DATE d 1s r e JPS SfiCltft'f' SRNSITIH 31io -z ol FOIACASE # 12 -F-ouKO Wednesday May 19 1993 MEMORANDUMRlR 11ESECRETAR Y OFDEFENSB llJHDEPUIY SECREI ARY 1HtOlDI FRANK G HWM JOUN A OfIIDOR M 20 ml From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive DECLASSIFIED BY Trip Report on Strobe Talbott s Mission to 1he Former Soviet Union Talbotts delegation departed May 8 on the finl of three trips that will take him to each of the 12 new iepublics and the Baltic states 1'be ovcnll message of t be trip was the trip ibeJf - to show to the republics all of them the attention dw will be paid by the new Adminisbation to their democn tic and refmm goals In Ubaine we e1aboraled a new policy that does not have as its sole objective the ratification of START and accession to the NPT The stop in Ekaterioburg was to show that U S inteICSt in refonns is not limited to Mmcow In Moscow we llcld the fust meeting of the TalboU-Mamedov group winch we hope will he able to deal with the more sensitive secmity issues between Russia and the U S in informal discussions In Yerevan and Baku discussions focused on resolution of the Nagomo-Kaiabakh war in addition to CCOllOIDic and -refonn issues And in TaHinn we spoke mainly about the Russians militaiy and civilian who still remain in Estooia At all stops we discussed the poSSilrility of Russian participation in peacekeeping operations in the CIS an idea that was lllliversally unpopular Ukraine At every meeting the delegation made the point that we came to Ukraine to do all that is possible to put the U S -Ubaine relationship back on ttack Ubaine is a new country America has a new Administration and thus the stage is set fOI' a new relationship and we are ready to tum a new leaf I gave the Defense Minister yom letter accepting an invitation to visit Kiev and extending an inYitatioll to visit Washington I told him that the U S wanted to begin a security dialogue with Ubaine at several levels and that SHCRE'f - SHNSl'AVR mnrm n ll liit tlfaz DiiLtASSHi GI W llJllltCIIS - 2 the minister-level meetings would be the kick-off of this dialogue Y OUlf meetings could chalter a Bilateral Working Group which in mm could lead to Joint Staff TaJb expanded miliwy-to-miliwy contacliS and an MOU similar to that yon will sign with Minister Gncbev I also suggested defense conversion discussions headed by Dr Perry and reported on what the U S was a heady doing to expand the lMET program and to open an Office of Defense Conversion We reported on the START eliminations Morosow seemed genuinely pleased with these specific and concrete steps wants to put the period of 'lost oppo rtnnityffll behind us and is looking for ways to reverse the strong feeling in the Rada that President Kravchulr s policy tow ml the U S was a failure and nuclear weapons shoo Id be retained Morosov stated clearly that he would support START and NPT in die Rada 'even if it costs ane my position Strobe closed by offering U S good offices in helping resolve any issues between Ukraine and Russia ms The delegation met with the Foreign Minister and deputy for several homs the Economic Minister and the Piresident Strobe only Our message about a new relationship was well Teceiwed evCTy member of the executive supported START and NPT saying the problem was with the Rada This would suggest that a more public approach to show our support of the K ra vchulr policies and more explanations about why the treaties are in the interest of 1 llkrame may pay dividends That wd the feelings in die Rada are deep and the prospects f« START and NPT are not good Additional themes and points We suggested that the U S and 1 Jk raine could develop a 'charter as we have done with Russia that would be a public explanation of the principles that underlie the U S -Umine relationship to be signed 'at the highest levels ' There was a perception in 1 llknine that the Tokyo G-7 initiative was only for Russia We tried to disabuse them of that idea There is some reluctance to inviting Jim Goodby back now - there are still differences in details of the agireements on taxes and diplomatic immunities and privileges and the Uhainians want these resolved tint Ubaine will be hying to establish a Central and stem Europe Zone of Security and asked f« om support Details are not clear bot they envisage a very loose coalition or network of Europeans with similar SHCRWf S SITIVE From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive made to date and encomaged Ukraine to receive Jim Goodby soon SHCRE'f _ SRNSITIV 3 coocems They do not see dus as competition with any of the fonml secmicy fora since it would not ha we a fonnal organizational strncmre but they intend to use it to demoostrate that Ukraine does not have interests that are similar to Russia Tamsyuk expressed gi'Cat displeaso re about the HEU negotiations with Russia He reported that Umme had tried to upgrade the level of the negooatioos to the prime minister level but Russia had not responded He slared that the issue turned on the question of ownership Ukraine did not want to control the weapons but in an economic sense the weapons are the property of Uhaine and that had to be acknowledged by Russia 'Instead Russi a charges the atmosphere by accusing us of noclea r ambitions ' Russia hu also refused to acJrnowledge Ukrame·s claim on the economic value of the tactical weapons that have already been withdrawn On use of Russian pearekeepe rs m states of the fonner Soviet Um on all with whom we spoke were aullamamtly opposed under my conditions They argued that it lends legitimacy to the CIS which they will neither join nor support and is ooly useful iin extending Russian presence and influence outside the borde rs of Russia In summary we were effective in mtuming the page ' or ' showing a little anHe ' of what the future U S -IDmrine relatiioosbip could be and offering some specific proposals for expanded dialogue possibly leading to expanded military contacts The Russia-Ukraine relationship seems to be deteriorating centering primarilly on the questions of nuclear weapons and the Black Sea flee11 Our offer of good offices was heard but nothing specific was suggested Our tasks will be to follow through oo the milituy contact aren3 i draft a charter for discussion in the political aren3 i and find ways to provide more ammunition foir use with the Rada I SIISJJCCt Morosov will accept your invitation for July On the margins I made it clear that a convenient date for yom- visit would be immediately following Gannish SECltET - SRNSITI 7R From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive Ta rasynk said that Uhaine had not been violating the sanctions to the Fonner Yugoslavi3 i that they were m fact the com ib y who is mjmed the most by the sanctions and therefore UNSC smrements to the contrary supported by the U S were an insnlL ' SECRJ T - S NSffl 7E Ekaterinburg We met with several Americ a n gn ups who aie supporting priva tizatio n visited a 'supennarket ' toured the Ummass factory a nd met with the Oblast gove mor U admass is mak mg an effort at privatization -- they aie now a joint stock company but don t Jmow what to do with that The facilities ue falling dow n emploJIDCnt is cut from 55 000 to less tba n 30 000 a nd that level is far too large for the ordeIS that are on the boob One of the products they have made in the past are the oil drilling rigs for much of the USSR Now orders are way down and they believe that the new U S deal in Kaz akbstam and U S and UK deals Bairn will keep them from recovering Defense conversion them building washing machines a nd wheelbarrows - at about three percent of capacity Moscow The main ewent was the openmg round of the Talbott-Mamedov group The meetings were too short but a positive tone was set Both Nik obyev and Ladygin were there along with a number of their generals The number two from the security service was there along with a number of staff - all were identified by name and position It seemed that the Russian goal was to use this visit to esb blish a Russian interagency group with Mamedov in control Mamedov did most of the tailing setting the gmnnd mies that this was not a fo11ill31 negotiating channel bnt rather an informal group to explore solutions to mutual problems After Mamedov s sb ge setting we broke into three subgroups one on peacekeeping chaired by Toby Gati from the NSC one on non-proliferation chaired by Admim Smdeman and one on strategic issu es that I chaired The Russians in my group included Nilmlayev Berdennikov and Ambassador Dubymn Nitobyev repeated his lines from the Joint Staff Talk s on several issues but most of the time was devoted to nuclear weapons in l Jla ame His main points were Global Defenses These are worth working on but there is no common opimo n betwee n the U S and Russia We sboold establish a common system for exchanging early 2ffling informations but this mmt be done in strict compliance with the ABM Treaty Russia will not be the first to breach the testing moratmium but we understand that the Americans may have some Nuclear Testing SECRET - SENSff From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive The half day spent here was primarily to 11 1sbow the flag ' outside of Moscow and suppmt the opemng of a consufate there later this year SHCRE F - SENSITIVE s tes1ing to do If we blew yoor plans we cooJd fmther refine om approach I can tell yoo that any Russian tests would be only for safety or reliability not modernization Berdennikow subsequently made the point that whatever negotiations we do together we must find a way to involve the CD or the mnltilateG ll community l wiH newer accept the resnlts negotiated bilare rally or among the five nuclear powen Troop Withdrawal In all places save Latvia and Estonia Russian troops were being withdrawn with dignity Russia expects U S assistance with these countries to help the troops depart with dignity and to protect the rights of the citizens who stay to live in these countries Ukraine bas assumed obligations which must be carried out They now have 600 weapons effectively under their coottol -- they are a defacto nuclear weapons state We Russia want to establ ish good relations with Ukraine but the way they are behaving makes that impossible We have offered them assistance to elimmate delivery vehicles but since March 3 we ha we had no response from them They will not discuss the matter Plus they me miking to Kazakhstan trying to get them to hold onto their weapons When asked what the U S oould do to help BenJennikov said the U S we should oot hold up the HEU agreement for we have effectively given them a veto We asked to see what they bad pl'Oposed to the Ubaimans and Dobynin passed over the draft agreement with Ukraine being translated Lunch with the entire group retmned to and stayed with the nuclear weapon issue with the Russians arguing that the Ukrainians will soon have operational control Ukraine The goal of frank conversation was deady met and we should expect to hear more from the Rnssians about the weapons in lJkraine They clearly see the situation deteriorating and leading to operational coottol by Um ine in a matter of some months Strobe extended an invitation to Mamedov to bring his group to Washington this summer Yere-Yan The discussions in Annellllia and Azerbaijan focused on the war The economic situation is quite desperate across Armenia largely as a result of SECRET - SENSITIVE From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive CFE Ranks WJkolayew reported that this was a particularly difficult issue for the Russians to raise bot that since the situation in Europe bad chmged it was in the interest of all nations that changing threats be taken into account However this issue should be discussed in Geneva not here St CRHff - SENSITIVE 6 We were told that the natio mul budget is 229 billion mbles this year with 50 billion going in direct aid to the Karabakhis not com1ting the military mppon in to the Kmabakhis They deny sending regular troops to the co nffic t but admit to logistical and other military snppon That said the President told Strobe in private that he recognized that there would never be an independent Nagorno-K m-abakh and that it could never be a part of Annema Thus he would be willing to find a way that wonld settle the war quickly and leave the Kmabakhis with a deg ree of political and cultmal independence At the President s request we passed this message to the President in Aze rbaijm Nevertheless Nagomo-Kmabakh is not an issue likely to be resolved soon Like every other stop we made the Armenians wanted nothing to do with Russian peacekeepers there or anywhere else They stiJI have Russians present however on the bonlle rs with Tnr1r 'GP and Iran Baku In Bak u we were told that the Azeris would never give up control of Nagomo-Kambakb They bad however mlready signed the Triputite agreement which promises a cease-fire and withdrawal from some of the cootested areas I am not sure bow they took the message Strobe canied from Yerevan -- we will have to wait to see how Jact Maresca s negotiations play out It is clear however th at they have not really mobilized to fight and that if they set mind to it they could mom1t a considerable military effo rt They Lo ' that there is direct Anneni m troop involvement in Nagomo-Karabach and th at tb e Russians are themselves trying to keep the situation unstable to entice both countries into the CIS They repon the capture sever ml Russian adviSOIS at the front including a Major Lukin a refa tiwe of the Ambassador The Russians are leaving the country with astonishing speed -- only about 2 000 paratroopers are left from one division and the operators a t tb e early warning radar The Azerii s take some pride in the fact that the SECRET - SENSITIVH From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive Bakuns blockade of eneEgY and otber trade There was no heat in Yerevan the put two winters - U S embassy staff apartments were u cold as 10 degrees Fahrenheit over the winter Electricity is on for at most two hours a da y there is no bot water What was not long ago a major industrial center now produces fOlf mll pn1tctic ml purposes nolthing Yet they continue to suppon the war continue to say they have no political influence over Na gomo-Karabakb and keep tensions high on the borders SECRET - SENSITIVE 1 Ruman presence is much less than in my of the fonner republics The only remaining presence will be at the LPAR - they made several jokes about privatizmg the radai' and offering it to us '1 be Azer is seem relatively unooucemed about the rue of Islamic fundamentalism They argue that their people are not particolady religious and lean much more to the Tmks than to the l rani ans -- except for going there to shop caDDOt do much while the war is going on and we nevelf may want to do much by offering a small team visit but it seems that we could learn quite a for a week or two We may learn much more about what is going on especially along the Inmim border md some signal of U S interest could AMOCO and Pennzoil help cement the oil deals that are pending Tallinn This was by far the most pleasant stop -- the city is much more northern Emope than anywhere else we visited and the economic refonns a re moving ahead briskly The two issues are the remaining Russian troops and the integration of ethnic Russians into society original 45 000 troops left in Although there are only about 5 000 of Estonia and only about 2 000 are combat troops that is not moving fast enough for Estonia The local commander has just mn a command post exercise to retake strategic positions in Estonia and bu invited local high wages Not sm prisingly dlis does Russians to join his division at not sit well with President Meri or any one else Ethnic Russians are not treated badly but the citizenship and l mguage laws will make it hard fm- them to become full-members of society This t ramitioo will not go entirely smoothly but we all left with the impression The biggest problem is that it would be resolved satisfactorily over Russia that are almost entirely in the industrial areas on the border ethnic Russian and largely out of work because of the changes m mm ket '1 bis makes unemployment seem to be ethnically focused Meri recogmzes this and asked for investment assistance targeted to this area Meri wu no more in favor of Russian peacekeepers than anyone else His major ugument is that yoo just cannot control the actions of the individual Russian troops He says he is speaking from experience Meri however is SECRE7F - SENSfftV E From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive I was approached several times about developing a real milituy relationsmp especially the openmg of a mnining facility Oearly we S CltE f - SENSITIV E 8 He argues that Yeltsin is not a democrat or a reformer - its just that wu the ooly path left open to him also the most anti-Ruma we met on the trip to smvive politically Tab C Tab D Aspin letter to Mm-osov JCS Trip S mmwJ' cc Gnham Allison Ash Caner Tony Williams s cttE T - SENSITIV E From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive Attachments Tab A Reporting Cables Tab B Talldng Points as used with Morosow