G i 5 4 3 2 0 2 2 b 1 - - - - - - - -_ _ _ b 3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ EO 12958 1 4 b 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 c 25Yrs ' EO 12958 1 4 d 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 e 25Yrs EO 12958 3 5 c Intelligence Report DCI Counterterrorist Center 9April 1999 Islamic Terrorists Using Nongovernmental Organiza ons Extensively U ------ - - -ely on nongovernmental organizations NGOs for funding and their exploitation ofthese organizations is likely ro grow • NGOs also provide an easily exploitable international network for logistics support which for ma 'f terrojts is ' lore valuable than the funds they may receive through NGOs Although there are more than 6 000 Islamic NGOs and charities only a few dozen support terrorists Those that do generally fall into three basic categories • Large internationally active organizations headquartered in the Persian Gulf countries which provide of ficial support ID the NGOs These organizations most often are exploited by individual employees sympathetic ID terrorist causes without the knowledge of the organiwti-on 's leadership The illicit activity tends ID take place at local branch offices rather than at headquarters locations • Private NGOs some of which are headquartered outside the iraditional Muslim world Several o es o these NGOs exist solely to support a militant cause making them somewhat more n The availability offunds cover and logistics networks makes NGOi-s_an-'---a _-'---'--'-'---- resource or ferro ' t O • 2300011 APPROVED-FOR RELEASEn DATE 25-April-2012 00543•2022 JbpSecret i· logistical support NGOs offer includes cover employment ftilse documentation bvlVel •itatio trainin a in some cases wea ons Te onsts typica penetr e 'S n ing '-- n - - -a sy_m_p_at _h ize - -'S-w h-o-d i-----'vert resources in support of the group but in a few instances entire NGO o es inclutlin senior management positions are staffed b extremists Most efjorls by Persian Gulf states to curb te orist use of NGOs by restricting the collection offunds within their borders have been ineffective largely because the steps taken do not address the diversion of resources at the branch offices · Domestic popular support in the Gulf states for the work of Islamic NGOs often outweighs pressure on these governments to improve NGO accountability Di _nors may be reluctant to contribute to an NGO publicly linked to terrorism in the aftermath of a specific te orist incident but over time these donors tend to be ieve such cases are rare and that their contributions are going toward the NGO's legitimate work Measures '---m1i- o-ip- te-d'b 1-Ni G O 'S--- ti ---o-p-ro-vid-- - e-gre-at ---- --er-h --e-adi- -q-uarti------ -e-r -'S-o-ve-r -'Si - g - ht- --o- ---- - _ -lranches could deter abuse where it is growing the fastest ·_ _ _ _ _ _ _ I - - ' 2 I I C05432022 - I I OD ' Islamic Terrorists Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively U 3 D C05432022 Islamic Terrorists Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively J Most nongovernmental organizations NGOs worldwide are accredited _with the United Nations and many work with the United Nations High Commission for Relief following natural disasters or other humanitarian crises providing food clothing shelter immediate medical care and oth r social services Ihe majority of Islamic nongovernmental organizations ·are educational or charitable noq profit organizations established by Sunni Islamic activists and typically pursue a-double agenda-to provide humanitarian relief to needy communities and to spread the Islamic faith as they interpret it Islamic NGOs also consider tlle defense of Muslims in olved in armed conflicts part of their ' humanitarian duties-explaining why many Islamic NGOs provided support including weapons to the Afghan and Bosnian mujahedin forces in the 1980s and 1990s respectively · • Despi their nongovernmental status many Islamic NGOs receive substantial rt from traditional Muslim overnment institutions • Three Types of NGOs Used by Terrorists Of the more than 6 000 Islamic NGOs an i charities only a few dozen-which fall into three basic categories-support terrorists I The first group includes the large internationally active NGOs based in Saudi-Arabia or one of the Persian Gulf states that are exploited by individual employees with ties to extremists These NGOs receive the political-and sometimes financial-support of their host governments Terrorist abuse of such NGOs takes place at the local branch office rather than at the organizations' headquarters Senior NGO leaders usually are unwitting of the activity and willing to take corrective action when apprised of the abuse · - ----- --- ------r-------- -- J L _ _ I sympathizers I I ave provided terrorists with __fu ndi- - -n-g_an_d- ---co-v-er-ern-p- -lo_y_m_e-nt ---cdoc-um_e_n_ta_ti_o_n -an--'d trainin 4 I CJ C05432O22 IOP Sec1et jj The second type of NGO terrorists use are the private organizations-some also are headquartered in the Persian Gulf countries-that either have opene offices in areas of military conflict involving Muslims or have groWJ out of such conflicts The outbreak of the Balkans conflict in the mid-1990s increased significantly the number · of th se organizations as Islamic activists opened Europe -based NGOs to aid Bosnian Muslims • ·1 The Pakistan-based Maktab al-Khidamat MAK is the premjer example of this type of NGO Established in Peshawar in 1984 by Usama Bin Ladin and Palestinian Abdallah Azzam to facilitate the travel and training of Arab volunteers to fight with the mujahidin in Afghanistan Ithe NGO has opened new office s in_a_t-- -le_a_s_t2 0 -c_o_u_n_trt e-s-s- --in-ce th e-IDI d 1980s D C0543 2O22 Too Sec1et or xtrem1sts Finally the third type of NGO terrorists use is one that maintains a close affiliation with a state sponsor of terrorism and often acts more as a foreign policy or intelligence_ tool of the state sponsors particularly Iran Sudan and Libya 2 Funding d Logistics Drive NGO UseD Many Islamic terrorist and extremist organizations useNGOs to funo their activities For many terrorists NGOs represent a dependable and seemingly endless resource base The popularity of the legitimate charitable work rformed b most NGOs ensures their sta ·n ower and abilit to raise mone 2 The US Department of State revjews slates suspected of sponsoring terrorism and provides an official list of these annually Currently Iran Iraq Sudan Libya Syria North Korea _and Cuba are on that lisL U _____I· cti 5431022- Using a number of NGOs affords terrorist groups protection from potential financial clisruotions such as from the closure of anv one NGO I NGOs also have provided terrorist and extremist groups with logistical support which in many cases may be more valuable than outright funding Several Islamic NGOs offer terrorists cover employment false documentation travel facilitation training and in some cases weapons · CJ L C•0543'2022 - Case Study Bin Ladin Use of al-Haramayn I I Usama Bin Ladin has established close relationshins with emoloyees in several al- Haramayn office has used these ties to divert resources to support his terrorist agenoaj I and 7 I kn embers of Bin Ladin's organization either planted or coopted by Bin Ladin after they began working for the NGO 8 C'05432022 J gR ieli Pefi • I I Extremists have capitalized on the international status of many NGOs to maintain cells and secure safehavens in several countries Most Islamic charitable NGOs are accredited with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNHCR which gives them credentials terrorists can use to travel more freely across borders and to establish ceUs in new areas under the guise of pursuing a humanitarian mission - t - D Various Methods of Infiltrating NGO Terrorist groups typically exploit NGOs oy establishing a close relationship with an NGO employee who sympathizes with their cause The sympathizer then diverts NGO funds or logistics support to the terrorist group usually in small amounts to avoid detection by NGO management I ' C05432O22 TOIi Scs st ·-1 In a few cases NGO offices are staffed almost entirely by extremists probably the result of sympathizers convincing their colleagues to engage in the _illicit activity or senior managers directing their subordinates State sponsors increasingly have turned to private NGOs to hide their involvement in terroris Bin Ladin apparently has created his own NGOs and planted members of his organization al-Qa'ida in others '------------'I I C05432O22 ·•· Mixed Results in Curbing Terrodst Use of NGOs D Minimal Efforts by Donor States Efforts by Persian Gulf states to curb NGO support to terrorists have had limited impact and are only partially enforced Control measures adopted in the past few year I hose citizens are the major source of funding for Islamic NGOs-focus on the collection of funds within their countries only offering no oversig ht of the finances once the monev reaches branch offices or recioients abroad 11 CJ 1· C05432022 12 C'0543£022 - ·•' Several factors work against a stronger response from hQst countries C'0543Q022 • Separating funding used for illicit versus legitimate activities is difficuit No· method currently exists to ens ure that funds collected in the Gulf states by NGOs are not diverted to terrorists or their supporters in the branch offices • Even if host-countries controlled the donor collection process terrorists could still use local branch offices for logistics support • The popularity of Islamic NGOs in the traditional Muslim world with their religious and humanitarian mandates makes strong actions a tough sell to local constituencies Gulf state governments in particular may fear that efforts to control NGOs or pressure them to control themselves would be viewed by - 'th e ---- public as limiting the omanizations' abilitv to nerfonn its lem timate tasks I Actions Against Individual Abusers a Successful Tactic The greatest success against terrorist abuse of NGOs has come in the form of legal or official action against individuals Such action not only disrupts temporarily the terrorists' flow of support but the resulting negative publicity also has forced some NGOs to monitor their personnel more c osely t avoid losing donors Closing an entire NGO branch office has proven a significant-though sometimes temporary-disruption to terrorists forcing extremists in the vicinity to scale back their activities I_I •· C0543'2022 T • S Unfavorable publicity concerning terrorist-ridden local branches or individual extremists employed by NGOs could persuade NGO headquarters' elements to improve their oversight of employment and travel documentation and the · accountability of funds Moreover donor or-host nations could take advantage of 15 C05432O22 ' f' 9 t ·negative public opinion to impress upon NGO leaders the need to adopt such measures D · 16 · CJ C0543£O22 CJ r · - Subject Islamic Terrorists Using Nongovernmental rganizations Extensively U Distribution Internal II I C0'5432022 Teo Se Ill D t C-0543'2022 '- ' CJ 1 D cb5432022 ---0______ __________________________ TupSccret '-----------'I 20 Cl 5432 022 TopScctet Subject Distribution External Department of State - av1 mpenter Assistant Secretary of State Diplomatic Security 1 - Ambassador Johnnie Carson De u assa or o ert Assistant Secret of State for epresentative for Dayton hnplementation l - Marc Grossman Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs I - m E Gibson Lanpher Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs 1 - Ronald Neumann Deputy Assistant Secretary Near Eastem Affairs 21 C 5432022 - ------------------------------------------- 1 - Phyllis Oakley Assistant Se retary of State for Intelligence and Research I - Amb Thomas Pickering Under Secretary for Political Affairs I 1 - Susan Rice Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 1 - Ambassador Michael Sheehan Coordinator for Counterterrorism 1 - Strobe Talbott Deputy Secretary of State 1 - Toni Verstandig Deputy Asssistant Secretary Near Eastern Affairs I 1 - David Welch Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary Near Eastern Affairs I I I National Security Council ·1 - Daniel Benjamin Director for Coul -terterrorism l - The Honorable Sal' Duel R Berger Assistan to the President for National Security Affairs I - Antony Blinken Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs 1 - Richard A Clarke Special Assistant to the President and National Coordinator for Security Tnfrastmctnre Protection and Canhterterrorism · 1 - Major General Donald Kerrick Deputy Assistant to the President for National Securi ffairs · _ _ I - Bruce Riedel Special Assistant to-the Pres1Jnt and Senior Director for Near Bast and South Asian Affairs 0 I - James Steinberg Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs e o the Vice President · · · D C©5432022 • So nrt Department ofDefense 1 - LTG Edward G Anderson III Director J5 Strategic Plans Policy 1 - MGEN John P Casciano Assistant Clµef of Staff Air Force Intelligence 1 - BGEN Richard COmer Demrtv Assistant Secretarv Policy SOUC Milions l - VADM Scott Fry Director J-3 Operations 1 - Keith HaU Director National Reconnaissance Office 1 - LTG Patrick M Hughes Director Defense Intelligence Agency 1 - RADM Lowell E Jacoby Director Naval Intelligence 1 -Frank Jones Deputy Assistant-Secretary Peacekeeping 1 - Franklin D Kramer Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 1 - GEN Charles C Krolak Commandant of the Marine Corps 1 - MGBN John Maher USA Deputy J-3 Joint Chiefs of Staff I - Barry McConnell Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa International Security A - 1 - GEN Joseph Ralston Vice Chairman JCS 1 - Alina Romanowski Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South · A n A ff 1 - Brian E Sheridan Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 1 - Walter Slocombe Under ecretary ·of Defense for Policy 23 c 543 022 ------------------------------------------- Top Satet omas Wil on Director of Intelligence Joint Staff JZ Federal Bureau o Investi 'lllion 1 - Dale atson Deputy Assistant Director for Terrorism National Secu • A en eneral Crimmal Division 24 C 5'43 022 ----0- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l 0 I Federal Aviation Administration Congress 1-HPSCI 1-SSC' T D 1 C S 43 022 TopSu tet I I· c D · Ce 5r43'2' 0 2 2 ' I -I _____--'
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