C J'S 41 19 61 · b 3 UNCLASSIFIED -· •·· Speeches Documents March 24 2004 DCI Written Statement b$fore the 9 11 Commission Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Beforethe National Commissio on Terrorist Atta ks Upon he United States · March 24 2004 Contents Introduction 1 The Emerging Threat Over Time 2 The Early Years Bin Ladin as a Terrorist Financier 2 The Taliban Sanctuary Years Evolving into a Strategic Threat 5 Afghanistan Key to Terrorists' Development 6 Analysis 8 Warning9 Our Warnings Were Being Heard 12 Intelligence Collection 14 The Predator· 15 Collection Operations Pay Off 17 CIA' s Response Was Strong and Persistent 18 The Intelligence CommunityRole 19 Working With Foreign Liaison 21 Countering al-Qa'ida's Global Presence 21 Runup to September 11-0ur Operations ·23 · Budget and Resources 24 The DCI's Role 26 APPROVED FOR RELEASEn The Status of the War on Terrorism 27 DATE 25-April-2012 Al-Qa'ida Is Not the Only Challenge 30 The War Ahead 32 1 of43 · · 6 1 2007 12 44 PM C®5411961 Introduction I welcome the oppo ity to be here today td support the National Commission's work in preparing a full and complete account of tb e circumstances surrounding the September _11 2001 terrorist attacks I firmly believe that it is most important for the Am erican_people and especially for th families of the victims· of the attacks to · understand what the CIA and the Intelligence C_ommunity were doing to learn about and destroy the al-Qa'ida terrorist networJ and to _try to prevent attacks on· Americans It is also important for me to outline for you what we have been doing s ce 9 11 to forestall any_ er attacks that Bm·Ladin and the· I-Qa'ida organization are d termined to attempt You have asked me to talk about specific themes What I will do today as explicitly as I can in this public forum is tell you and the American people what we learned· about the evolving al Qa'ida threat in the years before the tragic atta l_ s describe our intelligence collection against the threat d cribe the counterterrorism policies and programs we carried out and escribe my role as DCI in the war on terrorism Finally I will share with you where we stand npw in the war and the challenges w face in wim_ring it I hope we have a chance later in this forum to go into details on other issues as well There have been thoµsands of actions taken in this war over the past decade by CIA manage s operatives and analysts Not every action we took was xecuted flawlessly but I believe the record will show a keen awareness of the thr at a disciplined focus and persistent efforts to track disrupt apprehend and ultimately ·b g t justice Bin Ladin and bis terrorist henchmen · · · · The Emerging Threat Ove r _Time · September I I brought the fight with international terrorism honie to the United States in the most vivid way But we did not discover terrorism suddenly on September 11 2001 The Intelligence Community including the· FBI was _already fuJly engaged in iliis·war for several years The growing terrorist threat to US citizens and facilities worldwide-including in the United States-has been at the· tqp of the Jntelligence Col1llnunity' s agenda for many years We have a n¢arly two decade-long record of involvement in fighting terrorism and particularly in the last decade Usama Bin Ladin and his al-Qa'ida network It is· a 2 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM C 5411961 record of keen awareness of the threat disciplined focus and persistent efforts to tra k disrupt apprehend and ultimately bring to justice Bin Ladin and his lieutenants and dismantle al-Qa'ida It is also a record of con istent efforts to warn policymakers and the public of the seriousness of the al-Qa'ida threat The Early Years Bin Ladin as a Terrorist Financier · Although this hearing focus es on CIA's efforts since 1996 to counter the threat of terrorism it is useful to briefly review for the record how we got to that period The contex is nnportant for understanding both the complexity of the al -Qa 'ida target and the efforts we have been taking to defeat it Bin L din gained promi1 ience during the Soviet-Afghan war for his role in financing th recruitment transportation and training of ·ethnic Arabs who fought alongside the Afghan mujahidin against the Soviets during the 1980s At age 22 Bin Ladin · dropped out of school in Saudi Arabia and joined the Afghan resistan e almost immediately following the Soviet invasion in December 1979 While we iiaq heard of Bin Ladin from others with whom we were in cont ct in Afghanistan we had lio · direct contact witli him and his profile Wf S low enough to avoid _any p icular attention The Afghan experience provided Bin 1 adin with an opportunity to make and strengthen_ contacts ·with a wide variety of Islamjc extremists of various nationalities Many of the men who became key members of al-Qa ida _had m t him in Afghanistan - · It is at this time in- the mid- to late-1980s that' Bin Ladin began perverting the · teachings of Islam and the Prophet Mohammed for his own violent purposes In ddition he began to exploit underlying social political and economic discontent and widespread resentment of the West in many parts of th Muslim wodd • In a 1988 press 'interview he claimed that ·when a mortar shell that landed a few fe t away'from him did not explode be felt it a sign from God to battle all ppponents·oflslam · • Urged on by fervent Islamic radicals he began using his personal fortune to shelter and employ hundreds of militant stateless Afghan Arabs and to train them for jihad or holy war around the world · 3 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM' Cl3541 961 Although Bin Ladin returned to Saudi Arabia to work fu his family's construction business after the Soviets left Afghanistan in early 1989 -he continued to support militant Islamic causes and radicals who by then had begun redirecting-their-efforts against secular and ·moderate Islamic governments in the region He began publicly criticizing the Saudi Government and condemned the Gulf War and the presence of US and other Western forces in the Arabian Peninsula • Saudi officials seized Bin Ladin' s passport in 1989 in an apparent try toprevent him from ·solidifying contacts with like-minded extremi t he ha4 befri nded during the Afghan-Soviet war • The Saudis subsequently in 1994 stripped Bin Ladin of is citizenship while he was in Khartoum · Bin Lad in came to the attention of the CIA as an emerging terrorist threat during his stay iJ - Sudan from 1991 to 1996 • We saw him as a prominent financial backer of Islamic-terrorist - moveme1 1 ts who was funding the paramilitary training of Arab religious mili ts operating ju or supporting fellow Muslims in Bosnia Egypt Kashmir Jordan Tunisia Algeria and Yemen _• While in Sudan Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida financed Islamic· extremists who opposed secular anq moderat Islamic governments and who d espised the West · · · • We characteriz d him in Jan ary 1996 as among the most active financial sponsors of Islamic extremist and·terronst activity in the world _ During his five-year residence in Sudan Bin Ladin combitie_d business withjihad under the umbrella of the al-Qa'ida organization In association with powerful members of the ruling Sudanese National Islamic Front he embarked on several business· ventures His workforce in Sudan included militant Afgh veterans who were wanted by the _authorities in their own countries because of their subversive or terrorist activities war m While Sudan B Ladin apparently paid particular attenti n ·to the turmoil in · ei boring Somalia We believe his perception of events in Somalia played a · significant role in ·molding his views of the United S 3-tes He has publicly said the US withdrawal from Somalia d monstrated that Americans were soft and the United 4 of43- 6 1 2007 12 44 PM ce 5411961 States a paper tiger that could be more easily defeated than the Soviets had been in Afghanistan CIA' s· assessment of Bin Ladin during the early l 990s continued to be that h was a major terrorist financier • We did not yet see him as the center of a significant organization or network focused on carrying out terrorist attacks_on the United States • Moreover' he was only one of a number of potential te rrorist threats As -such the Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida targets competed for intelligence resources with other dangerous targets such as Hizballah then considered more threatening to US interests _ Nevertheless as Bin Ladin' s prominence grew during the latter part of his residence in Sudan our awareness of the threat he represented also grew significantly In early 1996 we singled him out as a major target for 01 lf co terterrorism operatio1 1S · In fact _what began in early 1996 as an effort designed to penetrate and destroy Bil l Ladin' financial network soon prov_ided intelligence revealing a broader and more pernicious terrorist capability that reached well beyond financial activity By the time Bin Laditi left Sudan in 1996 and relocated himself and his terror network to Afghanista1 1 the Intelligence Community had gained a substantial · appreciation of the ·signi1'cance of his threat and was taking strong action to try to stop him • For· example in January 1996 C focused more_ofits resources on him_ by creating a dedicated component in the Counterterrorist Center-the Bin · Ladin Issue Station-staffed by CIA NSA FBI and other officers The group's mission was to track him collect intelligence on him run operations against disrupt his fmances and warn policymakers about his activities and intentions · • -We monitored his whereabouts and increased our knowledge ab_out him and his organizati n by using every available intelligep_ce means is It important to· remember that du ririg this mid-1990s period Bin Ladin was oilly _one of several areas of terrorism concern that we were following The others included Lebanon's Hizballah the Egyptian Islamic Jihad the Sendoro Lumino o in Peru Abu Sayyaf #1 the Philippines and Sri Lanka's Ta Tigers just to name a Sof43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM C05411961 few The Taliban Sanct ary Years- Evolving _into a Strategic Threat If any doubts remained about the emerging threat B_in Lad in and al Qa 'ida represent to the United States they were gradually dispelled by a · series of declarations he issued °from his refuge in Afghanistan during the 1996-1998 timeframe • In an undated interview in Afghc1rnistan-published in July 1996 in the London daily The Independent Bin Ladin declared that the killing of Americans 111 the Khobar ToV _'ers- bombing in Saudi Arabia in June 1996 marked the beginning of the· war between Muslims and the United States • One month later in August 1996 Bin Ladin _in collaboration with· radical Muslim clerics associated with his group issued a religious edict or fatwa in which he proclaini e4 a Declaration of-War authorizing attacks against Western militru y targets on the Arabian Peninsula • I • • In February 1998 six months prior to the-August US Embassy bombings in East Africa Bin Lad in issued another fatwa under the banner of the_ World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders ' This _fatwa stated· ominously that all Muslims have-a religious duty to kill Americans _and their allies _ both civilian and military'' worldwid • During a subsequent m¢i_a interview Bin Ladin explained that all US citizens we re· legitimate targets boc ause they pay taxes to the US · Government · By the time of the 1998 East Africa bombings al-Qa'ida had established its modus operandi emphasizing careful planning and exhaustive field preparations toward a goal of inflicting high casualties For example Bin Laclin was asked in a November 1996 interview why his organization had not yet conducted attacks in response to its August fatwa He replied If we wanted to carry out small operations it would have · been easy to do so aft er the statements but the nature of the battle requires · · qualitative operations that affect the adversary which obviously requires·good preparation By_early 998 CIA knew that the pnited States was dealing with a sophisticated -·terrorist organization l ent on causing ·large p unibers of American casualties The 6of4 · 6 1 2007 12 44 PM cd541f961 llL'l L fl Ji il' l C l l East Africa bo1 11bings in August 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 succeeded because of al-Qa'ida's meticulous_preparation and effective security practices • _Al-Qa'ida targeting studies and training materials captured around the time of the East Africa and USS -Cole attacks revealed that much of the terrorists' advance planning involved- careful pati nt and meticulous preparation · • This included extensive surveillance and casing studies that detailed the vulnerabilities of potential targets Th' ' terrorists' casing study of the US · Embassy in Nairobi for example was prepared in 1993 five years before the attack It included information about the building's physical structure security posture and business hours s well as ·the lay ut of the r ception area inside the Embassy • The analysts also pointed out that the intelligence data indicated the errorists were very much conscious of operational security We were also becoming increasingly concerned-and_ therefore we _warned about-al-Qa'ida's interestin_acquiring chemical and biological weapons and· nuclear materials _ · •Ina December 1998 interview Bin Ladin called the acquisition of these weapons a religious duty • As early as July 1993 in testimony to the Hous·e Foreign Affairs Committee DCI Woolsey warned of the Intelligence Commw tity' s heightened sensitivity to the prospect that a terrorist incident could involv weapons of mass destruction In February 1996 in te_stimony fo the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence DCI Deutsch expressed his _concern about-the growing lethality sophistication and wide-ranging nature of the - terrorist threat He observed that terrorists would push this trep d to its most awful extreme by using weapons of mass destruction I made similar warnings to these commjttees as early as 1998 when I pointed to Bin Ladin's attempts to purchase or manufacture biological and chemical weapons for an attack against US facilities Afghanistan Key to Terrorists' Development 7_of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM ctl54lf961 None of Bin Ladin's and al Qa'ida's extensive terroris plotting planning recruiting and training in the late 1990s would have been possible without the Taliban sanctuary in Afghanistan • The Taliban aided Bin Lad in by assigning him security guards - establishing ommunicatj ons facili ties· for him and al-Qa'ida spreading dishuormation oµ his behalf • and permitting him to build and maintain terrorist camps The Taliban refused to cooperate with efforts by the international ·community to extradite Bin Ladin aft the US indicted him in 1998 on 319 criminal counts including ·conspiracy to murder US · citizens • In return Bin Ladin invested money in Taliban projects and provided hundreds of well-trained fighters to help the Taliban co olidate and expand its control of the country We often talk of two trends in terrorism state supported and people working on their own In Bin L din's case with the Taliban what we had was something completyly new-a terrorist sponsoring a state Afghanistan had served as a place of refuge for intema tional terrorists since the 1980s Since the Soviet invasion nd its aftermath -Afghanistan had become a country with a vast infrastructure camps a ad facilities for the reft J ge tra# ing indoctrination g and financing of tens of thous d of Islamic extremists from all over the world of • Afghanistan provided Bin Ladin an isolated and relatively·safe operating environment to oversee his organization's worldwide terrorist activities • Militants who receiyed training in Afghanistan were sent to fight in Kashmir Chechnya or Bosnia When they returned to their homes to resume their normal lives or migrate to other countries they onstituted a ready supply of manpower for terrorist operations 11 ie al-Qa'ida-Taliban training camps formed the foundation of a worldwide network by•sponsoring and en ouraging Islamic extremists from diverse locations to forge longstanding ideological logistical and personal ties · • Extremists in the larger qamps received basic training in the use of small arms and guerrilla tactics In the small r camps militants received 8-of43 6 112007 1i 4 4 PM C05411'961 advanced and specialized training in subjects such as explosives poisons and assassma tion techniques • Clandestine and counterintelligence tradecraft courses included basic instruction on how o establish secure cell-based cland stine · · organizations to support ins gencies or terrorist operations • Bin Lawn emphasized indoctrination in extremist religious ideas He included the onstant repetition that the United States is evil and that the current regimes of Arab countries are not true believers in Islam and should be overthrown as a religious duty ·• Some of the Afghan camps-such as the DeDJD ta camp-also provided the militants instruct_ion'in thepFoduction and use of toxic chemicals and biological toxins a In summary what Bin Ladin created in Afghanistan was sophisticated adversary · To be sure as CIA improved its understanding of the threat it refocused and intensified its efforts to track disrupt and bi1ng the terrorists tp ju tice We were handicapped however by the fact that we haa no presence in or access to · Afghanistan on a regular basis · An lysi Our analysts assessed al-Qa'ida's modus operandi capabilities and intentions to acquire weapons of mass destruction _S iinilarly they warned policymakers durip g the summer of 2001 that the threat of terrorist attacks was real and serious Stich perfonnance was the result of significant measures by the Directorate of Intelligence to enhance its analytical capabilities assigned to this target · • We strove to find the best balance between strategic· and tactical analysis From 1995 to the 11 ·september attacks we produced46·papers that I w uld call sigajficant s tegic intelligence analysis on Bin Ladin al-Qa'ida and Islamic extr sm · • A 1996 an lysis took a careful look at Bin La and other Isl c extremists as suspects in the Khobar Towers bombing in Dhahran Saudi Arabia • Papers in 1997 assessed Bin Ladin's seeking of a WMD capability and • the role of Islamic fmancial ·institutions in financip g extremist movements 9of43 6 1 2007 12 44· PM cd541l961 • A 1998 paper flagged the key shift in the Bin Ladin threat from one · aimed at US forces in- Saudi Arabia to US interests worldwide • A 1999 paper was a wide-ranging strategic analysis of Bin L s· command of a global terrorist network ' • A 2000 paper a$sessed al Qa'ida's ·efforts to develop chemical biological and radiological weapo 18 _ · • A March 2001 paper analyzed the cptical role played by Afghanistan 4i- international terrorism • An April 2001 -paper assessed the growing propensity of jihadist movements _to act as part ·or a global fight ag¢nst their perception of a US-led conspiracy against Islam· · We created a separate analytic mrit in July 2001 to assure that the demands for daily tactical support did not sidetrack our strategic analytic effort The separate unit allowed us to isol te its analysts from the grind of daily crises to focus on the bigger picture It also allowed us to better train and develop the analysts • During 2000 and 2001 we also pushed our analytical products both s tegic and tactical int · broader circulation · In addition to the analytic effort undertaken in the Counteiterrorist Center analysts from across CIA' s Directorate of Intelligence contributed to the counterterrorism ·mission They carried out specialized work on topics such as the societal issues that create the breeding ground for terrorism the f ancial flows that enable terrorism and explosive and other techjrical modeling to name a few Since 9 11 we have expanded our capabilities·to provide strategic and alternative analysis on terrorism _Additional experience cl officers have been added to the effort ·They benefit from the fusion of intelligence from all sources that has been the ha1Jmark of the Center They have access to electronic platforms that enable them to collaborate with coun terparts throughout the Intelligence Community to tap external expertise to help out-of-the-box thinking and to·communicate with policymakers We are adding to ·their toolkits regularly so they can manage the· volume of information that our focused collection is making available Their singular goal is to ·produce· ov r-the-horizoi1 analysis that will enable homeland defense war fighters and senior policymakers to make the smart d cisions about strategic commitments 10of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM C05411961 t4at will protect the American people against an evolving dynamic threat Warning The leadership of the CIA repeatedly warned' the policy community in the Executive Branch and the Congress· of the_ seriousness of the threat · I placed terrorism prominently in evf Y annual public testimony since 1997 to t4e appropriate Congressional Committees on th Worldwide-Threat as· shown in a setj es of excerpts from my State D -ents_ for the Record _ • February 1997 Even as our co terteirorism efforts are improving international groups are expanding their etworks improving their s s and sophistication and working to stage more spectacular attacks • January 1998 Mr Chairman I must stress that the threat to US interests and citizens worldwide remains high moreover there _has been a trend toward increasing-lethality· of attacks especially against civilian targets aconfluence of recent developments increases the risk that individuals or groups will attack US intei ests • February 1999 On terrorism Mr 'Chairman I must be frank in saying that Americans increasingly are the favored targets there is not the· sligl ttest doubt that Usama Bin Ladin his worldwide allies and s sympathizers are pla pni Q g further att_a cks against us despite progress against his networks Bin Ladin's organization has contacts virtually _ worldwide including in the United States he has stated equivocally · that all _Americans are_ targets we have noted recent activity similar to · what occurred grior to the African embassy bombings and I must tell you we ate conc_e ed that one· or more•of Bin Ladin' s attacks could occur at any time Bin Ladin's overarching aim is to get the United States out of · ·_ the Persian Gulf but he will strike wherever in the world he thinks we are vulnerable - • February 2000 Usama Bin Ladin is still foremost among these terrorists because o the immediacy and serio sness of the threat he poses everything w have lea tned recently confinns our conviction that he wants to strike further hlow_s against Am rica despite some_ well-publicized disruptions we believe he could·still strike without additional warning · • February 2001 The threat from terrorism is real it is immediate and it 11 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM c'05411961 is evolving as we have increased security around government and · military facilities terrorists are seeking out softer'' targets that provide opportunities for mass casualties Usama bin Ladin and-his global ·network of lieutenants an4 associates remain the most immediate and serious threat as shown by the bombing of our Embassies in Africa in 1998 and his Millennium plots last year he is capable of planning multiple attacks with little or no warning · · We raised the immediacy of the terrorist threat in other public an4 private forums as wclL - • During the Millennium threat in late 1999 we warned that we could ·expect between 5 to 15 terrorist attacks against American interests both · here and overseas • During the Raµiadan threat period in the· autumn of 2000 we warned that terrorist cells were planning attacks against US and foreign military and civilfan targets in the Persian Gulf region As it turned out operations were abl to disrupt the terrorists' ·plans · • ln hearings on terrorism in spring 2001 I told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Appropriations Committee that ·the threat from al-Qa'ida was 'an immediate and pressing concern t observed that that Despite our successes there are limits to what we can do We will generally not have specific time and place warning of terrorist attacks the result is that I consider it likely that over the next year or so that there will be· an attempted· terrorist attack' against us· interests our • During the week of July 2 2001 reacting to rash of intelligence threat reports I contacted by phone a dozen of my foreign liaison counterparts to urge them to redouble their efforts agaID$t al-Qa'ida The chief of the Counterterrorist Center the chief ofNear East Division and others made dditional urgent calls These calls resulted in several arrests· and detentions in Bahrain Yemen and Turkey · Even with the intense foc s on terrorism in gen ral and Bin· Ladin in particular the Intelligence Community had to deal with several other challenges that demanded the highest attention · • Some issues were themselves closely linked to terrorism such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the danger that some 12of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM c j5411961 v 1 v 1 J M l U J J- LI terrorist group would acquire such weapons In this regard we have worked extensively-operationally and analytically -on the danger of rogue elements· within nuclear states such s Pakistan and India helping terrorists gain acces to these weapons • Throughout the 1990s and beyond we were-intensely engaged supporting US policy and our military forces in the Balkans Haiti and elsewhere Under Congressional mandate we supported _the effort the International Criminal Tribunal on·War Crimes in Yugoslavia to bring some of the accused to justice of High priority i sues had resource consequences for collection operations and analysis Some of th es issues required increased tasking of collection assets that were in direct competition with our efforts on terrorism • After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998 for example we launched a major effort to improve our ability to warn of the next round of nuclear tests which entailed the diversion of resources to this· issue · _ Our experience over several years in assessing warning about and operating against al-Qa'ida contributed to our ability to warn during the summerof2001 that Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida were engaged in intensive operational planning and preparations and that among· their 'targets of choice was the US homeland -Our cone·ction sources lit up during this period They indicated that multiple spectacular attacks were planned and that some of the plots were in their final stages • By long-established doctrine we disseminated these raw reports immediately and widely to policymakers and action agencies such as the military State Department the Federal Aviation Administration FBI Department of Transportation the Immigration and Naturalization Service and others · · · • We documented the increased threat in the intelligence analysis that we provided to senior policymakers We cited plots in the Arabian Peninsula and Europe and ultimately in August 2001 we warned about in Ladin's desire to conduct terrorist attacks in the US homeland •· The interagency Community Counterterrorism Board also issued several threat advisories during the summer 2001 These advisories sent to US Government entities that have a counterterrorism mission noted that al-Qa'ida was inost likely to attempt spectacular attacks resulting in 13 of43 6 1 2007' 12 44 PM cd5411961 numerous casualties and that it was prepared to mount one or more terrorist attacks at any ·time The reporting was maddeningly short on actionable details The most ominous reporting hinting at something big was also the most vagµe The only occasions in this thread of reporting where there was· an e plicit or implicit location appeared to point abroad especially to US interests in the Middle East Our analysts tried to find linkages among the reports and linkages to past terrorist threats and tactics We considered policymakers' questions whether al-Qa'ida was feeding us this reporting to create panic through disinformation or to test our defenses but we concluded that the reports were real When ·some reporting hinted that an·attack had be n postponed we continued to stress tJlat there ere multiple· · · attacks planned and that one or m re could by continuing apace We grew concerned· that so much of the reporting pointed to attacks _overseas and noted that one of Bin Ladin' s goals had long been to strike out homeland · Our Warnings Were Being Heard CIA for many years was well awate that terrorists considered using airplanes in a variety of ways to conduct their operations We pro uced both sourc reports and strategic analysis addressing-these-issues CIA collected and disseminated relevant reporting and produced and disseminated relevant analysis to a wide customer base · within the US Government including the FAA Our information was r eived and understood by these customers For example the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security the Gore Commissio in 1997 noted The FBI the CIA a JJ d other intelligence sources have been warning that the threat of terrorism is changing in two important ways F_irst it is no longer just an overseas threat from foreign terrorists People· and places in the United States have joined the list oftarg ts and Americans have joined the rank ·oft rroris s The bombings ofthe World Trade Center in New· York and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City are clear examples ofthe shift as is the conviction ofRamzi Youseffor attempting to bomb twelve American airliners out ofthe sky over the Pacific Ocean The second change is that in addition to well-known estab i $hed terrorist groups it is becoming more common to find terrorists· working alone or in ad-hoc groups some ofwhom are not afraid to die in carrying out their designs · 14 of43 6il 2007 12 44 PM ··--- ------------------------------ cd5411961 U L vL r ll' IDJJ CIA FBI and FAA focused on the potential threat represented b y terrorists using airpla_nes in the 1995 plotting in Manila t-0 bring down 1-2 US airliners _• A National Intelligence Estimate later that year-the highest fonn of coordinated strategic intelligence that the DCI issues-noted this threat We reiterated this C ncem when we updated the Estimate_ two y s later • Threats to aircraft were also regularly disseminated in reporting and used in analysis The information we had about terrorists using airplanes was only part of a wealth of information on a range of terrorist plans and intentions ·Even th ough most of the reporting in this area was of questionable quality we disseminated it to our · customers with appropriat caveats given how seriously we took threats to American lives • Our information was pas_sed on to customers· in intelligence reports briefmgs to _senior policymakers and briefings to Cong_ressional Committees · • The FAA received thi intelligence at its headquarters and_ the FAA had_ a representative in the Counterterrorist Center with ·access to all analytical and operational information that related to airline security We are satisfied that all the reievant information we developed in the area of airline threats was made available to the FAA · We know that our strategic message on terrorism was reaching its audience For example ·in its 2000 annual publication Cri7 1inal Acts against Civil-Aviati n 000 the FM _emphasized threat to civil aviation posed by Bin Ladin and others · • The report noted Although ·Bin Ladin is not known to have attacked civil aviation he has both the motivation and the wherewithal to do so Bin · Ladin's anti-Western and_anti- Anieriqan attitudes make him and his followers a ·significant threat to civil aviation esp cially US civil aviation · • In citing the plot by convicted World Trad Center bomber Ramzi Yousef to place explosive devices o as many as 12 US· airliners flying out of East Asia the FAA report noted its concerns that others like Yousef who may possess similar skills pose acontinuing threat to civil aviation interests · 15 a £43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM cd5411961 • The report concluded increased awareness and vigilance are necessary to deter future incidents be they from terrorists or non-terrorists -It is important to do the utmost to prevent such acts rather than to lower · _ security measures by interpreting ·the statistics shown as 75 percent lower ·inci ence rate in 2000 compared to 1999 as indic ting a· decre sing threat · That said there i a vast difference between being aware that a type of threat _exists and having a specific warning of the date time and location·of a planned attack We did not _have intelligence of that specificity on which we could warn or take action · · Int elligence Collection Intelligence c llection is the necessary-prerequisite to any actions we could take to try to eliminate the terrorist threat-posed by Bin Ladin and his al-Qa'ida organization In the spring of_ 1999 we did a b seline review ofthe CIA's operational strategy against Bin Ladin and a new strategic plan The Counterterrorist Center produced· a · new comprehensive operational plan of attack against the Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida target inside and outside Afghanistan The Center previewed this new· strategy to senior-CIA management at the ehd of July 1999 By mid-September it had been briefed to CIA operational level personn l and to SA and FBI CIA then began to put in place the elements of this operational strategy that structured the Agency's counterterrorist activity for the intervening years leading up to the events of September 11 This strategy took on ·the name The Plan It evolved in conjunction with increased covert action authorities and built on what the Counterterrorist Center was recognized as doing well-collection qui k reaction to operational opportunities renditions and disruptions and analysis The Plan emphasized in its mt4tifaceted · program the priority of capturing and rendering to justice Bin Ladin and his ·principal lieutenants _ · • This central undertaking which involved a rang of operational initiatives recognized that the first priority was to acquire intelligence about in adin by penetrating his organization ·Without this effort the United States could not mount a s ccessful covert action program to stop him or his operations ·· • The Plan thus included a stro1 1g and rocused_ foreign intelligence · collection program We needed to be able to gather 1 he intelligence 1 Q at 16 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM i cc15411961 '-1i iu·u v would let us track d act against ·Bin Ladin and his _associates in terrorist sanctuaries including Sudan Lebanon Yemen and most •importantly Afghanistan The Plan comprised an aggressive human· source collection effort-both unilateral and-joint with liaison partner --and a vigorous development of technical collection ithin Afghanistan To execute The _Plan the Counterterrotj st Center developed program to select and train officers and put them where the terrorists are located The Center launched a nation-wide officers recruit ment program using the CIA's Career Training Program resources to identify vet and hirequalified personnel for countert rrorist assignments in hostile · environments We sought native fluency in Arabic and other terrorist- ssociated languages as well as police military experience and · ppropriate ethnic background In addition the· Center established ail ight-week advanced Counterteirorist Operations Course to teach CIA's · hard won lessons learned and couriterterrorism operational methodology • Another element of the strategy that emerged in 2000 and 200 I was the use of the-Predator unmanned aerial vehicle to monitor the activity ofBin Ladin and his camp network in Afghanisfa n The Predator L t me explain a bit more about our Predator operations Between September and December 2000 with the support of Air Force crews and an interagency operations and analysis team CIA flew an unarmed Predator Unmanned AeriafVehicle on 15 reconnaissance missions over Afghanistan Although the Taliban detected and· launched •interceptors agaJnst it the Predator was able to ·operate over adenied hostile area and returned imagery useful to the foreign intelligence collection program During two missions the Predator may have ·observed Usama bin Lad in · In one case · this wa an after-the-fact-judgment In the other sour es indicated that Bin Lad in would likely be at his Tarnak Farms facility and so cued the Predator flew over the · facility the next day It imaged a tall man dressed in white robes wi th a physical and ·operational signature fitting Bin Ladin A group of IO people gathered around him were apparently paying their respects for a minute or two · With the onset of bad weather-in ecember 2000 the Predator operations ceased ror the winter and the-aircraft were returned to tq ·united States Almost immediately ·· however planning and CIA began for a s cond deployment In 2000 Air Force 17 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM officers began to discuss the possibility of capitalizing• on an Air Force_ program to arm the Predator by adapting it to carry and fire Hellfire missiles These officers and later the leadership of CIA reasoned that if we could develop the capability to reliably hit a_ target with a Hellfrre missile an could develop the enabling· policy and legal framework we would have a capability to accurately and promptly respond to future sightings of high value targets · ' ·cIA recognized hat significant issues would need to be resolved·to enable this pro_gram These included the successful completion of weapons testing-technical· issues delayed deployment evep while we were solving others-approval by the nation ho sting e deployed operation -arrangements with the Department of Defense for·personnel and equipment and working through legal issues · · It was also clear that one of the most difficult issues would be developing a comm and and control artangenient that could respond to fleeting opportunities while ensuring the right level of leadership control over the operation CIA leadership from the beginning felt it important that there was a full understanding by the Pr sjden and the National S c-µrity Council of the capa biliti¢s of the armed Predator and the implications· of_ its use Weapons tests occurred between May 22 and June 7 2001 with mixed re ults While missile accuracy was excellent there were s me problems with missile fusing that raised questi ns about its uitability against some targets These problems were· not r solved· in the short term and remained questions on 11 September 2001 One issue that occupied much discussion was whether to try to deploy the Predator early in the summer of 2001 in a purely reconnaissance mode to _take advantage of good weatherj or to· wait until the armed capability was ready and the policy and legal questions were resolv d The Counterterrorist Center argued for the latter option for several reasons · 'i • The 2000 experience had demons ated that even if we again s1ghted Bin Ladin we did not have a timely response option Targets in Afghanistan were hours away from conventional attack even if the policy decision h d been made aJ d weapons were P9sitioned and ready • Some CIA officers believed that continued reconnaissance operations would undercut later armed operations The Taliban·would alinost certajnly detect the flights as it did fl1 e previous year and would alert al-Qa'ida to our presence Reconnaissance operations would als_q expose ·the Predator to the risk of interception or anti-aircraft fire 18 of43 6 1 2007 12 4 4 PM cdS411961 · · • Additl nally indications were that the·host country would be unlikely to tolerate extensive operations especially after the Taliban became aw re as it surely_would of that colµi try's assistance to the United States During the summer CIA led an interagency effort to fully devdop the capabilities of the armed Predator and to explore the questions inherent in its use One question that arose· was who would bear responsibility for Predators that might be lost-DOD or CIA While we fmally agreed to split the cost evenly the question was still in negotiation on 11 September 2001 It is important to emphasize however that this issue while contentious did not slow down the program We contin_ued to work all the preparations for armed c Ieployment with the knowledge that the funding question would eventually be resolved After September 11 it became a non-issue · As part of this interagency effort two exercises were conducted in May and June 00·1 to walk through the spectrum of operational and policy questions These _ ques1 ions included What are the apabilities of the system How do we set up the · communications architecture What are the-command and control arrangements What criteria wot 4d we use to shoot Who authorizes weapons firing What are the implications ·of a successful firing and of an unsuccessful firing In early September 2001 CIA was authorized to deploy the system with weapons-capable airc aft but for reconnaissance missions only The D I did n t · authorize the shipment of missiles at that time because the host nation had not agreed to allow flights by weapons-carrying aircraft Moreover the technical problems that had bedeviled earlier tests remained questio · · Subsequent to 9 11 approval was quickly granted to ship tlie missiles and the Predator· aircraft and missiles reached their overseas location on September 16 2001 The first mission was flown over Kabul and Qandahar on September 18 without carrying weapons Subsequent host nation approval was granted on October 7 and the first anned mission was flown the same day Collection Operations Pay Off · Our surge in _collection operations on counterterrorism in general and al-Qa'ida in particular paid off • Our human intelligence reponing on all counterterrorism topics increased steadily frqm 1998 through the first nine months of 2001 • Human intelligence reporting specifically on Bin Ladj n and al-Qa'ida 19 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM cd5411961 increased by 50 percent over the sam period • The number of human source s we had operating against the terrorism target grew by more than 50 pe i cent etweei L 1999 and September 11 • WorkiJ ig across agencies and in some cases with foreign services we designed and built -several collection systems for specific use against al-Qa'ida inside Afghanistan · • By September 11 2001 a map would show that these collection programs and human networks nearly covered Afghanistan This array meant that· when the military campaign to topple the Taliban d destroy al-Qa'ida began in Octob r 2001 w w re able to support it w_ith an enormous body of information and a large stable of assets The realm of human source collection frequently is divided between liaison reporting that we get from c ooperative foreign intelligence· _services and unilaterai reporting that we get from agents ·we run ourselves -Even before The Plan our vision for ·h an intelligence on terrorism was simple we had to get more of both types The fi e for both rose every year after 1998 and by 2000 the volume of reporting on terrorism from unilateral assets exceeded that from liaison sources • The integration of technical ·and human sources ·has been key to our understanding of and actions against international terrorism It was this •· combinatio1 1- this integration-that allowed us -years ago to confirm the existence of numerous al-Qa'ida facilities and training camps in Afghanistan •·· • On a virtually daily_ basis analysts a1J d collection officers from NSA the National Geospatial-Intelligence ·Agency formerly NIMA and CIA c e together to interactively use sat llite imagery communications information and· human so ce reporting • This integration helped pr9vide·the baseline data for the US Central _ Command's target pl g agains t al-Qa'ida facilities and infrastructure throughout Afghariistan CIA's Response Was Strong and Persistent As time progressed Bin Ladin became an increasingly harder target ·in his Afghan sanctuary In response additional authorities· were added in appreciation of both new operational opportunities and ·the increasing policy determination or Bin Ladin to be • 20 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM cd541i961 ren iered to law- enforcement By 1998 the key elements of the CIA' s strategy against Bin Ladin-included · • Working with foreign countries to-break up cells and carry out arrests • Disrupting and weakening his bu inesses_ and finances · · • Listening to his· communications' · · • Detaining and disrupting his operatives · • Pursuing multi-track _approach to bring him to justice including working with liaison services developing a close relationship with US federal prosecutors and enhancing our unilateral capability ·to capture him a CIA's policy and objectives-statement for the FY 199 budget submission prepared in early 1997 evidenced a strong deteimination to go on the-offensive against · terrorists The submission outliried our· Counterterrorist Ce1 1ter' s offensive operatiof S and noted the goal to render the masterminds disrupt terrorist infrastructure infiltrate terrori t groups and work with foreign partners · The FY 2000 budget submission prepared in early 1999·described Biii Ladin as the most significant individual sponsor of Sunni Islamic extremist and terrorist activity in the world today · • It noted the Agency's use of a wide range of offensive operational t hniques against the targets These included the creation of deqicated counterterrorist units in key·countries joint op t1ons with liaison partners to apprehend -wanted terrorists recruitment of well-placed agents and penetrations of terrorist' support groups Commenting on the Bin Ladin-dedicated Issue -Station µi the Counterterrorist Genter the FY 2000 submission_ noted that Thls Station staffed with CIA FBI DOD and NS-A- officers has succeeded in identifying ass·ets and members of Bin Ladin's organization and nearly 700 intelligence reports have bee disseminated about his operations ' It is important to note that the political context _of this period presented an ·operational · environment with significant impediments that CIA constantly fought to overcome - The US Government had no Embassy or other official presence in Afghanistan The US did not recognize the Taliban regime making it difficult to· get access to Bin Lad in al Qa'ida personnel and 21 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM cd5411 961· • US policy stopped short of replacing the Taliban regime or providing direct support to others for the specific purpose of overthrowing the Taliban These realities limited our ability to exert pressure on Bin Ladin's hosts · ' • Puring this period the Taliban gradually gained control over most of Afghanistan reducing the opposition's capabilities androom·to maneuver ' ' • Pakistan's nuclear tests of 1998 and the military coup in 1999 strained relations with Pakistan the principal access point to Afghanistan It a so is important to n te that this Afghanistan-focused trategy was played out against the necessity for aggressive and complex efforts to disrupt planned Bin Ladin-sponsored terrorist operations on a worldwide basis Responding to the Millennium threat the attack on the USS Co e and the rash of indications of planned terrorist actions during Ramadan 2000 and t4e months leading to September 11 worked to shift the focus of operational effort away fro internal Afgh stan op rations · The Intelligence Com_munity- Role Up to this ·point I have focused primarily on CIA' s role in developing our understanding of the al-Qa'ida threat and devising and implementing a robust and well-focused program and strategy to counter it A critical aspect of the overall counterterrorism ef ort is the bro der Intelligence C minunity role • Taking the fight to Bin Ladin and the al-Qa'ida organization was not just a matter ofmobilizing the Counterterrorist Center at CIA This was and still is an interagency-and international-effort ' • The Counterterr9ri t Center at CIA was created in 1986 to ta Ice the offensive to the t rrorists Its define l mission is to preempt prevent and disrupt terrorist activities and plans The Center enables the fusion of all sources of information in a single action-oriented uni Not only does it fuse source reporting on international terrorism from US and foreign collectors but it also integrates cotmterterrorism operational and analytical actiyity The Center is also the CIA's single point of contact on counterterrorism issues for US policymakers The Center's fused integrated activities give us the speed that we must have to seize fleeting opportunities· the hadowy world of terrorism m 22 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM C0541f961 · • The Center has racked up many successes including tlie rendition of many dozens of terrorists prior to September 11 2001 • No matter how inuch is integrated w thin the Center and no· matter how large we·build it there are still valuable counterterrorist players outside it malqng the s ring of knowledge essential We have counterterrorist partners for example throughout CIA especially in the field and with NSA the National Geospatial-IntelligenceAgency FBI and the Special i'orces to name a few It is also clear that when errors occur-·when we miss information or opportunities- it is often because our sharing and fusion ate not as strong as they need to be Qon mmnications across bureaucracies missions and cultures is among our more persistent challenges _in the fast-paced · high-pressure environment 9f counterterrorism The opposite is also true Progress in raising the level of coopei'ation among the Community agencies over the years has been key to warning policymakers and stopping d disrupting attacks against_ US interests overseas - · · The CounterterroristCenter has aggressively pursued inter-agency representation bo in line managenierit and at the working level since its establishment Over the years this emphasis has fostered both improved communications as well as beg_un to break down the often-cited cultural institutional barriers to creative and effective support and joint operations By_2001 the Center had over 30· represen tives from more than a dozen agencies involved in the fight against terrorism One of the more critical alliances in the war against terrorism is that between CIA andFBI ' • An FBI officer has been serving as a deputy to the chief of the Counterterrorist Center since the mid-1990s The FBI reciprocated by making a CIA operations officer deputy to the Bureau's Counter-Terrorist Division · • Prior to September 11 six FBI officers were detailed to the Center as a · whole a number that has now grown to some 20 officers • Two CIA operations officers served at FBI headquarters prior to September 11 2001 The Counterterrorist Center now has 10 of cers detailed to the FBI Since the 9 11 attacks the FBI ·has increased the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces JTTFs in the US to 56 The CIA has connectivity with and provides intelligence support to all 56 and ·has assigned 90 officers either full- or part-time to·23 ·ofthem CIA also had ·as·signed officers ·to work with FBI to assist them in establishing their own 23 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM cd5411961 foreign intelligence reporting and analysis capabilities • Fro the mid 1990s on the Center has had on average 10 to 12 NSA fficers on detail NSA-in addition to_ hosting working level CIA officers-had until recently a senior CIA I irectorate of Operations officer serving as one of the deputies to the NSA Operations pirectorate A CIA Directorate· ofintelligep ce officer serves as deputy to NSA's Office of Analysis and Pro uction • As the Counterterrorist Center ramped up-its efforts against Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida the relationships· and institutional structures that devel9ped over the years among Cmnm ty agencies paid enonnous dividends Working With Foreign Liaison The Agency's strategy of drawing foreign governments into the fight against terrorism_ also has continued to pay _strong dividends Through the Counterterrorist Center we have financed training and information-sharing arrangements that have · en ouraged the cooperation of scores of nations in regions both br eding and ·afflicted by terrorism This has facilitated many renditions and· other successful disruptions Working closely with foreign liais n partners has been an indisp nsable p·art of CM ' s counterterrorism strategy before and after September 11 A disruption of a terrorist plot abroad wouid often be impossible without the c operation of at least one liaison service arid the sharing of threat reporting • The involvement of at least three liaison partners was required to disrupt th plots in 1998 to blow up 1 he US Embassy in Albania and in the summer of 2001 to ·attack the US Embassy in Yemen and destroy the US Embassy in a Europ an capital · · To be sure there have been ups and downs in our relationship with liaison partners • Some ltaison services were 1 1D willing to provide the sourcing information that we use to evaluate a source's reliability and access This limited CIA' s ability to use their threat reporting · · • This reluctance to share becomes acute when concenis exist that information ba$ed on reporting from extremely sensitive snurces might be 24of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM co's411961 · V 'l t LA i 'i J J Lt U leaked to the press · Although liaison seryices are an essential part of an aggressive posture against terrorism their ability to share is somet es l lindered by their countri s' -own legal protections and open societies These limitations include restrictions on rendering-· terrorists to countries that permit capital punis ent Terrorists have learned how to · operate 41 open societies such ·-as ours and th9se pf our close partners Countering al-Qa'ida's Global Presence Even while targeting Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida in their Afghan lair we ·did not ignore its cells of terro spread across the globe Esp ially in periods of peak threat reporting we accelerated our work to spake up and destroy al-Qa'ida cells wherever we could_fmd them· • This took resources-'- perations officers desk officers analysts and translators-throughout the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies ' ·• We also mobilized intelligence services around the globe During the Millenniurp threat period the CIA overseas and the FBI in the US organized an aggressive integrated campaign to disrupt-al-Qa'ida The campaign used human assets techni al operations _· and the hand-off of foreign intelligence to ·facilitate obtaining court_ arrants under the Foreign Intelligence urveillance Act Over a period of months there were close daily consultations that included the ·Director of the J_ i'BI the National Security Advisor and the_ Attorney General We· · _ _identified 36 additional terrorist agents at the time around the world We pursued - operations against them in 50 countries Our disruption activities succeede l against _ 21 of these individuals and included arrests -re ditions detentions and surveillance · -· • We assisted the Jordanian government in- dealing with terrorist cells that -planned to attack religious sit s and tourist hotels We helped track down the organizers of the e attacks and heiped r nder them·to justice • We mounted disruption and arrest operations_ against te orists in eight countries on four continents which also netted information that allowed us to track down· wen more suspected terrorists _ _ • During this same period unrelate4 to Millennium threats we conducted 25 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM ' C05411961 · multiple op rations in East Asia l ading to the arrest or detention of 45 members of the Hizballah network · I • In th months after the Millennium experience-in October 2000-we lost a serious battle when USS Cole was bombed and 17 brave Anierican ·sailors· perished The efforts of American intelligence to strike back at a deadly enemy continued through tlie Ramadan_period in the autumn of 2000 another period of peak threat reporting · • Terrorist cells planning attacks against US and f-0reign military and civilian targets in the Persian Gulf region were· broken up This resulted in · the capture of hundreds of pounds of explosives and other weapons including anti-aircraft missiles These operations also netted proof that some lslamic charitable organizations had been either hijacked or created to provide support to terrorists operating in other countries • We succeeded in bringing a major Bin Ladin terrorist facilitator to justice with the cooperation of two foreign governments This individual had provided documents and shelter to terrorists traveling through the Arabian Peninsula • We worked with numerous European governments such as the Italians Germans French ·and British to identify_ and· break up terrorist groups and their plans against US and local interests in Europe Runup- to September 1-0nr Ope tatjons The third period of peak threat was in the spring and summer 2001 As with the Millennium and Ramadan 2000 we increased the tempo of our operations against al-Qa'ida We stopped s me attacks and ·cau ed the terroris s to postpone others • We helped to_bre up another terrorist cell iri Jordan and seized a large quantity of weapons including ·rockets and high explosives • Working with another foreign part lier we broke up a plan· to attack US facilities in Yemen · · • rn· June c rA· worked with a Middle ·Eastern partner to arrest two Bin 26 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM C05411961 Ladin operatives planning attacks on US facilities in Saudi Arabia • In _June and July CJA launched a wide-ran g disruption effort against Bin Ladin's organization with targets in almost two-dozen countries Our intent was to drive up Bin L din' s security concerns and lead his ·organization to delay or can9el its attacl s We subsequently received reporting that attacks were delayed including an attack against the US ·military in Europe · • In July a different Middle East partner helped bring about the detention of a terrorist who had been directed to' begin an operation to attack the US -Embassy or cultural center in a European capital • In addition in the summer of 2001 local authorities acting on our information arrested an operative desc ibed as Bin Ladin' s man in East Asia · • We assisted another foreign partner in the rendition of a senior Bin Lad in associate Information ·he provid_ed included plans to kidnap Americans in countries and to carry out hijackings • We p ovided intelligence to Latin Am rican service on band of terrorists considering hijackings and bombings An FBI team detected explosives residue in their hotel rooms · ·· three a a Budget and Resources We spend an enormous amount of time trying to get the money and the people the CIA D eds for the war on terrorism The Congressional Joint Inquiry investigation · singled out b dgetary resources specifically · T4e record shows that despite· the welV-documented resource reductions we took in the l 990s and the enormous competing demaµds for our attention I and a series of DCis before me saw to it that the resources connni ed to the c9unterterrorism effort were not only protected but also enhanced The last decade saw· a number of conflicting and competing-trends military force deployed to more locations than ever in our nation's history a growing co unterproliferation and countemarcotics threat constant t nsions in the Middle·East and · to deal w1th these d ·a host of other issues far fewer intelligence dollars and manpower · The cost of the post-Col l War peace di idend w s that during_the 1990s our · intelligence c·ommunity funding d clined in real terms redu ing our buying power by 27of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM ' C05411961 tens of billions of dollars over'the decade We lost nearly one·in four of our positions This loss of manpower wa devastating particµlarly in our two most manpower intensive activities all-source analysis and human source collection By the mid- l 990s recruitment of new CIA analysts and case officers had come to a virtual halt NSA was hiring no new technologists during the greatest information · technology chap ge ·in our lifetimes Both Congress and the Executive Branch for most of the decade embraced the idea th at we ·could surge our resources to deal with emerging intelligence challenges including threats from terrorism During this time of increased military operations around the globe the Defense Department was also reducing Its tactical intelligence units and funding This caused the Intelligence Community to stretch its capa ilities to the br aking point because national systems were covering gaps in tactical intelligence It is·always our policy to give top priority to supporting military opera ions While we grappled with a multitude of high priority overlapping crises we had no choice but to modernize selective intelligence systems and infrastructure in which we had deferred necessary investments and downsized or we would have found· ourselves out ·of business Throughout the Intelligence Community during this period we made difficult resource reallocation decisions tc try to rebuild critical mission areas affected by the funding cuts With the al-Qa'ida threat growfug more ominous and with our · resources devoted to countering it clearly inadequate however we began raking money and people away from _other _critic al areas to improve our efforts against · terrorism Despite the resource reducti 011$ ·and the enormous· competing demands for our attention we managed to triple Intelligence-wid funding for counterterrorism from fiscal year_ 1 90 to 1999 The Counterterrorist Center's resources nearly quadrupled in that same period We had signifi can y reallocated both dollafS and people inside our programs to work the ten orism problem From a budget perspective the last part of the 1990s reflects CIA's effort to shift to a wartime footing against terrorism GIA budget had declined 18 percent in real terms during the decade an we suffered a loss of 16 percent of our personnel this is slightly less of a cut than the 1 in 4 cited for the Intelligence Community as a whole · earlier Yet in ·the midst of that stark resource picture CIA's funding level for counterterrorismjust prior to 9 11 was more than 50 percent above our FY 1997 level CIA consistently reallocated and sought additional resources or this fight In 1994 the budget request for counterterrorism activitie$ equaled less than four· percent 's 28-of43 6 1 2007 12 44 fM • • C05411961 of the total CIA program In the-FY 2002 CIA budget request we submitted prior to · 9 11_ counterterrorism activities constituted almost 10 percent of the budget request · During a period of budget stringency when we were faced with rebuilding essential intelligence capabilitjes -we had to make some tough choices Although resources for v lly everything else in CIA were going do counterterrorism ·resources were_ gomgup · After the US embassies ·m Africa were bombed we knew that neither surging our resources nor internal realignments were sufficient to fund a war on terrorism C ns quently in the f ll of 1998 I asked the Administration to mcrease _intelligence funding by more than $2 0 billion_annuaily for fiscal years 2000-2005 and I-made similar -requests· for FY 2001-2006 and FY 2002-2007 Only small portions of these requests were approved Counterterrorism funding and manpower needs were umber one on every list I pi -ovided to Congress and the Administration an deed it was at the top of the funding list pproyed by Speaker Gingrich in FY1999 the first year in which we received a significant infusion of new money for US · intellige t ice capabilities during e decade ofthe 90s That supplemental and those that followed it were essential to our efforts They helped save American lives and we are grateful We knew however that we could not count on supplemental funds to build multi-year programs and that is why we· worked so hard to reallocate our resources and to se_ek five year funding ·increases J want to make a couple· of comments about manpower In CIA alone I count the equivalent of 700 officers working counterterrorism in August 2001 at both • · headquarters and in the field That number-does not include the people who-were· working ·10 penetrate either_ technically or through human sources a multitude of threat targets from which _we could derive int 'lligence on terrorists· Nor does it include friendly liaison serv ces and coalition partners You simply cannot gauge the level of effort by counting only the people wh -had words al-Qa'ida or Bin Ladin iti their position description · the · We reallocated all the people we could given the demands placed on us for intelligence on a number of the highest priority issues such as chemical nuclear and· biological proliferation support to operational ·military forces We surged thousands of people to fight this fight when the threat was highest When we realized surging was not sufficient we began a sustafu ed drumbeat both within the · Administr_ation and the Congress that we had to have more people and money · devoted to this fight Nonetp eless it will take many_more years to recover the capabilities we lost during the resource decline• of the 1990s - and 29of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM l C05411961 The DCl's RQle Up to now I have been talking about the terrorist threat and the actions of organizations to combat it I would like to tum briefly to a more personal topic- the role the American people have entrusted to me in this important endeavor · · The DCI is prosecuting this 'Yar every day I _was l oing that before the September 11 attacks and I am doing it now Going back to'the Millenniumthreat perio there is a · meeting almost every day at CIA about what we are doing operatio_nally what the relatio hiJ S are among all the players The need for the DCI to lead and communicate on th se issues is never going to · change The meeting in my conference room at five o'clock fl ye days a we kcould be the most important meeting that occurs in Washington on· terrorism because operational and analytic decisions are made on the -spot about_global_ terrorism al-Qa'ida Afghanistan the terrorist threat from chemical biological a11 d radiological weapons and the financial war on terrorism Representatives from all the qiajor agencies are there Obviously terrorism is an issue on which the DCI chooses to spend an enormous amount of personal time I spend it at the strategic level the· tactical °level and understanding our operations and analysis There is not a more dangerous ·tweat to the country than this I am personally involved with liai$On partners often making direct phone calls for operational diseussions In the Millennium pe od alone I personally talked vith 20 of our liaison partners to alert them to our findings about targets and the m ed to go after them Every visit I take overseas _has a counterterrorism or al- Qa 'ida component to it our That as the reality of my job before September 11 and it is the reality now I coi i tinue to devote the greatest proportion of my time to the war on terror just as I did before 9 11 Operations are more complex now and counterterrorism is intensely operational There is a constant flow ·qf new- data new thr at reporting new people and ew relationships · There are new and bigger actors on the cene because there· is a very different set of relationships with the military than existed b fore 9 11 I have a lose working relationship with the Central Command and with the Special Operatlons Command that is different today and very intense CIA is e i igaged in direct support to our · military in counterterrorism operatioiis in Iraq and Afghanistan and in other theatres of operation a scale not seen since Vietna 1p on 30of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM ' l C05411961 There is a difference h1 the pace and· scope of my relationship with the· FBI now that we· have created a common threat matrix and common data points that we_ review and · discuss each day We hav_e more joint inve$tigations and CIA support_to their investigations From a technical perspective we are collecting a lot more data because we have a lot _more people in the fight than we ever had before -We are managing· a collection pr cess that integrates the National° Security Agency and a new and very important Information Operations Center We can 4J_tegrate them with a Foreign-Intelligence Surveillance Act process in a way that was never done_ before · • Specifically the Patriot Act authorized intelligenc officials engaged in the collection of foreign intelligence under the FISA to consult with law enforcement personnel in order to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect gainst threats to national security • Additionally law enforcement personnel are required by the Patriot Act to share with the DCI foreign intelligence obtained during crinµnal · investigations _ • Finally the· Patriot Act gave me the authority to establish requirements and priorities for the collection qf foreign intelligence infonnation pursuant_to the FISA an authority that I have exercised We have a very robust analytical ·effort that is substantially bigger than before Additional supplemental funding provided by the Congres has provided an enormous amount of impetus From a management perspective we have a much bigger cadre of people working the problem than we ever had before We also learned that we could not fight this war effectively without a trusting professional dedicated set of liaison partners to help with collection and operations · I • Whoe er sits this job is going-to he right in the middle ·of countering terror for _th eir entire time in office It 4oes not matter who it is Yes w have broken down a lot of stovepipes But there are still things you work on all the time The big management moral of the story is that you have got to be here doing it hands-on in a cont_inuous way · · The Status of the War on Terrorism One month ago on February 24 I presented-to the Congress and the American people my ami ual worldwide threat assessment I egan that tesfunony·with a stark 31 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM l • C05411961 · J1 'lvLfl6 1 r 1 cu bottom line on terrorism d I will repeat it here today for you First though I sho-i ild tell you what w know so far about the recent tragic bombings in Ma d Spain While the investjgation is far from complete available information strongly implicates Spain-based Islamic extremists linked to al-Qa'ida as being· responsible Spanish authorities have detain¢ nearly a dozen suspects many with ties to former Spain al-Qa'ida cell leader Barakat Yarkas out we have no infomiation- inclicating whether the-central al-Qa'ida leadership ordered or approved the attack · I • • The exp osives used were inexpensive and likely obtained locally and-the key suspects appear to have some explosives expertise This suggests that they could haye launched the attack without financial or operational help from al-Qa'ida or other terrorist groups • Europe-based al-Qa'ida associates traditionally have received little or no oversight or funding from al-Qa'ida leaders judging from a variety of reporting since 11 September 2001 We suspect that there may be over 100 al-Qa'ida trained eX tre sts in Europe · • We have no infonnation suggesting the Basque Fatherland and I berty ETA terrorist group was involved in the attack but we continue to ·explore_ the possibility Returning to the threat assessment ·the al-Qa'ida leadership structure we charted after September 11 is seriously damaged but the group remains as committed as ever to attacking the US homeland A_s we continue the battle against al-Qa'ida we mU St · overcome-a global movement infected by al-Qa'ida's radical agenda In this battle we are moving foiward in our knowledge of the enemy's plans capabilities and _ intentions What w have learned continues_to validate my deepest concern-that this enemy remains intent on obtaining and using catastrophic weapons · Now let me tell you about the war we have waged against the al-Qa'ida organi'tation and its eadership Military and intelligence operations by the United States and its allies overseas have degraded the group Loc_al al-Qa'ida cells are forced to make · their own decisi because f disarray in the central leadership Al Qa'ida depended on leaders who not only direct terrorist attacks but also who carry out the day-to-day tasks· that support operations Over _the past 18 months we · have kill d or·captured key al Qa'ida leaders in every significant operational area-·Iogistjcs planning finance d training We have eroded the key pillars f the 32 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM ' C05411961 rganization such as the leadership in Pakisttini urban areas and operational cells in the al-Qa'ida heartland of Saudi Arabia and Yem en of The list al-Qa'ida leaders and associates who will never agaip_ threaten the American people includes -• Khalid ShaykhMuhammad al-Qa'ida's operations chief and the mastermind of the September 11 attacks · _ • Nashiri t e senior operational planner· for the abian Gulf area • Abu Zubayda a senior logistics officer and plotter ·• Hasan Ghul a senior facilitator who was s nt to case Iraq for- an expand_ed al-Qa'ida presence there • Harithi and al-Makki the most enior plotters in Yemen who wer involved in the bombing of the USS Col_e · - • Hambali the senior operational planner in Southeast Asia We e creating large and growing gaps in the al-Qa'ida hierarchy Unquestionably bringing· these key operators to ground 9isrupted plots that would otherwise have _killed Americans Al-Qa'ida's fmanyes are also being squeezed This is due in part to tak edowns of key tnon en in the past year particularly the Gulf Southwest Asia and even Iraq Meanwhile al-Qa'id central continues to lose operational-safehavens and Bin Ladin has gone deep underground We are hqnting him in one of the unfriendliest regions on earth We follow every lead · · We_ ate receiving a broad array of help· from our coalition partners who have been central to-our effort against al-Qa'ida · • Sinc e the May 12 2003 bombings the Saudi government has shown an important commitment to fighting al Qa 'ida in the Kingdom and Saudi officers have paid with their lives • Elsewhere in the Arab world we are re eiving yaluable cooperation · from Jordan Morocco Egypt Algeria the UAE Oman arid m any- others of • President Musharraf Pakistan remains a c urageo us a d indispensabl ally who has becoine the target of assassins for the help he has give11 us • Partners in Southeast Asia have been instrumental in the roundup of key regional associates of al Qa 'ida 33 of43 · 6 1 2007 12 44 PM 'f C05411961 _ L '--' _ j u • u u • Our Europeari partners worked closely together to unravel and disrupt a · · continent-w tde network of terrorists planning chemical biological and conventional attacks in Europe ·We have made notable stl ides Do not mis derstand me-I am not suggesting al •Qa'ida is defeated It is not We are still at war Al-Qa'ida is a learning organization that is colU1llltted to attacking the United States its friends and allies Successive blows to ·al-Qa'ida's central leadership hav transformed the organization into a loose collection·ofregional networks that operate more autonoinously The e egional components have demonstrated their operational prowess in the past year ·• The sites of their attacks span the entire reach ofcµ Qa'ida-Morocco Kenya Turkey Jordan Saudi Araeia Kuwait Afghanistan Pakistan and Indonesia for example • Al-Qa'ida seeks to influence the regional networks with operational training consultations and money · You should not take the fact that these attacks occurred abroad to me the threat to the US homeland has waned As al-Qa'ida and sociated groups undertook these att cks overseas detainees consistently talk about the importance the group still attaches to striking the main enemy th United States Across the· operati nal spectrum-air maritime special weapons-we have time and again uncovered plots · that are chilling · • On aircraft plots ·aI ne we have uncovered-new plans to recruit pilots and to evade security measures in Southeast Asia the Middle East arid Europe · · • Even catastrophic attacks on the scale of September 11 remain-within al-Qa'ida's reach Make n mistake-wherever these plots are hatcJ ied they tat_-get US soil or that of our allies Al-Qa'ida Is Not tbe 011-ly Challenge ' So far I have be en talking only about al-Qa'ida but al-Qa'ida is not the limit of terrorist threat worldwide Al-Qa'ida has· infected others with its ide logy which 34of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM ' C05411961 I '--'A-J t s uvii 41 JiJ depicts the United States as Islam's greatest foe · Th steady growth o Usama bin Ladin's anti-US sentiment through the wider Sunni · extremist movement the broad disserniml tion of al-Qa'ida's destructive expertise ensure that a serious threat will remain for the foreseeable future -with or·without al-Qa'ida in the picture and A decade ago bin Ladin·had a vision of rousing Islamic terrorists worl wide to · attack the United States He created al-Qa'ida to indoctrinate a worldwide moyem nt in global jihad with-America as the enemy-ali ene y to be attacke ·with every means at hand · · · · · In the minds of Bin Ladin and his ohorts September 11 was the shining moment their shot heard 'round the world ' and they watit to capitalize on it · Even as- al-Qa'ida reels from our blows other extremist groups within the movement it influenced· have become the next wave of the terrorist threat Dozens of such group ex st Let me offer a few thoughts on how to understand this challenge • One of the most immediate threats is-from smaller international Sunni extremist groups who have benefited from oo Qa'ida links They include groups as diverse as the al-Zarqawi network the Ansar al-Islam in Iraq the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan • A second level of threat comes from small local groups with limited domestic agendas that work with international terroris groups in tp eir own countries These include the Salitiya Jihadia a Moroccan network that carried out the May 2003 Cas blanca bombings and similar groups thro ughout Africa and Asia · These far-flung groups increasingly set the agenda _ and are redefining the threat we face They are not all creatures of Bin Ladin and so their fate is not tied to his They have autonomous leadership they pick their own targets and they plan their own attacks · · · Beyond these groups are the so-called foreignjihadists ' These in viduals·are ready to fight anywhere they believe Muslim lands are under attack by what they see · as infidel invaders They draw on broad support networks have wide ·appeal and njoy a growing sense of support from Muslims who are not _necessarily supporters of terrorism The foreign jihadists ·_see Iraq as a golden opportunity 35 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM J C05411961 lH'lv Ld Oll' LOLI Let me repeat for the·growing number ofjihadists-interested in attacking the United · States a spectacular attack on the US· Homeland_ is the brass ring that many strive for with or without encouragement by_al-Qa'ida's central lead rship To detect and ultimately defeat these force we_ will continually n d to watch hotspots present or potential battlegrounds and places where these terrorist networks converge Iraq is of course one major locus of concern Southeast Asia is another So are the backyards of our closest allies Even Westem Europe is an area where terrorists recruit train and target • To get the global job done foreign governments will need to improve bil_ateral and multilateral and even inter-service cooperation They also will have to strengthen do111estic counterterrorist legislation and security practices Al-Qa'ida's interest in chemical biological i adiological and nuclear weapons is strong Acquitjng these is a religious obligation in Bin Ladin's eyes Al-Qa'ida and more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing these materials Over· the last y ar we have also seen an increase in the threat of more sophisticated weaponry for this reason we take very seriously the threat of a chemical biological or radiolqgical attack · · · • We particularly see a heightened risk of poison attacks Contemplated delivery methods to dat_e h ve been simple but this may change as · non-al-Qa'ida groups share information on more sophisticated-methods and tactics • Extremists have widely dissercinated assembly instructions for improvised chemical· weapon using common materials that could cause a large numbers of casualties in a crowded enclosed area · • Although _gaps in our' understanding remain we see a1 Q 'ida' s program to· produce aJ -thrax as one of the most immediate· terrorist mass casualty threats we are likely to· face • Al Qa'ida continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a· o uclear capability It remains interested· in dirty bombs Terrorist documents contain accurate views of how suGh weapons would be used 36of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM C05411961 0L l _ _ _J n r u u Other terrorist orgfil -izatio13 s also _threaten US inte ests Palestinian terronst groups in Israel the West Bank and·Gaza_remain a fonnidable threat and contin e to use · terrorism to undermine l rospects for peace • Last year Palestinian terrorist groups conducted more than 600 attacks killing about 20 0 Israelis and foreigners including Americans • Lebanese Hizballah cooperates with these-groups and appears to be iricre ing its support It is also working with Iran and surrogate groµps in Iraq and wou14 likely react to an attack against it Syn a or Iran with attacks against US and Israeli targets worldwide _ • Iran and Syria continue to _support terrorist groups and their links into Iraq have become problematic to our efforts ·there FinalJy cyber vulnerabilities are another of our concerns with terrorists foreign governments hackers crime groups and industrial spies all attempting to ·obtain inform tion from our computer networks The War Ahead Since September 11 we have been essentially responsive threat by threat I expect to continue to discover terrorists' plans to wani of threats to analyze ·the terrorists' capabilities Our challenge-_mine the government's -and the Amen can people's-is to· turn-the warnings into actions that can save lives · The first step in that process is to manage our risk more effectively We need to fine-tune our defensive response so that we are reducing the risk from the threat we have identified One -size does not fit all · We need to become more agile in our response For example we can adopt sector py-sector approaches as ·we ·did during this last holiday season We learned of thr ats to specific flights and we took countermeasures without disrupting large portions of the airline industry At times·we may-need quieter approaches to avoid alerting the people we are trying to stop _At other times we may need a nationwide alert-a brute force response so th t terrorists see what we are doing and retreat That can buy us the time we need to disrupt their operation · We have learned a lot since September 11 from supporting our military forces in Afghanistan Iraq and elsewhere We are going to· have to use that experience to support governors mayors chiefs of police and_the like ifwe are going to reduce our risk of terrorist attack We need t_o share critical information quickly and· 37of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM C05411961 Iv 'lv IJdi o u·u u ·we n ed · seamlessly systems to put our intelligence t the disposal of those ho need it wherever they may·be and whatever their specific responsibilities are for protecting us from attack We will become more able to manage· risk as the Department of Homeland Security and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center TTIC evolve More importantly we will · become more effective and more agile when we have tapped the talent of people on he line at the federal state and local levels of government Officials on the visa line in embassies abroad immigration posts throughout the US and key officials in state and local governments can help provide the information we need to defend ourselves In partic ular we need to ensure that police officers have the information they need to spot and stop terrorists before they strike The burden is on us in the Intelligence Community to· protect intelligence as we distribute it The cop on the beat does not need a Top Secret Codeword clearance The Terrorist Threat Integration Center established May 1 2003 exemplifies a new way that-the Federal Government is doing business to advance our analytic capabilities in the fight_ against terrorism For_ the first time we have unfettered access to intelligence databases and other terrorist threat-related information spannirtg the intelligence law forcement homeland security _diplomatic and military · communities The Center has_ connectivity with 14 separate US Government networks enabling information sharing never before This unprecedented access to information is enabling us to provide a comprehensive all-source-based picture of terrorist threats to US interests at home and abroad · · TTIC's goal is to ensure that threat information gets to all who play a role in protecting the American people from terrorism Tl IC' s partnership wlth the Department of Homeland Security and the F deral Bureau of Investigation for · · instance helps to ensure t information· and analys s are passed expeditiously to stat_e and local officials and to law enforcement personnel •· Rapid sharing of eat information is critical Some call state and local officials and law enforc ent entities our first responders but if the information reaches them in time they are really our first and last defenders ' The Center and other inter-agency efforts have made tangible progress toward better information sharing To that end the Center hosts ajointprogram office to facilitate information sharing This joip t office is focused currently on key impediments to the free flow of terrorism-related information 38 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM a •· TTIC sponsors classified website that has more than 3 million terrorism-related documents from the intelligence law enforcement homeland security and military communities • Ouruse_of an information handling restriction known as ORCON or ''Originator Control '_' has dropped almost in half since the latter part of 2001 This change allows more rapid sharing of sensitiv information within the US· Government We are· determined to reduce the use of this control much more any such controls will be used only_to the extent that they are consistent with the ·President's priority on preventing preeJ pting and disrupting terro_r st threats and • The use of tear line reporting so that terrorism-related inform tion qan be disseminated to a much broader audience in timely manner without · revealing sensitive sources or methods has increased by 70 percent since late 2001 a TTIC is also responsible for integrating _and maintaining a repository of international terrorist identities info gnation_ in support of a streamlined system for watchlisting · · and terrorist screening activities To date the Center has approxiJ lately 100 000 · international terrorist identities catalogued TTIC works hand in glove with the FBI-administered Terrorist Screening Center which ensures that front line law enforcement officers consular officials a lid immigr tion and border personnel have the capability_ to rapidly screen· individuals known or uspected to be terrorists and to respond before they enter the US ·· · The integratio11 of perspectives from the many agencies and· departments that reside in the Center is a force multipli r in the fight against terrorism • On a strategic l vel the Center has developed reporting mechanisms by· which the President and key Cabinet officials are briefed daily on the key threats as well as actions underway This provid_es a common foundation of information for decision-makini regarding actions to disrupt terrorist plans • On a tactical level the analysis performed collectiv ly among partner · agencies and departments that reside in TTIC llows us to _be more agile We can for example use it to shape the -mitigation measures and security procedures that protect US citizens property and interests at home and · abroad · 39 of43 · 6 1 2007 12 44 PM C05411961 All this will ·be neither easy nor cheap We will need sophisticated distribution systems We will need substantial training and retraining then _more training We · -cannot place _this burden on state and local officials Large Sll Stained udget in fusi ns ill be required separate from o other resource needs An adversary is out th e who has a strategic targeting doctrine We know what the doctrine is We have to -stop thinking about this from a tacti_cal per pective of depending on discovering the day time and place of the next attack It is the wrong intellectual premise to trunk about it that way Rather we as a nati9n have to start thinking about how we take whafwe know about al-Qa'ida's doctrine and apply it in terms of real actions to protect ourselves and to close gaps in our ecu rity that will make it harder for tlw· terrorists to succeed · I must emphas_ize to the American people th t we are going to live with this for the foreseeable future It is not going· away We need to focus on our heartland and our homeland because people want to come hurt us It is not going to c hange · • The terrorists have _a tactical advantage Tp ey can pick anq choose any of countless targets as they please and attack them with misguided martyrs · · who do not care how many innocent people they kill or injure • Ironically the success we have had wrapping up al-Qa'ida leaders and disrupting its communications and finances increases the odds that local cells driven by their extremist hatred and cut off fro r p s_enior plannyrs may take independent· actions to kill Americans at any time · • We_ haye learned an important lesson that we cannot race from threat to threat disrupt it and then move on Targets at risk remain at risk We have gone on high alert several times for good reason only to haye attack occur I wish I could ay tJ ese were false alru ms - but they were not no • Total success against such threats is impossible Some attackers will get through to us despite our determined efforts and despite any conceivable defenses we mount We must des_ign systems that r uce both the chances of an attacker getting through and the impact if he or she does We must address both the threat and our vulnerability anq not allow ourselves to m ntally move ori while the enemy is still at large and intent on murder • 4 • There are no easy fixes We in the Intelligence Community will continue to look 40of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM I 'ti C05411961 incisively at how we carry out our missio11-S and will listen intently to suggestions about 1ow we can do our jobs better but we must also be honest with ourselves and with the American public abo the ·world in which we live - can The _National ·com inission help too We look forward to your recommendations · and guidance to not only the CIA but to all the entities that are engaged in this important fight The Joint Inquiry of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees in its Report last year made 19 recommendations to improve the nation's ability to combat t rrorism The Intelligence Community has taken action on all of them at are within our control A niong these are • The President signed National Security residential Directive 26 to create a dynamic process for articu lating and revie ing intelligence priorities DCI Directive 2 3 established a National Intelligence Priorities Framework as a m chanisin to transl te the 11-ational foreign intelligence· objectives d- priorities approved by _the National Security Council in o specific guidance and resource allocations for the Intelligence Community • In February 4-003 the rresident issued the National S tegy for Combating Terrorism incorporating strategic planning elements of national security homeland security combating weapons of mass destruction securing cyberspace and protecting criti al infrastructure • The position·ofNational Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats has been established and an officer and deputy are in place · • The· Terrorist Threat Integration Center was established in May 2003 to enable the full integration of terrorist threat-related information and alysis The Center is a joint venture composed of officers from five major partners CIA FBI Departmeµt of Homeland Security Department of Defense Department·of State as·well as from organizations ·such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commiss_ion Department of Energy and Capitol Police The Center reports directly to the DCI in his or her ·statutory capacity as head of the telligence Co unity _ •-The FBI is making considerable progress strengthening and improving its domestic capability in such fields·as counterintelligence counterterrorism and analysjs and reports The· Bureau has developed a strategic plan outlining 'its top counterterrorism priorities increased hiring and training and reassigned agents to high-priority programs and · expanded the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces to all 56 Field 41 of43 6 1 2007 12 4 PM 1 • • C05411961 -- ui'lv L1 u'J CLJ Offices and to 28 ·Resident Agencies • An interagency FISA Panel has een established to prioritize foreign intelligence collection pursuant to the Foreign Intellig nce Surveillance - Act when resources are not sufficient to permit timely processing of FISA requests • A plan to resolve SIGINT technical challenges provide quarterly reviews of products and funding and integrate collection and analytic capa f ilities ofNSA CIA andFBJ has been submitted to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees ' • Measures to enhance recfUitment and development of a C ounterterrorist workforce are ·undetWay These inclu_de· signing the Strategic Direction for · · _· Intelligence Community Language Activities directive to provide objectives for investment decisions in language training _launching a· five-year $15 million investment in new computer-delivered proficiency tests used by the Intelligence Community and making watchlist training mandatory for all Counterterrorist Center line officers • A DCI Directive was issued to address intellige ce information security in the context of providing expanded access to intelligence information outside the Intelligence Community - • The Information Sharing_Workip g_Group was established under the authority of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Manage111 ent and the Intelligence C01nmunity Deputies Committee to develop a comprehensive s ategy for sharing information among _int lligence and· law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism • Homeland_Security Presidential Directive 6 established the Terrorist -Screening Center to integrate all terrorist-related watchlist systems -• finally the CIA and the FBI ·as w ll as· other Intelligence Community agencies continue co ection ·and aJ alysis programs to try to determine the e teilt to which foreign governments are providing support to or are engaged in terrorist activity targeting the US -42 of43 6 1 2007 12 44 PM