ng to obtain a protocol and legally bindin g side letters and lhat becau se of the need for parlia ments to ratify the NPT Belarus Kazakhstan and Ukrain e would From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive 662 P O L I T I CS O F D I P L O M A C V 663 agree to accede to the NPT at the earliest possible time instead of a date certain Kozyrev was concerned about the ambiguities inherent in some of our proposed language but felt our approach would work nonetheless if everyone could be convinced to sign on I told him that even though Kravchuk was due in Washington in three days I was far from certain of obtaining Ukrainian agreement Additional pressure on the Ukrainians might lead to the signing of the protocol Kozyrev observed though Kiev is playing a very dangerous if typically Soviet psychological game a clear reference to the Communist Party backgrounds of I ravchuk and Zlenko On May 4 I called Zlenko to try to complete the side letter His draft text included the language on international supervision of the elimination of nuclear weapons an approach we couldn't accept because it would make the international community not Ukraine responsible for removing or destroying nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil When I tried to point out that we had already decided that that approach would not work Zlenko told me that the idea of international supervision had been proposed by the Ukrain ian President and the Rada Moreover the letter is already signed President Kravchuk is out of his office and will be unavailable to sign a new letter prior to departing for Washington In any event he would be irritated by any changes The START Treaty does not provide for international control or supervision I responded and the U S government is not willing to have this as a condition of Ukraine following through on its obligations I told him that if need be we could amend Kravchuk's letter in ink but if agreement couldn't be reached prior to the Ukrainian President's arrival then President Bush would have to take up the issue directly with him I want you to know I continued how deeply I regret that this matter is still unresolved I then read him an editorial in that day·s New York Times entitled Nuclear Backsliding in Ukraine It suggested that political and economic support be withheld from Ukraine until it made a commit · ment to eliminate nuclear weapons That's why I've been working at this for three weeks so it won't mar President Kravchuk's visit I said Finally Zlenko got the message He said he personally saw no problem with eliminating the disputed phrase but would have to try to reach Kravchuk An hour later he called me back a little more frantic than before and said he hadn' t been able to talk to Kravchuk I told him we'd just have to talk when they arrived in Washington Upon Kravchuk's arrival I rode with him to Blair House where he would be staying during the visit ''Mr President I began this visit is very important for both our countries For the first time the leader of a democratic and independent Ukraine is visiting the United States I went on to explain how much we wanted his visit to succeed but that required From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive T H E JAME S A BAKE R Ill closing on the protocol and the side letter I told him We understa nd why you want some form of control over weapons once they leave Ukraine But we couldn't accept that in START He only needed to add the words the position of Ukraine to the offending sentence and we would be done He agreed and the visit ended up as a major success for U S -Ukrainian relations Just as importan t it isolated Nazarbaycv who had given an interview on May 5-the day of the Bush-Kr avchuk meeting- with the Washington Post in which he said he was seeking security guarante es from Russia China and the United States before Kazakhs tan would give up its nuclear weapons But with the Ukrainia ns on board Nazarbayev had nowhere to go so I felt fairly confiden t when I wrote him on May 13 outlining our suggested approach to START and reiteratin g our 1968 NPT commitm ent He called me back on May 16 two days before he was due to arrive in Washing ton to see Presiden t Bush He told me that Kazakhs tan had received a collective security guarante e from Russia and combine d with our NPT commitm ent he felt secure in signing the START Protocol and joining the NPT as a non-nuc lear weapons state I noted that we also needed a side letter and he said he would send one through our Ambassador Bill Courtney But in Moscow on the way to the United States Nazarbayev remarked The question of giving Kazakh territory for our common defense and for deploym ent of nuclear missiles will be decided on mutually advantageous grounds a signal that he might be trying to cut a deal with the Russians to keep part of his nuclear arsenal Once the Kazakh Presiden t arrived in Washing ton at midafter noon on Monday May 18 I spent an hour with him at Blair House and then we breakfas ted for an hour the next day in an effort to finish off the agreeme nt which we did in time for President Bush and Nazarbaycv to announc e it Tuesday afternoo n The START Protocol was done and we would sign it that weekend in Lisbon where all the states involved were meeting for the conference on assistance to the former Soviet Union I breathed a sigh of relief Three months of negotiati ng were over-or so I thought Unfortun ately even as I was headed to Lisbon we were still haggling In London for a stopover I found out that the Ukrainians were balking and so I called Zlenko from my suite at the Churchil l Hotel Within a minute of the conversa tion it became clear he was backing away from minor issues we had already resolved That infuriate d me there's nothing worse in a negotiation than to have an interlocu tor who you begin to feel can't be trusted Finally I had enough and slammed down the receiver This guy's a liar I blurted to no one in particular He is nothing more than a Communist I'm sick of this issue Dennis Ross who had been listening in on the conversa tion as my note From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive 664 I DIPLOM ACY 665 taker came into the room with a huge smile on his face What are you smiling at I asked Zlenko didn't realize you weren't on the line anymore He kept talking and talking and when he didn't get any response he said 'Mr Secretary Mr Secretary Mr Secretary Oh no he hung up ' In Lisbon it was just as bad At 4 30 r M on Saturday May 23- the day we were c cheduled lo sign the protocol- I had Zlenko and K01yrev come to my holding room Without any staff or note takers I asked them to sit down Gentlemen I said you need to work this out and I'm not going to let you leave here until you do So you better get to work After looking at each other warily like two boxers in a prizefight Zlenko and Kozyrev finally started talking and rec olved their differences After Zlenko left Kozyrev exclaimed This is worse than dealing with a Bulgarian Comnrnnist Frankly by that point I didn't care I just wanted the protocol completed Finally at 8 IO r M I filed into the Winter Garden Room of the Ritz Hotel with representati ves from Belarus Kazakhstan Russia and Ukraine In an austere wordless ceremony- we didn't want a shouting match- the protocol was signed the letters were exchanged and six minutes later we had reached our goal there would only be one nuclear power on the territory of the former Soviet Union t A Visit to a Friend From Lisbon I left on a six-hour flight to the funner Soviet Union not to negotiate over nuclear arms but to visit Georgia the former Soviet republic now led by my friend Eduard Shevardnad ze Georgia was the only republic I had not visited ince the August coup It had been racked with turmoil in the past months as its democratica lly elected leader turned despot Zviad Gamsakhurd ia had been violently ousted in January after a year of oppressive rule Armed thugs still roamed Tbilisi's streets at night and with the perpetual threat of unrest looming the government implemente d an 11 00 P M curfew j Shevardnad ze had returned that spring as Georgia's interim President •In my report to the President that night I wrote Suffice it 10 say the wrangling brought back some pre11y vivid memnries ol eight trips to the Middle East and what it took to nail down the invitation for the Madrid Conference tHowever the Climon administration had to dt•al wnh some delay and backsliding by Ukraine in taking the actions agreed to in the protocol tThe curfew was belier al protecting iJmocenl than deterring aiminals Indeed during the night gunlirc could be heard •11tside the guest house where I was staying From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive THE POLITIC S OF