C05417744 b 1 · - - - r - - - - - - - - - - - C b 3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ EO 12958 1 4 b 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 c 25Yrs 16P See1et EO 129581 4 d 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 e 25Yrs r EO 12958 3 5 c m-0000686 J Intelligence Report 12 April 20 1 DCI Counterterrorist Center Pursuing the B n Ladin Financial ·Target LJ Usama Bin Ladln 'a financial_ assets are difficult to track because he 'l Sea a wide variety ofmechanisms to move and raise money By using a combination of · traditional hanks money couriers underground Jankers--known as hawala dealers Ond non-governmental organizations NGOs to transfer funds he capitalizes on a large dij lcult-to•identify network with few long-lasting nodes for penetration• • • ·I • • Couriers and hawala dealers are used to move fundsl · eaving behind no paper trail The wide use ofhawala dealers in the Gulfand South Asia males it difficult to determine which are movhtg money for legitimate purposes and which are moving money for terrorist-related activ ities •· Bin Ladin further distances himselffrom fund transfers undertaken for_ him by using financial lieutenants members ofal-Qa'ula trusted sympathizers and even businessmen wlto m not mow th are movin mon or al- a'ida NGOs pose a significant problem because the maioritv ofthe work they do is legitimate Bin Ladin associates or supporter I runne'-t_m_o_ney_t ---o- B in-lA --di in · -o ft-- -en-un-d ' ere 1 •• 0801448 APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE 25-April-2012 • Ill I C05411'744 'l'np Scent • tit guise ofhumanitarian id These transfers are difficult to stop because we · tll'e unable to distinguish between funds earmarkeffor lqiimate humanitarian pu poses and those that supporl terrorist activities We have identified a number ofsources ofincomefor Bin Ladin including NGOs sympathetic donors personal investments commercial activities and even drug trafficking It is difficult to determine with any degree ofaccuracy what percentage each contributes to ltis overall financial position1 but his assets are sufficiently diversified that '#liminating access to one or two ofthese sources would not · appreciably reduce the operational capabilities ofhis organization Al-Qa'ida has shown ·that it is skilled at adapting to VllTJ1ing conditions and will seek out alternative sources ofincome ifnecessary I I · Gaps in our understan fing contribute to the difficulty we have in pursuing the Bin Ladin financial target We presently do not have the reporting to determine how much ofBin Ladin 1s personal wealth he has used or continues to use in jinan f lng his · organization we are unable to estimate with confidence the 11alue ofhis assets and net worth and we do not know the level offinancial su port he draws from his family and other donors mpathetic to his cause I 1 • •• The following Intelligence was iarea by the DCI Countertemirist Center with contnoutions ftonithe Office ofTra osnational Issues j i - - - __ _ _ _ _____ 2 Te pScetct • Pursuing the Bin Ladin inancial Target ----' I ·• Usama Bin Ladin's finances have become increasingly difficult to track since lie moved to Afghanistan in 1996 and al-Qa ida began shifting its financial activities underground The shift was due in large part to the organization s increased need for security following the US Embassy bombings its reluctance to rely on Afghanistan's ru entary banking system and a more cautious approach to operating businesses following Bin Ladin's abrupt departure from Sudan-where he reportedly was forced to -liquidate most of his assets at a loss Because it is now difficult to attribute directly any business holding or bank account to Bin Ladi n or his organization we focus on identifying the key play his funds and the echanisms he uses to move them Iri addition the international community specifically targeted Bin Ladin's finances late last year by passing United Nations Security Council ResolutioJ J 1333 which calls on ail members states to freeze any funds associated wi$ al-Qa'ida This likely will cause Bin t adir and his assobiates to be - _more discreet with' their financ_ial p ctices Tracking Bin Ladin's Funds-A Moving Target· - - Bin Ladin s extensive financial network uses a number of mechanisms to transfer the funds arv fo eondnct al-Oa'ida 's activities Among these are I derground bankers known as_ha _w_al_a_d e-al - ___ money couners and finaq cial lieutenants who oversee financial transfers open bank accounts and ensure thaHimds arrive at their appropriate festination In addition · ·numerous supporters and sympathizers of al-Qa ida take advantage of their positions with non-governmental organizations NGOs and charitable organizations to secretly divert funds to Bin Ladin and his associates without the knowledge of senior NGO officials The wide• mechanisms used to transfer funds are difficult to track •• •• 3 C0541J744 • •• I I I Money Changers and Hawalo Dealers• in Ladin depends on an unspecified·number ofkey money changers and hawala dealers in · · Pakis ·· • to help al-Qa'ida remit and receive funds ese money changers and hawala dealers e used widely in the Gulf and South Asia and can renµt funds anyw ere m the world Their popularity likely stems from the fact that they l ve virtually no paper trail and conduct business on the basis of tmst •Once the money they have transferred reaches its chosen destination itis hand-carried by a trusted associate and delivered to its intended recipient Becmise Bin Ladin uses numero-us interchangeable hawala dealezs and couriers it is difficult to trackthis transfer mechanism · •• I 4 CJ 5 41 7 7 4 4 •• Financial Lieutenants Bin Ladin makes the final decision on ow funds are spent but · he entrusts key lieutenants with various asp e ts of his financial netwo includ in • I NGOs Terrorist funds that flow through NGOs are hard to track because the majority of the money moving throueh theNC'-d s is for legitimate humanitarian needsJ ds earmam ed - ror---- · -- humanitarian purposes e co-mingled with those slated for nefarious pwposes making it extremely difficult to identify anii seize funds directly finJced to terrorist activities The •• - I 5 I C0541_ 7744 • Sources 0 Financial Support for Bin Ladin I- - NGOs Saudi citizens and sympathetic donors raise funds for Bin Lad in at the _grassroots leve I vestments commercial I activities and drug trafficking also provide Bin Ladin with a of funds fllw J- - - - NGOs Bin Ladin associates and supporteci use the draising capabilities of a number ofNGOs·to collect donations-for Bia Ladin and his organization • •• I 6 CQ541J744 41'608 oNI • 1 a Sympathetic Donors Bin Ladin has vast network ofsympathizers who provide his tion WI'th tin ancia1 support orgamza •·· - I I 7 CQ541 7744 • • We do not have enoue h infollilation to _quantifv accurately the vmue ofBin Ladin's assets • • I I We l not k mw be 1-1 of in I snm ort lhat Bin T din dn s fmm fimmhl e Saudi Government froze Bin Ladin's bank accounts in the Kingdom and bis interest in bis family s construction business ·- I 8