K 7'7 V' --- MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL fKtJHPT 'FOP S SGRET SENSITIVE ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR FROM UK Polaris Improvement Project SUBJECT Attached Tab I is a package for the President on the British Polaris project It recommends that he agree to the Prime Minister's request for our continued collaboration in the project For the President's approval is an answer to the Prime Minister which he asked for by January 25 and a memorandum to the relevant agencies instructing them of the President• s decisio n to proceed with the Polaris project RECOMMENDATION 1 at Tab I That you forward the attached package to the President 2 Alternatively that you approve the package for the President by authorizing the transmittal to the Prime Minister of the message Tab A to the President's memorandum and sign the memorandum at Tab B Approve -- k · · ·_ · ___ DECLASSIFIED E O 12958 as amended Sect 3 5 L -J CJ -03 q pe fr 3 1o 1•otl By -Ytv R NARA Date p 1 f 1 5 I' 7 2010 'FOP SEGRE'F SENSITIVE Disapprove ------- 109-X MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON ACTION TOP SECRET SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HENRY A KISSINGER SUBJECT UK Decision on Polaris Inlprovement ' Prime Minister Heath has sent you a message to inform you of the British Govermnent 1 s decision to continue with a program to improve their Polaris missile warheads rather than pr cure a modified Poseidon warhead Tab C He hopes that you will confirm your previous agreement in principle to collaborate on the Polaris improvement project and expresses his appreciation for your generous offer of the Poseidon system Since ' the UK hopes to announce this decision in their annual Defense White Paper subject to your agreement the Prime Minister asks if you could indicate to him your decision by January 25 1974 The British decision is mainly ip otivated by economic considerations The Prime Minister notes that domestic problems including the energy crisis have forced a retrenchment in spending but that his govermnent is determined that this retrenchment not affect the UK's NATO commitments Thus he has decided on the less costly alternative of improving the existing Polaris warhead for the UK nuclear submarine fleet rather than undergo_ the expense of converting to a non-MIRV vers_ion of our Poseidon missile The Polaris improvement program involves adding to the three multiple reentry vehicles MRV a package of penetration aids that will ensure a British capability to overcome the existing Soviet ABM defenses We have been cooperating with British experts on the initial experimental phase of this improvement package but have not made a further commitment to the develop ent pending a British decision on whether to shift to the P6seidon If you agree to proceed with the· Polaris project we will probably have to provide space in our underground nuclear testing program for so_me UK tests of their modified warhead and for testing of the missile itself on our test ranges This was envisaged from the outset though no formal commitment was made Your agreement to the Prime Minister's request NLN 01-0'3 tf TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Cr z uf e J 13 I Jfj 2 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE will permit the program to go forward The British realize however that there is no guarantee that their modification of the Polaris warhead will succeed since it is a new concept with which we are not thoroughly familiar There are no problem_s in agreeing to cooperate with the UK on this decision From our standpoint it is easier to accommodate the British decision on improving the Polaris than had the UK chosen to procure the Po eidon technology Accordingly I reconrmend that you confirm your agreement with the Prime Minister to collaborate in the project RECOMMENDATION ' 1 ·That yo authorize tran mittal of the attached message via the Cabinet Line to the Prime Minister confirming your agreement to collaborate with the UK on the Polaris improvement project Message at Tab A Approve _ _ _ _ __ Disapprove _ _ _ _ __ 2 That you authorize me to issue the memorandmn at Tab B instructing the relevant departm ents and agencies to proceed with the UK projec-t and extend our cooperation Appr o ve ------ Disapprove ------ · '' _- J L1 l l 1 -03 C 'f'OP SECRET SENSITIVE TOP SECRE'f VIA CABINET LINE TO THE PRIME MINISTER LONDON FROM THE PRESIDENT · I fully understand the rea soning that led you to choose the ·Polaris improvement project a t this time We will of course extend our cooperation and I will instruct the appropriate US officials to collaborate with your government With regard to the technical matters involved my advisors inform me there are certain innovative aspects of this project that may pose problems We will fully support your effort to bring it to a successful conclusion I believe it very important that yoµ c'Ch itinue to maintain a modern effective deterrent force · I am pleased to he·a r that this decisio will help enable you to maintain the UK's conventional capabilities •and commitments to NATO This is extremely important in pre sent strategic circum- sfa hce s and in light of the negotiations on force reductions in Central Europe I hope you will not hesitate to inform me of any problems that arise during· the Polaris improvement project Nl J • J 7 Iq TOP SECRET ·- - THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON ' FOP SECRET SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE CHAffiMAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION HE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE SUBJECT Cooperation with the UK on Polaris Improvement The President has· ·agreed to a request from the Prime Minister to extend to the UK our full cooperation in completing the Polaris imp r ovement program Super Antelope You should take the actions necessary to insure that this project can-go forward Periodic status reports should be provided to the President The previous restrictions NSDM 124 July 29 1971 limiting our participation to the project definition stage are hereby rescinded L_ fl L_✓ A Kissinger enry t· cc Director of Central Intelligence Director Arms C mtrol and Disarmament Agency Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - - L Dated Jan 2 1974 Received 5 00P M Jan 3 1974 Text of message from the Prime Minister to President Nixon When we met in February last year I discussed with you the background to the decision with which HlVIG has been - faced in connection with the improvement of our strategic nuclear forces so that they may be able to penetrate the area ballistic missile defences and radar cover which the Soviet Union is permitted by the ABM Treaty to deploy around Moscow We have had to weigh the military technical and financial factors relevant to two possible options for improvements One option upon which your people and ours have been working together for some time is to effect a very considerable increase in the penetrative capability of our existing Polaris A3T missiles we have ourselves developed a good deal of the necessary technology but we have also relied upon you for very substantial and continuing support The second option which you have m re recently and very generously off red to us is that we should buy Poseidon C3 missiles less the uclear components of the Mark III warhead for which we should ourselves be responsible and with a dispensing system adapted to remove a Mirv capability I need not tell you of the difficulties through which the British economy is at present passing We have been badly hit by the energy crisis and-by the world-wide escalation CJ DEORE9 NLN 01-01 9 lt •t J L or BEORE - 2 - e calati n of commodity prices which have greatly aggravated our balance of payments difficulties Of course we shall come through it all but only by tightening our belts ' So we have had to conduct a drastic review of public expenditure and you will have seen that on 17 December we announced measures of retrenchment designed to reduce demand by £1 200 million in the next financial year Of this sum we had to seek £178 million for the defence budget I have been particularly anxious that we should not weaken our contribution to NATO's conventional deterrent to which I know that you too attach great importance I am entirely clear that an adequate conventional posture is an essential ingredient of deterrence and I regard the provision of efficient conventional forces as an essential contribution to the partnership upon which the Atlantic Alliance must rest We do not foresee any reductions in our conventional forces as a result of the reductions in defence expenditure that we have announced We have therefore had to examine the nuclear options with particular attention both to costs and to the implications for our conventional forces Against this background we have decided upon the option of improving our Polaris missiles We greatly appreciated your generous offer of the Poseidon-based option and were conscious of its many advantages But the Polaris-based option is substantially cheaper over the next few critical years for our or SEORB4' p 1 J 1cJ 31 3fj • 9 '0P SEGRE' - 3 - our public expenditure programme costly in foreign exchange and it is also less We realise that it lacks the potential capability of the Poseidon-based option to penetrate terminal defences should the Russians decide to 'I depl_oy these at some future date But with our smaller and less flexible deterrent force it is not necessary for us as it is for you to be able to penetrate terminal defences that might be deployed around ICBM complexes and if they were deployed around central Moscow within the limitations of the ABM Treaty we judge that a considerable por ion of the greater Moscow area not to mention the other great cities of the Western USSR would be open to penetration by our improved Polaris missiles I am sure that you will understand the reasoning behind our decision I very much hope that you will feel able to confirm your agreement to the principle of our continuing collaboration so that our people and yours can proceed together to full development of the improved Polaris system I am of course keeping knowledge of our decision to a very restricted circle here at this stage It would be important however to be able to announce the decision when we publish our 1974 Defence White Paper which is due -· to appear on 13 February but has to be put into final form by 25 January After the White Paper has been published we would of course plan to set expert to work without delay Of' GEORE'I NLN fJt-0 9 fe i of i 1 _ 3y I 1 3iJ r THE WHITE Hous WASHINGTON Action approved verbally by the ' President January 17 p NLN 01-01 9 'i cf- 03 I q