TO Doug Feith FROM Donald Rumsfeld DECU IFIED IN FULL Autho ty £013526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date JUL 2 0 SUBJECT Strategy 2010 Here are some edits to the U S Strategy in Afghanistan · It is a pretty good paper Please take a look at the additions and changes Mark them in bold type do your own edit and then I want to send it to some folks Here is a draft memo to send it with to the Vice President with copies to Colin Powell Condi Rice and George Tenet Attached is a revision of the paper entitled U S Strategy in Afghanistan It seems to me that it is useful to upcl ate this from time to time Thanks t Attach 10 16 01 memo U S Strategy in Afghanistan DHll dh 103001-50 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Please respond by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ l I DECLASSIFIED IN FULL vS E C R El T Autbo -ity EO 13526 BS CLOSE I19bD Chief Records Declass Div WDRAFT FOR DISCUSSION frDU Glk N '- ''' ' I ' 3 JUL 2 O 2010 Date October 16 2001 7 43 AM SUBJECT U S Strategy in Afghanistan All elements of U S strategy must be integrated-military diplomatic covert humanitarian financial etc L U S Goals re Al-Oaida • Eliminate Al-Qaida leadership and forces • Deal with Al-Qaida in a manner that clearly signals the rest of the world that terrorists and terrorism will be puni J - of re • Collect intelligence for the worldwide campaign against terrorism 2 Goals re Taliban • Terminate the rule of the Taliban and their leadership • End the use of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorism • Do so in a manner that signals the world that harboring terrorism will be punished severeJ x A C W I 111- J _ r- f' k 1 w J • d j tt 6 Take steps to contribute to a more stable post-Taliban Afghimstan ' • J l 1 fl' Note The U S should be involved in the diplomatic effort but it is not witma U S power to assure a specific outcome U S preference for a specific outcome ought not paralyze U S efforts b oust Al-Qaida and the Taliban The U S should not commit to any post-taliban military involvement since the U S will be heavily eng ed in the anti- en Jorism effort JJ rJ worldwide Tl h _ l e N P J Ji lJS 3 Execu t10n • ct- t LJ -1' l fvtr bv · $ _1 _ v el IN IJlttfl- I frrr · J 1 I ' 1e- f-e Al-Qaida's and the Taliban's main assets are people They must be destroyed DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION €LOSE HOLD --8 E e-R E 1 09-M-2216 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 tMef Records Oeclass DIV WHS Data JUL 2 0 2010 • SFGBlif ·€LOSE WOLB DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION Use any and all Afghan tribes and factions to eliminate Al-Qaida and Taliban personnel and military capabilities fn 1i-DoD and CIA_ oordinate closely in getting all factions engaged in eliminating A -Qaida and Taliban by the use of incentives and disincentives-money food military equipment supplies air strikes etc • 4 ations · ft 1'Jrl -1 OSD 1 4 b· • Urgentl nsert amtittena-1 CIA teams and Special Forces in country operational n t s A teams by any means both in the North and the South country special forcesff arnpriatc U K _ liililiillAustralia New Zealand etc l 1 -e J fc Ill ca f If '4 • CIA and DoD teams on the ground are critical for success-U S influence targeting logistics and humanitarian efforts • Ground liaison teams should urge Afghan ground forces In the North in this order to - • Establish a land bridge to Uzbekistan by attacking and occupying land and major cities • Eliminate Al-Qaida Taliban and Arab forces to the north and northeast • Move toward Kabul and to the extent possible threate urround Kabul while making pronouncements about a shared government with other key elements • Sever Taliban lines of command northwest and northeast of Kabul uC UJ y In the South and West to Move against Al-Qaida and Taliban forces and strongholds throughout the country • U S military and coalition forces will 09-M-2216 AL oS t ' I - l - v- Q - n - _ L '• r l J e b SE nose HQbD '°'' J dti1 · J 9 - ni 'Ju Jt Jv AJ c J ·$t I • DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION Closely coordinate with forces on the ground to achieve the military p C I J- ' CINCENT will use all capabilities to encourag und forces to achieve U S goals 1 -- • Attack from the air enemy capabilities to facilitate success of Afghan forces on the ground • Pro de money u l j o ft DECLASSIFIED IN FUU Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date JUL 2 o 2010 r - • Establish secure air and land supply routes in the North and South so aid can be focused on opposition forces rather than in Taliban-occupied areas • Build humanitarian supply rout s and cente s J k 1Lt u k Off '' te flt 'rft lf -- 6 Kabul Providing additional conventional support to Northern Alliance forces north of Kabul the vicinity of Panshir and the Shomali plains may set conditions for Northern Alliance to eliminate Taliban resistance in Kabul and take the citY ·• • l l ha-l The USG should not agomze over post-Tahban arrang --ts to the point that it delays success over Al Qaida and the Taliban ' e sooner the Taliban is pushed out of Kabul Herat Mazar-e-Sharif and other key cities1 the better However without slowing down the Northern Alliance's advance the USG should begin discussing international arrangements for the administration of Kabul to relieve Pashtun fear of domination by Northern Alliance Tajik-Uzbek tribes Engaging U N diplomacy ee em 1 Jli 'bieyond intent and general outline could interfere with U Sltn ilitary operaitions and inhibit coalition freedorq of action Diplomacy can be ipost useful 1ft J J m I j J - 11 Oiti11 kt fno w-f '4 l tDRAFT Fo'R 01scuss 0N 2r' c l vr h y 11- r· vlJ ffe 3 e' f'tJi' rJu L rl 09-M-2216 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13528 ·chief Records Declass Div WHS Date JUL 2o 2mo iliSDliiif CLOSE HOLD DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION I bilaterally particularly with Pakistan but also with Iran and Russia to reinforce our messages to the Northern Alliance and to Southern Pashtuns see below 2 to enlist commitments from key allies and Muslim countries for a follow-on peacekeeping force for Kabul • An international group could be UN-based or an ad hoc collection of volunteer states such as Turkey -and Egypt along with other NATO allies but not the U SlThe U S will have a 'P• lll i P • deal of work to r '1-oi Y'r-l- do in the rest of the world z The South OSD 1 4 b It is critical that CIA and DoD speed up the process of establishing on-the-ground contacts in the South as well as the North Pakistan could be key in this regard particularly if the U S emphasizes to them that this is the key to balancing gains by the Northern Alliance The U S should explore the value of ties with King Zahir Shah He may have some influence with Pashtuns particularly if he is seen to have the confidence of the U S The U S should be wary of associating closely with the still hated Russians or the Iranians given Pashtun fear of domination by Iranian-backed Shia 8 Messase to Southern Tribes The message to Southern tribes should emphasize the importance of joining the U S if they wish to balance the Northern Alliance • The U S is prepared to give them the same support it is giving Northern groups if they will join with the US • U S actions in the North demonstrate that the U S is able and willing to · support its friends • The U S is committed to preserving Kabul as a capital for all Afghans not one dominated by the Northern Alliance 9 Message for the Northern Alliance • The U S goal is to help Afghans drive out the foreign terrorists defeat the Taliban and help Afghans regain contro1 over their land and people 4 DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION €LOSH Ht LB 91 1 J Riiaf 09-M-2216 DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date JUL 2 0 2010 t CRS C -€LOSE 1101 B DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION • The U S will provide support to accomplish those goals coordinated air strikes with ground movement ammunition supplies and food • Long-tenn the U S and its allies are prepared to provide economic support for reconstruction within an al1-Afghan political framework • It is crucial that their forces conduct themselves humanely and professionally toward the civilian population Atrocities will damage their cause U S support depends on their dealing severely with breaches of professional conduct • The U S must also ally with anti-Taliban forces in the South This means the future of Kabul should be decided by a political process and not by military action alone The U S expects them to declare as soon possible that their goal is not to establish dominion over the entire country but to get a political process started that will reflect the interests of all the Afghan peoples • The U S envisions some kind of international security arrangement for Kabul and the surrounding area in which a political process could take place The U S envisions a highly capable peacekeeping force drawn from allies in Europe the Muslim world and elsewhere to help to secure Kabul until stability is achieved • The U S will consult on its plans for moving on KabuJ It may be wise to encourage the Taliban to surrender the city without the Northern Alliance forces having to invest and occupy it by force possibly by surrounding the city and introducing a capable peacekeeping force TOimin The President has properly prepared the American public for a long campaign However it would be helpful to achieve some decisive results relatively early • An early defeat of Taliban Al Qaida will make it more difficult for them to conduct additional terrorist operations • Making an example of the Taliban increases U S leverage on other state supporters of terrorism 5 DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION €L05E HSLD --SSCRET- 09-M-2216 DECLASSIFIED IN FULL SECR E'F€1 0SE HQLD Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Dec lass Div WHS Date JUL 2 O 2010 DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION • There will undoubtedly be intense diplomatic activity once winter slows down military operations That diplomacy must operate against a background of U S success or it will inhibit U S actions • Success will build U S public confidence for action in other theaters • Success will maintain the support of key coalition members protracted fighting may achieve the opposite • However early successes may not be possible and expectations should be kept to realistic levels 6 09-M-2216