I PR Ref ruJ •enorerha1th1Scopyissuppl1edsubJo« ru Fut1her mforma11on ts J 3 b2_ given In the 'T on hive tcnns and cond1t1oru and th it o enns and Cond1t1on s of supply of lhc Nallonaf Archiv s• e C a be subJeci 10 copyncJ t Record CopymB counter e isp ayed it 2fld avrulablc from the of 6 Copies records by Sir Thomas Brimelow and Mr Nairne respectively of their discussions in Washington yesterday Sir Thomas Brimelow's record deals with the projected United States Soviet Declaration renouncing the use of nuclear weapons code name for this enterprise is Hullabaloo Dr Kissinger Our own But this is not known to It makes very interesting reading and I think that so far as it goes it confirms our initial impression that there is no deliberate intention on the part of the United States to relax the pressure on the Soviet Union in Europe or to jeopardise the interests of the Alliance But that is not to say that it would not have this effect in practice and we shall clearly need to look very carefully indeed at the draft of the Declaration Annex 3 which Sir T Brimelow has brought back with him If we are to meet Dr Kissinge_r's timetable we ought to try to send him considered comments on this text not later than the end of next week I have therefore agreed with Sir T Brimelow that he will now initiate a careful study of the document with a view to submitting recommendations about our reply to yourself the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence by about the middle of the week It will then be necessary to consider whether Ministers will need to meet to settle the precise wording of the reply Mr Nairne 1 s record suggests that on the separate issue of our own deterrent we are continuing to make gradual progress and the United States disposition to help us so far as possible is clearly confirmed The various options which Mr Nairne has brought back will now be further examined and I think that we can leave this process to take its course on the basis ✓ that when we wi_sh to carry matters a stage further with the White House the door will be open to us On the other matters which arose during my own visit - SALT II MBFRs the CSCE and so forth - Sir T Brimelow confirmed that provided that the channel of communication continues to be initially confined to Dr Kissinger himself appropriate British teams would be welcomed in Washington in the near future for bilateral discu sions before any of these matters is carried further in the NATO context ·V The FCO and the Ministry of Defence will ensure that this offer is followed up -1- I 2 ems Ref p R ' aiio I hives 2 ins 3 b 2 l l' e note th t this copy is supplied su ' restrictions Further information is givenm the Joct Tmns to the National Archives conditions and Conditions oftenns supplyand of the Nation tyo uslle of t may be subject to copyright Record C-Opying counter ves ea el displayed nt and avnil blo from the E R 1 -__· · I am sending copies of this minute and of the two records in formal breach of Dr Kissinger 1 s stipulation at c on page 6 of Sir T Brimelow's recordn to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence and I am sending copies of the minute only to Sir T Brimelow and Mr Nairne 11th August 1972 I ' ' ' ' ' ' '• j _ i' TOP SECRET J · HULLABA 0 CONVERSATION WITH DR KISSINGER WASHINGTON 10 AUGUST 1972 1 Dr Kissinger accompap ied by Mr Sonnenfeld and I'Ir Rodman received Mr Tebbit Mr Nairne and myself at 10am for a discussion of the Soviet proposal for a Soviet US renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons 2 He made it clear that the US Government would not contemplate an 1 illqualified renunciation•of the use of nuclear weapons He explained that during President Nixon's visit to Moscow the Russians had produced a draft suggesting such a renunciation Annex I He had explained the objections and had not agreed that the question be discussed by President Nixon and Mr Brezhnev Subsequently and after Sir Burke Trend' s visit to Washington the Russians had produced a second draft Annex II This was desig- ned-to protect the interests of the allies of the two principals but one of its impor-tan effects ike that of the first Soviet draft would have bee t o leave the Soviet Government greater freedom of action with rega r-d to China No reply had yet been returned by the White House to the second Soviet proposal but the President did not wish to r ebuff Mr Brezhnev and Dr Kissinger wished to have a counter-proposal ready within the next seven or ten days His staff had prepared two drafts with neither of which he was satisfied He wished to take advantage of our - 1 - TOP SECRET HULLABALOO · - · --- -· ---- --------- ' ' · ' ' r - z c_m _ s P GJ 1 T h e A rc h iv7es - -_- - - -_--- -_-_-_-_-_-_ - - - _- - - ____ _ 3f N a t i o n a l ins Ref 2 l' e note that this copy is supplied subjC t to the Nati -restnc11ons Further infonnation is given in the 'Terms and 0' ' y- nt o° ie •y ho subject to copyright Record Copying counter ca e 1'P aycd at and available from the TOP S $C T HULLABALOO presence to prepare jointly a third draft which would be entirely without commitment by either side but in which account could be taken of the preliminary views formed by United Kingdom Ministers after consideration of Sir Burke Trend's report We worked on such a draft with Mr Sonnenfeld after leaving Dr Kissinger at 12 10 and we discussed it with him at 16 30 This discussion led to the text at Annex III which I agreed to submit to Ministers Dr Kissinger emphasized that this text had no status other than that of a White House staff paper been seen by the Presidtmt No US official outside the White r House knew of the Soviet proposals been consulted The earlie_r drafts had not No other NATO Government had No reply to the second Soviet proposal would 'oe returned until he had received through J Vlr Tebbit the comments of United Kingdom Ministers He 1Jhe1 1 Mi tha'6 '6he a es H hieh '1 e had e g reea with l tis e'ffieials Hel l ls l l a· e little if aJ ¼37 BiJfleal te the De oiet GevoPB mEH3 t He went on to express the view that the sub- stance of the draft which we had prepared was unlikely to appeal to the Soviet Government though he acknowledged that they might be attracted by the further demonstration of Super-power partnership in the nuclear field He appeared to accept that it might nonetheless be the basis for the US response and he did not rule out that the Soviet Union would then drop the whole idea Alternatively they might make a counter-proposal - 2 - TOP SECRET HULLABALOO He did 2 ems The National Archives PRGM Ref ins 2 1--S- 3G2 Please note lilat this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives tenns and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restri 1ions Further infoJ lllalion is given in U1e 'Tenns and Conditions of supply of the National Archives• leaflet displayed a't and available from tho Record Copying counter TOP SECRET HULLABALOO not think it would be prudent to _consult NATO until it had become clear that there was a prospect of agreeing with the Soviet Government a text which might be adopted without harm to the Alliance 3 The foregoing represents ·the outcome of a discussion which lasted over two hours I'Ir Rodman took a record of_which a copy will be sent to us through Mr Tebbit In the course of the discussion I was able t_o raise most of the points covered in the paper attached to your minute to t_he- Prime Minister the principal omissioll being any mention of Japan In the discussion I took the line that we regarded the original Soviet·proposal as disadvantageous and that before United Kingdom Ministers could form any further judgment we needed to know what qualifications Dr Kissinger had in mind His remarks in the discussion can be summarized as follows a In the current political situation in the US A the Administration did not wish to be classified as either hawks or doves b The condition for their being able to act firmly as occasion demanded was that they should be seen to be ready to work for d tente c It was for this reason that they did not wish to rebui'f Mr Brezhnev d They had found from their experience of dealing with the - 3TOP SECRET HULLABALOO I Ref PRG VI I 3G2_ I lease note that •• copy is • PP •ed subject to the Nation I Archives temu nnd conditioos and that our use of it ma · · • restnci1ons Further information s given in the 'Tcnns aad Conditions of s pply ofU1e National An hiv • leaflet displa ' 1 r t the Record Copying counter TOP SECRET HULLABALOO Russians that in the first place the Russians advanced an extreme bargaining position If this was dealt with coolly they retreated to their instructions regarding their bargaining stance ·if this too was dealt with coolly there was a chance of getting into talks in which their teeth could be drawn this was what the Administration hoped to achieve with regard to the Soviet proposal for the renunciation of nuclear weapons Their experience of discussing the Middle East with the Soviet Government had convinced them that the process of negotiating with the Soviet Government was like that of peeling an onion You have to take off one layer after another They wished therefore to continue the discussion which the Russians had begun 4 I regard the foregoing paragraph as the kernel of oµr talk In my opinion the President and Dr Kissinger ar e not going to be dissuaded from going ahead with their exploration of what may be agreed with the Soviet Government and for us the main problem is how to avert or minimize the potential damage to NATO a problem to which Dr Kissinger is fully alive My conclusion is that if the Soviet Government decide to drop the question the United States will acquiesce But if the Soviet Government return to the charge with another draft the White House will keep the ball in play - 4 - TOP SECRET HULLABALOO 2 ems The National Archives ins J Ref Ple ise note th it this copy is supplied subject to tbe National Archive tClll S and conditions and that yow- use ofit may xi subject to copyright restrictions Further info ation is given in the 4Tcnns and Conditions of supply of the National Archives' leaflet displayed 1't and available from the Record Copying counter TOP SECRET HULLABALOO 5 Our own contribution to the two White House drafts which Dr Kissinger had rejected and of which we were shown but not given copies wasl a to make clear the continuing loyalty of the US Government to their· obligations under the United Nations Charter and their other treaty commitments b thereby to minimize the harm which would result from any doubts amongst the European memoers of NATO about the intentions of the US Administration 6 Ilr Kissinger's react i on to the third draft which we have prepared with l Ir Sonnenfeld was phlegmatic He saw at once that the draft we have prepared would have no attraction apart from its obeisance to the status of the two super powers to the Soviet Government But he agreed after certain amendments that it should be accepted as a working document for submission to United Kingdom Ministers and to the President 7 In the course of the two sessions we had with him he made the following points with particular emphasis a the White House had never contemplated the acceptance of any agreement which would have the effect of weakening the US nuclear deterrent or the US commitment to the defence of its allies - 5 TOP SECRET HULLABALOO ------------------------ TOP--------------- --SECRET - - ---- - HULLABALOO b he agreed with our view that the Soviet Government was still trying to change the balance of power in the world and that the two Soviet proposals should be interpreted against this background c he could oniy let me have copies of the two Soviet proposals on the understanding that they were kept in Sir Burke Trend's office and that no copies would be made and distributed The same restriction would apply to Mr Rodman's record when it was sent to us d he would like our comments on the latest US draft reply as soon as possible e the United States Government could not contemplate the conclusion of an alliance with Ghin_a but the White House had · no intention of freeing the hands of the Soviet Government · with regard 8 to China My general comment is that any te x t which is to stand a chance of being accepted by the Soviet Government is likely to weaken confidence in the US deterrent and to give rise to additional doubts in NATO From this point of view it would be bett not to follow up the Soviet proposals But I doubt whether the White House can be dissuaded at this stage and we should concer trate on ensuring that their ne x t message to Mr Brezhnev is madE as harmless as possible 6 - TOP SECRET HULLABALOO THOM AS BRil1ELOW 11 August 1972 ····-· ··'··- ----------------'---------------- - --- - -- I 2 ems Ref The National Archives UIS PR€M I'S' I 3b2 Plwc note that this eopy is •urplied subject to tho N tional Archivos tams and conditions and tli t your us e of it rony be subject to copyright restrictions Fuithcr infonnation is given in the 'Tenns and Conditions ofsupply of the National An hives' leaflet displayed at md available from the Record Copying counter •r C IBfflET omoi A 9 lf ll 11 AUG 1972 FILING IN5TR UCTIINi Copy No l flLE No SIR J3URKE TREND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY OPTIONS I accompanied Sir Thomas Brimelow to Washington for talks with Dr Kissinger and Mr Sonnenfelt the subject of a separate report by Sir Thomas Brimelow At the end of the morning meeting I ised 'Wi-th Dr Kissinger the possibility of the follow-up discussions about the further information we sought in the strategic nuclear field which he had discussed with you on 28th July last · Political considerations 2 Dr Kissinger repeated with some emphasis that the present US Administration wished to be as helpful as possible ·as regards the British objective of maintaining an effective strategic nuclear deterrent He stressed however that the Presidential Election would be bound to create political difficulties hinting at the same time that we should face an entirely different situation in the nuclear sphere if Mr McGovern were elected President and that there were questions which could not be answered now He indicated in particular that nothing further could be added before the Election to what he had already said about the political problems posed by a British Poseidon option He did not refer directly to SALT II but he made clear that much would turn on the strength of a new Nixon Government and on the position in Congress If Mr Nixon we re returned to the White House and the British Governm nt wished to p'lll'su e the possibility of buying Poseidon the US Ad ministration worud wish to do what it could to help on 3 Dr • Kissinger went to say that for the purpose of following up his talk with yourself he had arranged for certain cost estimates to be prepared He seemed unwilling or unable to make clear to what precisely the estimates would relate but he offered to arrange for me to see Mr Schlesinger Chairman of the A EC later in the day Meeting with Mr Schlesinger 4 I met Mr Schlesinger during the afternoon in a conference room at the White House He was accompanied by Colonel Duff of the A EC General Haig and Mr Rodman of the White House were also present Dr Kissinger himself opened the meeting by emphasising to me in the strongest possible terms that I• Page 2 of 3 pages the strictest security must be applied and that any follow-up by ourselves of the information to be provided by Mr Schlesinger must onJ y be through him or General Haig and should not be the subject of discussion with any other person including any member of the White House staff or agency in Washington he then left the meeting 5 Mr Schlesinger outlined - t considerable speed and with no preliminary explanation - four possible options which we might care to consider for the modernisation or improvement of the British strategic nuclear deterrent I noted what was said but I also enquired whether the options could be set out in writing This was agreed and later in the d V the note at Annex was handed to me 6 The note sets out four options one relating to Super Antelope and the other three involving Poseidon or its successor DLMS-1 in some form In answer to questions Mr Schlesinger made the following additional points Option 1 - relating to Super Antelope involving support going significantly beyon the degree of support which the US are providing now - would in the US view in volve a greater hardening of the warheads and thus a more effective deterrent This option had not been examined with us before it could a a the US saw it offer a solution which in the event would turn out to be no more expensive than the current British solution even though the dollar cost quoted is about double the size o f the present dollar element of Super Antelope • a c Options 3 and 4 are in effect variants - one involving the 03 Poseidon missile and the other the 04 ULT-lS-1 or TRIDENT Mr Schlesinger left me with the clea i- impression that under both options the MIRV capability would not be made available to us but when I came to examine the note at Annex I found under Option 4 the phrase Acquisition o f ULMS-1 with Poseidon bus This will need to be clarified 7 Mr Schlesinger also made clear two further general points - TOP SECRET UK EYES ONLY 2 ems 1 ne l auu11 u u ·- Please noto that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives terms iUld condi1i n s and tha yoor useof t rony be subject i copyright restrictions Fwther information is givc 1 in the 'Tams nnd Conditions of supply of the Nahonal Archives' leaflet displayed at and ava 1lablc from the Record Copying counter TOP SECRET UK EYES ONLY Page 3 of 3 pages a Warhead design and non-nuclear components · Under the three relevant options all except Option 1 we should assume that the US would be ready to give us access to the design information of their warheads and to sell us the non-nuclear components of the warheads and the re-entry body shells in the same way as had been done in respect of the Polaris A3 missile b The cost estimates quoted which could not be explored in detail at the meeting were based on US analogues ' •·When I mentioned the possibility that we might later wish to continue to keep the Super Antelope o p'ti6n open -- hu t at minimum cost and with the minimum loss of·momentum - while continUing to e q lo re other e ptions and awaiting a new US Administration 'Mr • Schlesinger responded that should we aJ pr cich the appropriate authorities in that situation tlle US side would w l sh to do what they could to be helpful Next steps 8 Dr Kissinger has been most helpful in arranging for the A EC to put on the table _so soon after his meeting with you a range of possible options for ua to consider - in a situation in which the main oseidon option cannot be taken further for the time being with the US authorities I expressed appreciation in suitable terms It is clear however that the new options will now require careful scrutiny and they may have to be the subject of further discussion with the AEC experts before we ca n reach any conclusion about their potentiaJ _value to ourselves This process can best be carried out by the Ministry of Defence as part of the current programme of reviewing the strategic nuclear options to be su bmi tted to Ministers in the Autumn 9 I have reported to the Defence Secretary and am arranging to set this work in hand In the light for example of the point of doubt mentioned in paragra ph 6 c above I expect that we shall need to take early action through the Kissinger channel to clarify aspeets of the in f'ormati n provided 10 I suggest that the Prime Minister and his colleagues may wish to take note of the position and of the further action indicated in paragraphs 8 and 9 above f t j M TQP SECRET UK EYES ONLY 11th August 1972 P D NAIRN BJ