S SGRE'F 3 l TIVE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS Henry A Kissinger Lord Cromer Charles Powell tn_ Helmut Sonnenfeldt W DATE June 30 1973 PLACE San Clemente 1 J obert Visit Kissinger Jobe rt said that he would do some drafting on the declaration Then if the US the UK France and the FRG agree that we are in the same ballpark we can have a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting Except Jobert said they don't have a Deputy Foreign Minister and would send some body called Puaux Cromer That's not too good But we have a problem of a different character with our Deputy Foreign Minister Minister of State Kissinger Jobert says very privately that Pompidou prefers a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting in the NATO framework but Jobert himself prefers an ad hoc framework He said he would talk to Pompidou to see if he can turn him around I myself did not express a preference but we actually prefer an ad hoc framework The NATO machinery is a nightmare Now I gave Jobert two documents - two drafts for a declaration from State and the other is ours One is Cromer You should know that Rogers told Alec Home that there were four State versions Kissinger Cromer Well I don't know what he was referring to Can we tell the French that you gave us these texts _ _ __Q CLASSif'IE - -- _ _ ---- c ···_·-- ' --C ' ------ r REPRODUCED AT T E NATIONAl ARCHIVES 'i 'i ·-i r- • DECLASSIFIED - - _ _ -_' Authority C C I B _J NARA DateJJ Q_KJ 2 CRE I SE1'181'f VE 0 Kissinger No come back to us soon Also we Rogers has not don't tell Jobert that you have them He is supposed to first with some reactions He said he would do it very have another problem Stoessel has seen our draft but So could you keep this in our channel Now as you know I told Jobert that everything he was doing was consistent with talking this whole thing to death But he said he really would act quickly He told me while we were walking that he had a massive problem in the Assembly and also at the Quai But he again mentioned that he would not fillibuster Cromer Well it seem·s to be moving Trend when I get back to Washington ' 2 I will get these back to Burke • Poseidon Cromer Is this a di ficult one for you Kissinger Schles singer does not see why you want it The only advantage is greater accuracy The main disadvantage is low r yield And of course accuracy is only useful for hard target kill So the question is why with only five boats you want to get this Cromer Well this is a good question But I think in the discussions at home when this was considered the conclusion was that if we do this thing we should go the · hole way and get the best Kissinger But it is a major problem for us And we would prefer not to face it in our present position Of course if the Prime Minister really wants to take this up with the President we will try our best Cromer Does it _have to go to Congress Kissinger I don't think technically is does but under present political circumstances it would be unavoidabl If Heath were to appeal to the President the chances of our agreeing would be fifty fifty Of course the other program is a certainty If you wanted to go to the MARK III we could give you warheads for MIRV retrofit Cromer Well as I understand it we actually have the warheads but not the technology SEGRE l' SEI JM'i'IVE • - C • ECLAssrFiEo -- · _ - - - - ' 1 - A t ajp' p REPROD C E TTH NATIONALAAC'i 3 SEGRE'i - SE NSITIVE · Kissinger Schlessinger really thinks you would be better off with the other one because you would lose so much in yield If you would like to send some technicians vie could discuss it with them and we would be very sympathetic Then if you really wanted the MIRV we would see what we could do But it would create Congressional and Soviet problems although we made no agreements with the Soviets at all as you know Cromer Yes we understand that message to you Kissinger Cromer 3 Is this your reply to Burke Trend's Yes it is OK that's fine I will get this back to him Spey Engine Kissinger My suggestion would be that you stay cool on this I am going to China in August and then after that we can overrule the bureaucracy Can you wait that long 11 11 talk to the Chinese Cromer Well I don 1 t know I hear rumblings from London that if the reply in COCOM is negative our people will go ahead anyway Kissinger Cromer 4 Well could you wait two weeks I'll see what London says Brezhnev Visit Cromer I wanted you to know very confidentially that we had a report from Paris that Gromyko told Jobert the US was not very serious on the Middle East I just wanted you to have tbis Kissinger Well we are trying to get an ambiguous agreement which could then be subject· to •interpretation The Soviets tried to get us to agree ahead of time on the whole package and we refused This cam up directly between the President and Brezh v • Cromer ' · Did you giveJhem any hope that progress can be made eEGRET SENSITIVE REPRODUCED AT 'HE NATIONAl ARCHIVES - • -· • _ _ __ - 'V'_ I DECLASSJFIED Y_- -- i»l# i I CREl 1SENSITIVE 4 Kissinger We are prepared to make a maximum effort to bring the parties together and get a general statement that would leave open a return to the 1 67 borders But to debate abstractly making all the issues an entrance price for negotiations will never work Cromer The UN Security Council debate will certainly be frustrating Kissinger You know the last night that Brezhnev was here he asked for an early dinner and the·n went to bed at 8 00 and took a nap Then he got up at 10 00 and aske_d t see the President He beat on him for 3 1 2 hours to get us to accept the total package He stamped and screamed and really made himself obnoxious We continued to talk about the principles but they wanted a private understanding from us on the total package As you know our principles fall far short of what the Israelis want and we are not the lawyers of the Israelis When Brezhnev continued his ranting I finally told Dobrynin that this should stop Whatever Brezhnev managed to gain this way wouldn 1 t hold anyway Then Brezhnev tried to get the President to take just one element and accept it -- the 1967 borders The President didn 1 t even reject this he just said Gromyko and I should continue to work on the principles It really was a rough session 5 Burke Trend 1 s Trip Kissinger Cromer Kissinger Cromer 6 Is Burke going to be able to come Well I don't' know when would it be convenient Maybe July 10th I'll check with him Cambodia Cromer Can we be of any help Kissinger Well there· is some reason to believe that the Chinese and maybe even Hanoi are working on it But with our Congress who knows what will happen Maybe· one argument to use with the Chinese is the bad effect on Europe if the whole US position in Southeast Asia were to collapse romer There is no question that Congressional actions are very inhibiting to you Well if there is something we could do please let us know Summary of a meeting between National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and British Ambassador Rowland Baring third Earl of Cromer at President Richard M Nixon's California home at San Clemente Discussion centered on the following French foreign policy POSEIDON submarine-launched ballistic missiles SLBMs U S Soviet relations White House 30 June 1973 U S Declassified Documents Online link gale com apps doc CK2349623388 USDD u wash74137 sid USDD xid fcef0376 pg 1 Accessed 20 Apr 2021