CQl25j044 b 1 b 3 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E O 129581 4 b 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 c 25Yrs - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E O 129581 4 d 25Yrs Q 12958 3 5 C THE AGENCY'S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORT Directorate of Operations APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE 25-April-2012'----f------------------------1 _Q __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___JO Sis '------' C01252044 t s · - BY REPORT THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ON THE AGENCY'S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORT OCTOBER 1994 · SECRE'l· ___I_ ____ C01252044 s TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive SlllilIIl ary • i Trends · 1 Agency Resources · I 2 Program Effectiveness 2 Mission Objectives Customer Evaluations Sup o t to Law Enforcement Agencies Training 3 CTC- -Elements of Success _ Mission Clarity In the DO DI-DO Integration Community Center Responsive 1- • 3 s 8 10 10 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 11 11 • 11 11 With a Few Problems Resources Reorganization Gender • Career Issues 12 12 12 12 13 Information Systems 15 of Operations •••_ __ __ ANNEXES Annex I Supporting Data Annex II Scope and Methodology __ _l_- 8_ __ C01252044 SE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Our inspection which was conducted from 1 March 1994 to 30 June 1994 found that CIA and the Counterterrorist Center CTC have had significant counterterrorist mission successes The counterterrorist program has been most effective when the collection target was well defined--an organized group a specific event or an individual terrorist The most significant weakness of the program was an extremely limited ability to provide timely warning of impending terrorist attack The difficulty in penetrating terrorist groups is the principal cause of this weakness CTC is an effectively managed mature Center performing its mission as intended Customers give CTC high marks for expertise and responsiveness Relationships with some Key FBI field offices and legal attaches are negatively affected by poor professional relationships between CIA and FBI field officials stemming from personal and protessional experiences These relationships hamper the counterterrorist efforts of both agencies Page 8 includes an advisory regarding this issue · CIA officers working in the counterterrorist program do not receive systematic training in the range of skills required to provide effective support to law enforcement agencies I I Our recommendation for required training is intended to reinforce the Joint Intelligence Community Law Enforcement Task Force recommendations The main challenge for the Agency is to adapt its strategy resources and organization to new trends in terrorism--a rising threat fromiradical religious or ethnic nongovernmental groups and an increased presence of terrorist organizations in the United States On the basis of our research we belieye CTC and the DO are currently engaged in addressing that challenge S' e Cf E '---·____ C01252044 SE Trends This inspection of the CIA's counterterrorist program comes at a time of significant rransitions in worldwide terrorist groups The threats posed by some state-sponsored terrorists and some leftwing te rrorist groups have declined At the same time threats from radical religious ethnic and nongovernmental terrorist groups have increased These latter groups often very small close knit and deadly are extremely difficult to penetrate The fact that terrorists have struck in the United States and have the potential to strike here again profoundly affects intelligence priorities and objectives The World Trade Center bombing and the alleged plot to blow up other facilities in the New York City rea brought • terrorism home to the United States and to the CIA Those events and subsequent discovery of the extent of terrorist elements resident in the United·States reemphasized the priority of the CIA counterterrorist mission--and complicated it The trends also require Agency and Center management to simultaneously shift target priorities increase penetrations of terrorist organizations enhance and improve support to law enforcement agen9ies change Counterterrorist Center CTC organization to reflect the new priorities I jimprove the use of '----------------------- information management technologies and accomplish all of these changes within the context of severe budget and personnel constraints CTC management is currently engaged with the Intelligence Community in adjusting target priorities and changing CTC organization to reflect those new priorities the Congress ---------' '--i 's __c_o_n_s i d e-r i_n_g I C01252044 s' L____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ providing resources to go with the additional tasks Agency Resources The Counterterrorist Center CTC is the main counterterrorist element for the Agency and for the Intelligence Community The Chief of CTC serves as DCI Center Manager Community Issue Coordinator in his role in the Needs Process National Intelligence Officer and in most cases crisis manager CTC is a worldwide multifaceted operational and analytical unit Although CTC is central other CIA elements are active 1 y J nVO1 ve d in counterterrorist oroqrams Th e DO area divisions IDS T I ' Iopen-source imagery and signals intelligence Program Effectiveness We measured the effectiveness of the Agency's counterterrorist program against four criteria • Mission objective achievements 2 BECRECf''-j_ _ __ l C01252044 I • • t 1 s • Customer evaluations • • Support to law enforcement agencies Quality of program management CIA has had notable successes measured against its mission objectives Terrorist capabilities have been minimized Mission Objectives - PJ anned terrorist operations were preempted directly I jand indirectly by helping law enforcement agencies bring terrorists to justice--a World Trade Center bomber and I '--------------' hijacker Customer Evaluations During -this inspection we discussed the effectiveness of CIA support with a wide range of external customers in the policy '------ and law enforcement cornmLu_n_i_t_i_e_s____C_T_C_w_a_s_t_h_e__ ke element to which most of the customers related as playing a significant role we also discussed CTC's support with customers within CIA External Customers Generally external customers were extremely leased with Agency support Praise for the program covered many different ervices from White Houselevel policy support to effective Intelligence Community leadership on resource and collection issues to tactical support to law enforcement agencies '--------------- Most of the praise was directed at CTC '---------- and particularly at its senior managers for their responsiveness to customers for their expertise on terrorist issues and for their Community leadership also -received-praise and in several LJ 3 8ECRE L-------' C01252044 r' J t -1 cases awards from the FBI for their counterterrorism support Internal Customers Internal customers--particularly stations and bases abroad--reported excellent support from CTC Interviews with case officers serving in field stations indicated that CTC answers its mail promptly It 4 SECR T I- - - - C01252044 j provides sound operational support and initiatives in most cases highly valued by stations for their contributions to maintaining critical liaison relationships A few internal customers particularly station officers expressed reservations about the effectiveness of so e CTC operational recommendations They said that CTC desk officers do not have a sufficient grasp of local operational realities and that their recommendations reflected that fact A few station officers also indicated J that in their view CTC was sometimes too aggressive I --- We did not evaluate the specific cases about which internal customers expressed concern We did discuss both criticisms with senior CTC managers They told us that in their judgment the quality of CTC operational recommendations is sometimes adversely affected by the Center's having too few officers With re ard to CTC pressing stations senior CTC officials commented that '-------------' aggressiveness is appropriate t the Center's mission and what is expected of CTC by policymakers Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Agency components support the Secret Service FBI 1 Department of·Justice and other law enforcement and regulatory agencies The main efforts involve support to the Secret Service and the FBI During the inspection both the Secret Service and the FBI had officers assigned to CTC CTC supports the Secret Serv ce in both its protective responsibilities and in its special ·investigation Several Agency elements--CTC -------- and many stations-support FBI counterterrorist efforts Secret Service The Secret Service USSS reports excellent Agency support for both its protective 5 SRCRE'1' ' - I- - - - - ' C01252044 J •• SEC - responsibilities and -----------------According to senior Secret Service managers CIA reporting was essential in 15 of the Secret Service's major protective cases in the past two years I I Department of Justice Senior Department of Justice officials also report good support from the Agency on counterterrorism issues and an excellent but limited personal involvement with CTC _They have concerns about counterterrorism support from CIA that parallel issues considered in the draft report bf the Joint Intelligence Community Law Enforcement Task Force Senior Justice Department officials indicate that in their view CIA needs to improve its handling of criminal information While they did not cite cases involving terrorism they did refer tol las examples of problems that could have been avoided with appropriate training and foresight by Agency officers BBCRE' Pf -- C01252044 ·' 1 They also expressed a generalized concern about the Agency's slipping into law enforcement activities in its close support to law I enforcement agencies L __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ L _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ FBI Relationships with the FBI are a more complex matter We interviewed officers and conducted interviews I relating to CIA-FBI relationshiL'p-s -------------'--- j The data from our interviews indicate that generally CIA support to the FBI wa_s effective on counterterrorist matters In the case of the World Trade Center bombing CIA support was particularly helpful At the same time data from the inspection including interviews with senior officials in FBI and CIA field elements indicate that the effectiveness ·of support to FBI counterterrorist programs is overly dependent on the status of ·personal relationships Some relationships· are excellent others are not In addition ·our interv ews indicated that the prevailing view among FBI field officers and some Department of Justice officials working on counterterrorism is that the CIA witholds information that the FBI needs for its counterterrorist efforts In one interviews with CIA officers revealed that the FBI would not ·tell the CIA station what terrorist groups it was concerned about In another I indicate that mistrust adversely affects information shari1 g and cooperation on counterterrorist programs If poor cooperation leads to a failure to provide information that 7 SECRET'- _ _ _-_ C01252044 t t could have been used to preempt a terrorist incident in the United States the results could-be tragic RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND FBI--AN ADVISORY • Poor professional re ationships between CIA and FBI personnel serving at some key US and foreign posts adversely affect the counterterrorist programs of both agencies and require the attention of the top managers of both agencies • The perception among FBI and Department of Justice personnel that CIA is withholding information the FBI needs to fulfill its counterterrorist mission also affects critical relationships between the Agency and the FBI · • Similarly some CIA field personnel perceive that they are not receiving information from FBI field offices required to fulfil their counterterrqrist mission Interviews of CTC officers '--------- and their managers demonstrate '----------------- that CIA employees are not provided the systematic training they require for effective support to law enforcement agencies Some officers are experienced and have absorbed on-the-job training Others are neither experienced nor trained As the Joint Task Force concluded compromising a source or damaging the prosecution of an alleged terrorist because a CIA officer was not aware of the requirements for supporting law enforcement agencies are real and serious risks Interviews with officials in the law enforcement community indicate that they see evidence of inadequate training of CIA offic rs in their work with CIA on counterterrorist matters To ensure effective support to law enforcement agencies all Agency officers working on terrorism need Training C01252044 t f legal awareness training The recent addition I has helped make some '------------------ additional time available for training which is now- - - - provided '---- I I We suggest these current efforts be strengthened by the systematic formal training the Joint Intelligence Community Law Enforcement Task Force proposes in its draft report The costs of this training would depend ainly on the time CIA and other officers would d vote to taking or teaching the course s TRAINING FOR SUPPORTING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES--AN OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATION Findings • Agency officers are not systematically receiving training in supporting counterterrorist efforts of law enforcement ·E gencies • Our interviews with CIA officers and with knowledgeable officials in the law enforcement community provide clear evidence that as a result of insufficient training many Agency officers at Headquarters nd in field stations do not fully understand the legal impact their activities may have on the subsequent conviction of a terrorist and are unclear about law enforcement's legitimate role abroad Operational Recommendation That all appropriate Agency personnel engaged in supporting law enforcement agencies• counterterrorism efforts receive leg l awareness training as proposed in the draft report 0£ the Joint ----- Intelligence Community Law Enforcement Task Force SECRETr ---- C01252044 r • J s Date Disapprove_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ 1 µ zf Date- - - - - - - - CTC--Elements of Success CTC is recogntzed within the Agency the Intellig nce Community and the Policy Community as an effective DCI Center In interviews focus groups surveys and briefings CTC employees and customers told the team of their high regard for the Center its product and its management We found no significant substantive issues relating to the management of CT programs at the Agency level DO Area Divisions and field stations accept and by all evidence work effective·ly with CTC Within the Community CTC has provided effective leadership for both budget and collection resources We believe on the basis of our research and information from interviews that this record is a reflection of the leadership that a well-run firmly established widely_accepted DCI Senter can provide for an Agency program and for the Intelligence Community Our data also suggest that this record is a reflection of the quality and skills of current senior CTC managers The elements of CTC 1 s mission-and management success can be identified and should be remembered as positive lessons learned for other DCI centers Mission Clarity We found clari_ty concerning CTC I s mission in the Center the Agency and in the Community In the management survey 99 percent of the CTC staff agree th_at they understand the Center I s miss-ioris and functions Our data also indicate- that CTC management has kept CTC C01252044 ' J employees and CTC customers well infonned'about mission and functions In the DO The Center is administered within the Directorate of Operations where' the operational mission is paramount and the Directorate is designedito support the mission CTC supports DO area division efforts effectively and in turn draws on them for support DI-DO Integration In CTC we found operational and analytic activity effectively integrated Our interview data indicate that the work of DI analysts is highly valued by the operations officers in the Center esp cially those analysts involved in operations support The analysts and operations officers both report that the analysts have adequate access to DO operations traffic to allow t em to work effectively and conversely operations officers have access to DI data bases I Judging·from our interviews with CT Community participants we believe CTC has effectively projected its role as an Intelligence Community center Officials with whom we met in the Intelligence and Policy Communities acknowledged CTC's central and coordinating role on counterterrorism issues inc uding budget crisis management analytical work and some operational efforts Comments from a focus group composed of officers working in ' CTC on rotation from other counterterrorism community agencies underlined the fact that they were well integrated into the operations of the center This group also agreed that CTC provides value added in tenns of expertise and the synergistic effects of an integrated center Responsive The Inspectiort Team found that policy customers operational elements of other agencies and CIA operations officers in the field regard the Center as responsive to their needs Focus groups and interviews with Community Cente 11 s--E CR E IT'-I_ _ ____ CTC officers reveal that prompt response s considered to be important and a source of some pride in ere With a Few Problems Against this background of strong leadership and engaged program management our individual interviews focus groups and survey data brought a few protlems to our attention Resources Some Directorate CT efforts do not appear to be in concert with current Agency priorities I threat to US interests the size of the Agency's effort appears disproportionate to tne current t reat Reorganization In interviews and focus groups a sig ificant number of CTC employees complained that they had to rely on five months of rumors for information about the reorganization of the -------------------- They also lamented that CTC management did not·seek out the views of the working-level officers as had been done in a recent reorganization of --------------- ----- Gender Responses to the management survey revealed a perception among about 25 percent of female officers in CTC that their professional opportunities were limited by their gender Female officers pointed to the all-male management I structure of the __________________ and the fact that all senior managers in the Center are male They also said that they did not have an opportunity to apply for management jobs in I - the process of selecting officers was not open The concerns of female officers appear to war ant CTC management attention particularly in the process used to select CTC managers Interviews with managers indicated that the selection process was not open and a review of the current management structure of the 12' S ECRE'J f C01252044 _ center confirms that all managers inj j '--- -------- are male Career Issues The management surve¥ focus groups and interviews with managers and staff officers indicated a ' of service in widespread concern about the adyerse impact I CTC on the careers of its officers I I ---------- ------ In the opinion survey and personal interviews the overwhelming majority of CTC employees to d us that they found working in CTC to be challenging and personally rewarding · However in the opinion survey only 35 percent of employees agreed that their home office or career service recognized the value of their work in CTC and-rewarded it Furthermore we were told by both managers and employees that perceptions about the impact of service in CTC on employees' careers discouraged some well-qualified employees from serving in CTC In the course of interviews mana_gers operations officers and an·alysts had told us of persons who had turned down offers of pos tions in CTC because of concerns about adverse effects on their careers The causes of this concern appear to vary by directorate Some CTC managers and staff officers point to specific cases of deserving DI fficers on rotation to CTC who were not promoted because they had not done traditional DI long-term research papers Senior CTCjmanagers however do not believe that long papers were the issue in those cases In the DO the concern has·two origins First among DOI officers service in CTC may delay opportunities to serve abroad because many area ·divisions require a -------- headquarters tour before assignment overseas I officers assigned to CTC most of whom are engaged in training are disadvantaged by precepts designed for 1 - 3_ _ _ ECRlfT L _ I- - - - - ' C0 1252044 officers assigned engaged primarily L------------ ------- In order to understand the facts underlying the perception that service in CTC may hinder·an officer's ca eer progression we interviewed senior DI managers and reviewed promotion data Senior DI managers we interviewed believe that the DI officers are being evaluated fairly and promoted equitably They indicated that the rotational panel chaired by the A DDI is specifically charged with resolving disputes between home and rotational offices· I jdata on DI and DO promotion rates for officers serving in CTC Wittl regard to DI officers the indicate that promotion rates for data DI officers serving in CTC are essentially the same as for DI officers serving in their home DI offices We also interviewed senior DO managers and developed data concerning promotion rates The Deputy Director for Operations recently determined that despite his earlier efforts to secure additionalJ none were provided ptfice s for the Center Therefore he recently directed assignment of'------ officers ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ jto the Center in the coming months 1 The need for ______ repeated direct action by the DD0 is one of the best indicators of the strength of perceptions and the depth of the problem The dataL----------- indicate that officers are disadvantaged by service in CTC J j Jofficers do not receive promotions at a ate comparable to t h e i r D Ocolleagues in the DO as a whole In order to be receiving promotions at the same rate as otherj Jofficers J - - - - LJshould have receivedDromotions during the last four years Instead they received _·_ _ _ ___ 14 8ECRE 1_ _ __ C01252044 • t L • s The data do not provide information about the reasons for the shortfall in promotions However our interviews indicate that limited opportunity for service overseas and The individual competitiveness of the officers serving in CTC is also a plausible contributing factor The perception thatl officers are disadvantaged by service in CTC is supported by the promotions data _____ Compared withj jpromotion ra es '--a-c_r_o_s_s_t_h_e_D_O_ _p_r_o_m otion parity_ for CTC I jofficers would have been promotions during the last four years while granted The deviation from parity in CTC '--- promotion rates compared with DOI promotion rates is likely to be accounted for by the fact thatl I precepts do not adequately cove the activities of''---- officers serving in CTC ·we discussed the issue of management promotions with CTC They indicated that the A DDO has recently bec me aware of the disparity of precepts affecting CTcj jofficers He has dir cted a group to review J- - J precepts and to make necessary changes The data I however indicate that jofficers received a somewhat higher rate of promotions than their counterparts in other DO offices Promotion parity for fficers would have been J- - - promotions during the last four years In fact I jofficers were promoted During the same pe r_i_o_d- - '---p-r_o_m_o_ tion parit forj jofficers would have beenj whileDromotions were granted -- L __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Information Systems CTC responsibility for information management systems includes several internal systems and the ·community On the basis '--------------------------0 f briefings we received and our interviews with CTC officers we believe the internal information systems are 15 SECRET'---1_ a----- CQ1252044 _ well focused and now meet the re irements of CTC In contrast with the internal systems program has been affected by bo h management __a_n_d__f_u_n_d_i_n_g_ problems As a result senior TC managers responsible for the program acknowled e that the Intelli ence Community has underperforming Communit system __ Interviews with present an past program managers suggest that the origins of thej Jproblem lie in the first instance in grudging acceptance of responsibility for developing the system by the DO and CTC The program concept originated with the Idtelligence Community Staff several years ago The staff decided that CIA should develqp and manage the system Senior CTC managers accept responsibility and are working to provide the resources for an effective program however they indicate that they would just as soon not have responsibility Compounding CTC 1 s initial reluctant acceptance of responsibility was t e fact tha t according to our interviews the DO and NSA insisted on pursuing the development of a compartmented workstation in order to accommodate and control ORCON documents OIT warned about the perils of developing a compartmented workstation When ' its warnings were not heeded OIT provided minimal support to the project Management of resources also contributed _______ I 1 '---- -- problems Projected cost'- -- --c------- ----- --- - CIA reduced that'--------- Iri what appears to be a fundamental error the project s cope was increased not d e c r e a s e ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Experienced project managers indicated that the decision to expand rather than reduce scope probably was one key reason for the CQ125 044 l' ' - funding shortfall the program encountered I Another underlying problem flo ed from the initial system requirements The Agency's request for proposal RFP did not require the contractor to review in detail the project requirements This oversight permitted the contractor to develop from an ambiguous set of requirements Given the complexity of developing a state·of-the-art compartmented workstation experienced project managers indicate that a detailed review should have been required On the basis of our interviews it appears that during the actual development of the system ·certain- basic program management controls were not established For example the impact assessment and requirements management processes were not well controlled The technical complexity of the compartmented workstation and the lack of re irements analysis made oversight of the technical process both difficult and ineffective In December 1992 C CTC informed theiCommunity that it would have a shortfall inj jProgfam That meeting was followed by a February 1993 memorandum informing the Acting DCI of a shortfall CIA management failed to come up with additional funds until after the program manager issued a stop-work order for the program Only after the program stopped and the contractor team dispersed did CIA find money to continue the program This inability to decide whether to terminate or continue the program has cost a substantial amount of money and impacted on delivery of services to the counterterrorist community was stopped for six weeks while '------------- funds were redirected to cover the funding shortfall CTC now has two additional funding requirements '----------- 1 the contractor stop-work costs as described by the contract and 2 the new startup costs to continue the I lr'-7_ _ __ S S CRET j C01252044 ' 1' • s I contract Before fu ding interruptions t_h_e_ _ _--- developmental acti v_i_t_i_e_s_w_e_r e performed w th a team '---- contractors Current plans indicate a development staff of L---- IThis level of support will impact on what the staff can develop and when the staff can deliver the system To improve the management of the project OIT and CTC changed the project manager during the summer of 1993 and colocated the entire development team during the spring of 1994 The chjnges wire intended to address many of the concerns that had surfaced over the many months of development The project manager change appears to have been beneficial and helped resolve many of the existing problems While the management of the pro'gram has improved continued attention from CTC and OIT senior management will be required to ensure that is a success Directorate of Operations The Directorate of Operations has had an active counterterrorist e f f o r t ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - establishment of CTC in 1986 consolidated the program The high priority accorded the counterterrorist effort was reflected The DO' s field stat ions combined with CTC to fonn the Agency's counterterrorism actiori arm J 19 SBCRB'±'I ---- C0125 2044 r • s C01252044 I S ECRE' 'l ----' C0125 2044 r SECRE l -- Cs_ 12 5 Q O4 4 s Sli CRg '-----' SECRB'ft - - c912s_ 2 044 £li CRR T I _ ___ cQ 1253044 SFC ET'-1_ _____ c 1 2 i2 o4 4 GECRE'f' I- - SE C@l 25 2 0 4 4 BBGRE'rl -- c 12 Y' 2 o4 4 SECRE'f _ _ I- - - - ' SECR1 __ ___ Table 5 The Counterterrorist Community Department of the Air Force Department of the Army Bureau of Tobacco Firearms Capitol Police Central Intelligence Agency Coast Guard Department of Commerce Customs Service Drug Enforcement Administration Defense Intelligence Agency Department of Energy Federal Aviation Administration Federal Bureau of Investigation Immigration Naturalization se5ice Department of Justice Marine Corps National Securi y Agency National Security Council Department of the Navy Nuclear Regulatory Commission Department of Defense Postal Service Secret Service Special Operations Command Department of State Department of Transportation Department of Treasury US Information Agency White House Communications Office White House Military Office 9 SECRE'f1 --- BECRE' P ANNEX II I'---- SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY The inspection of the Agency's counterterrorist program focused on • Overall program effectiveness of the effort as reflected in managerial operational and analytical efforts • Effectiveness of the management of CTC • Status of interrelationships among Agency elements responsible for counterterrorist efforts • Status of interrelationships between the Agency and the· intelligence and policy communities related to counterterrorist efforts The Inspection team --------------------- L------------------ began the inspection on 1 March 1994 completed in June 1994 The final draft was The inspection was based on a Terms of Reference reviewed by the Agency's Executive Director four Deputy Directors and the Executive Director for Inte ligence Community Affairs The Chief of the Counterterrorist Center reviewed and agreed to the Terms of Reference C CTC also agreed that CTC officers would have access to both the Employee Opinion Survey and the Inspection Report The information upon which the inspection report and its recommendations are based includes ---------------- • The Employee Opinion Survey • That total includes interviews with CTC staff officers L_----------------------- Community detailees operations officers analysts secretaries support officers and __ _ _ _ _ _ _ contractors • Interviews ·with 87 consumers of CTC products and services within the intelligence and policy communities--including senior NSC staff and officials from State the FBI DOD L--- IDOJ and usss ' SECRE L---- • Visits '--------------- abroad during which interviews were conducted and visits to L - - - - - - - _ _ J FBI field offices during which were interviewed • Review of a substantial amount of documentarv material The Inspection Team - Members of the inspection team were