The National Archives' reference CAB 130 1224 r J3al I Catala ue Reference cab 130 1224 Ima e Reference 1 © Crown Copyright The National Archives' reference CAB 130 1224 I TOP SECRET I THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT • The circulation of this paper has been strictty limited This copy is issued for the personal use of Copy No MISC 7 83 2nd Meeting CABL'IBT NUCLEAR DEFENCE POLICY MINUTES of a Meeting held in 10 Downing Street on TUESDAY 8 MARCH 1983 at q 30 pm PRESENT The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP Prime Minister The Rt Hon William Whitelaw MP Secretary of State for the Home Department The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP Chancellor of the Exchequer The Rt Hon Francis Pym MP Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine MP Secretary of State for Defence A LSO PRESENT Field Marshall Sir Edwin Bram all Chief of the Defence Staff SECRETARIAT ·Sir Robert Armstrong Mr ADS Goodall Mr R LL Facer SUBJECT BASING OF UNITED STATES CRUISE MISSILES • I TOP SECRET I e Refenmce cab 130 1224 Reference 1 © Crown Copyright The National Archives' reference CAB 130 1224 I TOP SECRET I - BASING OF UNITED STATES CRUISE If ISSILES Previous Reference MISC 7 83 1st Meeting Ministers resumed their considera tion of control arrangeme nts for United States Ground Launched Cruise Missiles GLCMs to be based in the United Kingdom They had before them a minute from the Secretary of State for Defence dated 25 January about the timing of the deploymen t of GLCMs at Greenha Common a minute from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary dated 26 January about the consequen ces for the Alliance of any major new initiative on the control issue a minute from the Secretary of State for Defence dated 4 March about arrangeme nts fo-r delaying the delivery of cruise missiles and related equipment until November and on the possibili ties for increasing the British component in the manning and guarding of the cru se missile force and a minute from the Secretary of the Cabinet dated 4 March reporting discussio ns by officials in Washingto n on the updating of the Murphy-Dean Agreement on procedure s for joint decision concernin g United States nuclear weapons bas d in the United Kingdom THE DEFENCE SECRETARY said that his officials had now confirmed with the United States that the Government would not wish major it_ems of cruise missile equipment o be delivered to Greenham Common before November The Americans had prepared a revised schedule for the delivery of equipment and for the training of the cruise missile force under which no cruise missile transport er-erecto r-launche rs launch control centres missiles or warheads would arrive before 1 November There would be no off-base flight dispersal training until 1984 The United States authoritie s still wished to deliver before November some ancillary equipment He would propose to them that certain large items should be He had also considered increasin g the British component in the manning and guarding of the cruise missile force He proposed to double the contribut ion to the force responsib le for the defence of the delayed missiles which would accompany them at all times • rhether on the base or at dispersed sites Some 200 Royal Air Force Regiment personnel in addition to the 220 which it had already been agreed to provide would be 'required Provided that the increase was phased rather than achieved • immediate ly there would be no insuperab le problems but it would be necessary to consider command and communica tion arrangeme nts The increased Bri tist component •iould ar iount t o up to t• o- thirds of the total force Page 1 of 6 pages lTOP SECRET I Relerence cab 130 1224 Reference 1 © Crown Copyright The National Archives' reference CAB 130 1224 I TOP SECRET I MR GOODALL said that he had visited Washington on 1 March accompanied by officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministr of Defence to put to the United States Administration proposals for updating the secret r Iurphy-Dean Agreement covering the procedures for implementing the understanding on joint decision relating to United States nuclear weapons based on United Kingdom territory Once they were reassured that the British Government regarded this as a selfcontained exercise separate from the wider issues of public presentation and dual key control the Americans had agreed to co-operate in a radical redrafting of the Murphy-Dean Agreement and had accepted that this should be done on the basis of the British proposals The leader of the United • States team the Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department Mr Eagleburger had told him that the Administration was closely watching the public debate in the United Kingdom on the issue of the control of United States nuclear weapons It had been explained to him that part of the purpose of updating the Murphy-Dean Agreement would ee to ensure that British Ministers were in a position to continue to take in good faith the public line that they were satisfied that the arrangements · for implementing the existing understandings were fully effective Mr Eagleburger had expressed his admiration for the firmness with which British Ministers were resisting the Parliamentary pressures to explain details of the arrangements but said that some of the language which Ministers were using notably the term joint control as distinct from joint decision was causing great concern in Washington The Americans believed that the more public attention that was focussed on the special arrangements between the United Kingdom and the Unit d States the greater the risk of the other Allies seeking similar arrangements The Italians were now pressing for some form of dual control for the GLCMs to be based on Italy could be gravely damaging The effect on deterrence Mr Eagleburger had emphasised that if the Government decided that it was necessary to have a stronger public formula it would be vital to discuss this with the United States Administration and obtain their agreement In the discussions about the revised procedures themselves the British side had left a draft text explaining that it had not been shown to Ministers The Americans wo1 ild have alternative language to suggest but the only substantive difficulty which had emerged from the first round of talks was over the proposal that there should be joir t decision befor r uclear-armed cruise missil Page 2 of 6 pages ITOP SECRET I © Crown Copyright The National Archives' reference CAB 130 1224 I TOP SECRET I were deployed off their bases as well as before they were fired The Americans had explained that this requirement would raise very serious problems since they drew a clear distinction in their own command and control arrangements between measures relating to the actual use of nuclear weapons which required authorisation at the highest political level and measures designed to ensure survivability which the discretion of the relevant military commander v1ere within Furthermore the Murphy-Dear• Agreement allowed for nuclear-armed airers ft t o be dispersed or even put into the air under positive control without prior consultation between the President and the Prime Minister The Americans had sought an assurance which had been given that it was not the British intention to restrict the discretion allowed to military commanders to disperse nuclear-armed aircraft or put them into the air under positive control in advance of a joint political decision on the use of their weapons The Americans had been left in no doubt however that as far as cruise missiles were concerned the British side attached great importance to providing in the secret agreement for off-base deployment to be subject to joint decision In discussion the point was made that while the Government were now winning the argument against unilateralist critics of their nuclear defence policies there was still widespread public and parliamentary concern about the control arrangements for the cruise missiles Some 35 Conservatives had signed an early day motion calling for dual key control which its sponsor Mr Alan Clark had been persuaded to withdraw Leading members of the Opposition parties could not reasonably criticise the arrangements concerning United States nuclear capable aircraft and Poseidon submarines since they had been party to them when in Government but they would continue to criticise the lack of a dual key arrangement for the cruise missiles by analogy with the only other land-based missile system that had been stationed in the Unite4 Kingdom the Thor missiles to which dual key arrangements had applied In attempting to counter this criticism Ministers had already enlarged upon the public joint decision formula as set out in the Truman-Churchill Understanding of r952 by saying that joint decision meant joint control that use of the bases covered use of the systems and that the deployment of cruise missiles off their bases would be covered by the exist ing under tandings It was clear that under existing North Atlantic Treaty Organisation r A ' 1O Page 3 of 6 pages ITOP SECRET I ue Reference cab 130 1224 Reference 1 © Crown Copyright The National Archives' reference CAB 130 1224 I TOP SECRET I alert procedu res the British Government would be consulte d before authori ty was given to the relevan t military commander to disperse the cruise missiles from their bases but in an emergen cy where a nuclear attack appeared imminen t the Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACEUR would have the authori ty to disperse the missiles without politica l agreeme nt in order to ensure their surviva l It might be possible to negotia te agreeme nt with the United States Government for joint decision on deploym ent of cruise missiles off their bases if Her Majesty ' s Government were prepared to enter into a side understa nding with the United States which would recognis e that there would be the need for swift action in an emergen cy of this sort It was hardly conceiva ble that in the event of a crisis any Presiden t of the United States would ignore the understa nding to reach a joint decision with the Prime Ministe r on nuclear release if he believed that the British Government might refuse a request for the release of nuclear weapons based in the United Kingdom there were many alterna tive weapons availab le under sole United It was in any case unlikely that the cruise missiles based in the United Kingdom would be among the weapons selected for an initial nuclear strike In practice the cruise missiles could not be States control deployed without the active co-oper ation of Royal Air Force personn el It might be possible to arrange for confirm ation of the Prime Ministe r ' s assent to a joint decision to be separat ely convey ed British channel s to the base commander or to the commander of the British component at the base so that an order to fire would not be validate d unless and until such confirm ation was received at the base It would in any case be necessa ry to answer question s about the command and control arrangem ents governin g the British component in the manning and guarding force and this would require further study In further discussi on the point was made that there would be damaging repercu ssions if the United Kingdom were to ask for dual key control of United States cruise missile s The deploym ent of Alliance long-range nuclear forces was intended both to counter the threat from the Soviet SS 20 missile s and to couple the United States strateg ic nuclear deterren t firmly to the defence of Europe If the only America n weapons capable of striking the territor y of the Soviet Union we r e the strateg ic weapons based in the United States then there would be a risk that the American s might not be prepared to use them or fear of provokin g massive retaliat ion on the ITnit ed States itsel Any dual ey sjs1 e - 1 Page d of 6 pages ITOP SECRET I Referance tabt'130 1224 © Crown Copyright The National Archives' reference CAB 130 1224 I TOP SECRET I • would be less effective as a deterrent than a single key one A request for dual key at this stage would create the impression that the objective was now to be in a position to restrain the United States rather than to ensure that she was ready to defend the Allies If the Americans felt that the United Kingdom had lost confidence in them this would have serious effects for their attitude to co-operating with t e United Kingdom particularly on the Trident programme If the United Kingdom were to ask for dual key the Italians would press for it The Germans were precluded by their own internal political imperat ives from acquiring even an indirect share in contro l over a nuclear weapons system which could strike the territory of the Soviet Union and German acceptance of long-range theatre nuclear weapons had always been conditional on at least one other European nation taking the weapons under similar conditions There was thus a risk that a British request for dual key would jeopardise the whole decision taken by NATO in 1979 to deploy these t·rnapons This would be a grave setback for the Alliance and a victory for the Soviet Union THE PRIME MI NISTER summing up the discussion said that it was essential to maintain the credibility of the Alliance's nuclear deterrent which rested in the last resort on mutual confidence between the United States and her allies especially the United Kingdom This basic requirement would be jeopa dised if the United Kingdom were to seek dual key control over the United States cruise missiles which were to be based here She noted that the Defence Secretary proposed to seek to increase the British component in the manning and guarding of the cruise missile force and that further consideration would need to be given to the command and communication arrangements for the British component The arrangements for implementing the existing joint decision understandings should be made as watertight as possible But the Government's continued ability to defend the adequacy of the joint decision understandings would depend crucially on being able to take a more explicit and positive public line than hitherto on joint decision with American support In continuing t p e negotiations with the Americans over the updating of the Murphy-Dean Agreement officials should maintain the British requirement for a provision that off-base deployment of cruise missiles should not take place without tp e Prime f-1 inister 's agreement but this would be on the ' understanding which might be ep cressed separately that SACEUR could have standin - au t iority to deploy the weapons of -base ir an eme -ge 1c r Page 5 of 6 pages ITOP SECRET I © Crown Copyright The National Archives' reference CAB 130 1224 ITOP SECRET I if that were necessary in order to ensure their survival The negotiafl' should be pursued urgently and should be ad referendum to Ministers a • • each stage As soon as it had been established that satisfactory provisions could be negotiated for an updated Murphy-Dean Agreement it would be necessary to broach with the Americans the need for a new and more forthcoming public line The most convincing element in t his for British public opinion would be a public statement by the Preside nt of the United States that he would not contemplat e the possibility of a ny decision on the release of United States nuclear weapons based in the United Kingdom to which the Prime Minister was not a party It might have to be made clear to the Americans at the appropriate moment that only something along these lines would enable the Government to resist the political pressures on them to seek dual ey control In that event it would be necessary to prepare the ground with the Americans for a high-level approach in this sense The Meeting Instructed the Secretary of the Cabinet in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence 1 i to continue negotiations with the United States Administrati on on the revision of the Murphy-Dean Agreement on the basis outlined by the Prime Minister in her summing up of the discussio and to report ii to consider the form content and timing of a highlevel approach to the United States Administratio n about the need for a new public line on joint decision and to make recommendati ons Approved the arrangements proposed by the Secretary of State for Defence for the delivery of cruise missile equipment to the United Kingdom 2 Cabinet Office Page 6 of 6 pages ITOP SECRET I © Crown Copyright