REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LEGAL ATTACHÉ PROGRAM U S Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit Division Audit Report 04-18 March 2004 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LEGAL ATTACHÉ PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI operates offices known as Legal Attachés Legats in 46 locations around the world 1 Special agents assigned to these offices work with their counterparts in foreign countries to obtain information for the FBI on crimes and criminals that could harm U S citizens or interests The globalization of crime and terrorism in recent years as well as congressional expansion of the FBI’s extraterritorial authority has resulted in a significant growth in the FBI’s overseas operations in the last decade GROWTH IN LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES • Number of Offices 60 50 50 46 45 46 41 - Number of Offices 40 f--- - - 35 32 32 - 30 25 22 20 19 20 22 17 15 10 Pr oje cte d 20 03 20 02 20 01 20 00 19 99 19 98 19 97 19 96 19 95 19 94 19 93 19 92 19 91 19 90 0 Years _____________ 1 During the data collection portion of our review the FBI had 45 Legal Attaché offices abroad and a liaison office in Miami Florida which covered certain areas of Central America and the Caribbean For purposes of this report we included the Miami liaison office in the total of 46 Legal Attaché offices Effective October 1 2003 the Miami liaison office was closed BECAUSE THIS REPORT CONTAINED INFORMATION CLASSIFIED AS “SECRET’ BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WE REDACTED WHITED OUT THAT INFORMATION FROM THE VERSION OF THE REPORT THAT IS BEING PUBLICLY RELEASED WHERE SUCH INFORMATION WAS REDACTED IS NOTED IN THE REPORT i REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED The 46 Legat offices are staffed by 119 special agents and 75 support personnel Most offices are staffed by a Legal Attaché one Assistant Legal Attaché known as an ALAT and one Office Assistant although a few of the larger offices have ten or more permanent staff Fiscal year 2003 expenditures for the Legal Attaché program totaled $43 7 million up from $27 6 million for fiscal year 1997 or an increase of about 58 percent Plans are under way to expand the FBI’s overseas presence Five new Legat offices and three sub-offices in existing Legats are in the process of being opened or are under consideration and additional staff have been added to other offices The Office of International Operations OIO at FBI Headquarters oversees the Legal Attaché program OIO provides managerial oversight as well as administrative and logistical support to Legal Attaché offices and employees and their dependents In addition it maintains contact with other federal agencies operating in the international arena INTERPOL and foreign police and security officers assigned to embassies diplomatic missions in the United States 2 This audit examined the type of activities performed by Legal Attaché offices the effectiveness of the offices in establishing liaisons with foreign law enforcement agencies and coordinating activities with other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies stationed overseas the criteria and process used by the FBI to determine the placement of offices the oversight and management of existing offices and the processes for selecting and training FBI personnel for Legat positions We reviewed Legat operations at FBI Headquarters in Washington D C and at Legal Attaché offices in Berlin Germany Ottawa Canada Pretoria South Africa and Tokyo Japan Legal Attaché Mission and Priorities The primary mission of Legal Attachés is to facilitate and support FBI investigative interests in the overseas arena that pertain to threats against the United States its persons or interests The Legal Attachés establish maintain and enhance liaison with foreign law enforcement agencies in order to accomplish this mission By working cooperatively with foreign police agencies the Legal Attaché offices seek to build _____________ 2 INTERPOL — the International Criminal Police Organization with headquarters in Lyon France facilitates cooperation among international police authorities ii REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED networks that prevent crime or alternatively that ensure access to the information the FBI needs to locate and extradite international criminals and terrorists and obtain evidence for their prosecution Legal Attaché staff may become directly involved in specific investigations but they have no law enforcement authority in foreign countries Thus investigations are usually conducted jointly with foreign law enforcement agencies in accordance with local laws and procedures established by the host country In addition because investigative activities could have a potential impact on the conduct of U S foreign relations these investigations must be coordinated with the U S Department of State Legal Attachés also are expected to coordinate their investigative activities with other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration DEA and the Central Intelligence Agency CIA that operate in the same country or regions to exchange information and to avoid duplication and overlap In addition Legal Attachés provide or arrange for training for foreign police officials in locations such as the FBI National Academy in Quantico Virginia and the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest Hungary Programs offered at these two locations are designed to strengthen ties between U S and foreign law enforcement officials For example graduates of the National Academy have an international alumni network and Legal Attachés are expected to maintain close contact with the alumni in their territory The investigative priorities of Legal Attaché offices mirror those of the FBI as a whole The FBI’s strategic plan identifies three functional areas or tiers that prioritize the variety of threats it must address • Tier One encompasses foreign intelligence terrorist and criminal activities that directly threaten the national or economic security of the United States • Tier Two encompasses crimes that affect the public safety or undermine the integrity of American society • Tier Three encompasses crimes that affect individuals and crimes against property iii REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Legal Attachés’ investigative efforts abroad cover all of these tiers but similar to the FBI as a whole since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 their number one priority is counterterrorism investigations and activities Legal Attaché Offices Reviewed Although in a broad sense the mission of each Legat office is the same the specific activities of offices vary because of the differing political and cultural settings and the nature of the criminal activity that occurs in the countries or regions in which they operate Thus no single Legat office can be considered typical Consequently we selected Legats Ottawa Berlin Pretoria and Tokyo in order to obtain a cross section of offices taking into consideration factors such as the number of staff assigned number of countries covered geographic location workload the nature of the criminal activity and ongoing terrorism-related work The Legat office in Ottawa has responsibility for FBI liaison matters in Canada the second largest country in the world in terms of land area Legat Ottawa’s workload is the highest of all Legal Attaché offices due primarily to the common lengthy and largely unguarded border with the United States The Legal Attaché office in Berlin has responsibility for liaison matters in the Federal Republic of Germany Because one of the key terrorist cells responsible for the September 11 2001 attacks was located in Hamburg a significant portion of Legat Berlin’s workload involved the PENTTBOM investigation 3 The Legat office in Pretoria South Africa has responsibility for FBI liaison matters in 15 countries in southern Africa and focuses on counterterrorism matters organized crime and fugitive extraditions Legat Tokyo has responsibility for liaison matters in Japan and the Republic of China Taiwan Historically organized crime has been the top priority of the Tokyo Legat but in recent years the priority has been counterterrorism and counterintelligence _____________ 3 PENTTBOM is the FBI’s term for its investigation of the Pentagon-World Trade Center bombings on September 11 2001 iv REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Legal Attaché Office Workload A key function of the FBI’s Legal Attaché offices involves handling requests for investigative assistance referred to as investigative leads from FBI headquarters and field offices These requests range from simple tasks such as tracing telephone numbers or obtaining copies of documents to more complex and timeconsuming activities such as tracking financial transactions locating suspected criminals and terrorists or interviewing individuals as part of an investigation In recent years the number of investigative leads handled by Legats has grown significantly In the 5-year period between fiscal years 1998 and 2002 the number of leads rose from 20 267 to 53 105 an increase of about 162 percent This increase is primarily due to the growth of international crimes and terrorism but also because the number of Legat offices has grown Overall Legats appear to have been able to handle the increasing workload Legat Ottawa however has a significant volume of pending leads — a longstanding problem that the FBI has not addressed adequately Legat Ottawa has a heavy workload and receives a large volume of leads relative to other Legat offices because its proximity to the United States results in it playing a substantial role in supporting many FBI investigative matters This heavy workload has resulted in a backlog of pending leads as of June 30 2003 Legat Ottawa had 1 134 leads pending the highest number of pending leads of any Legal Attaché office 4 In contrast the other Legat offices averaged 104 pending investigative leads as of the same date Previous reviews conducted of the Ottawa Legal Attaché office by the FBI’s Inspection Division have reported that the office was having difficulty addressing its heavy workload The FBI has attempted to manage the workload in Ottawa primarily through the use of short -term temporary duty TDY staff but the backlog of pending leads remains In addition the use of TDY staff in our opinion does not appear to be an effective solution Most of the temporary personnel are assigned for 30 to 60 days The high turnover is disruptive to the operation because for example agents often return to the United States before completing work on many of _____________ 4 As of December 31 2003 Legat Ottawa had 1 335 pending leads v REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED their leads In 2001 the FBI opened a sub-office in Vancouver and has been approved to open another sub-office in Toronto While these sub-offices may help alleviate some of the workload in Ottawa they also are likely to generate additional work as new liaisons are established In FY 2002 an additional staff person was reallocated from the Mexico City Legal Attaché office to Legat Ottawa and a second staff person is expected to be added in FY 2004 for a total of ten permanent positions However we are not optimistic the increased staffing will be sufficient to reduce the backlog Controls Over Temporary Duty Travel By statute and Presidential Directive the U S Ambassador has responsibility for the actions of all U S government officials in the country in which he or she is accredited As part of carrying out this responsibility Department of State rules require that all U S government employees obtain approval from the U S Ambassador before traveling to a foreign country to conduct official business This approval is known as a country clearance Legal Attachés are responsible for keeping Ambassadors informed of all FBI employees traveling to their countries but we found that both Legat Ottawa’s and Berlin’s records of country clearances were incomplete In addition the failure of some FBI staff to obtain appropriate country clearances has been a longstanding problem and on at least two occasions since 2000 the FBI has issued memoranda to its employees emphasizing the importance of obtaining country clearances Our review of travelers to Canada between October 2001 and April 2003 indicates that the problem persists The FBI could not locate country clearances for 135 or 32 percent of the 422 FBI employees who traveled to Canada during that period We also found that the FBI could not locate country clearances for nine FBI staff who had traveled to Germany Effectiveness of Liaison Activities Based on our interviews with officials from numerous law enforcement and security agencies in Canada Germany Japan and South Africa we concluded that the Legal Attachés in the se countries were maintaining effective foreign liaisons Most of the officials we interviewed were complimentary of the Legal Attachés and the working relationship that existed between their respective offices Many provided examples of how they persona lly or their agencies in general had worked with the Legal Attaché staff to solve international crimes Officials in the two countries where English was not the vi REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED primary language — Japan and Germany — often noted how impressed they were with the ability of Legal Attaché staff to communicate fluently in the native language and emphasized the positive impact this ability had on fostering a close working relationship In addition many officials spoke highly of the training provided or arranged by the Legal Attachés The following examples illustrate their points • Legat Ottawa’s primary liaison contacts in Canada are with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service CSIS Officials from the RCMP the national police force in Canada told us they had a close working relationship with the Legat and his staff especially since the BORDERBOM case and the September 11 terrorist attacks 5 CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED • Representatives from Legat Berlin’s primary liaison contacts in Germany — the Bundeskriminalamt BKA the CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED and the Berlin Landeskriminalamt LKA — were complimentary of the Legat staffs’ professionalism and responsiveness and emphasized appreciation for the FBI staffs’ language proficiency • Legat Pretoria’s primary law enforcement contact was the South African Police Service SAPS South Africa’s national law enforcement agency Officials from SAPS’ Crime Intelligence Division told us they worked closely with the Legat and had conducted traces and compiled profiles on individuals and performed telephone record checks Officials from the National Central Bureau component of SAPS that maintain liaison with INTERPOL stated that they worked closely with the Legat office on extradition matters shared information on criminals and conducted criminal checks for the Legat They commented that the Legat personnel were very professional accessible and responsive _____________ 5 BORDERBOM was the term the FBI gave to its investigation of Ahmed Ressam the Algerian national who was arrested by U S authorities in Port Angeles Washington in December 1999 while attempting to bring explosive materials into the United States from Canada vii REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED • Japanese law enforcement and intelligence officials advised that they had frequent contact and worked closely with Legat Tokyo staff on law enforcement matters Officials from the Public Security Investigative Agency a component of the Ministry of Justice responsible for monitoring potentially dangerous domestic terrorist groups CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED Officials from the Japanese National Police Agency told us that the Legat and his staff had been very helpful and responsive in providing needed information on the activities of Yakusa a Ja panese organized crime group in the United States Officials from both agencies were highly complimentary of the Legat and the ALAT’s proficiency in Japanese Not all the comments from foreign officials were positive however Some German and Canadian officials we interviewed were critical of the FBI’s heavy use of temporary duty personnel For example the head of the BKA’s Terrorism Division told us that in contrast to other foreign law enforcement agencies CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED Similarly CSIS officials in Canada pointed out that the Legat appeared to be short -handed and as a result often relied on temporary FBI personnel to fill in the gaps They added that reliance on TDY staff inhibited the establishment of long-term relationships that they believed were especially important in the intelligence business Thus they were not as comfortable sharing information with FBI personnel on temporary duty and with whom they had not developed such a relationship One difference between Legat Ottawa and the other Legats we visited is that because of Canada’s proximity to the United States FBI field offices near the border have for many years worked closely with Canadian police agencies This creates a potential for problems if the Legat who is responsible for all FBI activities in Canada is not kept apprised of what the FBI domestic field offices are doing The Chief of the Toronto Police Service told us that over the years he had developed a strong working relationship with the FBI’s Buffalo New York field office and consequently preferred to deal with agents from that office rather than the Legat staff in Ottawa The Legat told us that in the past the Buffalo field office had nominated Toronto law enforcement officials to participate in FBI National Academy training programs without his input or concurrence The Buffalo field office however sought his input after he raised that concern Nevertheless the Legat said he still believed he was in viii REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED effect competing against the Buffalo field office in providing training slots at the FBI National Academy for Canadian law enforcement officials FBI Headquarters officials told us that the recent establishment of a Border Liaison Officer in the Buffalo field office is designed to ens ure that appropriate coordination occurs between Buffalo and Legat Ottawa Determining whether the Buffalo field office appropriately coordinated its contacts in Canada with the Legat was beyond the scope of our review However the police chief’s comments raise a concern In our opinion the role of the Legat could be diluted if Buffalo field office personnel are not coordinating their activities in Canada with the Legat Further if the Toronto sub-office is ultimately opened the FBI could be perceived by Canadian authorities as being disjointed if both the Legat sub-office and Buffalo staff are meeting with the same Canadian authorities and not coordinating their efforts In addition other FBI field offices near the Canadian border may have similar contacts with their Canadian counterparts all of which in our opinion should be coordinated with Legat Ottawa Coordination with Other U S Agencies Overseas Legal Attaché personnel are considered part of the U S Embassy staff and the Legal Attaché office is physically located on the premises of a U S Embassy As part of their duties FBI Legal Attachés often need to interact with Ambassadors and their staff as well as with representatives of other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies that station personnel abroad Besides FBI Legal Attaché staff an embassy may have law enforcement representatives from agencies such as the DEA the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives the Secret Service and Immigration and Customs Enforcement CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED Overlapping interests and jurisdictions among these agencies could be harmful to U S interests and run the risk of antagonizing the host government Moreover a lack of coordination among law enforcement agencies abroad could be detrimental to the ability of the United States to effectively combat international crime and terrorism To avoid such problems statutes as well as agreements between agencies typically delineate their responsibilities overseas and U S Ambassadors are responsible for ensuring that overall law enforcement activities are coordinated In addition the FBI’s Legal Attaché Manual emphasizes the importance of maintaining effective liaisons with other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies abroad ix REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED In the four countries where we reviewed Legat operations the Ambassadors their staff and representatives from selected U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies uniformly described their interactions with the Legal Attaché offices as positive The consensus among the officials we interviewed was that Legat personnel in these four countries readily collaborated and shared information on law enforcement matters Law enforcement representatives told us that especially since the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001 they were working closer with their counterparts in the embassies than ever before Some pointed out that even before September 11 the rivalries that based on their experiences seemed common among law enforcement agencies in the United States appeared much less prevalent in an embassy setting None of the U S law enforcement officials we spoke with expressed concerns about duplication of effort between Legat activities and their agencies’ activities FBI Oversight of Legal Attaché Program Based on our review we found that the FBI periodically assesses the need for offices abroad and adequately justifies the opening of new Legal Attaché offices and expanding existing Legat offices The FBI’s assessments consider factors such as specific terrorist and criminal activity in a country or region that threatens the United States commitment of the host country to cooperate with the FBI analysis of workloads in existing offices and the availability of funding Assessments of the location and composition of Legat offices are an ongoing and normal part of headquarters’ oversight of the Legat program These assessments have resulted in the opening of new offices in areas previously covered by existing offices adding staff to existing offices to address the workload and consolidating offices when the workload no longer justified keeping an office open Periodically Congress has asked the FBI to provide justifications for existing and planned Legal Attaché offices We reviewed reports that were provided to Congress in 1999 and 2003 and found them to be comprehensive and for the four Legats we reviewed consistent with what we found when we reviewed these offices For example the 2003 report concluded that the staffing levels in Legats Pretoria and Tokyo were adequate for the workload In contrast the heavy use of temporary duty personnel in Legats Berlin and Ottawa was expensive and did not provide needed continuity in more complex investigations Thus the report proposed increasing the permanent staff at both locations to better cope with the workload x REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED The FBI uses various methods to monitor and oversee Legat offices For example each Legal Attaché office is required to prepare and submit a Legal Attaché Annual Accomplishment Report LAR The LAR reports provide detailed information about the office’s operations and accomplishments To better keep abreast of Legats’ workload OIO recently began analyzing each Legat office’s pending leads on a quarterly basis The results of the analysis are provided to the applicable Legat office and problems identified must be explained or resolved OIO officials told us they maintain regular telephone and e-mail contact with Legat offices OIO managers also meet regularly to discuss significant issues or problems pertaining to Legat offices They obtain feedback on Legat offices from Ambassadors and domestic and foreign law enforcement and intelligence personnel visiting FBI Headquarters In addition OIO hosts an annual conference in Washington D C attended by all the Legal Attachés to discuss relevant topics including Legat performance expectations The FBI’s Inspection Division conducts in-depth reviews of the activities of individual Legal Attaché offices normally on a 3-year cycle The inspections include a review of management issues staffing administration liaisons workload and training matters The reports comment on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Legal Attachés We followed up on 26 of the 31 findings from the latest Inspection Division reviews of Legats Ottawa Berlin Pretoria and Tokyo We concluded that the FBI had taken appropriate corrective action for most of the findings with the exception of a finding related to the staffing problems in Ottawa In addition documentation was lacking that corrective action had been taken related to changing safe combinations in Ottawa and conducting unannounced cash counts of the imprest fund in Tokyo OIO managers told us that they made site visits to the Legal Attaché offices to review operations However these reviews were conducted sporadically We found documentation supporting OIO site visits for only two of the four offices we visited OIO officials acknowledged that site visits needed to be conducted more systematically and said they were developing a plan to review offices on a regular basis starting in FY 2004 xi REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Legat Selection and Training According to OIO officials the FBI seeks candidates for Legat and ALAT positions who have broad knowledge of FBI programs and who are skilled supervisors Among other things the individuals should possess sound judgment and common sense and require minimal guidance and direction from FBI Headquarters In addition these individuals should be proficient in one or more languages used in an office’s assigned territory Applicants for Legat openings are ranked by a Legat Screening Panel LSP consisting of FBI senior managers and analysts against the qualifications contained in the vacancy announcement The topranked candidates are referred to a second panel known as the Special Agent Mid-Level Management Selection SAMMS Board The SAMMS Board may agree with the LSP rankings or come up with its own ranking based on a review of the candidates The SAMMS Board recommends to the FBI Director the top three candidates in rank order The FBI Director interviews one or more of the Legat or ALAT candidates and makes the final selection We reviewed the files for 13 recent Legat and ALAT vacancy announcements and concluded that the FBI was following its procedures FBI officials told us that in the past when the Legat program was growing rapidly some individuals who did not have sufficient management or supervisory experience were select ed for Legat positions Officials believed that the current selection process which places considerable weight on supervisory experience should help avoid some of the problems that occurred in the past Nevertheless misconduct by some Legat employees is a concern An FBI Office of Professional Responsibility OPR official remarked that in his opinion the number of OPR investigations of Legat personnel was higher than would be expected given their small number and attributed this problem to past staffing decisions This official added that Legat staff represent the FBI overseas and should be role models rather than subjects of OPR investigations OPR officials identified 13 staff against whom 12 investigations were initiated during the 3-year period xii REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED between September 1999 and September 2002 6 Our review of the files on these investigations which included allegations of voucher fraud misuse of position and security violations revealed that they resulted in five suspensions three letters of cens ure two counseling one dismissal and one resignation The FBI Director has commented that he wants future top managers in the FBI to have international experience In our discussions with officials and employees in FBI Headquarters and the four Legat offices we reviewed many said that historically Legat positions were not considered career enhancing This perception appears to be changing as more agents are being sent overseas to work on major investigations and gain first-hand experience about the nature of a Legat’s work In FY 2003 according to OIO officials 40 returning Legat staff were promoted — a significantly higher number than had occurred in the past Because the FBI’s Inspection Division was conducting a detailed review of the pre-deployment training program for newly selected Legat staff concurrent with our audit we limited our work in this area We asked selected Legat staff at the four offices we reviewed about the training they had received in preparation for their assignment and in general they had positive comments about this training These views were in contrast to what the FBI Inspection Division was told by a focus group of both former and current Legat staff as reported in its July 2003 report on the pre-deployment training program 7 Focus group participants expressed dissatisfaction with briefings they had received as part of the training from headquarters operational divisions The focus group participants also indicated that they did not believe the pre-deployment training program adequately prepared newly selected Legat staff for the difficulties of adjusting to life overseas Other issues noted in the FBI’s Inspection report included that funding for the pre-deployment training was insufficient and _____________ 6 Subsequent to our exit conference another OPR official provided us with a list of 17 additional cases that had been opened on 15 Legat personnel during our review period In addition the OIG Investigations Division which also can investigate allegations against FBI personnel provided us with allegations against two more Legat personnel We did not review the case files for these additional cases 7 FBI Inspection Division Report Legal Attaché Pre-deployment Training An Evaluation of the Preparation of FBI Personnel for Overseas Assignment Reengineering Project Number 35 July 2003 xiii REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED training facilities were inadequate The FBI’s Inspection Division made 12 recommendations to improve pre-deployment training for Legat staff Based on our observations in Legat Tokyo language proficiency is critical in fostering close relationships with foreign liaisons According to a Language Services Section official employees selected for Legat positions typically have about 3 months to work on language training before they are transferred to a Legat office In our opinion three months is not sufficient time to learn a foreign language a view echoed in the FBI Inspection Division’s July 2003 report Our analysis of the language skills of the 97 FBI staff stationed in countries where English is not the primary or secondary language revealed that 22 of the staff or about 23 percent had no language skill applicable to the host country or the territory covered by the Legat office In addition 14 agents had some language skills pertaining to that area but did not meet the oral language goals as stated in the FBI’s Legal Attaché Manual In total 36 or over one-third of the 97 Legat staff assigned to these countries did not meet the FBI’s language goals Tours of Duty To ensure that FBI personnel do not lose contact and familiarity with the changing practices and priorities of the FBI as well as concerns that extended tours of duty abroad could result in a security risk the FBI places limits on the length of time staff can remain abroad FBI personnel are limited to no more than five consecutive years abroad in one location or six consecutive years in two locations although exceptions to these limits are permitted when necessary to meet the needs of the FBI Further according to an OIO official prior to 1997 no tour of duty limits existed for support staff Our analysis found that some Legat staff have remained abroad for long periods of time We examined the tours of duty for 370 FBI agents and support personnel assigned to Legat offices since October 1 1996 Our analysis indicates 21 FBI employees had remained overseas for more than 6 consecutive years An additional eight Legat staff will be overseas for more than 6 years if they complete their current tours of duty xiv REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Conclusions and Recommendations Increasingly crimes and terrorist acts that occur abroad impact the United States and its citizens and the FBI’s Legal Attaché program plays a key role in detecting deterring and investigating these crimes Based on our review and first-hand observations at four Legat offices we believe that the Legat program in general and the four offices we reviewed in particular make a significant contribution in these efforts The many law enforcement and intelligence officials we spoke with in these countries gave the Legats high marks for fostering strong relationships In addition Legats appeared to coordinate effectively with their U S law enforcement counterparts stationed in U S embassies and were highly regarded by all four U S Ambassadors There has been a significant increase in the number of leads directed to Legat offices in the past five years While most Legat offices have been able to cope with the workload Legat Ottawa has consistently had a high volume of pending leads The FBI’s efforts to alleviate this problem primarily through temporary duty staff has had marginal success In addition our review of FBI personnel traveling to Canada on temporary duty assignments indicated that stronger controls are needed to ensure that required country clearances are obtained and complete records of these clearances are maintained Based on our review the FBI’s process for assessing the need for new Legat offices and realigning or closing existing offices appears adequate The FBI also monitors the offices’ operations and activities and is taking steps to strengthen this oversight In addition the FBI has a reasonable process in place for selecting agents for Legat positions But both the FBI Inspection Division and our review indicate that improvements are needed in the training program for newly selected Legat staff We noted that over one-third of Legat staff did not meet the FBI’s foreign language proficiency goals as stated in the Legal Attaché Manual Finally we found that some Legat staff have remained abroad for long periods of time While extensions to tour of duty limits may sometimes be necessary we believe these extensions should be kept to a minimum xv REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Based on the issues identified in this report we offer six recommendations to improve the operation of the Legal Attaché program Among the recommendations are that the FBI should • Analyze the staffing level and workload in Legat Ottawa to determine if additional permanent resources are needed to resolve the backlog of pending leads • Strengthen controls to ensure that country clearances are obtained develop a system to ensure that complete records of these clearances are maintained and direct the Inspection Division to review compliance with country clearance requirements during its inspections • Implement the FBI Inspection Division’s 12 recommendations contained in their July 2003 report on pre-deployment training for Legat staff • Require adherence to the FBI’s limits on overseas tours of duty and keep tour-of-duty extensions to a minimum xvi REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LEGAL ATTACHÉ PROGRAM TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 History of the Legal Attaché Program 1 The Legal Attaché Program Today 2 Legal Attaché Staff 6 FBI and Legal Attaché Priorities 7 Activities of Legal Attachés 8 Audit Approach 10 CHAPTER 2 LEGAT OFFICE AND COUNTRY INFORMATION 12 Legat Ottawa 12 Legat Berlin 14 Legat Pretoria 16 Legat Tokyo 19 CHAPTER 3 LEGAT INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES 23 Legats’ Process for Responding to Investigative Leads 23 Legats Have Coped With Sizeable Rise in Leads 25 Review of Pending Leads at Four Offices 27 Backlog of Pending Leads in Ottawa 29 Ottawa Backlog Previously Reported by FBI Inspection Division 32 Actions Taken by FBI Have Yet to Fully Address the Backlog 32 Controls Over Temporary Duty Travel Need Improvement 33 Conclusions 37 Recommendations 38 CHAPTER 4 LIAISON ACTIVITIES WERE EFFECTIVE AT THE LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES REVIEWED 39 Details of Liaison Activity and Accomplishments by Office 39 Conclusion 51 Recommendation 53 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED CHAPTER 5 LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES COORDINATE ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER U S LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OVERSEAS 54 U S Law Enforcement Presence in American Embassies 54 Overlapping Jurisdictions Create a Potential for Conflict 55 The Role of the U S Ambassador 56 Legal Attachés Coordinate and Collaborate With Other U S Law Enforcement Representatives 56 Conclusion 60 CHAPTER 6 FBI OVERSIGHT OF THE LEGAL ATTACHÉ PROGRAM APPEARS ADEQUATE 61 FBI Justification for Establishing and Maintaining Offices 61 Oversight of Offices 63 Conclusion 66 CHAPTER 7 SELECTION AND TRAINING OF LEGAL ATTACHÉ STAFF 67 Process for Selecting Candidates for Legat Positions 67 FBI Acknowledged Some Past Staffing Decisions Could Have Been Better 69 Misconduct by Some Legat Staff is a Concern 70 Increasing Recognition of the Value of Legat Experience 72 Pre-Deployment and Foreign Language Training for Legat Staff 73 Some Legat Staff Remain Abroad For Long Periods of Time 78 Conclusion 79 Recommendations 81 STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT CONTROLS 82 STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS 83 APPENDIX I AUDIT OBJECTIVES SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 84 APPENDIX II LISTING OF FOREIGN AGENCIES CONTACTED 87 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX III LISTING OF U S AGENCIES CONTACTED AT U S EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES 89 APPENDIX IV FBI LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES AND SUB-OFFICES FISCAL YEAR 2003 STAFFING LEVELS 90 APPENDIX V RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FBI INSPECTION DIVISON REPORT ON LEGAL ATTACHÉ PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING 92 APPENDIX VI FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE 94 APPENDIX VII OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT DIVISION ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT 103 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI serves as the principal investigative agency of the federal government responsible for investigating crimes against the United States and performing other duties connected with national security FBI headquarters in Washington D C provides program direction and support to 56 field offices approximately 400 satellite offices known as resident agencies and 4 specialized field installations Although the FBI is a domestic law enforcement agency it has stationed special agents abroad for many years in foreign posts known as Legal Attaché Legat offices Special agents assigned to 46 Legal Attaché offices and 5 sub-offices abroad work with their police counterparts in foreign countries to obtain information for the FBI on crimes and criminals that could harm U S citizens or interests 8 The globalization of crime and terrorism in recent years has resulted in a significant expansion in the FBI’s overseas operations Fiscal year 2003 expenditures for the Legal Attaché program totaled $43 7 million up from $27 6 million for fiscal year 1997 or an increase of about 58 percent History of the Legal Attaché Program The FBI began assigning agents abroad during World War II These agents were assigned initially to Central and South America to monitor activities of German agents operating in the area as well as individuals and organizations in the large German émigré community believed to be loyal to the Nazi regime By the end of World War II agents also were posted to American embassies in Europe and Asia In subsequent years the FBI opened and closed offices abroad depending on factors such as political conditions changing criminal priorities and FBI finances In 1953 there were 6 Legat offices this rose to 12 by 1968 By 1971 the number had increased to 17 offices and the justifications for the increase included a general rise in terrorism and airline hijackings growing numbers of deserters and draft resisters overseas and increases in drug trafficking _____________ 8 At the time of our review the FBI had 45 Legal Attaché offices abroad and a liaison office in Miami Florida which covered certain areas of Central America and the Caribbean For purposes of this report we included the Miami liaison office in the total of Legal Attaché offices According to FBI officials the Miami liaison office was closed effective October 1 2003 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED The number of Legat offices continued to rise during the 1980s and 1990s spurred by the increasing globalization of crime For example the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communist regimes opened borders and created a flood of organized criminal activity in those countries and the United States Likewise the increasing flow and speed of international bank transfers a liquid world-wide financial market and loosened restrictions on the export of capital allowed large sums of money to be moved and concealed with ease by drug traffickers and white collar criminals By 1996 the FBI had 25 offices abroad Since then the number has doubled due in part to the threat of international terrorism directed against the United States The increasing FBI presence overseas in the last two decades has also been fostered by changes in statutory authority Historically the FBI’s criminal jurisdiction was largely limited to domestic investigations and activities The United States rarely asserted criminal jurisdiction beyond its borders and consequently most criminal behavior that occurred outside the country could not be prosecuted in U S courts In response to the rise in international crime and terrorism however Congress through express statutory language has extended federal jurisdiction “extraterritorially” to protect U S citizens and interests abroad According to a 1996 FBI report entitled The FBI’s Presence Overseas The Need for FBI Agents Abroad to Better Protect the United States From International Crime and Terrorism federal law covered nearly 50 types of offenses that could have an overseas element double the number of crimes that existed before 1980 The Legal Attaché Program Today The map in Exhibit 1-1 and the table in Exhibit 1-2 show the locations of the 46 Legal Attaché offices open as of September 30 2003 the year they were opened and the geographic areas and countries they cover As the map also details this geographic coverage extends to all countries in the world with the exception of Cuba Iran Libya and North Korea—countries with which the United States has no formal diplomatic relations In addition FBI agents from the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division are currently on temporary duty in Iraq but these agents are not part of the Legat program Almost twothirds of the Legat offices have opened since 1990 In order to open a new Legat office or modify staffing levels in existing offices the FBI must obtain Department of Justice Department of State Office of Management and Budget and Congressional approval 2 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED EXHIBIT 1-1 LOCATION OF FBI LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES WARSAW BUCHAREST PRAGUE TALLINN BERLIN COPENHAGEN BRUSSELS LONDON MOSCOW OTTAWA BERN PARIS KIEV ALMATY VIENNA MADRID ANKARA ROME BEIJING TOKYO SEOUL ATHENS CAIRO MIAMI RIYADH SANTO DOMINGO NEW DELHI HONG KONG TEL AVIV MANILA MEXICO CITY CARACAS BANGKOK AMMAN BRIDGETOWN PANAMA CITY ISLAMABAD BOGOTA LAGOS SINGAPORE NAIROBI BRASILIA SANTIAGO PRETORIA BUENOS AIRES 3 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED CANBERRA REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Legal Attaché Office Almaty Kazakhstan Amman Jordan Ankara Turkey Athens Greece Bangkok Thailand Beijing China Bern Switzerland Berlin Germany Bogotá Colombia Brasilia Brazil EXHIBIT 1-2 LISTING OF FBI LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES YEAR OPENED AND COUNTRIES COVERED 9 Date Opened Countries 2000 2001 2000 1993 1990 2002 Pre-1970 199810 Pre-1970 1999 Bridgetown Barbados 1988 Brussels Belgium Bucharest Romania Buenos Aires Argentina Cairo Egypt 1989 2001 1997 1996 Canberra Australia Pre-1970 Caracas Venezuela 1992 Copenhagen Denmark Hong Kong SAR China Islamabad Pakistan Kiev Ukraine 1999 Pre-1970 1996 1997 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Jordan Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Turkey Albania Bulgaria Cyprus Greece Lebanon Macedonia Syria Burma Cambodia Laos Thailand Vietnam Mongolia Peoples Republic of China Liechtenstein Switzerland Germany Colombia Ecuador Brazil Anguilla Antigua and Barbuda Barbados Dominica French West Indies Grenada Guadeloupe Islands of St Barthelemy and French St Martin Martinique Montserrat Netherlands Antilles Islands of Saba St Eustatius and Dutch St Maarten St Christopher St Kitts St Nevis British West Indies St Lucia St Vincent and the Grenadines Trinidad and Tobago Belgium Luxembourg The Netherlands Moldova Romania Argentina Paraguay Uruguay Djibouti Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia Somalia Sudan Australia Christmas Island Cook Islands Fiji French Polynesia includes Austral Islands Bora Bora Marquesas Islands Moorea Society Islands Tahiti Kiribati includes Canton Caroline Flint Gilbert Islands Malden Phoenix Starbuch Vosttok Nauru New Caledonia Papua New Guinea New Zealand Niue Pitcairn Island Solomon Islands Tokelau Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Wallis and Futuna Islands French Samoa Aruba French Guiana Guyana Netherlands Antilles islands of Bonaire and Curacao Suriname Venezuela Denmark Greenland Finland Iceland Norway Sweden Hong Kong Macau Afghanistan Pakistan Belarus Ukraine _____________ 9 The year opened for most pre-1970 offices was not readily available Before 1998 the Legat in Germany was located in the city of Bonn 10 4 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Legal Attaché Office Lagos Nigeria Date Opened 9 Countries 1999 Gambia Ghana Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone United Kingdom England Scotland Wales Northern Ireland Republic of Ireland Channel Islands Jersey Guernsey Andorra Cape Verde Equatorial Guinea Gibraltar Portugal Spain Philippines Mexico Bahamas Belize Bermuda Cayman Islands Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Jamaica Nicaragua Turks and Caicos Islands Haiti Russia Kenya Tanzania Uganda Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Sri Lanka Canada Panama Algeria Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Republic of Congo France Gabon Guinea Guinea-Bissau Cote d’Ivoire aka Ivory Coast Mali Mauritania Monaco Morocco Niger Rwanda Senegal Togo Tunisia Western Sahara Democratic Republic of Congo Zaire Czech Republic Slovakia Angola Botswana Comoros Diego Garcia British Indian Ocean Territory Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Mozambique Namibia South Africa Seychelles Swaziland Zimbabwe Zambia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia U A E Yemen Italy Malta Bolivia Chile Peru London England Pre-1970 Madrid Spain Manila Philippines Mexico City Mexico Miami United States Liaison Office Moscow Russia Nairobi Kenya New Delhi India Ottawa Canada Panama City Panama 1991 1988 Pre-1970 Paris France Not Determined 1994 2001 2000 1942 Pre-1970 Pre-1970 Prague Czech Republic 2000 Pretoria South Africa 1997 Riyadh Saudi Arabia Rome Italy Santiago Chile Santo Domingo Dominican Republic Seoul South Korea Singapore Singapore Tallinn Estonia Tel Aviv Israel Tokyo Japan 1997 Pre-1970 1994 2001 Dominican Republic 2000 2000 1997 1996 1954 South Korea Brunei East Timor Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Estonia Latvia Lithuania Israel Japan Taiwan Austria Bosnia Croatia Herzegovina Hungary Slovenia Yugoslavian Republic Serbia and Montenegro Poland Vienna Austria 1992 Warsaw Poland 1997 EXHIBIT 1-2 CONTINUED 5 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Plans are underway to expand the FBI’s overseas presence Five new offices are in the process of being opened in Georgia Malaysia Morocco the United Arab Emirates and Yemen In addition the FBI has received congressional approval to establish three sub-offices in existing Legats in Bonn Germany Legat Berlin Milan Italy Legat Rome and Toronto Canada Legat Ottawa Finally the FBI has augmented staff to the Legats in Amman Jordan Islamabad Pakistan Manila Philippines Ottawa Canada Riyadh Saudi Arabia and Cairo Egypt The Office of International Operations OIO at FBI Headquarters oversees the Legal Attaché program OIO provides managerial oversight as well as administrative and logistical support to Legal Attaché offices employees and their dependents In addition it maintains contact with other federal agencies operating in the international arena INTERPOL and foreign police and security officers assigned to embassies diplomatic missions in the United States 11 Legal Attaché Staff The title “Legal Attaché” was established by the Department of State for the special agent designated to be in charge of an FBI liaison office abroad These agents are typically senior managers with many years of experience in handling criminal investigations Additional agents assigned to the office are generally referred to as Assistant Legal Attachés or ALATs Office Assistants provide administrative support The typical office has a Legal Attaché one ALAT and one Office Assistant although some of the larger offices have 10 or more permanent staff The Legal Attachés are generally temporary Grade 15s and the ALATs are temporary Grade 14s for the term of their assignment In total at the end of fiscal year 2003 the Legat offices were staffed with 119 special agents and 75 administrative support personnel 12 Legal Attaché personnel are considered part of the U S Embassy staff and the Legal Attaché office is located in a _____________ 11 INTERPOL—the International Criminal Police Organization with headquarters in Lyon France facilitates cooperation among international police authorities 12 See Appendix IV for a breakdown of personnel by office 6 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED controlled access area within the diplomatically protected premises of a U S embassy or consulate 13 As needed additional personnel are assigned to Legal Attaché offices on a temporary duty TDY basis to help manage the workload In addition unless otherwise directed by FBI headquarters Legal Attachés have authority over and are held responsible for all other FBI personnel who are in the country or region to work on specific investigations attend conferences or conduct training FBI and Legal Attaché Priorities The intent of the Legal Attaché program is to create a network of law enforcement relationships that can work together to address the rising tide of international crime and terrorism Ultimately the goal of the program is to detect deter and investigate international crimes against United States citizens and interests The FBI believes that placing agents overseas provides the most reliable effective and timely means to combat international crime and prevent it from reaching the United States In its 5-year strategic plan issued in May 1998 the FBI has identified three functional areas or tiers that describe the variety of threats that it must address to realize the goal of enhanced national and individual security Tier One encompasses foreign intelligence terrorist and criminal activities that directly threaten the national or economic security of the United States Tier Two encompasses crimes that affect the public safety or undermine the integrity of American society Tier Three encompasses crimes that affect individuals and crimes against property Legal Attachés’ investigative efforts cover all of these tiers but much like the FBI as a whole since the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks their number one priority is the prevention of terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests As a result the bulk of the Legats’ workload centers on counterterrorism activities _____________ 13 A controlled access area is a specifically designated area within an embassy where classified information up to a secret level may be handled stored discussed or processed 7 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Activities of Legal Attachés The activities of FBI staff assigned to Legal Attaché offices vary to some degree depending on the country or region where the office is located and the nature of the criminal threats to the United States In general however the primary function of Legal Attachés is to establish maintain and enhance liaison with foreign law enforcement agencies Legal Attachés serve as a conduit between FBI headquarters and field offices needing investigative assistance or information from foreign countries and law enforcement officials in those countries At the same time foreign law enforcement agencies transmit their requests for investigative assistance in the United States via Legal Attaché offices to FBI domestic offices By working cooperatively with foreign police agencies the Legal Attaché offices seek to build networks that prevent crime or alternatively that ensure access to the information the FBI needs to locate and extradite international criminals and terrorists and obtain evidence for their prosecution Most Legal Attachés have liaison responsibilities for multiple countries so they often spend a significant portion of their time traveling In some instances Legal Attaché staff may become directly involved in specific investigations and may be assisted in these investigations by FBI personnel sent from the United States However Legal Attaché personnel have no law enforcement authority in foreign countries they have no arrest powers and usually are not allowed to carry weapons Thus investigations are usually conducted jointly with foreign law enforcement agencies in accordance with local laws and policies and procedures established by the host country In addition because investigative activities could have an impact on the conduct of U S foreign relations these investigations must be coordinated with the State Department Legal Attachés also facilitate the rapid deployment of FBI personnel in response to major cases such as the attacks on U S embassies in East Africa the bombing of the U S S Cole in Yemen and the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks PENTTBOM 14 The number of agents and other FBI personnel that have been sent abroad temporarily to work on such investigations is significant For example _____________ 14 PENTTBOM is the FBI’s term for its investigation of Pentagon-World Trade Towers bombings on September 11 2001 8 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED according to recent congressional testimony in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and throughout the following year about 700 FBI personnel were temporarily assigned overseas to work on PENTTBOM 15 Another key function of Legal Attachés is to coordinate their activities with other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies that operate in the same country or regions to exchange information and to avoid duplication and overlap These include the Bureau of Diplomatic Security within the State Department whose agents known as Regional Security Officers RSOs protect U S embassy facilities the Central Intelligence Agency CIA the Drug Enforcement Administration DEA the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives ATF Immigration and Customs Enforcement ICE 16 and in countries where the U S military maintains installations U S military investigative and intelligence services Legal Attachés also participate on embassy law enforcement teams consisting of representatives of the federal law enforcement agencies assigned to the embassy which advise the Ambassador and share information on law enforcement matters Providing or arranging for training for foreign police officials is another important activity of Legal Attachés For example Legats make presentations at training sessions and seminars and arrange for technical assistance from FBI headquarters when needed or requested by the host country In addition they interview candidates from among their foreign police contacts to attend law enforcement training programs in the United States and abroad This training includes the FBI National Academy in Quantico Virginia which mid-level managers from state local and foreign police agencies receive training and the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest Hungary Programs like these are designed to strengthen ties between United States and foreign law enforcement officials Graduates of the FBI _____________ 15 Testimony of Roderick L Beverly Special Agent in Charge Office of International Operations before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration Border Security and Claims May 13 2003 16 On March 1 2003 the law enforcement and investigative functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Department of Justice and the Customs Service in the Department of Treasury were transferred to Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security 9 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED National Academy have an international alumni network and about 10 percent of National Academy students come from overseas Legal Attachés are expected to maintain close contact with graduates of the National Academy in their territory meet with them regularly on matters of mutual interest and hold periodic training sessions for the graduates Audit Approach We initiated this audit because of the growing importance and significance of the FBI’s Legal Attaché program The objectives of our review were to examine the Legal Attaché program to determine 1 the type of activities performed by Legal Attaché offices 2 the effectiveness of the offices in establishing liaisons with foreign law enforcement agencies and in coordinating activities with other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies stationed overseas 3 the criteria and process used by the FBI to determine the placement of offices including oversight and management of existing offices and 4 the processes for selecting and training FBI personnel for Legat positions We conducted work primarily at FBI Headquarters in Washington D C and at Legal Attaché offices in Berlin and its suboffice in Frankfurt Germany Ottawa Canada Pretoria South Africa and Tokyo Japan At FBI Headquarters we interviewed officials from the Office of International Operations the Office of Professional Responsibility OPR Language Services Section and the Criminal Counterterrorism Inspection Finance Security and Administrative Services Divisions We reviewed policies procedures manuals correspondence and other documents related to the Legal Attaché program We also reviewed Legal Attaché annual accomplishment reports Inspection Division reports workload data OPR cases vacancy packages and language scores and information on TDY travel to selected foreign locations At the Legal Attaché offices we interviewed the Legal Attaché and selected staff assigned to the office At each embassy we also interviewed the Ambassador and selected embassy staff including representatives of other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies In addition we interviewed officials at the American Consulates in Toronto Canada and Cape Town South Africa see Appendix III for a list of our contacts at the embassies and consulates 10 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED visited We also interviewed numerous representatives from law enforcement and security agencies in the countries we visited see Appendix II for a list of the foreign agencies At the Legal Attaché offices we examined various records files and documents observed physical security followed up on selected FBI Inspection Division findings and examined a judgmental sample of open requests for assistance from domestic FBI offices Further details of our scope and methodology are presented in Appendix I 11 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED CHAPTER 2 LEGAT OFFICE AND COUNTRY INFORMATION The following sections in this chapter present background information on each Legal Attaché office we reviewed and the country or region covered by these offices We selected these locations judgmentally to obtain a cross section of offices taking into consideration factors such as the number of staff assigned number of countries covered geographic location workload crime problems ongoing terrorism-related work and prior inspection findings Although the mission of each Legat office is the same the activities of offices vary because of the differing political and cultural settings in which they operate and because of the nature of the crime problems that exist in the host country or region that have a connection to the United States Thus no single Legat office can be considered typical Legat Ottawa The Legat office in Ottawa has responsibility for FBI liaison matters in Canada see Exhibit 2-1 Canada is the second largest country in the world in terms of land area It is comprised of ten provinces and three territories spanning five time zones and has a population of over 31 million About 80 percent of the population lives within 100 miles of the U S border Canada’s major population centers are Montreal Quebec Toronto Ontario and Vancouver British Columbia Ottawa the capital is located in the St Lawrence Valley between Montreal and Toronto The official languages in Canada are French spoken primarily in the Province of Quebec and English the dominant language for the rest of the country According to a Department of State Background Note the bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States is probably the most extensive in the world as evidenced by the $1 4 billion in daily trade and the 200 million peopl e who cross the border annually 17 The Legal Attaché office in Ottawa opened in 1942 is one of the oldest of the FBI’s foreign offices As of April 2003 it was staffed by a Legat four ALATS and four office assistants Because of the heavy _____________ 17 Background Notes are issued by the Department of State and contain information on countries with which the United States has relations 12 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED EXHIBIT 2-1 LEGAT OTTAWA TERRITORY EXISTING AND PROPOSED LEGAT LOCATIONS IN CANADA YUKON TERRITORY NORTHWEST TERRITORIES NUNAVUT NEW FOUNDLAND BRITISH COLUMBIA ALBERTA Vancouver MANITOBA SASKATCHEWAN QUEBEC PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND ONTARIO NOVA SCOTIA Ottawa NEW BRUNSWICK Toronto Legend • Legal Attache Office Existing Sub-office Proposed Sub-office 13 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED workload additional personnel are frequently assigned on temporary duty A sub-office staffed by one ALAT and one Office Assistant was established in Vancouver in May 2001 and covers the Province of British Columbia and the Yukon Territory The FBI has been authorized to open an additional 3-person sub-office in Toronto Most of Legat Ottawa’s workload before and after September 11 2001 has been focused on addressing terrorism matters According to Legat Ottawa’s September 30 2002 Annual Accomplishment Report the PENTTBOM investigation alone generated more than 7 000 requests for assistance from FBI headquarters and field offices The office receives many other requests relating to national security national infrastructure protection computer intrusion telemarketing fraud organized crime drugs money laundering Canadian-based car theft rings and fugitives Legat Ottawa’s workload is the largest among all Legal Attaché offices due largely to the country’s proximity to the United States The common lengthy and largely unguarded border makes it relatively easy for crime to traverse the two countries CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED Legat Berlin The Legal Attaché office in Berlin has responsibility for liaison matters in the Federal Republic of Germany see Exhibit 2-2 Germany consists of 16 federal states 5 of which comprise the former German Democratic Republic It has a population of over 83 million inhabitants the largest in Europe after Russia It also has the largest economy in Europe Germany’s land area is comparable in size to Montana The Legal Attaché office used to be located in Bonn the former capital of West Germany Shortly after the reunification of Germany in 1990 the German government designated Berlin as the new capital and later the American Embassy and the Legal Attaché office moved to Berlin Various German law enforcement agencies maintain headquarters offices in cities other than Berlin thereby requiring Legat staff to travel throughout the country In addition there are a large number of U S military facilities located in the country 14 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED EXHIBIT 2-2 LEGAT BERLIN TERRITORY EXISTING AND PROPOSED LEGAT LOCATIONS IN GERMANY Berlin Bonn • Frankfurt Legend • Legal Attache Office Existing Sub-office Proposed Sub-office 15 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED As of June 2003 the Berlin Legat was staffed by a Legat one ALAT and two Office Assistants The Legat and the ALAT were fluent in German The Legat told us that most of the discussions with their liaisons are carried out in German At the time of our visit a special agent was also assigned on temporary duty to this office for a 6-month period this agent had been previously detailed to the office several times and was also fluent in German A Legat sub-office is located in Frankfurt and at the time of our review was staffed by two ALATS two Office Assistants and one analyst on temporary duty assignment The two ALATS were conversant in German There were also two special agents who were on temporary duty assignment at a German counterterrorism center in Meckenheim One ALAT from Frankfurt supervises these two special agents A sub-office is expected to open in Bonn in the near future and the FBI expects to staff it with two ALATs and one Office Assistant Terrorism matters are the number one priority worked by Legat Berlin and because one of the key terrorist cells responsible for the September 11 2001 attacks was located in Hamburg a considerable amount of the office’s time was spent on the PENTTBOM investigation According to the FY 2002 Legal Attaché Annual Accomplishment report for Berlin the office processed over 1 400 requests for assistance during the first month of this investigation and about 100 FBI personnel were sent on temporary duty to Germany in support of the PENTTBOM investigation during calendar year 2002 The Legat office also works other requests relating to terrorism foreign counterintelligence organized crime and fugitive cases Legat Pretoria The Legat office in Pretoria South Africa ha s responsibility for FBI liaison matters in 15 sub-Saharan countries in Africa Angola Botswana Comoros Diego Garcia Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Mozambique Namibia Seychelles South Africa Swaziland Zambia and Zimbabwe see Exhibit 2-3 The closest country— Botswana—is 150 miles away and Diego Garcia an island in the Indian Ocean is over 3 000 miles away Flights to some of these countries are few in number and travel can be arduous because most of the region is in a third world state of development and has 16 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED EXHIBIT 2-3 LEGAT PRETORIA TERRITORY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA DIEGO GARCIA D MALAWI COMOROS SEYCHELLES r ANGOLA ZAMBIA I --- o 0n t ll NAMIBIA BOTSWANA M MAAD DAAG GAAS SCCAA RR ZIMBABWE MO ZA MB IQ UE l l y MAURITIUS SWAZILAND Pretoria SOUTH AFRICA LESOTHO Legend 17 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Legal Attache Office REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED unstable governments inadequate communication services erratic public transportation unfavorable economic conditions and an escalating rate of violent crime English is the predominant language in most of the countries with the exceptions of Angola Mozambique Comoros Lesotho and Madagascar where other languages including Portuguese Arabic Sesotho and French are spoken South Africa is a developing na tion about twice the size of the state of Texas The country enjoys a reasonably well-established infrastructure access to world financial markets and abundant natural resources Between the 1970s and the early 1990s relations between the United States and South Africa were adversely affected by South Africa’s racial policies In 1994 South Africa became a democracy when Nelson Mandela was elected President of the new South Africa bringing the era of apartheid to an end The Legat Pretoria office became operational in June 1997 It is located in the capital city of Pretoria South Africa and at the time of our review was staffed by a Legat one ALAT and one Office Assistant Legat Pretoria does not have any sub-offices in its territory According to the FY 2002 Legal Attaché Annual Accomplishment Report the Legat has visited every country in his territory at least once with the exception of Diego Garcia and Lesotho The Legat told us that he would like to make more frequent liaison trips to the other countries in his region but that other work priorities and travel budget constraints limited the number of visits made Further much of the Legat’s work pertains to South Africa thus the need for contact with most of the other countries is relatively infrequent The Legat stated that he is usually able to get needed information from countries in his territory either through his own contacts in police departments or by working with the Regional Security Officers at the U S embassies in these other countries Besides high rates of HIV AIDS a 30 percent unemployment rate and illiteracy crime is one of the most pressing societal problems facing South Africa today The incidence of rape for example is reportedly one of the highest in the world Murders car jackings and home invasions are common occurrences and cross all economic classes According to the FY 2002 Legal Attaché Annual Accomplishment Report there has been an influx of Russian Eurasian Italian and Asian criminal syndicates because of the availability of modern transportation communication and banking systems in South Africa 18 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Also according to the 2002 Legal Attaché Annual Accomplishment Report the cumulative effect of several bombings that occurred in the region domestic right wing activity in South Africa and requests for assistance related to investigations pertaining to chemical biological materials CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED The office also receives requests for assistance related to organized crime and the extradition of fugitives Legat Tokyo Legat Tokyo has responsibility for liaison matters in Japan and the Republic of China Taiwan see Exhibit 2-4 Japan is slightly smaller than the state of California and has a population of about 126 million It is a major economic power in the region and globally The Japan-United States alliance is considered the cornerstone of U S security interests in Asia and Japan provides bases material and support to about 50 000 U S troops stationed in the country Tokyo is the capital and the largest city and has a population of over 14 million Taiwan is one of the most densely populated countries in the world with a population of about 23 million in an area about the size of West Virginia The U S government does not officially recognize the government of Taiwan Rather the American Institute of Taiwan a nonprofit corporation incorporated in the Commonwealth of Virginia functions like a U S Embassy without diplomatic status and pursues U S interests Taipei the capital of Taiwan is located about 1 300 miles from Tokyo The primary languages spoken in Japan and Taiwan are Japanese and Mandarin Chinese respectively—limited English is spoken in both countries Legat Tokyo opened in 1954 and like Legat Ottawa is one of the oldest Legat offices At the time of our review it was staffed by a Legat an ALAT and two Office Assistants The current Legat was also an ALAT in Tokyo between 1987 and 1992 Both the Legat and the ALAT are fluent in Japanese At the time of our visit a special agent was on a 30-day temporary assignment to help manage the workload while the Legat and ALAT were traveling and on leave This individual was also fluent in Japanese 19 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED EXHIBIT 2-4 MAP OF LEGAT TOKYO TERRITORY JAPAN AND TAIWAN JAPAN Tokyo ' TAIWAN Legend Legal Attache Office 20 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED According to the Legat about 75 percent of the office’s workload involves Japan and most of his liaisons are with Japanese officials in Tokyo He periodically makes visits to Japanese law enforcement officials outside the Tokyo area The Law for International Assistance in Investigation LIAI in Japan governs and limits how requests for information from the FBI to Japanese law enforcement agencies are handled and according to the Legat there are many legal restrictions on the ability of the FBI to obtain information Compared to Japan there are fewer restrictions on the ability of the FBI to obtain information in Taiwan The Legat told us that distance and travel budget constraints limit visits to Taiwan to about six times per year However he maintains frequent contact with law enforcement and intelligence authorities in Taiwan through telephone and written correspondence In addition some representatives of these agencies are posted to Tokyo Because the United States does not officially recognize Taiwan or its government the Legat cannot meet with these officials in their offices or on the premises of the U S Embassy Thus the Legat periodically meets with them in public places in Tokyo Historically according to the Legat organized crime was the top priority of the Tokyo Legat but this has been overshadowed in recent years by counterterrorism and counterintelligence issues Nevertheless organized crime particularly in Japan remains a threat to U S int erests and the Legat has maintained a longstanding cooperative relationship with Japanese law enforcement officials who investigate organized crime matters The Japanese organized crime syndication known as Boryokudan or the Yakusa has approximately 80 000 members and consists of many groups and subgroups Boryokudan groups reportedly participate in criminal activity in the United States through money laundering drug trafficking gun smuggling and a wide variety of financial fraud In Taiwan organized crime has been growing in recent years The major organized crime groups in Taiwan are the Triads consisting of about 45-50 gangs the largest of which operate internationally including major metropolitan areas of the United States While counterterrorism matters are Legat Tokyo’s top priority its September 30 2002 Legal Attaché Annual Accomplishment Report indicated that the threat of terrorism in Japan and Taiwan was low in part because of their small Muslim Middle Eastern populations However the large U S military and business presence in Japan 21 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED coupled with the country’s support of the war on terrorism makes Japan an attractive target for terrorist acts according to the report As a result a significant amount of the Legat’s liaison efforts with Japanese law enforcement and intelligence agencies have centered on terrorism matters and PENTTBOM-related leads In the foreign counterintelligence area both Japan and Taiwan are very developed countries and as a result they offer numerous opportunities for economic espionage In addition the U S military presence in Japan is always a target for foreign counterintelligence operations 22 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED CHAPTER 3 LEGAT INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES A key function of the FBI’s Legal Attaché offices involves responding to requests for investigative assistance known as investigative leads from FBI headquarters and field offices These requests range from simple tasks such as tracing telephone numbers or obtaining copies of documents to more complex time-consuming activities such as tracking financial transactions locating suspected criminals and terrorists or interviewing individuals in connection with a matter under investigation Because the Legats lack the jurisdiction to carry out investigations in foreign countries they rely on their role as an intermediary to obtain cooperation and assistance from their foreign police liaisons which in turn conduct the inquiries on behalf of the FBI In recent years the number of leads handled by Legats has grown significantly primarily due to an increase in international crimes and terrorism but also because the number of Legat offices has grown Overall Legats appear to have been able to cope with the increasing workload Legat Ottawa however has a significant volume of pending leads —a longstanding problem that the FBI has not addressed adequately In addition we found that controls over temporary duty travel by FBI personnel to Canada needs strengthening Specifically the FBI could not provide us with documentation showing that required Ambassador approval known as a country clearance had been obtained for 135 of the 422 personnel who traveled to Canada during a 19-month period between October 2001 and April 2003 Legats’ Process for Responding to Investigative Leads When a federal crime occurs the FBI office in the vicinity of the crime must decide whether to open an investigation 18 If it decides to do so the office is known as the Office of Origin and the investigation is referred to as a case When the Office of Origin needs assistance on a case from another field office FBI headquarters or a Legal Attaché office it prepares a request which is known as a lead At the time we began our fieldwork there were two categories of leads _____________ 18 These decisions are based on a variety of factors including priorities set by headquarters knowledge of the local criminal environment interest of other federal agencies in the jurisdiction and the prosecution threshold of the local U S Attorney’s Office 23 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED administrative which involve non-investigative tasks and investigative which are case-related tasks in this review we focused on investigative leads 19 Legats receive leads when an investigation by the Office of Origin identifies issues that need to be pursued in a country in the Legat’s assigned territory Leads are a significant component of the Legal Attaché office’s workload and prompt resolution of the leads can be critical to the FBI’s investigations in the United States When an Office of Origin ini tiates an investigation the case is entered into the Automated Case Support ACS system the FBI’s centralized records and case management system The case is assigned an identification number and an investigative program An investigative program such as Counterterrorism or Violent Crimes Major Offenders VCMO program provides oversight for the investigation of particular groupings of classifications For example when a “272C” case is opened money laundering it is assigned to the VCMO program When an Office of Origin determines that leads need to be pursued by other offices such as Legats it prepares an electronic communication EC within ACS 20 The request typically includes background information on the investigation priority level 21 and instructions on what action is required from the receiving office For example the request may ask the Legat to identify the subscriber of a telephone number identify and track financial transactions locate suspects or conduct interviews The amount of work involved in responding to these requests can vary widely depending on the nature of the request _____________ 19 Effective March 1 2003 the investigative and administrative lead categories were replaced by three new lead categories “Action Required ” “Discretionary Action ” and “Information Only ” 20 An electronic communication is a standardized communication component of the ACS system which is used to create letters memoranda and other internal FBI documents 21 Leads are assigned one of four priority levels immediate priority routine and deadline according to the speed of service required For example an immediate priority lead requires prompt action while a routine priority lead requires information or action within the normal course of business 24 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED An Office Assistant in each Legat office checks ACS to determine if any new leads have been assigned to their office The applicable ECs are printed and assigned to investigative personnel At the Legal Attaché offices we reviewed the leads were usually assigned to individual agents by investigative program such as Counterterrorism or Violent Crimes Major Offenders Legat staff at the four Legal Attachés we reviewed confirmed that their offices’ top priority was to address leads pertaining to counterterrorism matters and thus counterterrorism leads are typically worked before others Investigative personnel review the action requested and determine which foreign law enforcement or intelligence agencies can provide the needed assistance They then prepare a request to the law enforcement agency or agencies and either hand deliver facsimile or mail the request The Legat personnel cannot undertake these investigations on their own because they do not have law enforcement jurisdiction in foreign countries Thus they rely on their law enforcement contacts in the foreign country to obtain an answer to the lead Legat personnel keep track of their assigned leads and follow up when necessary Once an answer is received in whole or in part the Legat staff analyzes the information and sends a response to the Office of Origin Legats Have Coped With Sizeable Rise in Leads As Exhibit 3-1 shows investigative leads handled by Legal Attaché offices have increased significantly In the 5-year period between FYs 1998 and 2002 the number of leads rose from 20 267 to 53 105 an increase of about 162 percent The increase in investigative leads assigned to Legats is largely attributable to the surge in international crime and terrorism especially leads related to the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001 Another contributing factor is that the FBI opened 14 new Legal Attaché offices and 2 suboffices during this period As these offices develop relationships with their foreign law enforcement counterparts additional leads are generated As Exhibit 3-1 also shows despite the sharp increase in leads the number of pending leads has remained relatively stable increasing from 6 489 in FY 1998 to 7 683 in FY 2002 or about 18 percent Compared another way the data shows that pending leads as a percent of total leads have decreased from 32 to 14 percent during the 5-year period as Exhibit 3-2 illustrates 25 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED EXHIBIT 3-1 INVESTIGATIVE LEADS BY FISCAL YEAR FOR ALL LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES 60 DOO l53 101'1 50 DOO i c w 40 DOO c iin 45 422 io aoo Comple1ed Le d· iii ' a Pending Leads JJ 115 W DOO 14 2 47 211 WJ 111 080 10 DOO 8 489 6 1111 11 StD B t NI 7 1118S 0 FY 96 fY gg FYOO F'r' 01 f' t12 FISCAL'r£AR Note The overall totals for FY 1998 1999 and 2000 do not reconcile to the totals for completed leads and pending leads We obtained these numbers from the ACS Leads Summary report and FBI staff have not been able to explain the discrepancies For example the data provided by the FBI showed that leads totaled 20 267 in FY 1998 but pending leads 6 489 and completed leads 14 247 totaled 20 736 or a difference of 469 leads Source FBI Legat – Leads Summary Administrative Report Recap EXHIBIT 3-2 PENDING LEADS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL LEADS FISCAL YEAR 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 PERCENT 32 26 24 20 14 Source OIG calculation based on data from FBI Legat – Leads Summary Administrative Report Recap Exhibit 3-3 shows investigative lead data for the four Legal Attaché offices we reviewed Similar to the data for the Legat offices as a whole these four offices have also experienced significant 26 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED increases in the number of leads received completed and pending from FYs 1998 to 2002 EXHIBIT 3-3 INVESTIGATIVE LEADS BY FISCAL YEAR FOR THE FOUR LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES REVIEWED INVESTIGATIVE LEADS 1998 Leads Received Completed Pending 1 192 956 131 Leads Received Completed Pending 2 255 1 257 1 007 Leads Received Completed Pending 38 28 52 Leads Received Completed Pending 597 556 45 FISCAL YEAR 1999 2000 2001 2002 Berlin 1 060 900 1 466 2 554 929 749 1 119 2 274 131 151 347 280 Ottawa 2 667 2 902 3 709 4 545 1 788 1 725 2 634 2 974 880 1 177 1 075 1 571 Pretoria 382 586 729 648 252 378 630 551 130 210 99 97 Tokyo 586 634 731 836 474 568 669 727 112 66 62 109 Note Leads received minus leads completed do not always equal leads pending for FYs 1998 1999 and 2000 We obtained these numbers from the ACS Administrative Report Recap for each office for these years and FBI staff have not been able to explain the discrepancies Source FBI Legat – Leads by Office Administrative Report Recap Review of Pending Leads at Four Offices We judgmentally selected and reviewed a sample of open investigative leads at Legat Ottawa the first location we reviewed because the volume of pending leads was significant in that office and because we were told that the files for closed leads were not readily available due to space limitations within the Embassy To be consistent we also reviewed judgmentally selected samples of pending leads at the other three Legats Consequently because our samples of pending leads were judgmentally selected and because we did not review closed leads our results are not necessarily representative of how the offices responded to their leads overall 27 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED As Exhibit 3-4 shows we reviewed 114 leads that were pending at the time of our review of these offices We identified minor discrepancies at all four of the offices involving 28 leads which remained open in ACS yet all the work had been completed The Legal Attachés acknowledged that these leads should have been closed In addition we found that two offices Ottawa and Pretoria were sometimes slow to either initiate work on a lead conduct follow up or respond to the Office of Origin The Legal Attachés in these two offices acknowledged the delays but explained that they occurred because the offices concentrated on higher priority matters EXHIBIT 3-4 PENDING LEADS REVIEWED AND EXCEPTIONS AT THE FOUR LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES LEGAT OFFICES Berlin Ottawa Pretoria Tokyo TOTALS LEADS SAMPLED 32 33 25 24 114 EXCEPTIONS NOT CLOSED UNTIMELY IN ACS RESPONSE 2 0 9 22 2 9 15 0 28 31 The following are examples of some of the delays we identified during our review of Pretoria and Ottawa’s open investigative lead files • The New York field office asked Legat Pretoria on August 9 2001 to investigate certain individuals and interview them if necessary regarding allegations that had been made about weapons and explosives bound for the United States The lead was designated routine by the Office of Origin meaning that action was required within “the normal course of business ” However no action had been taken on this lead more than 16 months later when we reviewed it in January 2003 According to the ALAT the lead was overlooked and added that he would follow up • On September 25 2001 the Buffalo field office asked Legat Ottawa to conduct a background check on an individual who had sent photographs of the World Trade Center destruction to a former co-worker and to conduct a follow-up investigation if necessary This lead was designated routine The lead was assigned to an agent on May 14 2002 almost 8 months later at which time action was taken to initiate requests to Canadian 28 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED law enforcement authorities Subsequent follow up action was not taken until another 10 months later when second letters were sent to the Canadian law enforcement agencies According to the Legat the office was understaffed and was busy addressing higher priority PENTTBOM leads • On January 11 2001 the New York field office requested that Legat Ottawa contact Canadian authorities in an effort to obtain current information relative to possible terrorist and or criminal activities of two subjects in Canada This request was designated as a priority lead meaning that action needed to be initiated within 24 hours However the Legat did not send requests to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service CSIS and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police RCMP until March 8 and April 6 2001 respectively CSIS responded on June 6 2001 and Legat Ottawa forwarded their information to the New York field office and kept the lead open pending a response from the RCMP However action was not taken to follow up with the RCMP until September 24 2002 over 17 months later Backlog of Pending Leads in Ottawa According to FBI officials Legat Ottawa has a heavy workload and receives a large volume of leads relative to most other offices because its proximity to the United States results in its playing a substantial role in supporting many FBI investigative matters This heavy workload has resulted in a backlog of pending leads As Exhibit 3-5 shows as of June 30 2003 Legat Ottawa had 1 134 leads pending the highest number of pending leads of any Legal Attaché office 22 In comparison the other Legat offices averaged 104 pending investigative leads on the same date According to the Ottawa Legat about one-half of the backlog consisted primarily of white-collar criminal matters such as telemarketing fraud child pornography organized crime and Internet scams _____________ 22 As of December 31 2003 Legat Ottawa had 1 335 pending leads 29 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED EXHIBIT 3-5 PENDING INVESTIGATIVE LEADS BY LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICE AS OF JUNE 30 2003 PENDING LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICE LEADS Almaty Kazakhstan 35 Amman Jordan 39 Ankara Turkey 68 Athens Greece 65 Bangkok Thailand 89 Beijing China 20 Bern Switzerland 179 Berlin Germany 167 Bogotá Colombia 48 Brasilia Brazil 56 Bridgetown Barbados 45 Brussels Belgium 97 Bucharest Romania 39 Buenos Aires Argentina 33 Cairo Egypt 63 Canberra Australia 71 Caracas Venezuela 29 Copenhagen Denmark 59 Hong Kong SAR China 45 Islamabad Pakistan 48 Kiev Ukraine 64 Lagos Nigeria 69 London England 450 Madrid Spain 83 Manila Philippines 116 Mexico City Mexico 339 Miami United States Liaison Office NA Moscow Russia 169 Nairobi Kenya 22 New Delhi India 69 Ottawa Canada 1 134 Panama City Panama 22 Paris France 465 Prague Czech Republic 42 Pretoria South Africa 89 Riyadh Saudi Arabia 399 Rome Italy 165 Santiago Chile 21 Santo Domingo Dominican Republic 71 Seoul South Korea 96 Singapore Singapore 173 Tallinn Estonia 32 Tel Aviv Israel 92 Tokyo Japan 83 Vienna Austria 108 Warsaw Poland 24 TOTAL 5 692 Source ACS Administrative Recap Report for the 9 months ending June 30 2003 30 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED The Legat also told us that several factors account for the backlog Many pending investigative matters could not be fully addressed between 1999 and 2001 becaus e a majority of the personnel assigned to the Ottawa Legal Attaché office were working full-time on the BORDERBOM case Soon thereafter the September 11 terrorist attacks occurred which resulted in a huge upsurge in investigative leads —more than 7 000—that had to be pursued before any others Because of the heavy workload associated with the BORDERBOM and PENTTBOM investigations the office had a difficult time keeping up with other lower priority but still important leads In addition the Legal At taché told us that Canadian authorities were sometimes slow to respond to the FBI’s requests partly because of the significant volume of requests that were submitted to them Officials from a component of the CSIS one of Legat Ottawa’s primary liaisons for example told us that the number of requests they received from the Legat office after September 11 increased by 300 percent and each request had to be researched They added that the increased volume of these requests presented a major challenge for their agency We believe another contributing factor to the office’s backlog could be the process it used for requesting and obtaining information from Canadian law enforcement and intelligence authorities The process was paper intensive and time consuming especially given the volume of leads Ottawa staff advised that they spent considerable time typing requests for assistance and often a lead required requests to both of the Legat’s primary liaisons CSIS officials told us that the hard-copy correspondence they received from the Legat slowed down their ability to respond because CSIS was highly automated and operated in a virtually paperless environment Consequently preparing hard-copy responses to the Legat’s requests was time consuming CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED The Legat acknowledged the inefficiency of the office’s process for requesting information from the foreign liaisons and told us in October 2002 that plans were underway to establish an electronic link with CSIS and the RCMP During a follow up visit to Ottawa in April 2003 the Legat told us an electronic link had been set up with CSIS that now allows the office to transmit its requests and receive responses electronically and we were provided with a demonstration of 31 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED the process The Legat added that he hoped to establish a similar electronic link with the RCMP in the near future As of October 2003 this had not yet occurred Ottawa Backlog Previously Reported by FBI Inspection Division The last two reviews conducted of the Ottawa Legal Attaché Office by the FBI’s Inspection Division reported that the office was having difficulty addressing its heavy workload For example the July 1998 inspection noted that the number of leads assigned to Legat Ottawa had increased by 122 percent since a previous inspection in 1993 yet the staffing level had remained the same The report added that because of the excessive workload in the office investigative personnel were unable to properly follow up on the large number of outstanding leads The report recommended that Ottawa’s staffing levels be reviewed In response FBI headquarters officials said they would dispatch TDY personnel to Ottawa until the workload was brought to a manageable level and would monitor the office’s workload and provide continued TDY assistance until a permanent solution was found A subsequent inspection of the Ottawa Legat in July 2001 indicated that the backlog of pending leads persisted and concluded that the office’s staffing level was inadequate to address the workload The report noted that during the inspection period 31 special agents and 15 support employees were detailed to the Legat to help with the workload The report went on to say however that this short -term strategy of assigning TDY personnel on a continuing basis to address the huge backlog of leads was not cost effective and did not lend itself to the assignment of long-term complex matters to TDY personnel The inspection report recommended that the FBI consider assigning permanent rather than temporary staff to reduce the backlog Actions Taken by FBI Have Yet to Fully Address the Backlog In response to the Inspection reports the FBI has continued to send staff to Legat Ottawa on a temporary basis For example since the last Inspection in July 2001 through the end of fiscal year 2002 a total of 47 additional special agents and support personnel were assigned to help reduce the office’s workload Temporary staff continued to be sent in FY 2003 including two agents from the Criminal Division specifically tasked to work on the unaddressed whitecollar crime leads 32 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED The FBI’s heavy reliance on short -term temporary duty staff has had limited success however in reducing the backlog of pending leads in Ottawa and in our opinion the use of TDY staff does not appear to be an efficient or effective solution According to the Legat most of the temporary personnel are assigned for 30 to 60 days which is disruptive to the operation because it is not enough time to master the process for requesting assistance from Canadian law enforcement authorities or work on complex matters For example the Legat said that TDY agents often initiate requests with Canadian law enforcement authorities but return stateside before a response is received thus necessitating someone else usually another TDY agent to become familiar with the matter and to prepare the response to the Office of Origin The use of TDY staff is also disruptive the Legat said because each new temporary employee needs training and closer supervision than permanently assigned staff In 2001 the FBI opened a sub-office in Vancouver staffed by one ALAT and one Office Assistant A second sub-office to be located in Toronto and staffed by two ALATs and one Office Assistant was approved in 2003 OIO officials told us in November 2003 however that the sub-office was unlikely to be opened due to difficulty locating suitable space in a controlled access area The establishment of the sub-office in Vancouver and the one in Toronto if opened could alleviate some of the workload in Ottawa but these sub-offices will likely create additional work as new liaisons are established At the end of FY 2001 the Ottawa Legat had four agents and four office assistants During FY 2002 an additional ALAT position was reallocated to Ottawa from the Mexico City Legal Attaché Office and the FBI plans to fill an additional ALAT position during FY 2004 for a total of two additional agents Therefore in FY 2004 Legat Ottawa will be staffed with 10 permanent positions Controls Over Temporary Duty Travel Need Improvement Department of State rules require that all U S government employees obtain approval from the U S Ambassador before traveling to a foreign country to conduct official business This approval is 33 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED known as a country clearance 23 By Memorandum of Understanding MOU signed by the Department of Justice and the Department of State the FBI has agreed to keep the U S Ambassadors informed beforehand of all FBI employees and their activities in the Ambassadors’ territories At the same time it is also critical for the Legal Attachés to be aware of all FBI personnel who are traveling on official business in their assigned countries or regions Requests for overseas travel must be approved by the Special Agent in Charge of the appropriate field office the Assistant Director in Charge of the Field Division the Assistant Director of the corresponding headquarters division and the Legal Attaché who obtains the country clearance from the U S Ambassador of the destination country Requests vary depending on the circumstances and the country to be visited but at a minimum are expected to include such things as the name of the traveler s purpose and nature of the trip name of country to be visited identity of persons or entities to be contacted proposed itinerary and estimated travel costs Requests and approvals of country clearances are normally processed electronically within the ACS system We were told however that sometimes clearances are processed outside the ACS system and that no mechanism is in place to ensure that the required clearances are obtained On at least two occasions since 2000 the FBI has issued memoranda to its employees emphasizing the importance of obtaining country clearances In a July 2000 memorandum OIO reported instances where FBI personnel had traveled to foreign countries without obtaining the required country clearances Without identifying the countries involved the July 2000 memorandum stated that some FBI personnel traveled repeatedly without obtaining country clearances and as a result a U S Ambassador denied the FBI permission to travel to or through the foreign country until discussions were held at the highest levels of the FBI and the Department of State In other instances the memorandum noted that an Ambassador denied country clearances when the requests for country clearances were presented late The memorandum emphasized that _____________ 23 FBI personnel traveling abroad on official business are also required to travel on official rather than personal passports issued by the Department of State Passport Office The travelers may also be required to obtain a visa—a permit affixed on the passport which allows the bearer to transit through or enter into a foreign country for a specified period of time 34 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED the failure to obtain country clearances was more than a breach of etiquette it violated the Departments of Justice and State Memorandum of Understanding requiring the FBI to keep U S Ambassadors informed of all activities and operations of FBI employees within the Ambassadors’ territories In March 2002 the FBI Director issued a memorandum to all Special Agents in Charge noting that Legats were continuing to encounter inappropriate actions on the part of domestic agents who apparently were unaware of international rules The Director pointed out that FBI employees must contact the appropriate Legat and request and obtain country clearance before traveling to any country as a representative of the Executive Branch of the U S government The Ottawa Legal Attaché told us that he believed that some FBI personnel were traveling into Canada on official business without his knowledge and therefore without the required country clearances Because this appeared to be a continuing problem and because we noted that country clearances were not an area covered during FBI inspections of Legat offices we requested that the Travel Advance and Payment Unit in the FBI’s Finance Division identify all personnel who had traveled on official business to Canada between October 1 2001 and April 17 2003 After adjusting the list for travel that either had not occurred was listed in error or involved duplicate entries we determined that 422 people on the list had traveled to Canada during this period 24 We compared the Travel Unit’s list to the Legat’s list of personnel who had received country clearances According to the Legat’s records only 173 of these FBI employees had been granted country clearance However the Legat acknowledged that his list was not necessarily complete and said that some country clearances could have been overlooked and not added to the list especially soon after _____________ 24 Because the information we were seeking was not readily available the Travel Unit ran a special program to query the database of travel vouchers to identify travelers to Canada during this period using data from the FBI’s Financial Management System The query included all the major cities in Canada and the term “Canada” and therefore should have captured most FBI personnel who traveled to Canada during the period According to the Travel Unit Chief however this list may not be complete for various reasons such as incomplete travel destination information on the travel vouchers or because of data input errors We also obtained similar data for Germany 35 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED September 11 At FBI headquarters we asked OIO staff to research the remaining 249 names for evidence of country clearance Through research of the ACS system OIO found approved country clearances for 75 personnel who were not on the Legat’s list and claimed that 39 others had attended a conference in Toronto and had received a blanket country clearance For the remaining 135 personnel OIO was unable to locate a record of either a country clearance request or approval in ACS Subsequent to our exit conference OIO officials directly contacted some of these travelers and were told by some that they had copies of their country clearances While the number of travelers without country clearances may decrease somewhat as a result the fact that OIO had to contact individuals rather than obtaining this information from a centralized source in our opinion demonstrates an absence of internal control over these records We recognize that our review period started on October 1 2001 shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks Given the national emergency and the need for an immediate response by the FBI we can understand why many FBI personnel might have traveled to Canada without obtaining country clearances beforehand Indeed according to the information provided by the Travel Unit 18 of the 135 FBI employees lacking country clearance traveled to Canada between October and December 2001 and 94 traveled during 2002 Nevertheless our analysis also indicates that some FBI personnel have continued to travel to Canada long after the September 11 attacks without a country clearance Of the 135 people lacking country clearance 23 traveled between January 2003 and April 2003 In our opinion the continued lack of compliance with FBI procedures and Department of Justice and State agreements is not defensible We also found discrepancies between the Travel Advance and Payment Unit’s list of 183 FBI employees who had traveled to Germany between October 2001 and June 2003 and Legat Berlin’s records of country clearances 58 of the travelers had not obtained a country clearance according to the Legat’s records We asked OIO staff to research the ACS system for evidence of country clearances and based on the documentation or the explanation subsequently provided we concluded that for 9 travelers the FBI had no record of a country clearance 36 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Conclusions Legal Attaché offices generally appear to have been able to cope with the sharp increase in investigative leads in the last five years But backlogs of investigative leads have been a longstanding problem at the Ottawa Legat and efforts to reduce the backlog with temporary personnel have not been effective The FBI’s efforts to enhance the permanent staffing of the Ottawa Legat appears to be a step in the right direction although we are not sure that the addition of two agents will be sufficient to significantly reduce the office’s backlog Nevertheless this approach could help alleviate the problems associated with the use of TDY personnel The establishment of the sub-offices in Vancouver and Toronto if opened could also alleviate some of the workload in Ottawa but these sub-offices will likely create additional work as new liaisons are established It is important for U S Ambassadors to be aware of all federal employees who are traveling in a foreign country on official business The Ambassadors rely on FBI Legal Attachés to keep them informed through the country clearance process of all FBI employees both permanent and temporary who are assigned to the Legat’s territory Legal Attachés can do this only if FBI personnel follow procedures for requesting country clearances before traveling abroad and if accurate and complete records of country clearances are maintained Based on the results of our testing in Canada and to a lesser extent in Germany it appears that some FBI personnel traveling on official business have not obtained appropriate country clearances Previous OIO memoranda apparently have not been sufficient to eliminate this problem In addition both Legat Ottawa and Berlin’s records of country clearances were incomplete and further research by OIO personnel did not provide documentation for all of the remaining discrepancies Consequently we believe the FBI needs to take stronger measures to ensure that country clearances are obtained as required and develop a system that ensures that complete records of country clearances are maintained In addition the FBI’s Inspection Division should include compliance with country clearance requirements as part of its reviews of FBI offices 37 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Recommendations We recommend that the FBI 1 Analyze the staffing level in Ottawa and initiate action to adjust the permanent staff levels commensurate with the workload 2 Implement a process that ensures that FBI personnel obtain country clearances before they travel to foreign countries on official business and develop a system that ensures complete records of these clearances are maintained 3 Direct the Inspection Division to review compliance with country clearance requirements during its inspections 38 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED CHAPTER 4 LIAISON ACTIVITIES WERE EFFECTIVE AT THE LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES REVIEWED We concluded that the Legal Attachés in Canada Germany Japan and South Africa were maintaining effective foreign liaisons Most of the officials we interviewed were complimentary about the Legal Attachés and the working relationship that existed between their offices Many provided examples of how they personally or their agencies in general had worked with the Legal Attaché to solve international crimes Officials in the two countries where English was not the primary language—Japan and Germany—often noted how impressed they were with the ability of Legal Attaché staff to communicate fluently in their language and emphasized the positive impact this ability had on fostering a close working relationship In addition many officials spoke highly of the training provided or arranged by the Legal Attaché We had limited information in advance of our trips regarding the law enforcement structure of the countries we visited or the Legal Attachés liaison contacts in these countries so we relied on the Legal Attachés to identify their key foreign law enforcement liaisons and arrange the meetings with officials from these and other agencies While an argument could be made that such a selection might be biased in favor of the FBI we have no reason to believe this was the case We found the discussions to be frank and open and the comments were not always positive We also were able to satisfy ourselves that the agencies we contacted provided a cross-section of the Legats’ liaison activities The Legal Attachés or their staff sometimes introduced us to their foreign liaisons which provided us with an opportunity to observe firsthand their interaction with these officials However Legat staff did not attend our meetings with the foreign liaisons When the services of translators were needed we either hired them or used translators provided by the foreign agency Details of Liaison Activity and Accomplishments by Office The following sections present information on the law enforcement structure in the countries visited the views of foreign officials at the agencies we contacted and examples of specific 39 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED investigations that were worked in conjunction with foreign law enforcement agencies The examples were obtained primarily from fiscal year 2001 and 2002 Legal Attaché Annual Accomplishment Reports and from discussions with Legat staff 25 In most instances our meetings with foreign agencies were with high-level officials and so we generally did not discuss specific investigations Rather these discussions focused on broader issues such as • The nature of their relationship with the Legal Attaché including the type and frequency of contact • The types of investigations support and information provided to the Legal Attachés’ office • Restrictions or obstacles that limited their ability to provide information to the Legal Attaché office • Responsiveness of the Legal Attaché to their requests for information assistance or training • The types of training provided or arranged by the Legal Attaché • Their views on the effectiveness of the Legal Attaché office Legat Ottawa - The Legat Ottawa’s primary liaison contacts in Canada are with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service CSIS both of which are components of the Office of the Solicitor General A significant amount of the Legat’s time is spent making requests for information to these two agencies and furnishing the results to the requesting FBI field offices or FBI headquarters In addition Legat staff participate in joint investigations with Canadian law enforcement agencies and serve as liaison with Canadian law enforcement for FBI personnel from the United States who are in Canada working on investigations The RCMP is the national police force in Canada it provides police services to most of the Canadian provinces and territories and is the local police force for about 200 municipalities The RCMP is Legat Ottawa’s primary point of contact for most law enforcement issues in _____________ 25 The Legal Attaché Accomplishment reports provide detailed information about the office’s operations and accomplishments for the past year 40 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Canada We interviewed officials from the RCMP’s International Operations Financial Crimes and Immigration and Passport Branches at the agency’s headquarters in Ottawa All stated that they had a productive and close working relationship and frequent contact with the Legat and his staff and mentioned that some of their officers had attended the FBI’s National Academy The RCMP officials praised the Legat’s counterterrorism efforts since the BORDERBOM case and the September 11 terrorist attacks but expressed concern that the Legat’s heavy counterterrorism workload had created a gap in the Legat’s ability to pursue other serious crimes with a connection to Canada Legat Ottawa’s other principal liaison is with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service CSIS which is engaged in intelligence gathering and investigations involving threats to Canadian security such as SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED and sabotage foreigninfluenced activities political violence and terrorism and subversion CSIS is not a law enforcement agency and if the information it collects indicates possible criminal activity the RCMP has jurisdiction CSIS is a domestic intelligence agency CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED CSIS is headquartered in Ottawa and has regional offices throughout Canada We interviewed representatives from the Counter Intelligence Counter Terrorism Counter Proliferation and the Foreign Liaison and Visits Branches of CSIS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED in Washington D C On the other hand they pointed out that the Legat appeared to be short -handed and as a result often relied on temporary FBI personnel to fill in the gaps Several of the officials indicated that long-term relationships were especially important in the intelligence business Thus they were not as comfortable sharing information with FBI personnel on temporary duty and with whom they had not developed such a relationship Officials from the Office of the Solicitor General roughly the Canadian equivalent of the U S Department of Justice told us they frequently dealt with the Legal Attaché on political and policy matters such as the logistics associated with Solicitor General or DOJ officials’ trips to each others’ countries They said that the Legat was always helpful and responsive in dealing with the many details involved in such trips On the other hand these officials said there was a lot of misunderstanding on the part of the public and some government officials in Canada regarding the FBI’s presence especially because this presence was growing While these officials thought the Legat had 41 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED made a reasonable effort to explain the rationale for the FBI’s presence they felt he could do more to “market” the program Representatives from the Ottawa Police Service and the Police Chief of the Toronto Police Service indicated they had little direct contact with the Legal Attaché office because the FBI typically went through the RCMP for information Nevertheless Ottawa police officials said they knew the Legal Attaché and di d not hesitate to contact him when necessary They mentioned a burglary of a Canadian Immigration office that occurred just prior to a visit by the President of the United States in which several uniforms were stolen The Deputy Police Chief said she immediately notified the Legal Attaché of the incident One difference between Legat Ottawa and the other Legats we reviewed was that because of Canada’s proximity to the United States FBI field offices near the border have for many years worked closely with Canadian police authorities This creates a potential for conflict if the Legat who is responsible for all FBI activities in Canada is not kept apprised of what contacts field offices are making in Canada However the Chief of the Toronto Police Service told us that over the years he had developed a strong working relationship with the FBI’s Buffalo New York field office and consequently preferred to deal with agents from that office rather than the Legat staff in Ottawa We discussed the Chief’s comments with the Legat and he told us that in the past the Buffalo field office had nominated Toronto law enforcement officials to participate in FBI National Academy training programs without his input or concurrence After he had raised his concerns about the practice the Buffalo field office began to seek his input Nevertheless he still believed he was in effect competing against the Buffalo field office in providing training slots at the FBI National Academy for Canadian law enforcement officials We brought this issue up with FBI Headquarters officials at the exit conference and they subsequently provided documents which discussed the establishment of a “Border Liaison Officer” position in the Buffalo field office Such positions have been in existence on the Mexican border and in the Caribbean since the early 1990s and are designed to help FBI field offices deal with the myriad of criminal activity occurring across the border with Mexico and the Caribbean According to the documents provided the Buffalo Border Liaison Officer is responsible for coordinating contacts with Canadian law 42 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED enforcement and intelligence agencies in the Buffalo Niagara border region and keeping Legat Ottawa apprised of these contacts Determining whether the Buffalo field office appropriately coordinates its contacts in Canada with the Legat was beyond the scope of our review However the police chief’s comments raise a concern In our opinion the role of the Legat could be diluted if Buffalo field office personnel are not coordinating their activities with the Legat Further if the Toronto sub-office is ultimately opened the FBI could be perceived by Canadian authorities as being disjointed if both the Legat sub-office and Buffalo staff are meeting with the same Canadian authorities and not coordinating their efforts In addition other FBI field offices near the Canadian border may have similar contacts with their Canadian counterparts all of which in our opinion should be coordinated with Legat Ottawa The following are examples of Legat Ottawa’s liaison efforts and accomplishments in Canada obtained primarily from the Annual Accomplishment Reports • Legat Ottawa worked extensively with the RCMP on the BORDERBOM case In December 1999 an Algerian national Ahmed Ressam was arrested by U S authorities on the Canadian border in Washington State while attempting to bring explosives into the United States It was subsequently learned that he had intended to bomb Los Angeles International Airport FBI agents from the United States were detailed to Ottawa and Vancouver to pursue leads on the case and the Legat supported the effort both administratively and operationally CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED • In late 2002 an American citizen was arrested by the RCMP for drunken driving in Inuvik North West Territories Soon afterwards the sheriff in Montgomery County North Carolina ran a name check through the NCIC on a suspect in the murder of Jennifer Short a 9-year old girl whose body had been found on a property in Stoneville North Carolina in September 2002 When the sheriff’s office learned that the RCMP had arrested the suspect the Sheriff’s investigators on the case were ordered to travel to Canada to interview the subject and search his van apparently under the erroneous assumption that the North Carolina search warrant would be valid in Canada When the Legat learned of the situation he attempted to get the local FBI office to intercede with the Sheriff and cancel the trip When 43 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED that failed he sent the Vancouver ALAT to Inuvik in advance of the investigative team’s arrival to ensure that evidence was obtained in accordance with Canadian law and the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Canada and that positive relations were maintained with the RCMP According to the Legat the lack of experience and training in handling international investigations on the part of the local sheriff could have jeopardized the case • The Legat is assisting FBI headquarters and the New York and Detroit field offices in tracking the movements of members of the CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED across the U S Canada border by continually tracking leads and setting up conferences and meetings with its Canadian law enforcement and intelligence contacts to exchange information • Over 150 murders have been attributed to motorcycle gangs such as the Hell’s Angels and the Outlaws in the Province of Quebec The gangs are also well established in the maritime and western pacific provinces and their influence is spreading to Ontario Ontario police authorities have expanded their enforcement efforts against the gangs and the Legat facilitated the attendance of Canadian law enforcement officials at an FBI conference on outlaw motorcycle gangs in August 2002 The Legat also facilitated a meeting between RCMP and FBI headquarters officials to discuss the exchange of information and targeting of cross border motorcycle gang activity Legat Berlin – Legat Berlin’s primary liaison contacts in Germany are with the German federal criminal police — Bundeskriminalamt BKA the CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED and state police agencies known as Landeskriminalamts LKA We interviewed several of the Legat’s foreign liaison contacts in these agencies in Berlin Cologne and Meckenheim Germany These officials were complimentary of the Legat staffs’ professionalism and responsiveness and emphasized appreciation for their language proficiency The BKA is the German federal criminal police It has three locations consisting of a headquarters office in Wiesbaden which includes all criminal case operations a branch office in Meckenheim for all counterterrorism and espionage matters and a branch office in Berlin for protective responsibilities The BKA is the Legat’s primary law enforcement contact in Germany and is responsible for all investigative and liaison relationships between Germany and foreign 44 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED federal law enforcement agencies The Legat contacts the BKA concerning all criminal investigative requests counterterrorism matters where either a specific threat situation exists or a prosecution is imminent and SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED matters where there is evidence to be obtained for presentation in court The BKA reviews the requests determines which technical unit within the BKA should respond and if necessary forwards the request to the appropriate LKA for investigation at the state level The official in charge of the Terrorism Division stated that the BKA has law enforcement officers from several countries besides the United States working in their Counterterrorism Center The personnel from the other countries are permanently assigned to this location In contrast FBI Legat personnel are temporary and according to this official temporary duty staff are not on site long enough to establish effective liaisons with BKA staff The official was pleased however that the Legat staff including those on temporary assignment spoke German When we discussed this with OIO officials they agreed that a permanent presence was desirable However they stated that additional permanent positions abroad have not been funded and as a result a permanent presence in the Counterterrorism Center would have to come from existing resources Two of the BKA officers we spoke with supervised and worked on the Hamburg task force that investigated the terrorist cell whose principals were involved with the attacks of September 11 2001 The FBI and the BKA along with numerous other agencies worked closely together on this investigation they said Nevertheless the BKA officers stated that while they were empowered to share information with the FBI this information sharing was often one -way Authority to give out information seemed to vary from one FBI agent to another and some FBI agents had to check repeatedly with FBI headquarters to determine if they could pass information to the BKA In the BKA officials’ opinion this situation was disruptive to the investigation CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED We interviewed two high-level officials from the Berlin LKA similar to the state police in the United States Both were graduates of the FBI’s National Academy Both officials stated that at their level their contacts with the Legat office were nominal but one of these officials stated that his staff worked closely with Legat personnel He 45 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED also commented that it was absolutely necessary for the FBI to have a presence in Germany especially after the events of September 11 The LKA processed over 38 000 pieces of data related to the September 11 hijackers and helped with tracing their movements from Hamburg The following are examples of Legat Berlin’s accomplishments from their 2002 Annual Accomplishment report • Legat Berlin staff worked extensively with the BKA CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED and numerous state police agencies on matters relating to PENTTBOM especially on the investigation related to the terrorist cell in Hamburg From a search of visa application records at the U S Embassy Legat staff identified several applications with Hamburg addresses related to individuals thought to be connected to the terrorist attacks The addresses were immediately passed to the BKA for follow up Working with the German police Legat staff helped identify over three dozen subjects who were either directly or indirectly involved in the September 11 attacks served multiple arrest and search warrants initiated over 130 wiretaps and interviewed hundreds of persons Through daily interaction with the German police the Legat was able to provide real time intelligence and evidence relating to key subjects involved with the September 11 attacks to FBI Headquarters and field offices • Legat Berlin obtained key evidence in Germany that allowed the U S government to indict Zacharias Moussaoui in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11 The indictment alleges that Moussaoui received funding from sources in Germany • Legat Berlin forwarded information to appropriate U S military criminal investigators about two subjects who were planning to use one of the subject’s access to military installations to detonate an explosive device As a result of the Legat’s and the criminal investigator’s activities the German police searched the subjects’ residences and located explosive devices and materials Both subjects were arrested and remain in custody pending German prosecution Legat Pretoria - The Legat’s primary law enforcement contact in South Africa is wi th the South African Police Service SAPS SAPS 46 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED is a national police force that also performs many of the functions that are performed by local and state police in the United States It is headed by a National Police Commissioner and has its headquarters office in Pretoria Each of the nine provinces in South Africa also has its own SAPS office that is headed by a Provincial Police Commissioner who in turn reports to the National Police Commissioner We interviewed officials from the SAPS’ Crime Intelligence Division the National Central Bureau and the Training Division We also met with the SAPS Provincial Commissioner and his Deputy in Cape Town The Crime Intelligence Division CID within SAPS conducts crime analysis relating to terrorism organized crime various other crimes and intelligence matters The officials stated that their Division receives many requests for assistance from the Legal Attaché office Their liaison efforts with the Legat office focus on organized crime and terrorism issues They have conducted traces and compiled profiles on individuals and performed telephone record checks for the Legat office After CID logs in the Legat’s request it is sent out to the individual provinces for investigation and action when applicable CID then receives and finalizes the response and forwards it to the Legat office The officials discussed an anthrax-related investigation that was worked jointly with the FBI which required many interviews The officials stated that it was a good learning experience for their SAPS officers to see firsthand how the FBI operates and that this investigation was handled very professionally Officials from the National Central Bureau component of SAPS that maintains liaison with INTERPOL said that they worked closely with the Legat office on extradition matters shared information on criminals and conducted criminal checks on behalf of the FBI The officials also said they had helped Legat staff establishing contacts with law enforcement officials in other countries in Southern Africa They commented that the Legat personnel were professional always accessible and responsive The Deputy Commissioner of the SAPS Training Division told us that SAPS has been sending selected senior officers to the FBI’s National Academy since 1996 and upon their return the officers are expected to train other police officers in order to share their newly obtained knowledge He added that in his opinion if the FBI did not have agents “on the ground” in South Africa the communication between the two agencies would be poor He also stated that he was a graduate of the FBI’s National Training Academy He added that he 47 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED was working closely with the Legat on developing a refresher course for FBI’s Academy graduates from African countries The SAPS officials we spoke with in Pretoria did not identify any concerns about their interactions with the Legat during our discussions However when we interviewed the Provincial Commissioner and his Deputy in Cape Town they remarked that the Legat staff had ignored established protocol on at least two occasions by meeting and seeking assistance from subordinate staff on investigative matters without first seeking their permission One of the incidents involving an investigation of a Finnish businessman suspected of selling arms to Iraq had potential international repercussions yet neither their own staff nor the Legat staff had informed them of the matter the Provincial officials said We discussed these comments with the Legat and ALAT They explained that they had met with SAPS police officers in Cape Town after another U S law enforcement official mentioned that the police had information regarding the Finnish businessman’s alleged activities The Legat staff said they quickly determined that the information did not warrant further investigation and said they told the SAPS police officers to inform their superiors about the meeting The Legat staff said they had not seen a need to contact the Provincial Commissioner themselves The following are examples of Legat Pretoria’s liaison efforts and accomplishments partially based on information contained in Legat Pretoria’s 2002 Annual Accomplishment Report • In connection with the AMERITHRAX investigation in the United States Legat Pretoria was asked by the FBI’s AMERITHRAX task force to identify all laboratories and universities in South Africa that handled live anthrax or had the capability of handling live anthrax 26 The Legat was also requested to obtain telephone subscriber information and educational and employment information on a potential subject who had lived in southern Africa In addition the Legat coordinated and set up interviews with 26 individuals who had contact with the subject and assisted staff from the task force and the FBI’s Washington field _____________ 26 AMERITHRAX is the FBI investigation of the mailing of at least four letters in the United States during September through November 2001 that contained Anthrax 48 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED office in conducting the interviews In assisting on this investigation the Legat coordinated with the U S Ambassador in Zimbabwe to allay the concerns of Zimbabwe government officials about an FBI investigation being conducted in their country • Legat Pretoria worked closely with SAPS on the arrest and extradition of fugitive James Kilgore Kilgore was a former member of the Symbionese Liberation Army who was wanted for murder in a 1975 bank robbery in California 27 He had been hiding out in Cape Town under the name Charles Pape until the FBI tracked him down Based on information provided by the Legat SAPS arrested Kilgore in November 2002 He was extradited to the United States and in May 2003 pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to six years in prison Legat Tokyo - Our review of Legat Tokyo’s liaison activities was limited to Japanese law enforcement and intelligence authorities The Legat’s primary law enforcement contacts in Japan are with the Public Security Investigative Agency the Japan National Police Agency and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department According to the Legat contacts with representatives from these agencies occurred frequently often on a daily basis and involve counterterrorism foreign counterintelligence organized crime and other criminal matters such as computer and financial crimes and fugitive apprehensions The Public Security Investigative Agency PSIA is a component of the Ministry of Justice responsible for monitoring potentially dangerous domestic terrorist groups It gathers intelligence on organizations that have the potential for violent subversive activities and disseminates the information to law enforcement agencies We interviewed officials from the Legat’s contact within PSIA the International Division These officials advised that they worked closely with the Legat and readily exchanged information on terrorist threats CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED 28 International Division officials were also complimentary of the Legat and ALAT’s fluency in Japanese their willingness to make presentations at the agency and their ability to obtain slots for PSIA officials at the FBI Academy _____________ 27 The Symbionese Liberation Army was a group of individuals that advocated the violent overthrow of the U S government during the 1970’s 28 CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED 49 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED The Japan National Police Agency NPA is the central law enforcement agency in Japan Its many duties include supervising and controlling prefecture police departments police training and standards of recruitment coordinating efforts to combat transprefectural organized crime and providing international criminal investigative assistance 29 We interviewed representatives from NPA’s Second Organized Crime Control Division Second International Affairs Division and the Foreign Affairs Division Security Bureau Second Organized Crime Control Division officials told us that the Legat and his staff had been very helpful and responsive in providing needed information on the Yakusa’s contacts in the United States Similar to PSIA officials NPA officials were also highly complimentary of the Legat and ALAT’s command of the Japanese language adding that this ability was very helpful in communicating with NPA officials and facilitated getting things done Representatives from the other two NPA components made similar comments adding that although they had their own liaison in Washington D C in order to obtain information from U S law enforcement agencies they often submitted requests through the Legat office because the Legat provided a quicker response The International Criminal Investigation Division ICID of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police investigates crimes committed by foreigners in Tokyo The Superintendent of the ICID told us he had frequent contact with the Legat because many of the crimes the Division investigated had a connection to the United States and because the Legat was a frequent guest at FBI National Academy alumni events Since 1977 he said about 90 Japanese law enforcement officers had graduated from the FBI Academy and about one -half of the graduates worked in the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department many in highlevel positions The Legat also had made a number of presentations at the Metropolitan Police Department and at the Japanese National Police Academy The following are examples of Legat Tokyo’s liaison efforts and accomplishments in Japan taken primarily from the Legal Attaché Annual Accomplishment report _____________ 29 Japan is divided into 47 prefectures or administrative divisions comparable to U S states 50 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED • The Legat has obtained the cooperation of NPA and the Japanese Ministry of the Treasury in locating and freezing assets of persons and organizations suspected of conducting financial transactions with Al Qaeda-related organizations • In connection with the AMERITHRAX investigation the Legat has contacted numerous scientific research and educational institutions in Japan and Taiwan to obtain information on these facilities’ experience with various biological and chemical agents • In conjunction with the Cleveland FBI field office the Legat was involved in an economic espionage investigation of a Japanese scientific researcher employed at the Cleveland Clinic in Cleveland Ohio The researcher along with another individual was alleged to have engaged in the unauthorized removal of the contents of test tube ampules and replaced the contents with water The contents were being used in the search for a cure for Alzheimer’s disease and were sent to a Japanese scientific research laboratory where the suspect was hired after he completed his assignment at the Cleveland Clinic An arrest warrant was issued in May 2001 and the Legat has participated in efforts to have the subject extradited to the United States for trial including taking statements from numerous witnesses under supervision of the Tokyo District High Court in June 2002 At the time of our visit to the Legal Attaché office no decision had been made by the Japanese government regarding the extradition request • In preparation for a World Cup Soccer event held partially in Tokyo in the summer of 2002 the Legat worked with NPA to exchange intelligence information regarding the security arrangements for the event The Legat also helped arrange NPA visits to FBI headquarters and the Salt Lake City field office so Japanese officials could view the security arrangements that had been undertaken there for the February 2002 Winter Olympic Games Conclusion Based on our review of the Legal Attachés in Canada Germany Japan and South Africa we believe that the Legal Attaché program is an important tool in the fight against terrorism and in helping the FBI investigate and solve crimes that have an international connection 51 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Generally the offices we reviewed appeared to be effectively establishing liaisons and working cooperatively with foreign law enforcement agencies In our opinion the FBI would likely experience more difficulty obtaining needed information on international-related investigations if it did not have Legal Attachés stationed abroad In our discussions with foreign law enforcement officials it was readily apparent that the ability of Legats to speak the host country’s language as well as their ability to offer FBI National Academy training slots greatly facilitated their standing in those countries and helped foster effective liaisons One difference between Legat Ottawa and the other Legats we reviewed was that because of Canada’s proximity to the United States FBI field offices near the border have for many years worked directly with Canadian police authorities This creates a potential for conflict if the Legat who is responsible for all FBI activities in Canada is not kept apprised of what field offices are doing The Legat told us that such a situation had occurred in the past specifically the Buffalo field office had nominated Toronto police officials for training at the FBI National Academy without his knowledge or input FBI headquarters officials provided documents after the exit conference which discussed the establishment of a Border Liaison Officer in the Buffalo field office The Border Liaison Officer’s responsibility includes ensuring that appropriate coordination occurs between Buffalo and Legat Ottawa Determining whether the Buffalo field office appropriately coordinates all contacts in Canada with the Legat was beyond the scope of our review However in our opinion the role of the Legat could be diluted if Buffalo field office personnel are not coordinating their activities with the Legat Further if the Toronto sub-office is ultimately opened the FBI could be perceived by Canadian authorities as being disjointed if both the Legat sub-office and Buffalo staff are meeting with the same Canadian authorities and not coordinating their efforts In addition other FBI field offices near the Canadian border may have similar contacts with their Canadian counterparts all of which in our opinion should be coordinated with Legat Ottawa 52 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Recommendation We recommend that the FBI 4 Ensure the Buffalo field office and all FBI field offices coordinate their training and investigative activities involving Canadian authorities with the Ottawa Legat 53 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED CHAPTER 5 LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES COORDINATE ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER U S LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OVERSEAS Besides the FBI many other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies station personnel overseas and as part of their official duties FBI Legal Attachés often interact with these individuals Overlapping interests and jurisdictions among these agencies could be harmful to U S interests and run the risk of antagonizing the host government Moreover a lack of coordination among law enforcement agencies abroad could be detrimental to the ability of the United States to effectively combat international crime and terrorism To avoid such problems statutes as well as agreements between agencies typically delineate their responsibilities overseas In addition U S Ambassadors are responsible for ensuring that overall law enforcement activities are coordinated In addition the FBI’s Legal Attaché Manual emphasizes the importance of maintaining effective liaisons with other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies abroad To determine if FBI Legal Attachés were appropriately coordinating their activities we interviewed the Ambassadors their staff and representatives from selected U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Canada Germany Japan and South Africa These officials uniformly described their interactions with the Legal Attaché offices as positive and they mentioned that the Legat personnel readily collaborated shared information and coordinated their activities with them to avoid duplication of effort U S Law Enforcement Presence in American Embassies The U S law enforcement presence in an embassy abroad is often significant Embassies have special agents from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security within the State Department assigned to embassies and consulates as Regional Security Officers RSOs They advise the Ambassador on all security-related matters and manage programs for dealing with threats to the embassy from criminals terrorists and hostile intelligence agencies They also serve as a liaison with the host country’s law enforcement agencies and conduct law enforcement investigations on behalf of other U S law enforcement agencies—typically agencies that do not have their own agents posted to the host country 54 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED The number of other law enforcement agencies assigned to a diplomatic mission varies depending on the law enforcement issues in that country or region In addition to an FBI Legal Attaché an embassy may have law enforcement representatives from agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration DEA and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives ATF within DOJ and Immigration and Customs Enforcement ICE the Secret Service and the Transportation Security Administration TSA from the Department of Homeland Security In addition the Central Intelligence Agency CIA collects intelligence information and carries out counterintelligence activities in foreign countries CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED Finally the U S military often has investigative and counterintelligence agents in countries such as Germany and Japan where it maintains military installations Overlapping Jurisdictions Create a Potential for Conflict Many law enforcement agency functions and activities are authorized by Executive Order or Congressional mandate and this authority sometimes results in more than one law enforcement agency having jurisdiction for the same crime Overseas these overlapping interests create a potential for separate uncoordinated cont acts with the same host country law enforcement and intelligence authorities that could adversely affect U S foreign relations and could harm overall U S efforts to fight crime and terrorism Thus the responsibilities of Legal Attachés and other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies overseas must be clearly defined and their activities need to be coordinated Various statutory mandates and agency agreements delineate law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities abroad For example by Executive Order 12333 dated December 4 1981 the CIA is responsible for the conduct of counterintelligence activities outside the United States and the coordination of counterintelligence activities by other agencies abroad including the FBI Thus Legal Attachés are required by the Order to conduct their counterintelligence activities in coordination with the CIA Similarly while both the FBI and the DEA have authority under Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations to investigate violations of the drug laws the DEA is responsible for conducting drug investigations in foreign countries Consequently requests for foreign assistance on FBI drug investigations must be coordinated with the DEA 55 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED The Role of the U S Ambassador By statute and Presidential Directive the U S Ambassador has complete responsibility for the actions of all U S Executive Branch officials and organizations including law enforcement agencies such as the FBI Legal Attaché office in the country to which he or she has been accredited 30 All law enforcement personnel are considered part of the U S Embassy staff and the senior representative from each law enforcement agency that has personnel assigned to an embassy reports to the Ambassador Ambassadors play a key role in helping to ensure that the sometimes overlapping interests of law enforcement and intelligence agencies are appropriately coordinated Law enforcement agencies having employees in a country are required by Section 207 b of Public Law 96-465 to keep the Ambassador to that country fully and currently informed of all activities and operations of its employees and to comply fully with all applicable directives of the Ambassador To coordinate law enforcement activities Ambassadors have a team consisting of the senior representatives of the federal law enforcement agencies assigned to the embassy and usually chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission to provide a forum in which to share law enforcement information and coordinate efforts to combat terrorism Members of the team participate in duties including emergency action committees to organize embassy response to terrorist threats and incidents and formulation of the components of the embassy’s mission performance plan that coordinate embassy activities related to law enforcement and terrorism issues Legal Attachés Coordinate and Collaborate With Other U S Law Enforcement Representatives In the four Legat territories we reviewed we interviewed the Ambassadors other embassy officials selected representatives from law enforcement agencies stationed in the embassies CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED and in Germany and Japan officials from U S Military investigative agencies 31 The consensus among these officials was that the Legats and their staff in these countries readily _____________ 30 Ambassadors do not have authority over those personnel who are under the command of a U S area military commander 31 See Appendix III for a listing of our contacts at each location 56 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED collaborated and shared information on law enforcement matters Law enforcement representatives told us that especially since the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001 they were working closer with their counterparts in the embassies than ever before Some pointed out that even before September 11 the rivalries that based on their experiences seemed common among law enforcement agencies in the United States appeared much less prevalent in an Embassy setting None of the officials we spoke with expressed concerns about duplication of effort between Legat activities and their agencies’ activities We also attended two law enforcement team meetings one in Ottawa Canada and the other in Tokyo Japan to observe the process no meetings were scheduled at the other two embassies while we were there The Deputy Chief of Mission the FBI Legal Attaché and representatives from other law enforcement agencies and the CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED attended We observed that participants briefed the group on significant events activities or investigative and intelligence issues within their jurisdiction The following are examples of the comments made by U S officials we interviewed in Canada Germany Japan and South Africa regarding the nature and frequency of their working relationships with the FBI Legal Attachés and their opinions on how well the Legats coordinated activities and shared information with them U S Ambassadors – The U S Ambassadors to Canada Germany Japan and South Africa had uniformly positive views of the Legal Attaché offices operating out of their respective embassies The Ambassador to Canada for example described the working relationship and cooperation between the Legal Attaché othe r U S law enforcement agencies in Canada and their Canadian counterparts as seamless Such cooperation was absolutely essential he said given the lengthy border between the two countries and the extensive amount of trans-border crime The Ambassador added that the Legat kept him apprised of the status of major FBI investigations affecting Canada In Germany the U S Ambassador told us that the Legat kept him informed on important law enforcement issues such as the activities of the numerous FBI agents sent to Germany in the aftermath of September 11 The Ambassador to Japan was especially complimentary of the Legat’s knowledge of law enforcement structure and crime problems in Japan During a meeting with several Japanese 57 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED businessmen the Ambassador was told about certain underworld figures involved in the Japanese banking industry Needing more information he consulted with the Legat who promptly delivered a detailed paper on the issue The U S Ambassador to South Africa told us that the Legat readily shared information with the other law enforcement agencies represented in the Embassy The Legat the Ambassador said was an active participant on the Law Enforcement Team often had the most information to share and typically went out of his way to offer assistance to other members of the group Regional Security Officers RSO – The RSOs we interviewed advised that they had regular often frequent contact with the Legal Attachés sometimes provided assistance on leads and cases and said that they readily exchanged information with each other Some RSOs mentioned for example that visitors to the Embassy sometimes provided information on terrorism or criminal matters and such information was promptly forwarded to the Legat The RSO at the American Consulate in Cape Town South Africa stated he sometimes assisted staff from the Pretoria Legat by putting them in contact with appropriate officials in Cape Town or by following up on leads in the Cape Town area on their behalf The Deputy RSO in Tokyo indicated that while both he and the Legat in Tokyo maintained liaisons with the Tokyo Police the contacts and issues were different Because the RSO office was primarily concerned with the protection of the Ambassador and the Embassy its contacts were mostly with Tokyo police in the precinct where the Embassy was located while the Legat typically maintained liaisons with higher-level officials in the police department involving broader criminal matters CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED DEA – The DEA’s mission overseas is to conduct drug investigations that impact the United States To do this DEA Country Attachés conduct liaison with the organized crime and narcotic units of foreign law enforcement agencies By agreement between the FBI and the DEA the DEA is the first point of contact for drug investigations in foreign countries and the DEA officials we interviewed in Canada 58 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Germany and Japan all agreed that the FBI Legal Attaché offices were appropriately coordinating with their offices on drug-related matters or investigations 32 However they also indicated that such referrals were relatively infrequent because since the events of September 11 2001 the FBI had been focused on counterterrorism and had little time to pursue drug crimes Other Law Enforcement Agencies – An ICE agent from the former U S Customs Service in Germany stated that the FBI and ICE meet with different law enforcement entities in Germany so the two agencies have little overlap The ATF Country Attaché in Canada stated that the ATF worked well together with the FBI in the Ressam case ATF was one of the first agencies to respond in this case and afterwards they met daily with the FBI and U S Customs officials to share information on this investigation ATF also worked together with the FBI on a case involving a person who wanted to blow up the Alaskan pipeline An ICE agent from the former INS in Canada stated that his office had an outstanding working relationship with the Legat staff and communicated almost daily with them He added that they work closely together and share information on a “need to know” basis The TSA Civil Aviation Security Liaison Officer in Japan stated that he contacts the Legat office about three or four times a week with questions or to provide information The two agencies would work together in hijacking cases and in cases where DOJ evidence was being transported through Japanese airspace They would also conduct a joint interview initially if a “person of interest” who was on a “no fly” list arrived in Japan A Secret Service agent assigned to the Embassy in Berlin commented that he relays threat information to the Legat office and coordinates with the Legat office about the arrival of visiting dignitaries U S Military Agencies - A special agent with the U S Air Force Office of Special Investigations OSI in Germany stated his office was working three counter-intelligence cases with the FBI and the FBI Legat office had always been very responsive to their requests for assistance Also the military commanders in the area liked having “instant” access to the FBI In Japan an Air Force OSI official stated that his office had worked well together with the Legat office on a code breaker case He said that the Legat dropped everything to get the _____________ 32 The DEA Country Attaché we met with in South Africa had recently arrived in the country and consequently had had little interaction with FBI Legat staff 59 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED information that OSI needed quickly Officials from the U S Naval Criminal Investigation Service in Japan indicated they did not have a lot of interaction with the Legat office because the investigations of the two agencies tended to be mutually exclusive Nevertheless they had collaborated on several espionage cases and had worked cooperatively with FBI agents from other Legat offices in Australia and the Philippines Conclusion Many U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies maintain a presence abroad and FBI Legat staff often need to interact with representatives from these agencies Because law enforcement and intelligence agencies often have overlapping interests and jurisdictions it is critical that they coordinate their activities A lack of coordination among law enforcement agencies abroad could be detrimental to the ability of the United States to effectively combat international crime and terrorism In addition the FBI’s Legal Attaché Manual emphasizes the importance of maintaining effective liaisons with other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies abroad Based on our discussions and observations in the embassies we visited it appears that the FBI Legat staff worked cooperatively and appropriately coordinated their activities with other U S law enforcement and intelligence agencies Based on our review at these four sites it also appeared that there was little or no duplication of effort between the Legats’ activities and the other law enforcement agencies in these embassies 60 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED CHAPTER 6 FBI OVERSIGHT OF THE LEGAL ATTACHÉ PROGRAM APPEARS ADEQUATE Based on our discussions with FBI headquarters personnel and our limited review of office justifications and reporting processes the FBI’s overall oversight of the Legal Attaché program appears to be adequate The FBI periodically reassesses the need for offices abroad and justifies the need for new Legal Attaché offices or changes in the staffing or territories of existing offices Once a Legal Attaché office is opened the FBI monitors the activities of the office through periodic inspections site visits and various reports FBI Justification for Establishing and Maintaining Offices According to OIO officials determining whether new Legal Attaché offices should be opened or existing offices should be expanded realigned or closed is an ongoing and normal part of headquarters oversight Among the factors considered in making location and staffing decisions are • threat assessments of specific terrorist or criminal activity in a country or region that threatens the United States • the strategic location of the host country from a geographic political and economic perspective and the country’s respect for the rule of law • the commitment of the host country to cooperate with the FBI to advance investigations of unilateral and bilateral interest • analysis of workloads in existing offices and the ability of staff in these offices to cover areas beyond the specific country in which they are located • difficulty and cost of travel within a given territory • U S Ambassador or congressional interest in having a Legal Attaché office in a particular region and • the funding and resources available to the FBI to fulfill its mission 61 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Based on this ongoing review process the FBI has opened new offices or sub-offices or added staff to existing offices to address the workload For example the FBI opened a Legat in Seoul South Korea in 2000 because distance made it difficult for Legat Tokyo to maintain the frequent face-to-face contact with Korean law enforcement authorities that was necessary because of investigative caseloads In addition in FY 2002 an ALAT position was reallocated from the Mexico City Legat to the Ottawa Legat to help Ottawa manage its backlog of pending leads previously discussed in Chapter 3 The same review process has been used to consolidate offices when workload no longer justified keeping an office open For example the FBI closed the Legal Attaché office in Montevideo in 1999 because the workload in that office was not sufficient to maintain a presence in Uruguay The positions in that office were reallocated to the Legat office in Brasilia which opened that same year and had a greater amount of criminal activity affecting the United States Once the FBI determines a need for a new Legal Attaché office or a change needs to be made to the staffing level in an existing office it must seek approval from the appropriate U S Ambassador the Departments of Justice and State the Office of Management and Budget OMB and Congress The process begins with informal discussions with the Ambassador to determine if the Ambassador will support the FBI’s proposal If the Ambassador is supportive the FBI prepares a National Security Determination Directive 38 NSDD 38 proposal and submits it to the Department of State Under NSDD 38 agencies must seek approval from the Ambassador for any changes in size composition or mandate of personnel operating under their authority at each diplomatic post Staffing changes include permanently increasing or decreasing the staffing size at a given location as well as establishing new offices or shutting down existing operations The NSDD 38 proposal specifies the location of the proposed staffing change titles and grades of the positions justification statements and any support and cost implications for the post The FBI’s NSDD 38 proposals are reviewed by the Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs the Department of State and the respective U S Ambassador The FBI initiates staffing of the Legat office once the NSDD-38 process has been completed providing that congressional approval and funding are forthcoming If funding is not approved the FBI may reallocate the needed positions from another Legat office Subsequently a Memorandum of Understanding is entered into between the respective U S Embassy and the FBI 62 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED In 1999 in response to a congressional request the FBI submitted assessments for existing and planned Legal Attaché offices The assessments identified specific criminal activities in the Legats’ territory that affected the United States analyzed the impact of criminal activity on U S interests and persons and justified the presence and or need for enhancement of FBI resources In our opinion these assessments were comprehensive and along with other information identified the crime problems in the foreign countries that had a conne ction to the United States Later the House Conference report 107-593 which accompanied the “2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act For Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States” directed the FBI to submit a report to the Congress on proposed new Legal Attaché offices and existing offices to ensure that resources were being deployed to the highest priority locations The FBI’s report provided a synopsis for each Legal Attaché office and included the FBI’s conclusions about the staffing level at each location While we did not assess the conclusions for each office based on our review of the Legats in Berlin Ottawa Pretoria and Tokyo we agreed with the reports conclusions for those four offices According to the report the staffing levels in Legats Pretoria and Tokyo were adequate for the workload In contrast the heavy use of temporary duty personnel in Legats Berlin and Ottawa was expensive and did not provide needed continuity in more complex investigations —which was consistent with what we found when we reviewed these two offices Thus the report proposed increasing the permanent staff at both locations to better address the workload Oversight of Offices With Legat offices located all over the world headquarters oversight can be a challenge Time zone differences can make it more difficult to communicate and making site visits can be expensive and time consuming Nevertheless it is critical that FBI headquarters monitor the overall program Legats are required to provide periodic reports on their activities and respond to inquiries In addition both OIO and Inspection Division staff periodically make on-site reviews of Legat operations FBI Headquarters requires each Legal Attaché office to prepare and submit a Legal Attaché Annual Accomplishment Report LAR The LAR reports provide detailed information about the office’s operations and accomplishments for the past year For example the reports 63 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED include information on the law enforcement structure of the host country the Legats’ liaison contacts detailed threat assessments major case information FBI personnel temporarily assigned to the office and travel personnel and other matters handled throughout the year In addition the LAR identifies the offices’ goals and objectives for the upcoming year OIO officials use these reports to monitor offices’ accomplishments and told us they were currently examining ways to make these reports more consistent and useful For example OIO officials said that some of the information in the LAR could not be easily summarized in order to respond to congressional requests for information on the Legat program To better keep abreast of Legats’ workload OIO starting in May 2003 began analyzing each Legat office’s pending leads on a quarterly basis The results of the analysis are provided to the applicable Legat office and problems identified must be explained or resolved For example the Legats are required to provide explanations of their efforts to resolve leads pending for more than 360 days OIO officials told us they maintain regular telephone and e-mail contact with Legat offices Every Monday morning OIO managers meet to discuss significant issues or problems that have arisen in Legat offices over the weekend that need their attention OIO officials also told us they obtain feedback on Legat offices from the CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED Ambassadors Regional Security Officers and foreign law enforcement officials visiting FBI headquarters Annually OIO hosts a conference in Washington D C attended by all the Legal Attachés We attended the conference held in November 2002 A variety of topics were covered including recent changes in the FBI and the impact of these changes on the Legat program counterterrorism criminal and security issues relevant to operations abroad and Legat performance expectations and career development The FBI’s Inspection Division conducts in-depth reviews of the activities of individual Legal Attaché offices normally on a 3-year cycle We noted that this cycle was adhered to for three of the four offices we reviewed—Berlin Ottawa and Tokyo Pretoria the fourth office was opened in 1997 and was inspected in 1999 A subsequent inspection was scheduled for 2003 but was postponed due to other 64 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Bureau commitments and a pending assessment of the inspection process for Legat offices The inspections include a review of management issues staffing administration liaisons workload and training matters The reports comment on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Legal Attaché When an inspection is completed a report is issued with recommendations that must be addressed in writing by either the Legal Attaché or in some instances FBI headquarters OIO managers told us that in the past Inspection Division reviews of Legat offices were conducted using the same guide used for reviewing domestic offices Consequently some of the areas covered during these inspections were not relevant to Legat operations Recognizing this problem OIO met with staff from the FBI’s Inspection Division in order to revise the guide used for foreign operations As of November 2003 OIO officials told us that the Inspection Division had recently tested the revised guide at two Legat offices We followed up on 26 of the 31 findings from the latest Inspection Division reviews of Legats Berlin Ottawa Pretoria and Tokyo These findings involved noncompliance with FBI requirements in areas such as security financial management property management personnel and administration We concluded that the FBI had taken appropriate corrective action for most of the findings with the exception of a finding related to the staffing problems in Ottawa which we previously discussed in Chapter 3 However we found no evidence to confirm that corrective action had been fully implemented related to changing safe combinations in Ottawa and conducting unannounced cash counts of the imprest fund in Tokyo Apart from the more formal inspection process OIO managers told us that they made site visits to the Legal Attaché offices where they reviewed such matters as staffing levels and management and administrative issues They also spoke with U S embassy and foreign law enforcement personnel about the Legal Attaché’s liaison efforts However these reviews were not conducted on a regular basis We found documentation supporting OIO site visits for only two of the four offices we reviewed OIO officials acknowledged in November 2003 that their managers needed to make more systematic site visits They said they were in the process of developing a schedule of OIO site reviews so that either the Inspection Division or OIO would review each office every 18 months 65 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Conclusion The assessment of the number location and staffing of Legat offices is an ongoing process that takes into account multiple factors Based on these assessments the FBI has expanded realigned and even closed Legat offices Any such changes cannot be made without approval from the Departments of Justice and State the Office of Management and Budget and Congress Once a Legal Attaché office is opened the FBI provides oversight and monitors the activities of the office through periodic inspections site visits and various reports In addition FBI management officials said that they were taking additional steps to improve oversight of the program Based on our limited review we believe that the FBI justifications substantiated their location decisions for Legat offices and their oversight of these offices seemed adequate 66 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED CHAPTER 7 SELECTION AND TRAINING OF LEGAL ATTACHÉ STAFF The individuals selected for Legat Attaché and ALAT positions are the FBI Director’s personal representatives abroad The Special Agents selected for these positions are highly visible and shoulder considerable responsibility which if not managed appropriately could result in an international incident and potentially harm the FBI’s credibility In addition Legats and their staff must quickly adjust to living and working in a foreign culture that may be much different from conditions they are used to in the United States Further in some countries working and living conditions may be highly stressful and their personal safety may be at risk Thus the FBI not only needs highly skilled and experienced agents but also agents who can function independently and effectively in often stressful foreign environments Process for Selecting Candidates for Legat Positions According to OIO officials persons selected for Legat positions need to possess certain characteristics and skills OIO seeks personnel with a proven history of working in a multi-cultural multi-task force environment who are skillful in dealing with personnel issues They also should be seasoned investigators with broad-based knowledge of the FBI’s programs and skilled managers preferably with field office supervisory experience These individuals should be self-motivated versatile possess exceptional interpersonal and liaison skills and be able to work with a wide variety of people in a foreign environment Individuals should demonstrate good judgment and common sense and need minimal guidance and direction from FBI headquarters In addition the FBI requires individuals to have proficiency in one or more languages used in an office’s assigned territory When an opening occurs for a Legat or ALAT position a vacancy announcement is prepared and posted on ACS The announcement identifies the position and the location application instructions and the deadline for applying It also specifies minimum and preferred qualifications For example the minimum qualifications for eligibility to apply for any Legat position are 3 years FBI investigative experience one-year relief supervisory experience 33 and a current _____________ 33 A relief supervisor in the FBI is a agent who serves as a backup for a supervisor 67 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED “meets expectations” performance appraisal 34 The preferred qualifications include such factors as broad-based investigative experience supervisory experience language proficiency communication skills previous overseas experience and FBI Inspection Division experience These preferred qualifications can be ranked differently based on the particular needs of an overseas office Applicants are asked to submit a description of their experience that addresses the minimum and preferred qualifications along with a recommendation letter from their division head or the Special Agent in Charge The letter must indicate whether the division head recommends highly recommends or does not recommend the candidate and it also must include comments on the candidate’s qualifications for the job advertised as well as the individual’s leadership ability interpersonal skills and potential for advancement Application packages are reviewed by a Legat Screening Panel LSP The panel consisting of senior FBI managers and analysts from various FBI divisions reviews the applicants’ packages and ranks the candidates against the qualifications contained in the vacancy announcement submitting the top ranked candidates to a second panel known as the Special Agent Mid-Level Management Selection SAMMS Board The SAMMS Board whose members include the Deputy Assistant Directors of the Criminal Investigative Counterintelligence Counterterrorism Cyber and Inspection Divisions may agree with the LSP rankings or come up with its own ranking based on review of the candidates The head of OIO can appeal to the SAMMS board if he or she disagrees with the Board’s rankings The SAMMS Board recommends the top three candidates in rank order to the FBI Director The Director interviews one or more of the Legat or ALAT candidates and makes the final selection Reflecting the growing importance of the Legat program the Director has commented that he wants his future leaders to have international experience Between January 2001 and April 2003 a total of 84 vacancy openings for Legat or ALAT positions were announced To determine if _____________ 34 FBI agents are evaluated on a pass fail basis with “meets expectations” signifying acceptable performance 68 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED the FBI was selecting agents for Legat and ALAT positions in accordance with its procedures we judgmentally selected the files for 13 of these vacancies We reviewed the vacancy packages to determine whether the applicants met minimum qualifications the degree to which they met preferred qualifications whether the LSP and the SAMMS board appropriately ranked the candidates and whether these ranking decisions were appropriately documented Based on our review we concluded that the FBI was following its procedures According to an OIO official the FBI is implementing a ne w agency-wide promotion system starting in FY 2004 Applicants for any GS-14 position including an ALAT or non-Assistant Special Agent in Charge GS-15 position such as a Legat must take and pass a test which will measure their aptitude and abilities to handle managerial positions FBI Acknowledged Some Past Staffing Decisions Could Have Been Better Officials from OIO told us that in prior years when the Legat program was growing rapidly some mistakes were made in staffing Legat positions While not providing specific examples the officials told us that some agents selected for positions abroad lacked the management skills and judgment needed to handle overseas assignments properly In some instances individuals were selected who did not have management or supervisory experience Instead they were picked primarily because they spoke the language of the host country This lack of experience sometimes resulted in poorly managed offices In some cases incidents occurred that were serious enough to cause the employees to be recalled to the United States while others were not granted extensions to their tours of duty Moreover relationships with Embassy officials and foreign law enforcement agencies sometimes needed to be repaired Officials believed that the current selection process which places considerable weight on supervisory experience should help avoid some of the problems that occurred in the past 69 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Misconduct by Some Legat Staff is a Concern An Office of Professional Responsibility OPR official stated that in his opinion the number of OPR investigations of Legat personnel was higher than would be expected given their small number and attributed this problem to past staffing decisions This official added that Legat staff represent the FBI overseas and should be role models rather than subjects of OPR investigations Another OPR official attributed the situation to the fact that the Legats operate independently and tend not to be closely supervised by headquarters In contrast an OIO official said he did not believe OPR investigations of Legat staff were any more prevalent than for any other FBI division However during a conference for Legal Attachés held in Washington D C in November 2002 this same OIO official stated before the group that he was spending too much time dealing with OPR-related issues To obtain an understanding of the kinds of allegations involving Legat staff we asked OPR to provide us with the investigative files opened on Legat staff between September 1999 and September 2002 OPR provided us with 12 cases Officials said they did not know if these were all the cases opened during this period because their database did not identify the position held by the person under investigation Consequently OPR officials relied on their recollection to identify investigations involving Legat employees 35 These 12 OPR investigations involved 24 alleged offenses against 13 employees All but one of these employees was either a Legat ALAT or Office Assistant The remaining individual was an employee on temporary duty The following table summarizes the allegations and the examples provide more details _____________ 35 Subsequent to our exit conference another OPR official contradicted what we were originally told stating that the OPR’s databases do identify Legat staff who have been subject to an investigation As a result OPR provided a list of 17 additional cases that had been opened on 15 Legat personnel involving 34 alleged offenses during our review period In addition the OIG Investigations Division which has first priority in investigating allegations against certain FBI personnel provided us with allegations against two more Legat personnel We did not review the case files for these additional cases 70 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED EXHIBIT 5-2 ALLEGATIONS AGAINST LEGAT STAFF INVESTIGATED BY OPR BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 1999 AND SEPTEMBER 2002 ALLEGATION Security violations Inappropriate relationships Waste misuse of government property Inappropriate release of information Voucher fraud Misuse of position Violation of rules regulations TOTAL Source OPR investigative files NUMBER OF INSTANCES 8 4 2 2 5 1 2 24 • A Legat obtained a $40 500 advance from the FBI for educational expenses for his children at the foreign post in October 2000 Later he submitted a request to the Department of State DOS seeking payment for the same tuition and DOS paid $32 520 directly to the educational institutions in January 2001 OPR opened an investigation after learning of the duplicate payment The Legat did not return the advance to the FBI until August 2001 after he had been reminded to do so on two occasions As a result of the OPR investigation the Legat received counseling and was warned to avoid similar situations in the future that could reflect negatively on him and by extension the FBI • Another Legat was alleged to have misused his government credit card and submitted fraudulent travel vouchers The Legat routinely requested reimbursement for taxi rides in the amounts of $15 to $19 above actual incurred costs for a total of $360 over a 2-year period OPR officials advised us that the allegations were substantiated and the Legat was in the process of being dismissed • Allegations against an ALAT included misuse of his government credit card disclosure of sensitive and classified information to non-FBI officials failure to report contacts with foreign nationals commingling of personal and Bureau funds borrowing money from the office imprest fund and sending classified information 71 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED over an unsecure facsimile machine Because of these allegations the ALAT was returned to the United States and he subsequently resigned from the FBI As of October 2003 all of these investigations had been completed and 19 of the 24 allegations were substantiated against 12 employees These OPR investigations resulted in five employee suspensions three letters of censure two employees receiving counseling one dismissal and one resignation Increasing Recognition of the Value of Legat Experience In our discussions with FBI personnel some said that historically the perception was that employees assigned to Legat offices were part of a “wine and cheese circuit ” that did not involve substantive investigative work Others remarked that Legats had sometimes been appointed to these positions as a consolation for not being promoted to other positions or as a reward for long service near the end of their careers Because of the perception of the Legat program some Legat staff had difficulty finding career enhancing positions after they returned to the United States according to one OIO official However this perception appears to be changing The growth in international crime and terrorism in recent years has resulted in more FBI agents being sent overseas to work on major investigations and these agents often interact and work closely with the Legat staff The FBI agents sent on temporary assignment are increasingly realizing that the Legat work is demanding substantive and essential according to OIO and other headquarters officials As more FBI agents experience first-hand the importance and value of the Legat’s work they are increasingly applying for Legat positions An official from the Counterterrorism Division who also sits on the SAMMS Board agreed that more employees are applying for Legat vacancies than ever before and as a result the FBI has a better pool of candidates from which to choose In addition an increasing number of returning Legat staff are being selected for leadership positions in the FBI according to OIO officials For example they said 37 ALATs and Legats received permanent promotions at the GS-14 and 15 levels respectively in FY 03 In addition three returning Legats were promoted to Assistant Special Agent in Charge positions These promotions were significantly higher than what has occurred in the past and the officials believed 72 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED this success was partially attributable to their intensified efforts to promote the value of the Legat experience Pre-Deployment and Foreign Language Training for Legat Staff When we initiated this audit officials from the FBI’s Inspections Division told us that they were beginning an in-depth review of the pre-deployment training program including language training for newly assigned Legat staff Consequently we limited our review of the training program to understanding what type of training is provided and interviewing selected Legat staff in the four offices we reviewed to obtain their views about the training We also determined the extent to which Legat employees had proficiency in a foreign language 36 At the time of our audit over one-third of Legat staff did not meet the FBI’s foreign language proficiency goals The FBI Inspection Division’s analysis identified similar issues with language training as well as other problems with pre-deployment training and made 12 recommendations for improvement see Appendix V 37 Pre-Deployment Training - The FBI has a 3-week predeployment training program for agents and support staff who have been selected for assignment to Legal Attaché offices The first we ek of the training is designed to provide newly appointed Legat personnel with administrative information and policies and procedures associated with working in a Legat office and living in a diplomatic mission overseas Topics covered this first week include personnel and housing matters overseas allowances and vouchers Legat computer equipment and applications Department of State billings and payments security extraterritorial guidelines for informants language services and programs evidence cont rol employee conduct and the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs the FBI’s Inspection Division Office of Professional Responsibility and Health Services Unit Also during the first week of training the Legats and the ALATS receive individual briefings from the substantive units at FBI headquarters about programs and investigations that may have an _____________ 36 We obtained language test scores for Legat staff as of March 27 2003 37 FBI Inspection Division Report Legal Attaché Pre-deployment Training An Evaluation of the Preparation of FBI Personnel for Overseas Assignment Reengineering Project Number 35 July 2003 73 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED impact on their geographic area of responsibility For example they may receive briefings from the Counterterrorism Division if terrorism matters are prevalent in their region While these briefings occur for the agents the office assistants receive detailed briefings about administrative matters such as the field support account property inventory records and diplomatic pouch preparation techniques In addition if the support staff lacks sufficient familiarity with the ACS system arrangements are made for additional training in using the system During the second week of training agents and support staff attend a Legat Security Awareness course in Quantico Virginia Spouses are also encouraged to attend this class The training includes discussions and exercises relating to surveillance detection terrorist threat recognition hostage survival defensive tactics and vehicle residential and hotel security During the final week Legat staff attend a 2-day training class at the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute called Introduction to Working in an Embassy The course includes presentations on working in an embassy or consulate the role of the ambassador working with foreign service nationals embassy protocol administrative support within an embassy and crisis management Agents also receive detailed briefings from analysts and desk officers at the Department of State CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED related to the economic political and leadership of the countries and areas to which they will be assigned In addition to the 3-week pre-deployment course agents are encouraged but not required to take other classes offered by the Foreign Service Institute Further newly selected agents who have not worked overseas before and will be assigned to a newly established office are normally required to complete a temporary duty assignment in an established office where they receive on-the-job training Agents assigned to existing Legat offices normally do not complete a temporary duty assignment even if they have no overseas experience because they receive on-the-job training at the existing office We asked selected Legat staff at the four offices we reviewed about the training they had received in preparation for their assignment One office assistant told us that the State Department training on the automated systems used in an embassy environment was too cursory In general however both the agents and support 74 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED had positive comments about the training These views were in contrast to what the FBI Inspection Division was told by a focus group of both former and current Legat staff as reported in its July 2003 report The inspection report noted that the focus group participants expressed disappointment with most briefings they had received from FBI headquarters operational divisions These briefings which were supposed to address the crime problems and investigative concerns in the countries and territories to which the agents were to be assigned were described as short generic and superficial Some focus group participants added that the briefings were often provided by persons with little knowledge of these countries and as a result the information was of little use once they arrived at their office of assignment According to the inspection report the focus group participants also indicated that they did not believe the pre-deployment training program adequately prepared newly selected Legat staff for the difficulties of adjusting to life overseas This was especially true in hardship posts where the quality of life was very poor relative to the United States Not all Legat personnel or their dependents were able to adapt quickly or easily to a foreign environment and those who did not often felt isolated lonely and depressed The consensus among the focus group participants was that the FBI’s Employee Assistance Program was not doing enough to reach out to Legat employees not only before they departed overseas but also during their tours of duty 38 Other issues were noted in the FBI’s inspection report Funding for the pre-deployment training was noted as insufficient and training facilities were inadequate As an example of the latter the report said that Inspection staff had witnessed agent and support employees receiving computer training in a room about the size of a walk-in closet with some employees having to sit in the doorway while the instructor demonstrated Legat office computer operations Another issue related to the temporary duty assignments provided to certain agents selected for positions in newly established offices The inspection report suggested based on focus group comments that these assignments be expanded to others who had been selected for Legat assignments This would not only provide them with on-the-job _____________ 38 An Employee Assistance Program is a professional counseling and referral service designed to help employees with personal job or family problems 75 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED training but also gives OIO the opportunity to determine how well the employees performed in a foreign environment before they were posted overseas Language Training – FBI employees selected for Legat positions where proficiency in a foreign language is considered necessary can obtain language training through OIO’s Language Service Section A Language Services official told us this training can take various forms including self-study materials formal classroom training and tutors While intensive courses are available from the Defense and State Departments and the CIA FBI agents seldom attend because the courses are lengthy and not enough time is available between the time staff are selected and when they transfer overseas According to this official Language Services typically has about 3 months on average to work with newly selected Legat staff on foreign language training before they are transferred overseas but the staff also have the opportunity to receive further training while in the foreign country In our opinion three months does not appear to be sufficient time to learn a foreign language This view was echoed by the Inspection Division’s July 2003 report The report concluded that Legat personnel were not selected far enough in advance to successfully complete a course in foreign language training that would enable them to conduct business at a functional level in the host country language Depending on the complexity of the language anywhere from 9 months to 2 years of full-time training was needed to attain proficiency according to Language Services officials interviewed by the Inspection Division Other agencies contacted by the Inspection Division such as the State and Defense Departments and DEA reported providing more extensive language training for staff assigned overseas and more lead time to complete it For example selections for DEA country attaché positions in Asia and the Middle East are made at least 18 months in advance to permit at least 1 year of language training the Inspection report noted 39 Foreign language ability is measured according to the federal Interagency Language Roundtable Skill Level Description or IRL scale _____________ 39 DEA Country Attachés carry out investigative and liaison activities in foreign countries related to U S drug laws 76 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED level The IRL scale measures foreign language ability in areas of listening reading speaking and writing on a scale of zero to five with five being the highest rating For example a person with a level 2 speaking proficiency would have sufficient capability to meet routine social demands and limited job requirements A person with a level 4 speaking ability on the other hand would be able to use the language fluently and accurately on all levels normally pertinent to professional needs According to the FBI’s Legal Attaché Manual the foreign language requirements for a Legat and ALAT are a level 2 or above While no proficiency level is specified for support personnel the Manual states that they should have foreign language qualifications relevant to the office to which they are applying In contrast the FBI’s Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures Part 1 Section 22-2 5 1 states that the foreign language proficiency goals for Legats and ALATs in speaking listening and reading are levels 3 3 and 2 respectively For office assistants the goals are level 2 for speaking and listening and level 1 for reading However according to a Language Services official Legat staff currently are only tested for their speaking skills To see how closely the FBI was meeting these goals we obtained information from the CIA’s World Factbook on the official languages spoken in the 46 countries where the FBI has Legat staff 40 In 11 of these countries English is considered one of the official languages while in 11 others English is spoken by some elements of the population For the remaining 24 countries where the FBI has Legat staff English was not identified as one of the languages spoken Thus it is these countries where a mastery of the host country language by Legat staff is most likely to be necessary in order to effectively carry out their duties We also obtained information on the language skills of the 97 FBI staff stationed in the 24 countries where English is not the primary or secondary language Our analysis of this data using the criteria specified in the Legal Attaché Manual showed that 22 of the staff or about 23 percent had no speaking skill applicable to the language of the host country or the territory covered by the Legat office In addition 14 agents had some language skills pertaining to that area but did not meet the oral language goals as stated in the _____________ 40 The World Factbook prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency provides information on foreign countries for use by U S government officials 77 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED FBI’s Legal Attaché Manual In total 36 or over one-third of the 97 Legat staff assigned to these countries did not meet the FBI’s language goals Vacancy announcements for Legat and ALAT positions in nonEnglish speaking countries usually include language proficiency as a qualification factor However language is almost never the most important selection factor according to OIO officials because other factors such as investigative and supervisory experience are considered more essential OIO officials added that if documents or tapes of conversations need to be translated they could be sent to Language Services for transcription or translators or linguists with the appropriate security clearances could be hired While the use of translators and linguists may sometimes be unavoidable we believe that the FBI’s priority should be to ensure that staff selected for Legat positions who lack appropriate languages skills are given sufficient time and training to acquire them We observed the value of language proficiency firsthand during our visit to Japan The Legat and ALAT were fluent in the Japanese language Based on our discussions with Japanese officials and our observations of the Legat staffs’ interaction with these officials it was apparent the agents’ mastery of the Japanese language went a long way in fostering strong relationships and cooperation One Japanese law enforcement official remarked for example that current Legat personnel were more proficient in the Japanese language than their predecessors and as a result a strong level of rapport had been developed Some Legat Staff Remain Abroad For Long Periods of Time To ensure that FBI personnel do not lose contact and familiarity with the changing practices and priorities of the FBI as well as concerns that extended tours of duty abroad could result in a security risk the FBI places limits on the length of time staff can remain out of the country FBI personnel are limited to no more than five consecutive years abroad in one location or six consecutive years in two locations However exceptions to these limits are permitted when according to the Legal Attaché Manual the needs of the FBI would best be served by an extension Duration of such an extension should not exceed two years In addition according to an OIO official prior to 1997 there was no tour of duty limit for support staff 78 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED We examined the tours of duty for 370 FBI agents and support personnel assigned to Legat offices since October 1 1996 Our analysis indicates that 29 employees have remained abroad for long periods of time Specifically we found 21 agents and support staff who had remained overseas for more than 6 consecutive years Of these five employees had remained abroad for more than 10 consecutive years In addition 8 agents and support staff will have been overseas for more than 6 years if they complete their current tours of duty OIO officials recognized that some Legat staff had been abroad too long and said that some Legat staff had recently been denied extensions Further they acknowledged that in the past the tour of duty limits were not always enforced However in the “post-Hanssen era” concerns have been raised by the FBI’s Security Division about FBI employees remaining abroad too long and becoming a security risk 41 In addition an OIO official said he was concerned about personnel becoming too complacent and overly familiar in their relationships with foreign officials when they stay abroad for extended periods of time in one location Nevertheless at the exit conference an OIO official said that exceptions would still need to be made in exigent circumstances with the concurrence of the Security Division Given the need to reduce the risk of personal security exposure inherent in long tours of duty abroad and the apparent increasing interest and exposure among FBI employees in the Legal Attaché program which is likely to attract more candidates we believe that extending tours of duty beyond established limits should be kept to a minimum Conclusion Legal Attachés and their staff represent the FBI abroad and have increasing responsibility in accomplishing the FBI’s mission given the globalization of crime and terrorism Staff selected for these positions need to be highly skilled and experienced and should be able to _____________ 41 FBI agent Robert Hanssen who was discovered spying for the former Soviet Union and then for Russia pled guilty to 15 counts of espionage and conspiracy in July 2001 and was subsequently sentenced to life in prison without parole In the wake of the Hanssen case the FBI has begun to implement stricter security requirements 79 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED function independently and effectively in stressful foreign environments Currently the FBI has an adequate process in place for selecting qualified agents for Legat positions but acknowledged that in the past some poor staffing decisions had been made The Legat program was previously perceived by many within the FBI as a position that was not career enhancing However this perception appears to be changing as more FBI agents spend time overseas on investigative activities and realize the demanding substantive and essential nature of Legat work In addition the FBI Director has stated that he wants future FBI executives to have overseas experience and a clear understanding of international operations The FBI provides pre-deployment and language training for staff selected for Legat positions before they arrive at their posts of duty Our review of this training was limited because the FBI’s Inspection Division had initiated an in-depth review of these areas We noted that over one-third of Legat staff did not meet the FBI’s foreign language proficiency goals as stated in the Legal Attaché Manual The FBI’s Inspection Division’s analysis identified similar issues with language training as well as other problems with pre-deployment training For security reasons and to ensure that FBI personnel do not lose contact and familiarity with the changes in the FBI and the United States the Bureau places limits on the length of time staff are to remain abroad Our analysis indicates that some Legat staff have remained abroad for long periods of time The FBI has acknowledged this as a problem and is taking steps to limit tours abroad by not granting extensions in some cases While we understand that exceptions to tour of duty limits may need to be made in certain circumstances we believe these exceptions should be kept to a minimum 80 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Recommendations We recommend that the FBI 5 Implement the FBI Inspection Division’s recommendations contained in their July 2003 Report Legal Attaché PreDeployment Training and Evaluation of the Preparation of FBI Personnel for Overseas Assignment see Appendix V and provide us with details about the actions taken 6 Adhere to its limits on overseas tours of duty and keep exceptions to these limits to a minimum 81 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT CONTROLS In planning and performing our audit of the Legal Attaché Program we considered the FBI’s control structure over the Legal Attaché program for the purpose of determining our audit procedures This evaluation was not made for the purpose of providing assurance on the FBI’s management control structure as a whole However we noted certain matters involving management controls that we considered to be reportable conditions under Government Auditing Standards Reportable conditions involve matters coming to our attention relating to significant deficiencies in the design or operations of the management control structure that in our judgment could adversely affect the FBI’s ability to effectively administer the Legal Attaché program As discussed in the report we identified the following deficiencies 1 the FBI has not fully addressed workload problems in Legat Ottawa and 2 the FBI lacks controls to ensure that staff assigned overseas on temporary duty obtain required country clearances and that Legat offices maintain complete records of these clearances Because we are not expressing an opinion on the FBI’s management control structures as a whole this statement is intended for the information and use of the FBI in managing the Legal Attaché Program 82 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS We have audited the FBI’s management of the Legal Attaché Program In connection with the audit as required by the standards we reviewed management processes and records to obtain reasonable assurance about the FBI’s compliance with laws and regulations that if not complied with in our judgment could have a material effect on FBI operations Compliance with laws and regulations applicable to the FBI’s management of the Legal Attaché Program is the responsibility of the FBI’s management Our audit included examining on a test basis evidence about laws and regulations The specific laws and regulations against which we conducted our tests are contained in the relevant portions of • Title 21 United States Code Section 871 • Title 28 United States Code Section 533 • National Security Determination Directive 38 and • Executive Order 12333 Our audit did not identify areas where the FBI was not in compliance with the laws and regulations referred to above With respect to areas that were not tested nothing came to our attention that caused us to believe that the FBI management was not in compliance with the laws and regulations cited above 83 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX I AUDIT OBJECTIVES SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY Audit Objectives The objectives of the audit were to determine 1 the type of activities performed by Legal Attaché offices 2 the effectiveness of Legal Attaché offices in establishing liaison with foreign law enforcement agencies and coordinating activities with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies stationed overseas 3 the criteria and process used by the FBI to determine the placement of Legal Attaché offices including oversight and management of established offices and 4 determine the processes used for selecting and training FBI personnel for Legat positions Scope and Methodology We performed our audit in accordance with Government Auditing Standards and included tests and procedures necessary to accomplish the audit objectives Generally our audit emphasized Legat program activities that occurred during fiscal years 2001 through 2003 However some of our tests required us to use data from prior fiscal years To accomplish our objectives we conducted work at FBI Headquarters and interviewed various officials from OIO’s International Operations Section and Language Services Section Administrative Services Division Criminal Investigation Division Counterterrorism Division Finance Division Inspection Division Drug Section Security Division and the Office of Professional Responsibility We also interviewed officials from other Department of Justice components including the Justice Management Division Drug Enforcement Administration and the Office of International Affairs In addition we obtained documents from the Department of State’s Office of the Inspector General We conducted reviews of four Legal Attaché offices which we judgmentally selected We included offices that had varied staffing levels and workloads In addition we included offices that covered one country as well as offices that covered multiple countries English speaking and non-English speaking locations and offices in different geographical areas We reviewed the Legal Attaché Annual 84 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Accomplishment reports for 2001 and the latest FBI inspection reports for all of the Legal Attaché offices and took this information into account when making our site selections The Legat offices we selected and reviewed were located in Berlin Germany Ottawa Canada Pretoria South Africa and Tokyo Japan We also conducted limited work in Cape Town South Africa Toronto Canada and Cologne Frankfurt and Meckenheim Germany While at these locations we interviewed Legal Attaché personnel United States Embassy and Consulate officials and staff and selected foreign liaison contacts of the Legal Attachés’ from various police and intelligence agencies See Appendix II for a listing of foreign agencies contacted and Appendix III for a listing of U S agency representatives contacted abroad We also performed various tests at the Legat offices During our fieldwork we reviewed the files for a sample of judgmentally selected leads and cases to determine what actions were taken by Legat personnel in response to requests for assistance from other FBI offices and reviewed the timeliness of these actions in order to assist us in addressing objectives 1 and 3 Further we followed up on key findings contained in the FBI Inspection Division’s reports for the four offices to determine if corrective actions had been taken and reviewed other documents and records as needed We also determined if individuals who had traveled for official reasons on behalf of the FBI to selected locations in Canada and Germany had country clearances At our request the FBI’s Travel Advance and Payment Unit Finance Division identified these individuals using information from the FBI’s Financial Management System The printouts we received identified persons who had traveled to selected Canadian destinations between October 1 2001 and April 17 2003 and between October 1 2001 and June 4 2003 for the German locations Furthermore we reviewed FBI manuals policies and procedures memorandum correspondence and electronic communications related to the Legat Program We also reviewed various records and documents as needed including financial documents Legal Attaché Annual Accomplishment Reports workload data OPR case files vacancy packages and records pertaining to the Legat staff’s tours of duty and language proficiencies as well as reports provided to Congress 85 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Prior Reviews The Office of Inspector General has not performed any prior reviews of the FBI’s Legal Attaché Program We also did not identify any General Accounting Office reviews of the program The FBI’s Inspection Division conducts periodic reviews of individual Legal Attaché offices and we reviewed these reports as part of our process for selecting offices for review 86 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX II LISTING OF FOREIGN AGENCIES CONTACTED CANADA Office of the Solicitor General Royal Canadian Mounted Police RCMP International Operations Branch Financial Crimes Branch Immigration and Passport Branch Canadian Security Intelligence Service CSIS Counter Intelligence Branch Counter Terrorism Branch Counter Proliferation Branch Foreign Liaison and Visits Branch Ottawa Police Department Toronto Police Service GERMANY Landeskriminalamt Bundeskriminalamt CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED SOUTH AFRICA South African Police Service Crime Intelligence Division Training Division Interpol Division Western Cape Province National Prosecuting Authority Directorate of Special Operations 87 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED JAPAN Ministry of Justice International Affairs Division CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED National Police Agency NPA Second Organized Crime Control Division Second International Affairs Division Foreign Affairs Division Security Bureau Public Security Investigation Agency PSIA International Division Tokyo Metropolitan Police International Criminal Investigation Division 88 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX III LISTING OF U S AGENCIES CONTACTED AT U S EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES Canada Ottawa Department of State U S Ambassador Deputy Chief of Mission Consulate General Deputy Principal Officer Consular Section American Citizens Services Consular Public Affairs Regional Security Officer Narcotics Law Enforcement Affairs Department of Justice Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms Drug Enforcement Administration U S Attorney’s Office Toronto X Germany Japan South Africa Berlin Tokyo Pretoria X X X X X Cape Town X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs 42 Enforcement U S Secret Service Transportation Security Administration Department of Defense U S Air Force Office of Special Investigations U S Army Military Liaison U S Navy Naval Criminal Investigative Service X X X X X X X X X X X _____________ 42 In Ottawa we interviewed an ICE official from the former INS and another from the former U S Customs Service The ICE officials in the other three locations were from the former U S Customs Service 89 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX IV FBI LEGAL ATTACHÉ OFFICES AND SUB-OFFICES FISCAL YEAR 2003 STAFFING LEVELS OFFICE Almaty Kazakhstan Amman Jordan Ankara Turkey Athens Greece Bangkok Thailand Beijing China Berlin Germany Frankfurt Germany Bern Switzerland Bogotá Colombia Brasilia Brazil Bridgetown Barbados Brussels Belgium Bucharest Romania Buenos Aires Argentina Cairo Egypt Canberra Australia Caracas Venezuela Copenhagen Denmark Hong Kong SAR China Islamabad Pakistan Kiev Ukraine Lagos Nigeria London England Madrid Spain Manila Philippines Mexico City Mexico Guadalajara Mexico Monterrey Mexico Moscow Russia Nairobi Kenya New Delhi India Ottawa Canada Vancouver Canada Panama City Panama Paris France AGENTS 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 6 2 3 6 2 1 3 2 2 5 1 2 3 SUPPORT 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 5 1 2 6 1 0 2 1 1 4 1 1 2 90 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED TOTAL 3 3 3 5 4 3 4 4 3 6 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 6 3 3 11 3 5 12 3 1 5 3 3 9 2 3 5 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED OFFICE Prague Czech Republic Pretoria South Africa Riyadh Saudi Arabia Rome Italy Santiago Chile Santo Domingo Dominican Republic Seoul South Korea Singapore Singapore Tallinn Estonia Tel Aviv Israel Tokyo Japan Vienna Austria Budapest Hungary Warsaw Poland Totals AGENTS 1 2 3 4 2 2 SUPPORT 1 1 2 3 1 1 TOTAL 2 3 5 7 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 119 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 75 2 3 3 3 4 4 1 3 194 91 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX V RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FBI INSPECTION DIVISON REPORT ON LEGAL ATTACHÉ PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Finding 1 The International Operations Administrative Unit Office of International Operations and the Operational Skills Unit Training Division have successfully established a pre-deployment training • program for outgoing Legal Attache personnel Recommendation 1 1 That one comprehensive course evaluation instrument be developed for all Legat pre-deployment training and that all Legat personnel be required to provide feedback upon completion of training six months after reporting to their overseas assignment and at the end of their overseas tour Finding 2 FBI Headquarters operational divisions are not providing outgoing Legat personnel with briefings that address the crime problems and or investigative concerns associated with the country and terroritories that the agent will be responsible for covering Recommendation 2 1 That the FBI Headquarters operational divisions of Counterintelligence Counterterrorism Criminal Investigative and Cyber be required to provide agent personnel being transferred to a Legat assignment with substantive briefings describing the crime problems and investigative concerns pertaining to the Legat office and region of the world to which the agent is being assigned Recommendation 2 2 That the OIO send formal ECs to the Assistant Directors of the Counterintelligence Counterterrorism Criminal Investigative and Cyber to request substantive briefings for outgoing Legat personnel two weeks in advance of Legat pre-deployment training classes Finding 3 Sufficient pesonnel and nonpersonnel resources have not been provided for Legat predeployment training to ensure the continued success of the existing program much less allow for continuous improvement in order to meet future training needs Recommendation 3 1 That the Administrative Services Division identify space and the Finance Division identify funding for an 010 classroom facility and simulated Legat office to provide Legat pre-deployment training Recommendation 3 2 That the Resource Allocation and Staffing Requirements Office in coordination with the Training Division identify additional personnel resources within the Training Division's existing Funded Staffing Level to support the Legat Security Awareness Program Finding 4 The expanded use of temporary duty assignments would not only provide useful preFor official use only This document is not to be distributed outside the FBI 92 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED ii REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED deployment training for individuals selected for a Legat assignment but would also provide an opportunity for prospective Legat applicants to experience working in a Legat office and the 010 with an opportunity to assess the prospective applicant's performance in an overseas environment Recommendation 4 1 That individuals selected for Legat vacancies without any prior Legat experience regardless of whether the office is a new or established Legat office be required to complete a temporary duty assignment prior to transfer Recommendation 4 2 That the 010 and the Executive Development and Selection Program determine whether it would be feasible to require FBI employees to complete a temporary duty assignment in a Legat office as a prerequisite for applying to a Legat vacancy Finding 5 Agent personnel are not selected far enough in advance to complete a successful course of foreign language training that will enable them to conduct business at a functional level in the host country language Recommendation 5 1 That the Language Services Section OI0 provide an EC to the OI0 and the Executive Development and Selection Program describing the amount of time necessary to provide a successful level of foreign language training for each Legat office with a critical foreign language requirement Recommendation 5 2 That the information provided by the Language Services Section 0IO be used by the OI0 and the Executive Development Selection Program to prioritize advertise and select personnel for overseas vacancies far enough in advance to allow for an appropriate level of foreign language training to be provided Recommendation 5 3 That all FBI personnel receiving foreign language training be required to evaluate the foreign language training received and be tested to determine the level of proficiency achieved Finding 6 The FBI does not have a proactive system in place to address the mental health needs of Legat personnel Recommendation 6 1 That the Employee Assistance Unit Administrative Services Division provide estimates to the Finance Division detailing the amount of resources necessary to develop and implement a mental health program in support of the FBI's Legat Program Recommendation 6 2 That the Finance Division identify and reallocate resources in support of mental health services for the FBI's Legat Program For official use only This document is not to be distributed outside the FBI 93 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED iii REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX VI FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE U S Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington D C 20535-0001 March 10 2004 Ms Carol S Taraszka Regional Audit Manager U S Department of Justice Chicago Regional Audit Office Office of the Inspector General 500 W Madison Street Suite 3510A Chicago Illinois 60661 Dear Ms Taraszka Reference is made to your memorandum dated February 18 2004 requesting the Federal Bureau of Investigation's FBI response to the Department of Justice DOJ Office of the Inspector General OIG draft audit report titled The Federal This Bureau of Investigation's Legal Attache Program memorandum requested that the FBI review and provide written comments on the six recommendations contained in the draft audit report specifically indicating whether the FBI agrees or Also you requested that the disagrees with each recommendation FBI conduct a law enforcement sensitivity and classification review of this report and have appropriate personnel sign the Record of Sensitivity and Classification Review form Enclosed are the FBI's written responses to the six recommendations made by your staff in the draft audit report a copy of the draft audit report with appropriate sensitivity and classification review markings and the signed Record of The FBI is in Sensitivity and Classification Review form agreement with these recommendations and is currently taking corrective action to address the issues raised by your staff The format of the enclosed document identifies the DOJ OIG draft audit report's recommendations followed by the FBI The responses to the executive management's response recommendations have been coordinated through the FBI's Inspection Division 94 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED Ms Carol S Taraszka If you have any questions regarding the responses or if I can be of any further assistance please contact me at 202 324-2901 Sincerely Steven C Mccraw Assistant Director Inspection Division 2 95 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED FBI Response to DOJ OIG Draft Audit Report Re The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Legal Attache Program Chapter 3 Legat Investigative Activities Ottawa Backlog Previously Reported by FBI Inspection Division Recommendation Number 1 Page 38 We recommend that the FBI analyze the staffing level in Ottawa and initiate action to adjust the permanent staff levels commensurate with the workload Response The Office of International Operations OIO International Operations Section IOS agrees that there is insufficient staffing at Legat Ottawa to address the demands of the existing workload however office space and other administrative issues beyond the FBI's control as set forth below have also contributed to the backlog The IOS has consistently attempted to address the staffing issues in order to significantly reduce or eliminate the need for temporary duty staff Unfortunately the inability of the Department of State to identify commercial office space to create a law enforcement hub in Toronto has prevented the IOS from enhancing Ottawa by placing two additional agents in Toronto who would have addressed a substantial portion of the leads now assigned at Ottawa Legat Ottawa is currently staffed by one Legal Attache and six Assistant Legal Attaches ALATs one of whom is located in a sub-office in Vancouver As the OIG staff is already aware the Fiscal Years FY 2002-2003 Counterterrorism Supplemental Appropriation included approval for a two ALAT one Office Assistant OA sub-office to be located in Toronto Despite the difficulties mentioned above the IOS intends to deploy the approved positions directly to Ottawa In October 2003 Legat Ottawa advised that sufficient space is available in the existing office space to accommodate this increase in personnel It is anticipated that the personnel will be selected and deployed by mid-Summer 2004 The IOS believes that this infusion of personnel will significantly reduce if not eliminate the backlog of work in Legat Ottawa Controls Over Temporary Duty Travel Recommendation Number 2 Page 38 We recommend that the FBI implement a process that ensures that FBI personnel obtain country clearances before they travel to foreign countries on official business and develop a system that ensures complete records of these clearances are maintained Response The OIO IOS agrees with the OIG's assessment of the policy underlying the need for all FBI field office and FBI Headquarters travelers to request and obtain country clearance in Page 1 of 7 96 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED advance of foreign travel Information regarding the process for obtaining country clearance and other applicable policies is readily available and accessible to all employees on the OIO web page Since early 2003 the IOS has transmitted a semi-annual electronic communication EC to all employees reminding them of the need for country clearance and again setting forth the process Each Legat office plays a significant role in the country clearance process They receive the request from the traveler interact with the Ambassador to obtain concurrence for the travel and advise the traveler of the approvals The maintenance of accurate records and control files' established in each Legat office are assessed as part of each Legat' s performance appraisal Record-keeping with regard to country clearances is no exception The IOS responds routinely to Congressional inquiries where such information is needed and relies on the Legats to provide comprehensive statistical data in support of the IOS responses Whenever a Legat identifies individual employees who have traveled to their area of responsibility without country clearance the Legat notifies the IOS in order that remedial action may be undertaken with the effected field office or headquarters division According to Legat Ottawa between 500 and 600 requests for country clearance are processed for travel to Canada per calendar year The IOS has identified a technical issue regarding the number of failures to obtain country clearances as set forth in the OIG's report and the true extent of the problem as indicated by Legat Ottawa According to the OIG there were 135 vouchers submitted for travel to Canada during a two and one-half year period where no country clearances could be located From the list of 135 a random sample of 42 travel vouchers for 29 employees was examined by IOS Each employee was contacted via email and requested to identify the file number and serial number of the communication in which they requested country clearance In fact for 74 percent of the voucher submissions country clearance communications were identified by the employee and provided to IOS A review of these communications revealed that each one was addressed to Legat Ottawa It is clear that the appropriate protocols to obtain country clearance had been observed by the traveler but that the records at Legat Ottawa and at the sub-office in Vancouver were inaccurate Presuming an across-the board error rate of 74 percent the original figure of 135 reflected in the OIG report is reduced to 35 voucher submissions in two and one-half years for which there is no accompanying country clearance request While not statistically significant when compared to the number of official visitors during the same period OIO IOS acknowledges the need to strive for 100 percent compliance with existing protocols for international travel The IOS will continue to monitor this issue with all Legat offices to ensure that FBI employees traveling internationally comply with established procedures The OIG report does highlight the need for the OIO IOS to reinforce the need for each individual Legat to ensure that administrative controls are in place and are vigilantly enforced to provide the FBI and any other oversight entity an accurate assessment of compliance with country clearance requirements Moreover the travel of official visitors to any Legat's territory invariably requires staffing support from the Legat hosting the official delegation As such these Page 2 of 7 97 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED official visits account for an insignificant element of a Legat's workload especially in our closest allied nations such as Canada and Great Britain where Legats host an exceptional number of official visits each year An accurate accounting is of critical importance for IOS' reporting to Congress The IOS has prepared a communication to each Legat office to remind them of the importance of keeping accurate records and maintaining control files and will work with the Inspection Division to ensure these control files are reviewed for compliance during each Legat inspection On average more than 2 500 country clearance requests are handled by the 46 Legat · offices per year This number is expected to rise as more new Legat offices are established These requests may range from visitors for case specific investigative reasons to travel by the Director his staff and his security detail for high level meetings with embassy and foreign officials The centralization at FBI Headquarters of country clearance processing was attempted by the IOS in the year 2000 without success Insufficient resources exist in IOS to ensure adequate processing of requests and it was determined that inserting a bureaucratic layer between the requestor and the Legat responsible for obtaining the country clearance was redundant and overly cumbersome In addition many more requests were lost delayed or improperly handled and FBI Headquarters management ultimately saw no added value in making the process more bureaucratic rather than less so As a result the system currently in place was determined to be the most effective and efficient method of processing country clearance requests Recommendation Number 3 Page 38 We recommend that the FBI direct the Inspection Division INSD to review compliance with country clearance requirements during its inspections Response The Office oflnspections INSD agrees with the OIG's recommendation that compliance with country clearance requirements be reviewed during inspections To ensure field divisions have complied with the requirements set forth in the Department of State Justice and Treasury Memorandum of Understanding on Chief of Mission COM Authority the INSD will review all official business related foreign travel by FBI personnel assigned to the field office during on-site inspections As part of the on-site financial audit all travel vouchers submitted for foreign travel will be identified and a representative sample will be reviewed Documentation supporting the authority for foreign travel will be examined to determine whether proper authority was obtained from the Assistant Director in Charge ADIC or Special Agent in Charge SAC of the field division the Assistant Director AD of the corresponding FBI Headquarters division and the Legal Attache who was responsible for obtaining the country clearance from the COM of the destination country prior to the commencement of travel FBI citations addressing country clearance requirements are found in the Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines Part I Section 23-8 2 This citation states that prior to travel by any FBI employee to a foreign country to conduct any official business country clearance must be obtained Additionally an EC dated July 27 2000 was sent to all FBI Page 3 of 7 98 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED ✓ Headquarters divisions and field offices which states that the authority for all official international travel must be obtained in an EC approved by the ADIC SAC of the field division the AD of the corresponding FBI Headquarters division and the Legal Attache who obtains the country clearance from the U S Ambassador COM of the destination country Chapter 4 Liaison Activities Were Effective at the Legal Attache Offices Reviewed Details of Liaison Activity and Accomplishments by Office Recommendation Number 4 Page 54 We recommend that the FBI ensure the Buffalo field office and all FBI offices coordinate their training and investigative activities involving Canadian authoritities with the Ottawa Legat Response The OIO IOS agrees with this recommendation and has already addressed this matter prior to the OIG issuing this recommendation in the draft audit report The OIO IOS discussed this matter with SAC Buffalo who advised that the Director recently approved Border Liaison Office BLO status for the Buffalo field office This status permits Special Agents assigned to the Buffalo field office to travel approximately 50 miles into Canada for routine investigative matters These matters would not normally be addressed by the Legat because of their low priority SAC Buffalo advised that this limited travel into Canada is coordinated with Legat Ottawa who is provided with summary information concerning the need for the travel Legat Ottawa has confirmed that SAC Buffalo is coordinating this travel with the Legat office Outside of the National Academy NA the FBI does not provide training to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police a highly skilled modem law enforcement agency According to the NA Training Unit at the FBI Academy SAC Buffalo is permitted to recommend NA participants from within the Canadian territory covered by the Buffalo BLO This policy has been in effect for a number of years According to both SAC Buffalo and Legat Ottawa the selection of the NA candidates is coordinated to avoid duplication In addition the Detroit Seattle and Minneapolis field offices also work with Legat Ottawa to occasionally nominate and process candidates for the FBI NA According to the NA Training Unit this arrangement has met with great success and there is excellent coordination between the field offices and Legat Ottawa Chapter 7 Selection and Training of Legal Attache Staff Pre-Deployment and Forei n Lan ua e Trainin for Lee at Staff Recommendation Number 5 Page 82 We recommend that the FBI implement the FBI INSD's recommendations contained in their July 2003 report titled Legat Attache PreDeployment Training An Evaluation of the Preparation of FBI Personnel for Overseas Assignment see Appendix V and provide us with details about the actions taken Response The OIO IOS agrees with the recommendations contained in the INSD's report and Page 4 of 7 99 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED has taken the following actions to implement these recommendations 1 Develop a comprehensive course evaluation instrument Action Implemented in August 2003 Each participating employee now completes an evaluation of both the instruction and content of the training 2 That FBI Headquarters substantive divisions Counterterrorism Criminal Investigative Counterintelligence and Cyber provide substantive briefings to out-going Legat personnel Action Implemented in August 2003 All of the FBI Headquarters substantive divisions now provide Legat specific comprehensive briefings to our outgoing personnel 3 That OIO request the briefings mentioned at number two via formal EC Action Implemented August 2003 An EC is now transmitted to each division requesting the appropriate briefings one month in advance of the training dates The EC includes such information as the employee's name and their Legat office of assignment 4 That the Administrative Services Division ASD identify space for an OIO classroom facility and simulated Legat Office and that Finance Division FD identify funding for same Action IOS has been working with ASD to identify space within FBIHQ which can be converted into a classroom facility and simulated Legat office IOS working with the FD has identified funding resources for this project 5 That additional training personnel be assigned to the Legat Pre-Deployment Training initiative by the Training Division TD Action IOS has requested the TD to provide additional personnel The TD intends to request the necessary resources to increase its staffing in order to supplement the training 6 That personnel selected for Legat vacancies who have no prior Legat experience be provided with training in an established Legat office Action Implemented August 2003 To date Legats with no prior Legat experience have been trained in existing Legat offices Two recently selected Legats with no prior Legat experience are scheduled for training in an established Legat office within the next two months To supplement this training IOS also provides an overlap of approximately one month between the incumbent and the incoming Legat This enables the incumbent to provide training guidance and information relating to Legat specific procedures and initiatives and also ensures the smooth introduction of the new Legat to existing liaison contacts 7 That the Language Services Section LSS advise the IOS of the amount of time needed for training in the identified critical languages Action The LSS researched the issue of critical language skills and determined the amount of time needed for language training in critical languages According to LSS each of the critical languages Chinese Japanese Korean and Arabic requires two years of full-time intensive language instruction in order to achieve a speaking level sufficient to enable the employee to carry on routine business and social Page 5 of 7 100 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED discussions Language training in other difficult languages such as Russian Czech Romanian Urdu and Pashtu are 44 week courses However removal of a talented and valuable Special Agent investigator for such an extensive time period is not without a downside specifically a one or two year hiatus from investigative duties may result in an adverse impact on both investigative skills and current terrorism knowledge both of which are critical to success in the posts where these languages are necessary Thus there must be a continual balancing between the benefit to the FBI of deploying a Legat or ALAT with the language skills versus the actual ability of the employee to be successful in the Legat or ALAT position without the desired language skills Because of this dilemma I OS attempts to select employees for these positions who already have basic language skills or who may be heritage language speakers thereby reducing the need for extended language training prior to deployment 8 That the information provided at number 7 be utilized by OIO to prioritize advertise and select Legat personnel for those offices with critical language needs Action Implemented August 2003 Prior to August 2003 it was the established IOS policy to select replacements for projected vacancies one year in advance of the vacancy however this policy was difficult to implement due to a lack of available staffing within the IOS Beginning in mid-summer 2003 IOS began a concerted effort to realign staffing to comply with its own internal policy From that time until the established FBI management selection system was shut down in October 2003 pending the implementation of the new system IOS selected replacements for all projected Legat and ALAT vacancies through the end of calendar year 2004 Recently the independent Legat Selection System Review Group recommended that selection of Legat personnel be moved forward to 18 months in advance of the projected vacancy to facilitate language training when necessary IOS agrees that advancing the selection process would improve the ability to provide language training to employees without language skills and has formulated a plan to implement this recommendation when the new management selection system becomes operational in March 2004 9 That all personnel receiving language training be required to provide evaluations of the training received and then tested to determine their level of proficiency Action Implemented August 2003 The LSS requires evaluation feedback from employees who attend the various forms of language training In addition those who complete intensive language training in advance of deployment to an overseas assignment are tested for proficiency 10 That the Employee Assistance Unit ASD in cooperation with FD develop and implement a mental health program for Legat personnel Action The ASD intends to request an enhancement of personnel and resources in the FY 2006 budget submission The FD is awaiting this proposal 11 That the FD identify and reallocate resources to support mental health services for the Legat Program Action Because this is not a critical unfunded program the FD is awaiting the ASD FY 2006 budget submission where the enhancements for EAU will be included Page 6 of 7 101 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED ' Some Lei at Staff Remain Abroad For Loni Periods of Time Recommendation Number 6 Page 82 We recommend that the FBI adhere to its limits on overseas tours of duty and keep exceptions to these limits to a minimum Response The OIO IOS agrees with this recommendation Beginning in May 2003 procedures were put in place to ensure that Legats and ALATs do not remain overseas beyond the five year limitation absent the exigent needs of the FBI Since that time two three-month extensions beyond the approved five years have been granted to Legats who were involved in time specific initiatives One of these was due to participation in a trial in the foreign country and the other was due to hosting the annual FBI National Academy Associates Re-Trainer in the foreign country At the conclusion of the initiative both employees effected their transfer back to the U S In fact since May 2003 IOS management has denied four requests for extensions six months or one year to a number ofLegats and ALATs because the request did not meet the established criteria From time-to-time the IOS does permit Office Assistants OAs to extend beyond the normal five year tour limitation but only if they volunteer and are selected for a position in a hard-to-fill post which is normally a two or three year tour of duty These are the least desirable of the Legat offices where repeated postings of the OA vacancy resulted in no qualified applicants Only after a minimum of two such unsuccessful vacancy postings does IOS consider the selection of an OA who has already been abroad for five years In these limited cases IOS ensures that the OA will not be at the new post beyond the initial two or three year tour of duty Page 7 of 7 102 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX VII OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT DIVISION ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT Recommendation Number 1 Resolved The FBI agreed with our recommendation and reported that it intends to deploy to Legat Ottawa the positions that were approved for a three-person two ALAT one Office Assistant sub-office in Toronto The FBI anticipates that the personnel will be selected and deployed by mid summer 2004 Further the Office of International Operations OIO believes that this infusion of personnel will significantly reduce if not eliminate the backlog of work in Legat Ottawa In order to close this recommendation please provide us with documentation showing that the personnel have been deployed to Legat Ottawa along with quarterly workload reports for the 12 months following the completion of the deployment and an analysis performed to determine if the staffing is adequate In the interim please keep us informed about the status of filling these positions 2 Resolved The FBI responded that it agreed with our assessment of the policy underlying the need for all FBI travelers to request and obtain a country clearance in advance of foreign travel and emphasized the Legat’s role in this process The OIO acknowledged that some FBI travelers to Canada had failed to request country clearances but indicated that the 135 instances cited by the OIG were overstated Specifically after our exit conference the OIO said it contacted a random sample of 29 employees who had submitted 42 of the 135 travel vouchers and determined that for 74 percent of these voucher submissions a country clearance request had been submitted to Legat Ottawa However the response was silent regarding whether the country clearances for these 42 trips were actually approved and documented As we pointed out in the report the 135 discrepancies were based on information provided by Legat Ottawa as well as OIO’s research of its records and ACS At the time this research was initiated we suggested that OIO contact individual employees to ascertain whether these employees could provide evidence of country clearance but OIO declined to 103 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED do so As we also stated in our report the fact that OIO had to contact individuals rather than obtaining this information from a centralized source in our opinion demonstrates a weakness in the internal control over country clearances for FBI employees traveling abroad Moreover after all of this research the FBI still did not provide evidence of approved country clearances for the discrepancies we identified The FBI also stated in its response that the centralization at FBI Headquarters of country clearance processing was attempted by the OIO in the year 2000 without success Instead OIO said that it will remind each Legat office of the importance of keeping accurate records and maintaining control files and will work with the Inspection Division to ensure these control files are reviewed for compliance during each Legat inspection While we did not examine OIO’s unsuccessful centralization of the country clearance process we are unconvinced that a centralized source for maintaining this information is not viable Nevertheless OIO’s proposed alternative approach seems reasonable therefore we consider this recommendation resolved In order to close this recommendation please provide us with the 1 communication issued to all Legat offices reminding them of the importance of keeping accurate records and maintaining control files and 2 country clearance communications for the 31 vouchers 74 percent of 42 vouchers sampled that were subsequently located and provided to OIO by individuals 3 Resolved As stated in Number 2 the Inspection Division plans to review country clearance files as part of its reviews of Legat offices In addition the Office of Inspections said it will review compliance with country clearance requirements by reviewing vouchers for foreign travel as part of the financial audit conducted during on-site inspections of domestic field offices In order to close this recommendation please provide us with a copy of the guidance that will be provided to Inspectors for use during their reviews of country clearance requirements at Legat and domestic field offices In addition provide us with samples of Legat and field office inspection reports that demonstrate country clearance requirements were reviewed and the results obtained 104 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 4 Resolved The FBI agreed with our recommendation and said that the Director recently approved “Border Liaison Office” status for the Buffalo field office which permits FBI Special Agents assigned to the Buffalo field office to travel approximately 50 miles into Canada for routine investigative matters The FBI added that the Special Agent in Charge of the Buffalo field office provides summary information concerning the need for the travel to Legat Ottawa and that Legat Ottawa has confirmed that this is being done The FBI’s response was silent however as to how other FBI field offices near the Canadian border coordinate their investigative activities with Legat Ottawa This recommendation can be closed when the FBI provides 1 an example of the summary information provided to Legat Ottawa by the Buffalo field office 2 Legat Ottawa’s confirmation that Buffalo is adequately coordinating its activities and 3 specific comments addressing how other border offices are coordinating their activities in Canada with Legat Ottawa 5 Resolved In its response the FBI stated that it agreed with the recommendations contained in the Inspection Division’s report and has initiated actions to implement the recommendations The FBI however did not address one of the recommendations dealing with the need to study the feasibility of FBI employees completing a temporary duty assignment in a Legat office as a prerequisite for applying for a Legat vacancy To close the OIG’s recommendation the FBI needs to address this recommendation and provide us with documentation for the actions that have been taken on the others as shown in the following table 105 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED RECOMMENDATION DOCUMENTATION NUMBER REQUESTED 1 Copy of the comprehensive course evaluation instrument 2 3 Example of the electronic communication transmitted to substantive divisions at FBI Headquarters requesting specific comprehensive briefings for outgoing Legat personnel and evidence these briefings occurred 4 Progress reports about locating space at FBI Headquarters for an OIO classroom facility and simulated Legat office until this project is completed 5 Progress reports about providing additional training personnel to the Legat PreDeployment Training initiative 6 Documentation supporting that personnel selected for Legat vacancies with no prior Legat experience were provided with training in an established Legat office 7 8 Copy of the plan formulated to prioritize advertise and select Legat personnel for those offices with critical language needs which is expected to be implemented after the FBI’s new management selection system becomes operational 9 Examples of completed evaluation forms used to provide feedback about the language training received and evidence that personnel receiving language training are tested 10 11 FY 2006 budget submission where an enhancement of resources to the Employee Assistance Unit is requested in order to implement a mental health program for Legat personnel 106 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 6 Resolved In our report we stated that 29 Legat staff had remained abroad for long periods including eight employees who will have been overseas for more than 6 years if they complete their current tours of duty We recommended that the FBI adhere to its tour of duty limits and keep exceptions to a minimum In its response the FBI agreed with our recommendation and provided comments regarding its actions related to several requests for extensions The FBI did not comment however regarding the eight employees we concluded would exceed tour-of-duty limits if they are permitted to complete their current tours To close this recommendation please provide us with documentation supporting the requests for extensions and denials as noted in the FBI’s response and specific comments and or justification regarding the eight employees mentioned above 107 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED