8E8AEiiif HlilFOAfd · · wmnEe Inquire DOC24D Item No 17966 CDSOTG· 300727Z OCT 92 HEADER RR RUEAIIA DE RUEKJCS 16976 3040648 ZNY aeeae R 2613452 OCT 92 ---- b 2 b l l0 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC USC4l4 TO AIG 8742 RUCUSTR USSTRATCOH OFFUTT AFB NE L- --- blCll l RHLBAAA USCINCSO QUARRY I S PH b 0 RIJWSHXI USCINCTRANS b lJ SCOTT AF-B - IL_ ic - ____ __ RUFHV I lb © b 3 lo1JSC 124 RUEHBS RUEHSF RUEHOT RUEHPG RUFHCP RUFHLD RUFHNK RUFHFR RUFHOL RUEHTH RUFHBP RUEHRO RUEHKO From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive --t RUE lillL RUFHTH RUFHOS RUEHYR RUFHLI RUEHBM RUFHMD RUFHSK RUEHSW RUEHAK RUEl·ll-lY RUFHBE RtJEHBJ RUEHHK RtJEACHC -CH_C_W-AS_H_I_N-GT_O_N-DC- -r bh- 2 --i RUENAAA CNO WASHINGTON DC b 2 RUEADWD DA WASHINGTON DC L- - 2 --- f- __ RUEAHQA HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC RUCLEUA b tl I RULNAPG RUCDGDA RUKGWMA1-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --_ ___ ---- DIQflilAPJ WPIIPfJIEt lE8AET Page 87 3 efll T ••ere •• wrm• n From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY NPT THE BILATERAL STRATEGIC FORCES AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH RUSSIA IN JULY RESTATED ' MINSK'S COMMITMENT TO ABIDE BY START PROVISIONS 3 -toe WHILE THE RUSSIAN SUPREME SOVIET HAS FINISHED PREPARATIONS FOR START RATIFICATION SOME MEMBERS HAVE DEHANDED THAT UKRAINE FIRST RATIFY THE NPT AND THUS ENTER START AS A NONNUCLEAR NATION BEFORE· RATIFYING START THOUGH LESS LIKELY SOME RUSSIANS HAVE PROPOSED PROMPTLY RATIFYING START BUT DELAYING EXCHANGING THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION UNTIL AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH KIEV 4 FOR KIEV ' S PART ONGOING UKRAINIAN DOMESTIC DISPUTES OVER NUCLEAR POLICY WILL DELAY START RATIFICATION PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK OFFICIALLY SUPPORTS PROMPT RATIFICATION OF START BUT A SHALL GROUP OF INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT CONTINUES TO OPPOSE ACCESSION TO THE NPT AND RATIFICATION OF START KIEV IS SEEKING SECURITY GUARANTEES FROM BOTH RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES AND A SHARE OF ANY PROFITS FROM THE SALE OF ENRICHED URANIUM FROM UKRAINIAN DEPLOYED MISSILES AS WELL AS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE COMPLICATING THE ISSUE IS KIEV'S COMMITMENT TO GAINING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES DEPLOYED IN UKRAINE 5 - START STATUS OF RATIFICATION UNITED STATES RATIFIED 1 OCTOBER 1992 KAZAKHSTAN RATIFIED 2 JULY 1992 BYELARUS SUPREME SOVIET KEETS 20 OCTOBER TO CONSIDER RATIFICATION RUSSIA COMPLETED RATIFICATION PREPARATIONS NEGOTIATIONS UNDER WAY WITH UKRAINE TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES UKRAINE WILL CONSIDER TREATY RATIFICATION BY END OF YEAR OPPOSITION TO START AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY WILL HOST LIKELY DELAY RATIFICATION 6 MOUNTING INTERNAL UKRAINIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES THREATEN TO DELAY START RATIFICATION UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION IS KEY TO RUSSIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF START AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE START TREATY VERIFICATION MEASURES UKRAINE'S INABILITY OR UNVILLINGNESS TO RATIFY START COULD PUT THE ENTIRE START PROCESS AT RISK AND JEOPARDIZE THE UNITED STATES' ABILITY TO FULLY MONITOR COMMONWEALTH STRATEGIC FORCE COMPLIANCE WITH START PROVISIONS B U DESTRUCTION OF COMMONWEALTH ICBM SILOS PICKS UP SPEED 1 f0s'W O THE NUMBER OF SILOS THAT THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES RUSSIA HAS DEACTIVATED AND DESTROYED SINCE AUGUST 1991 SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCES RUSSIA'S START-ACCOUNTABLE LAUNCHER TOTALS THIS ACTIVITY ALSO REDUCES THE BURDEN OF ELIMINATING SILOS TO TREATY SPECIFICATIONS AND THUS DEFRAYS SOME POTENTIAL COSTS OF PROVIDING ONSITE INSPECTION SUPPORT 2 -tE 'tftf SHORTLY AFTER THE START TREATY WAS SIGNED ON 31 JULY 1991 THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN SUBSTANTIAL ICBM SILO REDUCTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR TREATY ENTRY INTO FORCE AS WELL AS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GAIN WITH THE CONTINUING DELAYS IN THE START RATIFICATION PROCESS HOWEVER SILO DESTRUCTIONS LAGGED ••eronu wrmoElt 6Eir4ii Page 93 lECREI D QSQPDS tlD DITSI BEHIND DEACTIVATIONS AS THE RUSSIANS REMAINED AT OR II LIMIT OF 1 398 ACCOUNTABLE LAUNCHERS FROM AUGUSTNEAR THE SALT 1991 UNTIL JUNE 1992 THE FORMER SOVIET UNION RUSSIA L b I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ I b l 3 tonno SINCE JUNE HOWEVER A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN SILO DESTRUCTIONS HAS BEEN OBSERVED THIS ACTIVITY SIGNI FICAN TLY REDUCES THE NUMBER OF DEACTIVATED SILOS AWAITING DESTR INDICATES PREPARATION FOR START IMPLEMENTATION AND ITS UCTION AND ASSOCIATF•'f DATA EXCHANG seECIFICALLY b ll r JC DESTRUCTidN OF THESE SILOS IS ADVANTAGEOUS BECAUSE IT REDUCES THE NUMBER OF ACCOUNTABLE CHERS AND FACILITIES TO BE DECLARED IN THE DATA UPDATE LAUN EXCHANGE O DAYS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE J b ill From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive SINCE AT LEAST 22 ACCOUNTABLE SS-18 LAUNCHERS MUST BE ELIMINATED EACH YEAR DING TO THE TREATY DESTRUCTION OF THESE DEACTIVATED SILOSACCOR WILL DELAYED UNTIL AFTER START TREATY ENTRY INTO FORCE HOST LIKELY BE 4 THE EARLY DEACTIVATIONS DESTRUCTIONS PROVIDE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR RUSSIA AND AND ALLOW A HEAD START FOR REDUCTIONS REQUIRED UNDER START THESE EARLY DESTR REDUCE THE BURDEN OF ELIMINATING SILOS TO START TREA UCTIONS TY-REQUIRED DEPTHS EXPLOSION TO 6 METERS OR EXCAVATION TO 8 METE REMOVAL FROH THE START LIST OF FACILITIES IN AN OPERA RS AND THE1R REDUCES THE NEED FOR ONSITE INSPECTION THE RUSS1ANS TIONAL STATUS CAPABLE OF MEETING THE REQUIRED TREATY-MANDATED REDU ARE FULLY CTIONS WITHIN THE 7-YEAR START DRAWDOWN PERIOD C U RUSSIAN CFE GROUND FORCE DATA ANOTHER REFLECTION OF THE CRU MB L N E IRE LA 1 HE REDUCTIONS AND WITHDRAWA OF RUSSIAN GROUND FORCES ARE REF TED IN THE NET DECREASE OF 94 LSOBJEC TS OF VERI FICAT ION IN RUSSIA 1 S CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY DATA DECLARATION SINCE NOVEMBER 1990 FURTHER DECREASES IN RUSSIAN OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION DISPUTES OVER OWNERSHIP AND MILIT ARY POLITICAL DISPUTES WILL REDUCE AND COMPLICATE NATO CFE INSPECTIDNS • 2-uU a i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ONSITE _ _ _ _ _-- I I • b O I HOWEVER' NET REDUCTION OF 94 OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION OOVS --BR REGIMENTS AND SEPARATE BATTALIONS OR STORAGE SITES IGADES TREATY-LIMITED EQUIPMENT AT SPECIFIED LOCATIONS--HASTHAT HOLD THE RUSSIAN GROUND FORCES SINCE THE DATA SUBMISSION OCCURRED IN 1990 THE DATA SHOW A NET REDUCTION OF 62 MANEUVER OF NDVEHBER REGIMENT OOVS IN THE GROUND FORCES CLAIMED BY RUSSIA--37 OF THEM FROM THE WESTERN GROUP OF FORCES GOF IN GERMANY THE FEW NET GAINS OF OOVS IN RUSSIAN MILITARY DISTRICTS HOS REFLECT THE MOVEMENT OF FORC ES BACK TO RUSSIA WHERE THEY REPLACE DISBANDED UNITS 3 U CHANGES IN RUSSIAN GROUND FORCE OOVS SINCE 1990 TABLE ARTILLERY 1992 MANEUVER MANEUVER REGIMENT oovs REGIMENT BATTALION BRIGADE DJQFORPI WUIP H t 6i9AET Page 94