1z-f-Ou o Ooc S • SEGREI • OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC 20301-Z OO J n- ·• ' - J - r 2'£ Cf CL - Ct- _ - -EE July 21 1993 SH CRE'i'ARY OF DEFENSE mIDERSECRETARY OF DEE'ENSE PRiliCIPAL DEPmtY mm OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND COUN'FERPROLIFBRA'FION - Q u· - l 'f ALBOTT HAMErnOV TALKS iUGHPOINTS L Strobe Talbott hosted a Russian delegation beaded by Deputy Foreign Minister Ham edov Monday and ' 'uesday In addition to Hamedov the Russian delegation incl uded General Staff and Russian Foreign lLnte11igence Agency representatives John Gordon and I at1te nded from DoJD_ A1so present on the o s_ side were Deputy CIA Director Bill Stu deman Hoscov embassy DCM Jim Collins and NSC staff in additiOJ l to Talbott Secretary of state Christopher joined our meeting briefly today Ke he1icoptered to car1isle Barracks Monday for tile ta1ks proceeded to get socked in and had to take a bus back t o lfashingto n The talks were broken into two groups corresponding to the hottest issues in O S -Russian re1ations peacekeeping especia1ly Georg1a and proliferation especial 1y mcraine I led tile discussion on Ukraine focusing on your early deactivation proposal At 'i'ab A are my talking points At Tab B is a non-paper detailing our proposal tllat I banded to the Russian side At Tab C is a non-paper on HBO prepared by State and a1so handed to the Russi ans Here are the main points l I t became quite apparent to us that the reason we haven't heard back from the Russians about early deactivation is that they failed t o understand key aspects of the proposal The garbled version they were working vith vas totally unacceptable 1to tb ellll so they just didn•t pay any attention to it For SEGREI X62100 tft_ - - F From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive DEPUTY SECRE'i'ARY OF DHE'ENSE • SEf RET • 2 example they had the impression that ve intended warheads to be dismantled in Ukraine rather th an in Russia Yes1terday's meeting made important progress at clarifying our proposal and rekind Jling their interest 2 When the proposal was explained to thee the reactiO ll was one of general though unofficial approval ' lrb ey rerna hn concerned that payment to the Ukrainians for mm contained in weapons on Ukrainian territory i mp1icit1y settles the issue of ownership in favor of the Ukrainians They• re also afraid that deactivation vi11 begin vith the SS-19s but never get around to 3 iiith these misunderstandings resolved Talbott and I discussed the fol lowing sequence for moving forward over the next tvo months 9 7 11 Jl 1 X a w preview m7se ideas and distribute the non- j c ·fn 7 later this and t o Horozov next veek JJ - • papers t o Taras n uk lf •E '__ i • ' prepare a fonmal agreement President Cl i nton to transmit it · _ 1 to President Yeltsin late this week noting that this agreement l 1 responds to President Yeltsin• s Tokyo suggestion tlna 11 a 1111Q t • tripartite U S Ukrainian Russian •security Treaty• be devised a · b At the same time ve based on our proposals and ask c Once ve have agreement from the Russians ve will tcy to secure agreement to the same text from the Ok rai nians d The objective is to have in place a basic agreement by early September so that the appropriate conditions are created in Kiev in late September for favorabl e Rada consideration of START and HPT er - L t_ From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive the SS-24s which the Ukrainians will retain • -CF • C --s y 3 Att acimre Dts 1 ' li a J'ci og Points from Dr carter Proposa1 Banded to Russians Non-paper om mm From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive 2 3 o The US considers t essential to its own security and to g1obal non-proliferation efforts that Ukraine ratify START join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state and eliminate all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive arms on tlle territory of Ukraine o we vant t o work closely with Russia on the best tactics to achieve this end In doing so ve recognize that the outcome of political developments in Ukraine is powerfully affected by the broader relationship bet -een Russia and Ukraine We also recognize that Ukrainian thinking about nuclear weapons is a f fected by their perceptions of t heir broader security situation o I would like to hegin th e discussion t his morning by focusing on the nuclear issue in Wtraine and i nvit ing you to elaborate your views on four r ma 11 t e rs upon vhlch ve have a lready ad prel imina ry contacts but still lack specific concrete information from you o The first I llatter concerns your reaction to the plan for early or accelerated deactivation of strategic offensive ar-lQS in Ukraine presented by De fense Secretary Aspi n to Defense Hi nister Grachev on June 5 and shortly thereafter to Ukrainian officials in Kiev Yhis plan envisions a process to begin as soon following steps as the parties can agree with the Nuclear warheaas ould be removed from SS-19 and SS-24 missiles and from heavy bc-m ber basing areas and transported to tvo existing central sec re storage facilities in Ukraine for temporary storage Sxisting procedures for varb ead removal and transport 'A'Ould be applied procedures it appears tc us that from Using such a technical standpoint work cou1d cotnn tence on all three types of weapons su ultaneously aJ ll d all nuclear weapons could be transported to the central storage sites in less than a year -- The warheads would remain temporarily stored in the centra1 s orage sites in mtraine until di smant1em ent facil ities in Russia are ready to accept them for prompt diS1Da Dtlement under arrangements to be agreed l lpOn by Russia and Ukraine iie expect tha 3 ussia n forces would provide internal sec- 1rity a ad acy requ rec cai ntenance within the central storage sites Ukrainian forces vou1d provide perimeter security If desired by Russia and Ukraine appropriate international monitoring could be establ ished to monitor from the exttericr he arrival and departure of From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive o nuclear weapons at the central storage sites Russia woul d give precedence to the clismant1ement of warheads 1 ocated in Ukraine on an agreed schedul e consistent vith nuc1ear safety and security Warheads vou ld be transfe from Okraine to the appropriate di smantl ement facility in Russia as soon as tllat facility vas ready to clisaantle then Dismantlement vould begin i mmediatel y after the warheads arrived at the m smantlement faci l ity Under arrangements to be agreed separatel y Ukraine vol111d The OS bas provided you vim a draft tri-partite agreement covering S1llcb arrangements The draft agreement provides ti a at as warheads 1eave Wcraine for Russia the OS vou1d pay Ukraine for the val ue o f the EIBU imi nus Russian dismantlement costs Ukraine would have the opt ion of being paid either in caslil or in low-enriched uranium reactor fuel of equival ent value Russia would transfer the mro to the us The mro from weapons located in Ukraine would be in addition to the 500 metric tons from other di smant1ed weapons that the US has agreed to purchase i f Russia and mtraine can agree to such a plan to compensate Ukraine Finally once 1t he process of removing warheads from missiles located in UJkra in e has begun and the appropriate agreements required under the Hmm-Lugar progrcum have entered i nto force us assistance for dismantling missi1es disposing of their fuel and dismmt ling silos vould begin 0 These then are our ideas regarcling deactivation and BEU revenue sharing o tile accelerated welcome the positive reactions t o these proposals we have beard frmm Russian officials But we -ould welcome your specific reactions to specific points in the proposals and your ideas for b ov we can help Russia and Ukraine reach agreement o The second i natter upon whlch we sol ici t your vi evs i s directly related rife know that Russia and Ukraine are discussing these issues bilaterally we would like to learn vb at ideas for accelerated deactivation Russia and Ukraine are consi de ri ng in these tal ks and whether the us can be helpful in promoting progress Defense Secretary Asp in wrote last veeic to Minister Grachev proposing early meetings of technical teams to vork on details of accelerated deactivation we are ready for these teams to meet for example a Jw y 16 lzvest ya artic1e vhicb reported that the first 10 SS-19 mssi 1es are nov being removed at ervoamysk wit h tile missi1es to return - - 'Re note imri ediately to Russia and the warheads to remain in Ukraine From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive - be rei Jmbursed promptly for the net va l ue of the big hlyenriched uranium in the warheads located on its territory Is this true Does it imply that some concrete agreement has been reached between Russia and Ukraine 0 J'hirn ve woul d like t o understand better 1the idea raised by President Yeltsin at bis meeting vitll President C1inton in Tokyo for a tripartite security treaty between Russia Ukraine and the OS 1Jnfort11J1Datel y there vas not occasion for President Yel tsin to el aborate tlrls idea in Tokyo We 'llfOu ld ve lcome your e1aboration of what tine treaty would encompass and hov it would be structured We have given tile idea some pre1ilminary thoughft as vel 1 We believe that a Russia Ukraine and constructive idea continuing security dial ague between the QJJS is a very imiportant and - We think am ore informal approach r rl gnt avoid some of the problems of a fo ic mal treaty vhl1e sti11 affording Ukraine a security context within which it vi 11 feel secure enough to remove nuclear weapons from its territory We a1so 'think it might be usefu1 to engage Byelarus and Kazakhstan in such a process so al I Lisbon Protocol signatories would have equal status and none would be tempt ed to disrupt the process - These pw poses vou l d be acirl eved if the Foreign Ministers of the five Lisbon signatories m et periodically to reviev implementation of START and tt b e security assurances that have been provided to Ukraine Kazakhstan and Byelarus- iife have discussed ideas a1ong these lines vi th you before and ve VOllllld welcome your suggestions for putting together the bes'C aspects of both proposals 0 Fourth and last we continue to be concerned about the safety security and control of the nuclear forces stationed on the territory of Ukraine Ambassador Dubinin cal led on our ambassador in Moscov on July 13 to inform us that Ukraine bad decided to establish what Ambassador Dw inin described as di rect control of - nuc1ear warheads at two storage sites in Ukraine identified as C-332 and C-341 can you tei1 us what thls is al 1 about and give us further inforimatio n about tllese sites e g whether they a re associated lri tb 'the tvo ICBM divisions in Ukraine or alternatively central storage sites Can you tel l us anyt hing e1se about the actual status of CIS noel ear forces located in Ukraine and about CIS Imel ear oozmanri arrangements in general - From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive - o Let me close by suggesting a timetable by vbi ch ve should seek to iceso lve these matters We do not believe Ukraine vil l take action on SI'ART and the NP'f' unti1 after the referendum scheduled for September 26 Shortly thereafter ve vill want Ukraine 1 o act We would lile to have al l the elements I have discussed in place so that tlley create a favorable clilmate for approval of START and HPT in Kiev_ That is al so the time to sbov Ukraine the US-British-Russian security assurances 1tbat you have recent1y approved in its final form Mlat are your tb ou ghts about this ti ming N Korea From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive Iran BW • - _ I DEAS ON ACCELERATED IM P ATIOH OF S'ER ll' 'EGIC ARMS Rwt 'CTIONS i mpl emenu ation of the strategic arms reductions required under the START Treaty We have already removed about 90 percent of the war heads from the ICBMs c Illd SILEHs whose 1 amachers wil l be eli mi nated wider START 'lie expect to complete this process by the end of 1994 and to have ren Ovea all the missiles froon their launchers by the end of 1995 All of our heavy bombers schedul ed to be e1inu nated to meec START limits have already been retired and been transferred to the site where they will eventually be eli mi inated Ballistic missiles have also been d eattivat ed in Russia and in Kazakhstan without waiting for en ry into force of the START The United Stat es encourages Russia and Kaza kb st an to 'E'reat y continue and accelerate mis process To do so vi 11 a1lov us all to reap the benefits of tile S AR 1 Treaty much earlier tban would otherwise be possible It would be a very positi J'e SLep f liJkrai lle vould join this effort The United St ates would like to offer our ideas for the process und er vhlch tills coutl i he done elemencs of our concept • i ollowing are the Nuclear warheads - oul d be removed froe the stra-cegic m issil es and transported to one or miore centra l secure nuclear weapons st orage faci lili ies in illkrai ne for temporary storage The same would be done vith nuclear '¥capons for heavy bombers Existing procedures for warhead removal and transport would be applied The United States suggests that existing central nuclear storage facili ies L uierai ne be used for the temporary storage of nese weapons • The nuclear warheads and heavy bomber '-E apons woul d be stored teeporarily at the cencral seC11 re scorage site s in Ukraine until disma tleoent faci it es in Russia are ready to accept them for oromct di sman es ent 1 lcier arranaements •that have been agreed Russia and lillc -ai ne Rcssian forces would provide internal secu i y a ri any required maintenance within the central storage si e s t mcrainian forces would provide perimeter security f desired by Russia and Ukraine appropriate nternaticnal morni t o d ag could be established to by monitor from t he exceri or arrival and departure of nuclear weapons at th cencral s orage site s c ·- -- t-- 'br' - - - From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive The United Stat es is well adv-c m ed in the process of early -2• Russia - roulci provide precede nee to the dismantlement of strategic nucl ear warheads a l 'l i heavy bomber weapons ocated in Okrai ne an an agreed schedule cor mensurate with m1clea r safet y and security The v-c rheads and heavy bomber weapons rould be transferred frcm Ukraine to the dismant ement faci lity in Russia as soon as ha facility is ready to dismantle themi Disman lener t of those veapoims woul d bea in immediately after their arrival at the dismant ement faci1ity • Under arrangements to be agreea separately Ukraine would be reimbursed promptly for the net value of tt he highly-enriched uraniU Il in the warheads l ocat d en its territory See attached non-paper and draft agreement • Once the remov-J of varheads from mssi es located in Ukraine has begun and the Nwl r - Lugar rella agreement and specific i mlplement iDg agreements have ae Jh signed an d enter into force U S assistance for disman l ing he llrissiles disposing of tl neir fuel and diso nant ing the siJ os voul d begin ' 'he United States hopes that the s and lill LCra i ne can conclude as a matter of priority tile ciscussions by Safety Security and Disaantlement delegations ecessary for the tvo sides to agree on the specific items of U S assistance and that the requti site Hmm-Lugar aqreemencs vi ll he si gned and enter into force as rapidly as poss ib e • 'i'he entire process would begin _i1th the removal of the varheads from one regicent each of SS-19s and SS-24s and from one heavy bomber regi c rent 4ild sending them to a secure cen ra 1 nuclear storage facility in Ukraine 'ibis process -ould provide the praccical experience lileeded to identify and resolve quickly any tecimical problems that might arise From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive July 20 1993 ¥4 Disposition of mm from warheads in Qkraine acd Kazakhstan In Vancouver President Yeltsin and President Clinton agreed that the Russian Federation and the United States should rapidly cmmplete and implement an agreement to convert highly enriched uranium removed from dismantled nuclear weapons of the form er Soviet Onion to coanercial reactor fuel and sell it to the United States This agreeEent will serve the financial securityr and non-proliferation interests of both countries Since that time substantial progress has been made toward this important goal Agreement has now been reached on all prov sions of a sales contract and the text has Ileen initialed Teams of and Russian experts have also worked out an agreement on os transparency measures that will give both sides confidence that the nuclear material involved in this transaction has been removed from dismantled nuclear weapons and is used for peaceful purpo es only in Moscow These documents are now being reviewed The principal remaining obstacle to implementation of the HEU transaction is agreement on appropriate arrangements to share the proceeds with Ukraine Kazakhstan and Belarus We appreciate the efforts that the Russian Federation has made to work out a sharing agreement and understand many of the obstacles that have prevented agreement including differences over the question of ownership of the nuclear weapons located outside the territory of Russia In an effort to resolve this issue promptly and equitably the United States bas prepared a draft greement between the Russian Federation the United States and Ukraine We would envision an identical agreement between the Russian Federation the United States and Kazakhstan rf a9reement on this approach can be reached rapidly the United States will be prepared to sign the HE'D sales contract when Prime l ti nister Chernom yrdin and Vice President Gore meet in Washington as suggested in Prime Minister Chernomyrdin s May 29 letter From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive e IP@ -2- The text of our proposed agreement is attached central elements are o The This agreement does not prejudice the question of 011Dership of nuclear weapons located outside Russia As you know the United States does not believe Ukraine owns the nuclear weapons located on the territoi y of Ukraine but we believe f bat it is not necessary to resolve this question in order to complete and implement the mm o Under this agreement Ukraine would agree to tbe transfer of nuclear warheads located on its territory to appropriate authorities of the Russian Federation for dismantling o The United States would pay Ukraine for the value of the highly enriched ura oiWII contained in these ileapons promptly on delivery to Russia for dismantling The amoU Dt paid to Ok rai ne $15 127 per kilogram is precisely the same amount the OS vill pay Russia for BEU under the H£U sales contract that has recently been agreed upon $15 000 per warhead would he deducted and paid to the Russian Federation to cover the cost of dismantling each warhead this amount reflects the costs that the United States incurs in dismantling nuclear warheads in the United States o Russia liOuld dismantle the warheads and transfer the mm removed from them to the United States which would transport it to the United States convert it to LBU fuel for commercial nuclear reactors and sell it thereby recovering the cost oE the payments to Ukraine o The transparency arrangements that have been agreed upon in connection with the HEU sales contract vould also apply as appropriate to the material covered by this agreement o Ukraine could elect to receive IJm in lieu of cash o The plutonium reB Oved from these warheads would be stored in Russia until the Russian Federation the United States _ and Ukraine jointly decide on the appropriate disposition of this material storage Ukraine would pay the expenses of From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive agreement -3- As soon as agreement is reached on this approach to the dismantling of the nuclear weapons now located on the territory mm of Ukraine and payment to Ukraine for the value of the removed from them the United States is prepared to sign and implement the BEU sales contract between the United States and over 20 years The delivery to the US of EiR1J removed from nuclear weapons wi t hdrawn from the territory of Ukraine and Kazakhstan 'IIOuld be in addition to the coam itments of both parties under the BEU sales contract The US envisions an identical agreement between the Russian Federation the United States and Kazakhstan for the withdrawal to Russia of nucl ear weapons now located on the territory cf Kazakhstan prompt payment by the UDited States to Kazakhstan for the value of the BEU dismantling of the warheads in Russia and delivery of the BEU removed from them to the United States where it would be converted to LEtJ and sold- The United States assumes that the small number of nuclear warheads nm in Belarus will not be dismantled when they are withdraND to Russia We helieve it would be appropriate therefore for the Russian Federation to pay BelaEUS for the value of tbe mm in those warheads at the same rate paid to Ukraine and Kazakhstan at the time these varheads are transfered to Russia The Russian Federation and the united States share a strong common interest in the approval of START and RPr in Ukraine and RP I' in Kazakhstan Pull implementation of the commitments made in Lisbon would advance important shared security and non-proliferation goals Ne believe that an agreement providing for the return of the nuclear warheads now located on the territory of Ukraine and ltazakbstan for dismantling and prompt payment for the value of the highly enriched uranium is essential to create favorable conditions for the actions we both want Ukraine and Kazakhstan to take As soon as we have the conCtl rrence of the Russian Federation we will share our proposal with the other parties and urge their agreement From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive the Russian Federation which provides for the conversion in Russia and sale of 500 metric tons of BEU removed from nuclear weapons and the payment to Russia of approrimately $12 billion AG E EU iE R'i ON Dl SPOSITIO I OF HIGHLY ERRicmm URARIU I Mm CERTAIR Oi 1iKR M 'l'mUALs BEnmEli THE GuVS RffliBRt OF niE UBITED STATES OF AIIBRICA THE GOVERPlf kt OF UDADIB ARD The Government of the United States of America the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine hereinafter referred to as the Parties Hereby Agree as follows Article I Pmrpose The purpose of this agreement is to establish arrangeamts for the dispositioa of highly enriched uranium BEU plutonium and certain other materials extracted from nuclear warheads located on the territory of Ukraine Articl e I I Transfer of Ruclear Warheads from Territory of mrraine 1 At least one month prior to the date of delivex y of nuclear warheads from the territocy of Ukraine to a faci1ity for dismantling nuclear weapons in the territocy of the Russian Federation Ukraine shall notify the United States of the number and type of warheads and specify the method of payment to be provided pursuant to article VI of tlris agreement 2 The Russian Federation shall dismantle the uuclear warheads transferred from the territo c y of Ukraine 3 The Russian Federation shall be responsible for providing for the safet y and security of the nuclear warheads prior to dismantling them and for ensuring tlle safe and secure storage and transport of HEU plutoniwm and other materials extracted from the dismantled varheads From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive T HE GOVERB4€Pn' OF THE RUSSIAN PEDDATl Oll -2Article IEI Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium 2 After deli very the United States shall be responsible for the safe and secure transport of the BEU and the conversion of tbe mm to I BU for use as fuel in commercial reactors 3 Payments shall he made to Ukraine md the Russian Federation as provided for in Article VI Article IV Disposition of Plutonium 1 All plutonium extracted pursuant to article II shall be stored in tbe territory of the Russian Federation until a decision is made by the Parties concenri ng the further disposition of the plutoniwm 2 Ukraine shall pay the actual costs of storing the plutonium not to exceed $ 1000 per kilogram per year and the f %PE DSe of imp1ementing any decision made by the Parties concerning tbe further disposition of the plutonium and i t shall be entitled to any proceeds of such further disposition Article V Disposition of other Materials All natural uranium depleted uranium bexyllium and lithium deuteride extracted pursuant to article II shall be delivered to Ukraine in accordance with paragraph 2 of this 1 article 2 Deliveries to Ukraine pursuant to paragraph l shall take place only if t hese materials are in a condition that permits safe and secure band ling transport and storage In the event that the condition of these materials precludes safe and secure handling transport and storage the Parties shall consult concerning the disposition of such materials 3 Ukraine shall consult with the Russian Federation and the United States and shall obtain the concurrence of the Russian From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive 1 All mm en racted pursuant to article II shall be promptly delivered to the United States F O B at a point of departure from the Russian Federation to be agreed by the United States and the Russian Federation The Russian Federation shall notify the United States of each delivery at least one month prior to the date of delivery -3- Federation prior to any transfer to another country of the materials referred to in paragraph 1 of this article Article VI The following methods of payment shall be available to Ukraine for BEU extracted from nuclear apans pursuant to article J I Cash Payment llfetbod a The united States shall pay Ukraine $15 127 for each kilogram of HEU having an average assay of 90 percent or greater of the uranium isotope 235 b A deduction of $15 000 shall be made by the United States for each warhead and the amount deducted shall be paid to the Russian Federation for the expense of dismantling the nuclear warhead containing the ee o c The payment to Ukraine shall be made within seven days of the delivecy- of the nuclear warhead containing the mm to a facility for dismantling nuclear ueapons in the territory of ·the Russian Federation flle payment to the Russian Federation shall be made within seven days of the delivei y of the HEU to the United States 2- Low-Enriched Uranium Payment Method a For each kilogram of HEU having an average assay of 90 percent or greater of the uranium isotope 235 the United States shall provide to Ukraine 19 kilograms of low-enriched uranium LEU with an average assay of 4 4 percent or greater of the uranium isotope 235 suitable for fabrication into fuel assemblies for use in a VVlm-1000 reactor b This LEU shall be delivered to Ukraine within one year of delive of the nuclear warhead containing the mm to a facility for dismantling nuclear warheads in the territory of the Russian Federation c The United States shall pay the Russian Federation $15 000 for the expense of dismantling each warhead containing mm This payment shall be made within seven days of the deli vecy of the HEU to the United States_ The low-enriched uraniUlill payn1en t met bod set forth in paragraph 2 of this article may be chosen by Ukraine only if i t bas entered into a an agreement ith the International Atomic From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive 1 -4Energy Agency providi ng for the applica tion of safegua rds on all source or specia l fission able materia l in all peacefu l nuclear activit ies within the territo ry of Ukrain e under its jurisdi ction or carried out tmder its contro l anywhe re and b an agreere n for nuclear cooper ation with the United States Article VIi u s Purchase of BEQ The hand1in g storage and dispos ition by the United States extract ed pursuan t to article II shall be subjec t to the terms 1 of mm of article V of the Agreem ent Bebleen the Governm ent of the United States of America and the GoveJ D ment of the Russian Federa tion Coecern ing the Dispos ition of Highly Enriche d Uranium Extract ed from llUclea r Weapons of Februa ry 18 1993 2 The activit ies of the United States under this Ag ceement or any implem enting contrac t or agreem ent shall be subjec t to the availa bility of funds to the Governm ent of the United states Article VIII Areornneot - EQt r ig to Force and Duratio n 1 This Agreem ent may be amenol d by the written agreem ent of the Parties 2 This Agreem ent shall enter into force upon signatu re and sball remain in force until all HEU deliver ed pursuan t to this Agreem ent has been convert ed to LEU and supplie d t o coaaer cial custom ers DOR£ at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ this _ _ day of June 1993 in triplic ate in the English Russian and Ukrain ian languag es each text being equally authen tic POR THE GOVWWWRT OF THE ORITED STATES OF AlfitRICA FOR ' BE 00 iERN Mltt OF THE RUSSIAI I r BOERArl O B From the Nunn-Lugar collection of the National Security Archive Provisions Governing