- ---- i t 053 5516 - I b 1 i--·- - - b 3 - - - - - - - - - - - _ __ _ _ _-- EO 12958 1 4 b 25Yrs - I • • fl e HRIW•U b' 1 i I · ' EEOO 11229955 88 11 44 cd 2255YYrs • rs EO 12958 1 4 e 25Yrs EO 12958 3 5 c EO 12958 6 2 c ntenerrorist Center i ' ·Central Intelligence Agency ---L---_L Intelligence Report 27 M arch 2001 DCI Counterterrorist Center _Afghanistan An Incubator for Inter ational· Terroris L----' Afghanistan plays a key role n harboring training and sponsoring-international terrorists including U sama Bin Ladin The country's Taliban leaders-sympathetic to ls am_ic extremist causes-allow more than two dozen training camps to operate their tmito y and provide logistics support to members'ofvarious terrorist organizations and'mujabidio engagef in jihads in a variety oflocations including Chechnya and Kashmir in • The camps p 11vide an opportunity for Islamic miiitants to forge ong-lastin g _·_ _ · ideological logistical and personal ties with coUM gu s around the worl' - I_ _ __ Weistimate tha -----------' ujahidin __ -- ---' have received training in Afghanistan since 1979 The current training curriculums· include religious indoctrination and instruciion in the use ofsmall lll'ms and g«err 1 a tactic ' The nurturing ofIslamic extremism in Afghanistan has inter _tational implications In the past two years terrorist plots in North America Europe the Middle East and Asia link back to Afghanistan Militants who receive training there often sent aftemards to fight in jihad When they return home to resume their normal lives or migrate to other countries thq constitute a ready supply ofmanpower for terr_orist operations are • Afghanistan provides Bin Ladin a relatively safe operating environment to ovenee his organization's worldwide terrorist activities He would he hardpressed to ind another loca#on offering the same security andfreedom ofaciion• ___I - -- - -- This Intelligence Repon was prepared by the DCI Countcrterrorist Center and-the Office ofNear Easte South As d al ·s ·es and comments arc welcome CTC# 01-40004 APPROVED FOR RELEASEn DATE 5-April-2012 ·• The Taliban will support terrorist groups in Afgha11istan as long as it is dominated by Mullah Omar's m0 r e hardlinefaction and ocked in a struggle-to gab control ofthe · territory still in Northern Alliance hands The Taliban ls not likely to succumb to international pressure t alier its policy given the limiJed leverage outsiders can bring to bear • · Pakista --as the Taliban's principalforeign patron-would appear to have the most influence over the Taliban but would ace a domestic backlus 1 and logistical hurdles if tried to apply significant pressure on the Taliban I · Origi_ns of Afghanistan's errorist Lin ----- of •• Afghanistan's ties to international terrorism are rooted in the Afghan-Sovi t war the 1980s and its aftennath Muslims from arounq the world participated in the anti-Soviet resistance created' an infrastructure to support the insurgency and helped Jay the groundwork for Afghanistan's continuing role as atraining ground for mujahidin involved in terrorist groups and in later jihads1 in other locations Much of the µfrastructure including the trainin cam s remained after the Soviet withdra a· buttressed by the presence of a large cadre of war veterans well versed in guerrilla tactics and willing to pass on their experiences and skills • Afghanistan at the crossroads of the Middle East South Asia and Central Asiais close to much of the Islamic world and is a convenient location for militants· to train for operations planned in other countries Afghanistan's mountainous terrain moreover provides a natural defense against law· enforcement and counterterrorism actions j j · · · Political instability and civil _war in Afghanistan foUowing the fall of the Communist Government in 1992 contributed to the favorable environment for terrorist-related activities Even before the Taliban emerged some Afghan leaders provided logistic suppot1 ---------- o the Islamic militants who helped them dc ' feat the Soviets others provided more significant assistance because it was· financially profitable and boosted their Islamic and le_adership credentials • • Abdul Rasul Sayyat for example pro r'-m ot ed nn ·t itan ·t- tra in in o oe -- - c - control as a wa to establish himsel 0 I Jihad Literally holy war used to designate either a war against unbelievers or a personal struggle to overcome one•s imperfections Extremists tend to broaden the concept of unbeliever • justifying terrorist violence·as a jihad against anything or anyone perceived as an1i-Islamic l J 2 C05375516 ' 1 3 • • • Another warlord Gulbuddin Hikrnatvar oversaw trainin2 ooeratiom I Terrorist Activities n Afghanistan Toda I Th Taliban's rigins co position and b d of highly orthodox Islam predispose the group to supporting worldwide Islamic extremist causes The Taliban's senior leaders including Mullah Omar and most of his close subordinates are former m jahidin from the war against the Soviet Union and-sta1 1I1chly support the concept ofjiqad - They even refer to the origoing Afghan civil war as such notwithstanding that the Taliban's opposition is composed largely of feUow Sunni Muslims · • • To fight its c wn civil war the Taliban relies heavily on foreign mtefahidin from camps in Afghanistan as well as Pakistani and Afghan students recruited directly from Pakistan's religious schools- some of which are widely regard·ed as bre ding grounds for Islamic militancy · · · · Training Camps U e camps provide instruction in military and terrorist tactics and religious indoctrination The graduates often go directly to ght in the Afghan or to jihads in-Kashmir Chechnya or elsewhere before returning to their ow 1_1 countries where many await insµuctions for participation in terrorist operations according to multiple sources war • The camps fonn the foundation of the world de n ujahidiri network by allowing · Islamic militants from diverse lrations to forge longstanding ideological logistical and personal •• indicates that over two dozen trainin cam s exist 1n tiesl -- -------- Jhave L---1 received training in Af an camps _since 1979 L - - - - - - - - - - - 3 C0537 5516 ' r • • An estimated 15 000 to 20 000 fighters have trained in Bin Laclin-supported camps since Bin Ladin's return to Afghan stan_in 19961 I · Camp Financing Financing for the camps is varied inchidi g public and private charitable organizations individual supporters of Islamic causes ''tuition paid by camp attendees according to a variety of sources Islamic militant groups raise money and directly from wealthy donors-primarily iri the Persian Gulf states and W estem Europe--to support terrorist trainin e and they funnel money thromrlt non govemmental organizations NGOs · '--- - - -_____ uggests Bin Ladin also provides substantial funds - - - - - - - _ '--d irectltand-throu-ghNGOs _to·most ofthe training camps-in istan j I -· M ilita y_ a d terrorist training I receive basic trainin in the use o-f-sm- -al_l_arm_s_an_d_gu_ --11 a-t-ac-b- c-sJ ------- -I advanced and specialized training in subjects such as explosiv I I ••• ------------' 4 I GQ537 - 516 I •• In addition to military and terrorist tactics traming in the Afghan camps emphasizes religious indoctrination Trainers frequently use the religfous· training to select militants whose religious fervor qualifies them for more specialized terrorist training The religious instruction includes repetition· of the ideas that the United States and Israel are evU and that the reeime of ATml counlriOs are true bclievera in Isl '1 I rt TraininI in no-nconventional weanons Terrorists exoeriment with nonconventional weannnd IT • •· I caml ____________________ ______ lm 1 ·h ·t an t s_ have received instruction I'----------------- --5---------- 1 - GQ537- 516 f -- Ji • Key Hub for Muiahidin Network U • ·•· • The mujahidm network-an infonnal collection of fighters and support pipelines first established during the Afghan war against the Soviet Union-bas continued to grow over the last two decades The network takes advantage oflax security along Afghanistan's borders to move militants funds and supplies on behalf of Bin Ladin and other Islamic extremist groups Many· of these men and materiel are exported from Afghanistan to fight injihads in Chechnya an other locations C05T7 5516 I I • • In September 2000 hundreds ofmen were training in Afghanistan I -Interoation ll Repercussions ofAfghani stan-Based T rrorism I I Islamic extremism nurtured in Afghanistan creates ripples throughout the world The arrests in December 1999 of azi Islamic extremist cell in Jordan and of an Algerian member of an extremist network in Canada attempting smuggle explosives into the United States highlight the linkages between Afghanistan and Islamic extr mist threats to US interests worldwide Although both networlcs consisted primarily of locallybased extremists who lacked foilllal affiliations with other terrorist groups available intelligence suggests that operatives ofal•Qa'ida _BinLadin•s organization headquartered in Afghanistan- -directed both operations and many ofthe cell members l ad received training in Afghanistan to •I the Jord µi cell members anci · particularl '-----c------' adr Abµ Hawshar _an Afghan veteran who belonged to al-Qa'ida-were in contact with Abu Zubayda an al-Qa'ida member involve4 in the training and movement of mujahidin into and out of Afghanistan and Khalil Deek a ----------- • utt 1-kn LW0'- 'wnl U- lfiicg1u e i11- i1Z-- network-based-m-l¾ikist-an who-may-alse-b P - a-- -----1--- 'member of al-Qa'ida 1 • • Ahmed Ressam-a fonner Montreal resident who tried to smuggle ver 100 pounds of explosives and timing devices into the United States-had tl1lined at Bin Ladin's camps in Afghanistan ISubsequent investigation indicated that Ressam's associates in Montreal-a network of North Africans involv d in criminal activities and su port to various extremist groups including the Armed Islamic Group _ GIA J ere preparing for terrorist attacks'---_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ al'--·_ _ _ _ _ · __ IMohammedou O ld Slahi · I • •• Several suspects in the Canada plot had contact with Abµ Zubayda and others in Afghanistan responsible for orchestrating the movement and training of mujahidin Financial and logistics support for _the Canada operation also may have come from extremist elements in Afghanistan ·I I 1 7 C05375516 - I f • •• The Algerian and Egyptian Islamic extremist movements have benefited from the leadership arid military skills acquired by some of their members i ll Afghanistan ·'· t ·-• - _v ' I c os37ss16 •• Nirconcs N orJc Suppo rt Tt Activities • ' • • I L----_J Th 'Taliban Bin Ladin and tither extremist groups ben tifrpm the narcotics network · in Afghanistan e substantial revenue · from trucing opium poppy cultivaµo n -licensing drug ia'bs and collecting fees for drug · ship _ents Iii many cases the Taliban-facilit tei•di ug'°trtrllickitlg·and receives payment lBiriLadin has tak n oovanfage of the situation in A fghamstan to encourage the Tahban and drug·barorufto _ i e n o s o tpl t arid lr Jcirii acthj to - port hi war a_g$ st · · ·Westeni interests ilm Ladir1 hlso' has en ouraged associatcid ·extremist groups to traffic r •• ' • • •· L · _ 'I· -• - · · •· ••• • • - •·•• J Iql cog cs to support th 1r caµs_es and operatio s -·· _ · - · 1 • •• • • • • • •• • · ·r iban earns __ - - ----- ---------- -- J •• •··• • 1 ' i _ _· _ _ t - _-t·· · - · ' -_ ' - -· · - '· · · ··- ' • · · Biii n··· anicf ates'1n·ifrange·oflegitiniafirand illicit·business· activities and - -' ·1 · · · en6 urage am1 cf in11stgioupi 1irici' e· Tiii'b ufiti•' ce tlieir activities ·i1tt · _ n#i af iinriei the'f bf'·f ut5i i i ·e iriin i_ai _t' Jeii ii-iris t rairiiizauoµ · · · · ' r- · • - - · 'I · - - · ' r - · t't· • '·1' r -· ·· ·0 0 • • · -£ - • - drets i • iik ireilgious old JFii J c 'ltioii for therr m ol ement m n otic_s -j J · · ' •• a e -' J l - - J d 't r ¥- 'lAt '- J - - ' tegtc µaJ tn neyqh tc ¥ qd cf i#iel' i tiori @ cfal_ iions--f tlie·_ - i ·' iP' 1 i uihy t 9 na i ·t m io' pori Ins ferrorisf·- ·- pparatus and the ckers to I aunder t _i ·proc s· f g sale tr· • I - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9 - - - - - - - - - - l1- t C05375516 • T t j_ • •· et The terrorist presence in Afghanistan has fanned anti-American sentiment and activitj es in Pakistan and other parts of South Asia Leaders of three extremist groups in Pakistan and Banglade1 h signed Bin Ladin's 1998 anti-VS fatwa oubliclv declarine their intention to retali te for any US attack on Bin Lad in I • Former President Clinton's trip in March 2000 to India Bangladesh and Pakistan fep orts that local Islamic extremist_s were targeting him for assassmation · I • Anti-US fervor in Pakistan peaked in November 1999 when the US Embassv and American Center in Islamabad were the tar YP ts of rocket attacks T e Future ofTaliba Support for International Terrorism'--1_ _ _j ---------Bleak--pr ectsforf#ndamen-tal-eltan ' 'iVIP ese- e' 'V e _--'----1---- - • indication of continuing to-support terrorist groups in Afghanistan Intelligence reporting highlights that the Taliban's fortunes on the battlefield have an impact on the _group•s dependeJ J ce on Bin Ladin's I-Qa'ida organization • The Taliban probably calculates that it gains more in terms of support for the war effort by a1Iowing foreign terrorists to operate within its territozy than it loses from international sanctions and the absence of international recognition • Even if the Taliban •wen i t9 successfully complete 1_ts military conquest ·of · Afghanistan omar is firmly committed to· Bin Ladin1 s continued stay in Afghanistan despite the negative impact the terrorist's presence has had on the Taliban's ability to gaii 1 international-recognition Bin Ladin wouid probably become an important provider of infrastructure and development assistance in the likely event the Taliban does not receive it from_ the international community ________ ·•· ___ JI · Even in the unlikely event the Taliban broke apart _or was defeated on the battlefield the factional infighting that probably would ensue as Afghanistan's displaced warlords -· 10 - - C0S 375516 T I • l _l t ' i ' • I I I returned would benefit Bin Ladin and other Islamjc extremists in the country At least two of the ·warlords Sayyaf and Hikmatyar-the most extreme Islamists among the factional leaders-operated terrorist camps-before the Taliban came into existence and probably would by to court Bin Ladin to gaiQ an edge in the struggle for ascendancy I -_ - - -- · Factors that might cause the Taliban to reduce support to terrorism The Taliban might at least tempor y temper its support for terrorism-for example by closing r down some of the training camps I two independent scenarios • The Taliban consolidates control over the rest ofthe ·country ___ _ ___Jtt'he Taliban may expect a military victory would bring them closer to intemational recognition and reconstruction aid concluding that some anti-terrori m measures could m ke a difference with the· international community • • The Taliban 's teadershiv dvnamic chan es · Leverage Over the Taliban is Limite J The Taliban's stomach for enduring the·consequerices of international arid b lateral sanctions makes applying effective pressure difficult· A vari ty of reporting indicates thai the imposition of US and UN sanctions has had no significant impact OD the Taliban's terrorism policies ••• I I ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___J I COS 3 75516 r I • I as Pakistan•s·longstanding financial logistical and operational support for the Taliban ·well its dinlomatic recocmition of the srronn_ 2ives it notential leveral e over the m-ouo Pakistan faces sionificant hurdles in maintainiM nressure on the Taliban • • The norous nature of Afp-hanistan's borders pose a serious lorostical challen e The Taliban also has suooortersl rwho would work to undermine pumtive measures aeainst the Taliban I • IL - ____ _ _ _ ______ JI 12 •· r C0S 375516 Bur T'M- • •• •· ·' t • 13 05375516 z ' ' I I 05 7 5 1 6c -------------------- 1· I I ·- c f7 516 _____________ _ ______________ 1 C05375516 '· · II- - fllflidMohllftflltd1Jl'IMAlm Alric a13 ml il i s TufiQIIOh --d blh Bin _ uueot atfzck Rulikfmn Au Hlion-tnleward-Mo11111 V---b- d--f-