29 Sept 78 j I l I SECRET UK EYES A ' i T SLcc· i EY -- A - R f ACl0 19 10 h I 1 DIS cs PAKISTAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTENTIONS THE OR G Y- E ' lfi INEG IN THE D P ' ' J Uf i Fl13ECTION3 4 OF THE PUL J _AECOBDSAe r ie58 Reference paragraph 6 of R J Alston's note to PH Moberly FCO Di52- wou1d 1 make the following comments · • - - -'- 1 We have no reason to modify our technical assessment of Pakistan's nuclear development capability• UC 2 The technical aasumptions on which we base our a-ssessment include the following a A 4-5 year period is required for completion from sanctioning given the availability of adequate workshop machinery and expertise About 2 years of which would be taken up by building and endurance testing a few ·hundred centrifuges b Separative work capacity Qf each centrifuge set at 1kg SW year c Assuming a d A supply of uranium hexafluoride of some 10 tonnes year will be plant of 10 000 centrifuges 50kg of highly enriched uranium could be produced per year needed for this plant s 3 In our view sanctioning of this project must have occurred by late 76 eru ly 77 s 4 Nev information indicating that in late 1977 Pakistan representatives were looking for me chine tool equipment costing about £250 000 This equipment c d be used for centrifuge manufacture S UK EYES A 5 This latter information suggests fhat the main cascades will be manufactured in Pakistan when workshops are suitably equipi ed possibly early 1979 and that an operational date for a cascade of 10 000 centrifuges may be 1983-84 In making this assessment we have taken an optimistic view of the technical competence of their craftsmen - s UK ETI A 6 7 8 The Pakistani•s have a pilot scale pl ant for uranium ore processing capable we assess of producing some 250kg of u10 concentrate per annum We are also aware of their plans to build a plant 8of some 20 tonnes yr capacity We have no further information on tha status of this proposal s A small plant for producing some 10 tonnes of uranium hexafluoride will be required we have no knowledge of plans for construction of such a facility or attempts to purchase uranium hexafluoride abroad This aspect is at present a significant gap in our information s Notwithstanding the later date of 1983-4 in paragraph 5 above it would seem unwise to assume that the Pakistani I s cannot acquire sufficient fissile material for a single device by 1981 at the earliest Our knowledge of their activities is still very sketchy and much remains ti unknown We would agree however that the probability of their acquiring n a weapons capability so soon is low S II R C HORSCROFT ADI DI52 cc DDSTI G E Clark Cabinet Office contd overleaf ·• I SECRE'l' UK F Y'F S_ A 29 sept 1978 · - • rl-1 IS A COPY THE ORIGINAL f-lAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE D RTI I r ut- JER SECTION 3 4 OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1968 I R Hervey PUSD FCO M Falconer J Nlf' FCO J Candlish s FCO -'- Sq L Gould ·n14 1'10D T Cooper I CAE2 DOT • J ' ' _ - - I P I Bailey Cabinet Office File Float ' f · · ' J' · '•' - ' · • - • ·- ' J · ' J • J I • ' · J - -· ' _r __ i -· • 1· • •• • • · - -· _ • ·· · ·- • I 1· J 1 ·_ _J _ · -- i·_ b L'• • __•• vi __· · o · - --- ' ·- - • ___ • 0 • • • • X _ _ - ---