cp543 3003 INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE • • • • • • • • • • • • •• •• • • • • • • - r J · ' ·· · · ·· ··Afihlbisia1t1cirtt c -trt Ttd ' - ·-t · r _ f' · · - ii -Ji_-_l · _ i 11 ' ••· · · _ - IR-0000018 APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE 25-April-2012 CTC 2003-40071CH C05433003 t ------- ••• - • • • • - - - • ••••••• ••••------- '-------------' Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot Can Al-Qa'ida Train on the Run I Key Findings U I of Al-Qa'ida used its sanctuary and network training facilities in Afghanistan not only to impart the skills necessary to carry out terrorist operations and jihad but also to select and vet terrorist recruits foster a jihadist lifestyle build commitment to the cause and develop liaison relationships with other groups j I Al-Qa'ida's Afghanistan camps played a central if not a crucial role in the planning of the 11 September attacks and in the selection and training of cadres to execute the plot • In their Afghanistan haven the organizers and masterminds were able to exchange views at length in face-to-face meetings as the plot took final shape in th Ramadan 1999 2000 time period • The in-person meetings greatly reduced the risk of discovery that more remote communications-by cell phone or Internet for example-would have entailed · • Although al-Qa'ida could still exploit the open society in the United States to repeat a terrorist act on the scale and with the complexity of 11 September it will be much harder to assemble as well-trained and carefully selected a team as Ithe 19 hijjckers without a safehaven comparable to Afgh anistan A variety of sources suggest that after the plot was set in motion in December 1999 the selection process for members of the second wave of hijackers-the support team for the pilots-also took place in Afghanistan and that it involved direct contact with the al-Qa'ida leadershi includin Bin Lad in and that Bin Ladin personally interv1ewe I mt epastyeara- 'fOP SEORET a as set up sma temporary poc ets o training in · IC0 S433_ 003 The '--g-r-o-up is-a lo_n_g_w_a_y_ h-o_w_e_v-er- fr -o_m_11_ec_Ii_e_ati ·n-g---- th_e_c_o_m_p_Ii_e- --he_n_s --iv_e_tr aining program it had in the Afghanistan camps In the short run al-Qa'ida can feed off the fruits of its labor in Afghanistan to maintain its operations and conduct small-scale training _The organization trained ' - - people in its camps in Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001 - I · IMost of the trainees received only basic training ut experienced tramers from those camps are now scattered to other locations where new training activities have been reported • Al-Qa'ida members can train with or provide trainers to allied terrorist groupsj · I · • AI-Qa'ida and associated groups are usin a umber of venues for small training efforts including madras ------ ------' efugee camps secluded compounds in areas under 1m1te government control schools mosques apartment and the Internet The training of a handful of men for terrorist operations is difficult to detect I I Over the long run al-Qa'ida's failure to find a safehaven in which to reestablish its full tra ning programs will affect the nature o_f_th_e____________ organization its ability to carry out complex operations such as the 11 September attacks and its standing among associated terrorist groups It will be more difficult and risky to bring new recruits into the organization without the lengthy vetting process that was pos ible in Afghanistan Senior planners will be less able to observe trainees and choose those best suited to op rations It will be more difficult to create the psychological environment necessary to tum out disciplined terrorist operatives who can cany out complex operations Finally al-Qa'ida wilJ increasingly be forced to train with other groups-rather than being in the position to offer other groups training-and thu will lose an important source of leverage and influence in Islamic extremist circles1 · - - - C05433003 TbP S 6 - - - - - - - - - - - Contents page Key Findings U The Role of Afghanistan U Targeted Candidates l Gathering in Afghanistan Selection Controlled Training Facilitators and Associates Flight Training U Picking Up the Pieces U Outlook U What Could Al-Qa'ida Do jjj TliF 3£6Rnf 1 2 2 2 4 4 4 5 6 C05433003 ' IOP SECR ----------- Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot an Al-Qj'ida Train on the Run · The Role of Afghanistan U Southeast Asia-to help set up training programs Al-Qa'ida's training facilities in Afghanistan served multiple functions-from allowing Bin Ladin to forge the organization to acting as the crucible for the 11 September plot The Afghan training system • Imparted the skills necessary to carry out terrorist operations and fight in jihad • Allowed careful selection and vetting of terrorist recruits and operatives by the most senior members of the organization • Fostered a jihadist lifestyle ainong all recruits allowing al-Qa'ida leaders to meld men of widely varied backgrounds and nationalities into a focused single-minded corps I The Afghanistan safehaven was a crucial factor in the planning and implementation of complex operations including the 11 September attacks Our analysis one-and-a-half years after the attacks indicates the plot was conceived and almost entirely directed from Afghanistan The safehaven played a key role in the planning and execution of the operation including the hijackers' selection indoctrination training and initiation into the plot Even the plot's relatively autonomous senior coordinator Muhammad Atta relayed his updates on the situation in the United States and recommendations for changes in the plan to Arghanistan seeking the input of the al-Qa'ida leadership I I Targeted Candidates Like many other eventual al-Qa'ida members the 11 September hijackers were targeted for recruitment outside of Afghanistan primarily in Germany and Saudi Arabia according to a variety of reporting Al-Qa'ida recruiters trusted clerics and family recommendations played roles in spotting candidates • Provided the isolation and psychological atmosphere necessary to support classic brainwashing techniques that turned recrui into committed operatives who--like several of the 11 September hijackers---eould be trusted to live fo s veTyears the West and still carry out their m1ss10n ii • Muhammad Heydar Zammar an extremist with suspected al-Qa'ida connections ecruited three of the fou r_p_i-lo-ts---- Muhammed Atta Marwan al-Shehhi and Ziad Al-Qa'ida used its Afghanistan camps as currency to increase its influence with other terrorist groups and to build an international network of trained Islamic terrorists to which al-Qa'ida could later turn for support for its operations According to various intelligence reporting among the groups that trained in al-Qa'ida camps in the past are al-Gama'at al-Islami I I D • Nawaf al-Hazmi probably recommendedt- h_ · _ ___ brother Salim al-Hazmi for recruitment a Jemaah Islami a I Al-Qa'ida also se_n_t_t_ra in_e_rs-to-o th_e_r_g-ro_u_p_s--pa_ru_ ·cularJy those in This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism An lysis Comments and oueries are welcome and mav he directed tol 1 1 TOPSESRE j'-------------' I C05433003 ' TOP better match individuals to specific operationll and operational environments a n o s e best able to blend into the target country L__J • Several of the Saudis appear to have been recruited from Saudi universities or mosques r five pilot candidates for the 11 September plot were selected during Ramadan meetings in 1999 with al-Qa'ida's senior leadership in Kandahar Three were the Hamburgbased hijackers and the remaining two were hijacker Nawaf al-Hazmi and facilitator Ramzi Bin al-Shibh Gathering in Afghanistan Travel to Afghanistan was a critical step in turning al-Qa'ida recruits into committed terrorists The experience of travel to the pure Islamic state the camaraderie among recruits and the discipline and commitment exhibited b al- a'ida ins ctors had powerful influenc I • A variety of sources suggest that after the plot was set in motion in December 1999 the selection process for members of the second wave of hijackers also took place in the Afghanistan camps and that it was thorough and involved direct contact with the al-Qa'ida leadership including Bin Ladin to iL The time spent in Afghanistan mobilized radicalized and transformed the youthj --- I All 19 hijackers as well as several of the plot's main facilitators spent time in al-Qa'ida training facilities and guesthouses in Afghanistan during the two years before the September 2001 attacks • The visits of the four pilots to Afghanistan were short relative to those of the second wave -the support team for the pilots Some of the second wave made more than one trip and most stayed many months in the training camps I I I We do not know how many potential suicide attackers were evaluated when the team that carried out the 11 S tember attacks was chosen but it was a large number - -- ---- ------- --- -- The large number of men passing through the Afghan training campaj allowed al-Qa'ida to be selective I Controlled Training Most of the hijackers underwent training similar to that given other al-Qa'ida recruits The al-Faruq training camp west of Kandahar appears to have been the preferred location for the training and vetting of most second-wave hijackers probably because of its proximity to Bin Ladin and the senior al-Qa'ida leadership Of the 12 young Saudi hijackers who were in Afghanistan coricurrelitly during the spring of Selection According to a variety of intelligence reporting while men were recruited worldwide actual selection into the ranks of al-Qa'ida occurred only in Afghanistan after the organization had ample opportunity to observe candidales' performances in training In Afghanistan senior planners observed recruits to TI FSEOR ------------ C05433003 I TOP 2001 at least seven underwent the basic training regime at al-Faruq martial arts ideological and religious indoctrination and familiarization with procedures that would allow them to blend in with their surroundings in the United States They likely were put through physical endurance tests including food and water deprivation to test their dedication to the cause and ability to withstand captivity-a common practice at al-Qa'ida training camps • Three other Saudis-Khalid al-Mihdhar Satam al-Suqami and Majid Muqid-trained at Khaldan another large basic regime training camp that was located in Paktia Province south of Kabul I I Al-Qa'ida instructors conducted training in stages designed to winnow out aJI but the best and most reliable recruits easier to conduct martial ans and operational security training which the second-wave hijackers acquired as a team with their future coconspirators in the controlled environment of the training camps in Afghanistan than in a classroom I I • According to a variety of intelligence reporting all recruits received standardized basic training including training in fireanns heavy weapons explosives and topography Recruits learned To prevent backsliding among the second-wave hijackers the al-Qa'ida trainers in Afghanistan used discipline and military life and were subjected to artificial stresses designed to measure their brainwashing techniques to cement their loyalty and psychological fitness and commitment to jihad discouraged them from contacting their families rd_u_n_·n g an_d_a_ft_e_r_th_e_ir_s_ta y_i_n_A_f _g ha_n_is_tan--jl_ _ _ _ After the initial stage of training al-Qa'ida instructors chose candidates to be suicide operatives I and others physically and emotionally capable of _ advancing t the next level L • Advanced training focused on tactical classes such as explosives handling and detonation sabotage and kidnapping Al-Qa'ida's philosophy was taught along with advanced theological training AI-Qa'ida also offered this trainin to recruits from other terrorist rou s a - a an w o tram ' m g amstan m t e summer of 2000 and swore an oath of allegiance to Bin Ladin apparently had second thoughts after he made an unapproved visit to his family while on a trip to Saudi Arabia with hijacker Ahmad al-Nami The two had been instructed to get US visas from the Consulate in Jedda but al-Hamlan felt misgivings about the suicide mission after speaking wi a brother and refused to return with al-Nami to Afghanistan Specialized training-such as surveillance urban warfare techniques and the manufacture of explosives-was reserved for al-Qa'ida members who had been selected to participate in terrorist operations and who had pledged bay'at an oath to Bin Ladin Facilitators received tailored training consistent with their specialties and operatives received training tailored to the specific operations Afghanistaµ offered the second-wave hijackers the opportunity to cement their personal ties and loyalties to each other in a relatively secure location as they absorbed the skills needed to execute the plot Senior planners could observe potential operatives and · assemble a team with complimentary skills Bin Ladin suggested that the hijacker teams in each aircraft comprise individuals who knew each other well and had forme d close bonds during training to I The second wave of hijackers engaged in monthslong daily intensive instruction which included 3 TOF 61 B A l C05433003 ' discovering that it was cheaper and shorter in duration than similar training in Europe ensure solidarity to the mission's end I Facilitators and Associates Several of the plofs key facilitators and members of the Hamburg network also trained in Afghanistan Like the second-wave hijackers the visits of the associates and facilitators took place after the Hamburg pilots' travel to Kandahar in late 1999 The Hamburg associates may have made these trips to Afghanistan so that the al-Qa'ida leadership could personally assess their trustworthiness and utility to the unfolding plot • Mounir al-Motassadeq convicted in Germany for his role in supporting the conspiracy admitted at his trial to having been in Afghanistan from June to August 2000 • The three Hamburg pilots used the Internet to research flight schools in the United States to submit applications for training and having arrived in the United States to order flight deck videos from an aviation store in Ohio • Al-Qa'ida's continued interest even after 11 September in obtaining this kind of training is clear from the discovery of flight training brochures in some of the Afghanistan training camps after the fall of the Taliban I I · Picking Up the Pieces U Al-Qa'ida today can draw on nmnerous resources to provide training outside Af hanistan The organization trained ople in its camp · · n U L - U ------------Jf-- - - - - - - - - - - - Experienced trainers from Afghanistan's camps are now scattered lm •--1 • Zaccarias Moussaoui whose role in the 11 September plot is still being determined visited Afghanistan in April 1998 and later that year August through October 1999 and again in December 2000 I I The group has· extensive contacts with other terrorist groups including many that are in debt to al-Qa'ida for P ast aid _ • Al-Qa'ida can utilize a variety of venues for small training programs including madrasa refugee camps secluded compounds in areas under limited ·government control schools mosques and even apartments Flight Training U • Al-Qa'ida sympathizers are also increasingly taking to the Internet to disseminate training materials such as ooison manuals and conduct online trainingj I although Muhammad 'Atif instructed the three Hamburg pilots to enroll in flight training he did not specify where Plot senior coordinator Muhammad Atta had enough decisionmaking latitude to seek flight instruction in the United States upon 4 IUFSEeRsj ------------ I C05433003 ' I - We have no information indicating that al-Qa'ida has been able to recreate anything approaching the lar escale trainin ro ram it once had in Af hanistan however that al-Qa'ida in the past year and a half has conducted or attempted to conduct short-term smallscale training in areas where it has a presence For example · • Al-Qa'ida and local extremist groups have trained in Pakistani border regions in preparation for launching operations against US and coalition forces and the Af han Govemmen Outlook U --------·-- - C05433003 _ r T '-------- Al-Qa'ida can feed off the fruits of its past labor in Afghanistan to continue conducting operations and conduct small-scale training in the near tenn It probably will be relatively easy to covertly train small groups of terrorists in the skills necessary to conduct operations The training of a handful of operatives will be difficult to detect I j The orchestration of major attacks however will become increasingly difficult without a new safehaven that would give the al-Qa'ida leadership the freedom to operate and control the plotting Without the Afghanistan camps to continue training thousands of men al-Qa'ida will have a smaller pool of recruits to choose from Moreover if al-Qa'ida is not able to exercise firm control over its training programs conduct consecutive courses and have its senior leaders observe and vet new trainees it will be more difficult to bring adequately trained new recruits into the organization Moreover those who are brought into the group may not enjoy the full confidence of al-Qa'ida's senior planners to operate independently over long periods oftime with unwavering commitment to the cause I 1 • Over the long run the failure to find a safehaven in which to reestablish its training programs will affect the nature of al-Qa'ida's organization and the broader extremist community and al-Qa'ida's standing among associated terrorist groups • Al-Qa'ida may lose leverage over allies as the global antiterrorist campaign further degrades its ability to provide financial logistic and training support to allied groups and to its own fighters 6 TOPSECREfl ---------- C0 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