41 i A I ' · i · · - 1 IJ - 1· • l ·· ' ·' - J I i' ·· l f 1 - •' 0p-36C jm r MEMOfWIDU M From Op-3 SC Tos Op 36 Via Qp- 36B Subj Br i etiz rg giyen to representatives of all Services at SAC Headquarters Offutt Air Base Omaha on lS March 1954 Force On 15 March SAC gave a briefing understood to be the same one given to the new JCS lclst July to about 30 officers of all Services including several fronl _O lAV · The briefing• lasted from 0830 until about 1$00 It was giVt 'fl b'-j 1 Director of SAC Operations General LeMay COM3AC conducted a question-and-answer period for about· JO mi Ir es at the end MAJGED A J •· Old tt the 2 The briefing was· done in an excellerm and skill tu manner utilizL g many- c ha a s diagrams projector slides· etc The rapidity nth - 4ilich i t was take mre than highlight notes The gist 0£ · given ma de it- di f ticult to these follows using the same breakdown o f major topics as -was used by G8 1eral Old BACKGROUND ' 1 be first strategic air mission was conducted in August 1942 ¼nen a group of B-l7'·s sortied from u K to attack targets in France The· first B-29 strategic air mission occurred on the same day Gu a i 'tila S invaded and consi sted or 50 B-29 ts attacking Japan ro m bases L'rl Incia RES DI- t of WORLD· WAR II During 49 nx n '1 B o f world War II 22 000 bombers were lost in st rategie air attacks against Germny 10 000 U S and 12 000 RAF Sitd larly during a 14-n-JJnth period 485 B-29 1 s were lost in strategic air attacks against Japan 2 690 Jooo tons of bombs were used in attacking Ge1 m2 ny mereas only 160 000 torus were used against Japan The above data -were intended to indicate tJ1e great difference between -the sea la of strategic air war fare agair st Germany as compared with Japan in World War II Copy_£6_o f_k copies Page 1 ofJ _pages _ Genera L Old showed a chart listing the BRAV-0 RQMF1 and DEL TA· objectives and stated ·tha the JCS bad established these as ha nng· priority in that order · He stated al though SAC baa been »assigned only a certain mmber of_ targets by the JCS thcl r planning has gone well beyond thi mmt er A current- plan indicated on a chart as SAC-miiX eovers up to 1700 mz•s which includes 409 air fields Genera1 Old stated that· SAC is not much concerned over current o - r proapecti v-e JCS all ocationa o t weapons 11becausa WG· r nov -we will get the weapons wen the bell rings» or words to that effect- ' Ha stressed howev-er tha their pr i nJa r coneem isl' nwhere are these weapons which t h e y to be- atlocated 11 That is in what sit es a rs they located so tba t SAC can pl an his pick-tJp schedules accord tng 7 This aspect -o r SAC I s philosophy - Uldif r-erenee to JCS allocations was repeated later by General L-e Mq · OIDAJIZAllOI C11arts- f llpplld- bT qidckl y mu ch showed that 1' 1 e SAC consists 0£ 3 -•A±r Fo rcesn in the United Stat e11 as i'ollows Second Air Fore e bued ai - -Barksdale AFB Louisiana Eighth Air Force at Carswell PJ B Fort Wo-r - _· and Fifteenth Air· Foree at March AFB - Ri verside California SAC liaa - 5- - _ ·-· ·nepu-ty- e r s overseas dem gnated as· follow r- · X-Ray - Depu't 7 Co -nde r· Far Victor· Deputy- Comender llaska Yoke - Deputy Gommnder Ii'rDmh M roecoZebra - Deputy Commander U K Ob ut -- Deputy Colllnander Northeast Othe-r unita overseas were own howver I did not have ti me to talca arr T' notea on ·the$-e - SAC now consists o f' 5 Heav r bonber w ings 30 B-36-•s per nng 13 Medium comber wings all composed of 45 B-k7•s per wing except lrlng of B-29is h Wings of heavy strategic reeonnaissanc e B J6 is 2 Wi ngs of modi wa strategic reconnaissance· B-47 rs 1 Wings of aircraft refueling I l _ -- 14 5 Strategic fighter wings I tanker planes one 42 si1 1adrons · and a couple of more types I As o£ 1 5 March SAC comdsted 0£ 2131 combat plai es of 1-Jhich ·a35_ are bomber s 31 5 reconnaissance 540 ta kers t· 325- fighters - 50 strategic support 35 air- reseue and a ew others • Of the total of 2131 nlanes 2095 were eo mbat caoa bleu ·o C i ---l-1 a ' -• 1 0 r r ' · -·' i tr- 1 · _ -nL - r 1 - --FitrC t J A - 1 ' c s t' t1C3 - 1 ' _' - ' · ' There followed charts shot ling charact a-ristics oi different bowers L't Ollt - - ' s L ur c-d ft· • ii j ' 1ih ich I made_ the- follovillg notes The B-36 ca Tyi ng the MK-6 bas a range 0£ 8 000 miles going on a mssioa at 40 000 fi al tilude• or 8 800 miles at 30 000 ft The •J 1 canyillg th J- ro -6 proceeding Qn a mis d on at op imwa al titudejr which meam a steady climb to rel ease point has a range of 5 600 miJ 1lSi ng one- in•ilight re£uel i Ilg or 7 800 miles um ng 2 refue1 1Dga · The B·-52 lg- the MK-o- ·and proeeedi z g at optimm· al titu de - s-teaqr cl illb 1ll ll a range 0£ 7 800 lJlil ' with one in- flight re fueling and i ooo mi lea m th 2 s - · The first· 2 quadroQ is expected to become operational a1 ou t mid• 1956 mth a second squad%0n co ming in near the eni of that year • CR'EWS ' ' SAC now has 2 390 C '1$ Nady· tor duty A crew ranges fro-DL 1 · oi- 'the f'ightera up to the -lJu-g• number i-equ1red in the -heav r· bombers A breakc bvn of this 2 390_ tl gD re u1 0 I·- -1008 h90 bomber cren fighter 16- a i r · - 272 rec« nnai 6$UJCe 74 strategic auppon 30 air reseua A S't1 l'e - SOl'B tLme ago· of ·aoou-t 360 of the crews smwed that the av e age of the officers wa a 32 o r the airman• 28 Recently- the average age·ot the airmen ball dropped somewhat and also th percentage of those married General Old said tba t tllis· trend 1a0rriea thera because it shows that th iwre experieneed onea 'id th famili• are starting to get out of the- ml liUU7 service possibl 7 as a result o f the recerli los-sea- or n e bene itsn $ etc·• Certain bomber -c-rews which reach a high level o r proficiency are desig• natal as Salect11 crews Others o ' a slight cy' less pro-ficie y but better than the average are called nt ead• crew There are now 300 Select _and -Lead crew out o f the l 008 bomber ems Each o r theae crews is gi- ren a target folder containing· all the data available on one specific enem target and the r spend aJ 1 tbeu-tta studying and practicing on al1 aspects of ho-vr to attack that particnlar target General Olddd not- say but I presume that they also have an al tarna te target or too to study SAC usea- the apot pro-niotion practice liherall7 among meubers of the Select crew All SAC crews are gl ven periodie thorough pro£ici ene7 checks by e special hot-shot team at Forl Wo as 1· recall and if for- any reason a erev loses its special designation a Jl7 men bers or the erew m th spot promtions also revert to their Copy o f 6 copies Page 3 of LL pag i ·1 normal rank or rating There was quite a bit of elaboration on this c01 1peti-- tive reward system indicating that- SAC considers it an important factor tor at't ai ni ng high lllOrale and M gh profieiency In answer to a question General Old said that SAC consists -0 f arout 60% Reserv-e of£ieers · They have a rather high degree of permanency in their ered s i becall$e they keep pet SC nnel asselabied as- crews as long as practicable -· SAC ts trairrl ng program was discusaed at some· length a this point and a considered ver thorough Froia the- number of dif f'erent phases o training they undergo and dif' terent types of proficiency cheeks run on them it muld appear that tha r must npend ab -u b 3 4 of their time in the air The frequency of long range training flighta• c 2 - h 000 miles or more• was irrpressive J u s there are giite a number 30 or· hO I would gueas RBS Bombing Scoring unit3 Some- oi these are ·mobile This is an al ee troniri luh on the· gl'Ound in different- industrial areas of the U S which tr-aeks bombers on their practice bombing ra ns and is- abl e to measure the error o£ hypothetical drops in l elation to the roz l h- T t is pbaslt 0£ thatr trai ui ng is stressed and eon tinnal records a kept- on a1l oombing erews- Around t - Radar t One interea pbaae of the truini ng which each SAC- b erev f ' undergo co e ns their· su rrl val and escape capabilities in case they are shot down over· enemy -terri tO 'T-• Each CTel1' as a unit- is sen out to some renDW· a_ Y'8a in Nev and turned l oose in the td ldemees with unothing but a fev- fish hooks and a pocket kni e • These cr WS mu st roa ke their way back aa · appreci a bl - ·distance- ovet- rough terrain toterritory and at- the sane tbe evade SAC 11enemy'l personnel t to capture the•• G-eneral Old said that this is quite a st -enuous ordeal for a J o-t- of the ei ty lads and o£ten nseparates - • man from the bo 's In a few eases plane c were ttr l eleQved f' xom thal r commands- because vealed by thi s ·tmusaal test or their poor leadership qualities re- Bases SAC noW' has 3I operational and staging bases for 2005 aircraft in the U S and OYerseap in l9SO SAC had 18_ such base 1 for 850- aircraft The ulti mate pla l ia ti have one heavy bomber wing per operational base or two tmt w ir1gs I did not get the b down bet1i1--een opera ti or al and staging bases _ Later General Le Hay remarked that he will be happier M1en he has a few nnre bases • Comuni cations CAPABILITIES _ COnsi derabl a data on coJi at ranges were presented General Old remarked · ·tbaii the Air Foree ld ll be delighted when jet tankers are avaiJ able so tha t heavy bombers llill mt have to $low and come-doml to love altitudes to take· a dr i nk- · Tm as course cuts dotm their ova -rall range Jet ta nkere lfill be required ·to rei tel B-52 'a d JB to their- high epeed Their rat ge l1i ll b4' increased 1 000 mil es 'ffith oue re f'Deling or 2 500 miles with 2 refuelings when the tuel illg ia done ·at J l 000 Et Designs of jet tanker-Jr are being or developed · In•fl- igbil· - ol all plane types iS now a routine and eaey' operation• day or m ght SAC J30W'mates a vet k -up - 5 mnut-ea s-ome phee in th wrld• Wet b ook-upa are 9 $UCCessi'ul -Relttel iDg iS usually dona• at l 8 20 000 ft at 6oO gals per ·m1 xmte lbbill i General Old stressed that too perftirmenee of ·the B ij 7 is not limt ed ·· by_ the plane i taelf but b7-the crew• endurance Various s t s are gu- ing on to det Drl ne just how much the crews can atanl ru d al so how their- proficiency- in_poiribiIJg ga • etc _ all a off attar prolo 'lged operatd on · Smla studies are conducted for the crews of othe SAC t roes a o- r- a fev -· long range mass Lights o SAC planes • - cited· including the- tanK us -round t h l d fiigh't by the B-50- Luck r Lady _ which passed over Washi ngton ·-at- the height of the B• 36 cont rovers Later General LeMa y remrked tha SACcan go aiywhere in the world and ht t arq e t designated by tha- JCS 7_ Navigation· SAO bombea use th-e u1• system lihich apparmtl 7 is q te wnderfttl and reliable Geneml Old did no el aborate on just what this s-- 1st em is and I· hope to fiDd out Dtlre aoout it Apparantl7 it is ti ed in with the bombing equipment itself and actually releas-es t he tomb at the proper mo withou the touch of' human hands a l Old stated tha SAC can llbomb m thin 2%· of th distance r1 m blind I presume this mans by dead reckoning 'by t he tsharkey• system tt A question was asked as to hov the fighters navigate when the are not a c larger planes He said they use a very rapid system 0£ celestial navigation tor which pre-computed data is provided for each fllgh J Jomb i DS Accuraez General Old stated ·tba if' the target can be seen their bombi cg errors will be 800 • 100 ft less than if radar bombing has to be used 1he current CEP's for al1 bomber crews using simulated radar bombing rro m 25 000 £t vs industrial targets is aoont 1400 ft For visual bombing this drops to 600 f't Tes-ts were run on their Lead and Select crews only to see how ouch better they were than the average he measuremmts of 202 simulated drops from 25 000 ft gave an average CEP o r 13$ 0 ft or radar boni ing ld 3 52 ft for visual It is presumed that these tests were con lucted using the Rffi ground equipment previously nenttoned 1 '- · ___ - - - _• - ll '- ' 1 ' SAC-•s ttra d ar prediction techniqua 9 - was described at some length Thi$ consists or maJdng 0 plates11· using ol d i nt lligenee data on Russian targets Th-0se plates consist o r squue pieces of clear 1ucite abo ¼- thick n ·which J t ave been etched or built up with a met aJJic substance outlines and solid block-in area a or topographical taaturea- by teclmicians in such a manner that mien this pl a·te i 3 '1i•e- li8d in a spec ial tra ini ng device •it shaw$ up exactly as voul d the radar scope of a bomb er fiyi ng over· the actual target 7his· technique baa been developed to· a fine art 4rgely by using old data on u s citie8 to prepare such plates and then tjleekirg them w th pictilres or the radar scope o the actual cities today In other words lakes rivers etc never chang inda str 1 a t areas- do not nilVe bu l' Jt' maJl y jtJS t change size and shape slightly SA6 has prepared $11Ch plate$ for 90$ ot the· ua ss i gned Russian ta rgeta • a It was illllStrated how these p1ates can be used to est a • lish 110 ttset aiming poi nta 1' In thiS 3YStm some promi nellt point on th$ plate such aa a bend in a rivei or· other easily indentin able point within 10 111iles of the lllZtr is aeil ect¢ 3$ the actual poin on which the bombardier attempt a to drop th8 'b mb-·· the l ombing sys-tem takes into- aceo the distailce and bearing or the true· roz fro a the 01·rs et- aim point and - actually guides the plane in such a ner tba t the bomb is· dropped on ·the - rea1 target -- Recently SAC- ran a check on 150 bombi rg training miss ions in a • ' _ period to check their theoretical ettecti veness 109 lfaNl• scored as completely -_ suecess£al J 7 11ere scored as having dropped their simulated lxnabs succesa- ' - - £u1l7 but had some S ·rt ot abort- after bomb rel e ase 24 l 6%- had a iJe __ aborts- befo they' got to tke target all oi which -wre due to SOJne di f f'i• eulty· with trs •p system and none were caused by the fl yir g capabill·ti es· of t h-e plar ee the Sel ves · hes missions were al l long range- in nature -_ so11te as much as 4 600 mil es · · an Penetration •- into Russian territory In l'brld War II only 1 68% sive- action ot Ute to d er- l o88es were due to f l l 'lq de fen• On 11 July 1953 SAC conducted Operation filili'DID --which eo isted 0£ a · drill te test the Air De£ense Command During a eertam 48 Jiour period SAC I I l was a nppo sed to make simulated attacks· on various U- Sl cities in order to I _______i test AOO Shor-cJ y pr tor to the start of this 48-hour period SAG surrepU• tiousl - flew a large nutriber of hea vy bomberB out o£ the country- by flying them out in the· East over South Carolina and Geo and in the- West- by going out at J aw level over M meo £or whieh no previous diplomatic arrange moots bad been 38 de These planes t hen turned and made coortlL- ated strikes against najor- cities all u p and dovn both coaets an also inland cities inel udi ng AIC head qaarters in Co1orado The striking time was within a hal f- hour a£ter the start 0£ the 48-hour period Sl C states that Atc w-ascaught nat- f'ooted and that they- only scored or a killu be fore bomb rel ease and only 1 lfJdll l' after b nn b release By the soori g n- rstaa us-ed h interc tionstions of bombers by ADC fighters was considered eq ial to one nld lllf I _ _ - L Cf - SSJt if · fQ t t I • '- hi TOP SEGRE c l 'ij Copy o f 6 copies Page 6 ofJl_p ages In this ex ercise 33 bomber It woul d be interesting to hear the AOO side o£' i t t 1at-er on arother drill was appreciably- greater• sorties were used in the 'West and 66 in the East obtain an o f i ci al report of th is exercise and well This exercise got A DC so stirred up that held in linich the nu ral er of interceptions was f SAC's presentatio l on this poin intended to deioonstrat-e that it·u extremely dif ttenlt tr llftecti prevent pen ration o t coordinated heaVJ bomber attacka which mJ· the em7 warning screen troa many-· dL ions simul •taneoual 7 To per rorii e f ectiTe fighter intercept ions- depends on tbe ability o grt und radars to first- acquire the incoming ai ra t i hen -track them and then b7' radio -eolllllBlication to be able- to vector fighters to the interception pGil lta- - A of any part ot this complicated electronic syatea b tbe ver aaturation ot the radar seree o s the nae oX tteba f f and other ECll device -1fil1 reeu1t in 'Vi tuallT m interceptions Concerning the uae ot eha ft ve wre abovn SQme aerial photographs ot a target bomber belng tracked _ by the see· radar uacld llg 1ihich Wl ll control the HIKE- guided missile When the bomber threif-ou chaff the rada e··erossm ree got or r t he bomber · and tollowed the cbaf t - General Old stated tbatt this partieu lar shorteomi ng could be c o probably bat ii c ·- a indicative of the itmbil i t r o it radar$ · to semJe· relative mili t 7 values 0£ difteren b- targets · It is practir a 117 _ impoaai ble for a fighter· pil to take ott troa the deck go up toe JO t r' 4O -000 · rt - and fim an iIJcomng high speed bollber in darkness- ciill- by bimsel f' _ STllllE PLAIS - 11We have several hundred strike plans p • From ZI Basea The 8COPG· or a strategi c ai r attack on Rus-sia t'roa ZI bases wuld·be - · det emi lled prlnlar ily by the nmri er ot· tankers· available to accomplish in- rliglm re-fueling Cba rta were displ wbicb' showed the difieren-t depths of pene-tratl on tha'h could be· accomplished fro• various ZI bases using in-n igkh teheling From Intemedi ate ·Bases The scope oZ strategic bombing eftors i'rola such bases wuld al so be governed by the number of tanka - i available · Intermediate bases were- s h places- as Goose Bay Alaska• GuaJZ Limestone nm te He 7 Strike SAC could lay wn a barrage o f about 200 bombs on F ussia starting frma Fairchild AFB Washington •·· Walker AY 8 New 11exico Carswell AtrB Texas and Limestone il - B Maine These strikes wtµd be re t ucMby ta nkera on the way a Thule Eielson Alaska etc 1 • ··copy_ P t 6 copies Page 7 0£ if pages j If relueling tankers are deploy et overseas in advance SAC could lay- dom a barrage of_ a b n1t 4W rombs operating all bombers om ZI Ootilmm Pl an 5 SAe oonside-i a that the optimwa si tuation Wluld be to have- adeq Ja 'te tan ¼91'$ deployed to 0-verseaa bases and also t 'la the bombers wuld be simil arl7 de ployed prior to the major attack It ·was estinated that SAC could lay dovn · an at_tack ·under these conditions o t 6oo •· 750 bol bs- by approaching Russia fro• maey·_ dtrections -so· ·aa to bit their earl 7 1iJ'al 'lli rg· screen 3imul taneous1 r - - 1 t wul d reqtlire about 2 hours- f ro n t 'Wt ltPmerrt until all bOJli s· hid been dropped by using the bon b as-you-go system in -which both BRAVO and tar• gets liOul d be· hit as they reached the - This · the briefing ms s Idl L· fullj done by ·showing Sllecesaive charts· o r Europe based on u r time intervals SAO bombers first bit the Russian l y warning screen Mmy- hea 97 · lines 0-ne representing each wing were shown progressively converging on _ the heart o£ Russia lill th pretty sta -s to indicate the many conint di-opped_on mz•s The·· r1mi impression was tba t nrtaany all of· Russia wuld be nothing ___but a smoking• radiating l Uin a-t the end or 2 hours• Th mmi er of planes - invol ved in this attack 110uld be 5 X 30 1 B-J6ts plus J 3 X 45 - S S· li-47 s ror a gi-and tot al o f 735 bombers Aa I recall_ the SAC fighters-wou td- pla7 _ practicall7 t attack · - _ · ·CL - ·__ - --- or - - __ ·-- · General Old 8tated tbat the exae manner in which SAC will i'ight- the lfclr· · i S J - a % and t JtJllt iJ ll decide t_ is matter a t -·· -momeni depending on the ·ad sting eondi o ---- --- --- · - - - · · SURVIVAL -·parb of the b riefi ag ms a ef' ort to c L the- question -11 Hov well could SAC- survive a Pearl fl arbor tn e of attack • SAC presrur that- Russia bas the BBAY0 bllmting objective as top prio eity just as we have F Uarcharta were- sh01an to indicate the depth into the United States tha t -Soviet 1 ' planes- could penetrate on one-way missions from di f ferent· ittarting pointB Some 0£ these· OVtU'lapc the e Y1tire Uni ted States · In maki tt g attacks on the U S SAC es-ti mates that USSR would have to plan on the following operational factors a 10 • 3o ·aborua b 0 - 30% 1osses fro• d a 1000 • 10 000 rt • CEP'·a g h 25 • 75 0 - _ 36 r • ·- ___ u s de£en es S • 20% grosa en-ors• 5 15% duds c 30 • 100 KT bomb yiel ds • weapons al1oca'ted to their BRA VO objective hours alert time in the U S I _ - y __L_ttt_ r A 5- ----_-- ' _r-_ _- · · cj lt ' Y l-1 _ 1 rrr J --r - - - - · · - - - - - j 5 ·i d rt t I C II I I EC hi General Ol d then displayed a whole falltLly of charted data to show th estimated e ftects on SAG of various combinations o t the above items Ass ing conditions among the it ems above most favora bl e least favorable and ave a fT fa-vorable to the R u the fol l owi lg estinates were giveni ADaolnit of Oun Alert fime _in U S 2 hrs-o 6 hrs o SAC· l Jestroyed Most tavorahle 35j Leu f Averagel - fa'wrabla · 2 15$ 2 16 l l 0 3j 3 Jte · All o thht points- tm tl'a the t ot a l time is tb9 ws f'aetor· aa far aa SAC- is concerned - It is bel Mwed that these aurv r pl data are based -·Rand atudie•• __ flmal teBly· 1-8 pulled - _--aurprJ se-exqicisea a '9ari oUS oft timess such as _l ate Satllrtiq a f t iD which the idea·waa·-•to- see-bov-·q iiekly_aJ i SAC pl mea -can get in the· air· and go to certa iD orbit pointa- or to other· · fields Some o f tbeee dr illJI- done--und one ot ho- assunptiomJ_ · eitber the planes- shonld take o t f'oll J'··_nanned ·and equippeu and ready ·to go · on '° nds -1 or •impl y take ot t with skeleton crewa as soon as possible to get away _f Olll the tbrea _hone t Lelda - Thi#• con 1uded the bnet 1llg by General 01 deQUESTIOJl AID A1iSl-D P mIOD COIDUCTED BY GEnEHAL LE MAY Some - - the inteestillg queations asked General LeMa7·includ Q • ·'What period 8 sr ort - - o- tble_ do cu consider we s i ould plan Dr to £Asked by· a Sav- Captain fight a - A About 30 da a• - SAC baa been compiling c o n data on critica1 parts required to keep the planes operational These p are k ept rrnyi Dg kit a-•• one for eaeh plane which are taken with the plane wen it departa ror a mi Bai on I consider these eri Mca1 parts so important that I never allowed thma m be taken out of flying kits £or local use Necessary parts have to be gotten f r0111 somewhere else other than the· flying kits or else the plane sta a on the ground until the part is obtained Not et It is tmderstDod that- Generak Le hail- in the past indicated a 60-day period hter· dropped to hS days-_ and still later to 30 daYlJ This ·question was appai-ently an effort to see it he had reached any lower-· esti• mate by nmr It seemed _apparent fn a General LeMay'a aIJSWer that he is fiml 7 conviDCed tha 0 dayS iS long enough to conclude World 'War III • Q Ia SAC prepared to conduct strategic air warfare in ease the use atomic weapons is outl ae l Asked by a Navy Captain are or A You ttsail w boya• always asking this foolish question - or trords __to that e£teet It ia ineonoeivabl e to me that this situation w J l ever ari_se - c _ #- -- - t _ fi 4 - r_ -t r 4 --- 1-wP 1 11 - ' ' ·•i 1 --- Nw ' _ 'f-6J r-_ Sr re · l _ -11 _ 1 '-- -_1_ - l t t ' ' · - -- - · - ' ' ' i li _ ' i _ t 1_ lj· ·0 n l_ _- l i LJ_ _ l 'j ·' Pi '± JPis 0Jl lt i l d U J ·--- · · •·· 1 Row do SAC 1s plans fit in with the stated p a·tional policy that th• will never strike the firs bl aw Q TI r··- s A I l t av heard this thought stated many times and it sounds very fine However it is not in keepi ng ldth Um ted States hi story Just look baclc and 1 note who star ed le Rtwol utionary War tbe War of 1 612 th Indian Wars an J the Spanish ean I want to mke it cl e that I am not advocating _ a preventive war ho'N8Vft I believ• th at if the U S • is pushed in the c o 1_ far enough we raould not hesitate to- atrike first or words- to this ettect _ I Could you a few li'O da as in Indo Cbina ' Q to your th oughts on hov to tight a ·war A I could t a l k 2 or 3 veeka on this • In tact I wouldn't tight a war in Indo Cn i Jla beca us e this a a squabble that could be aet tled by political action Thi$ ' 118 Y necessitate off'er i ng · e - to tms-e pa ple ti 1 tima t J y Q What wul d you adilocate in cas hostili ti-es are renewed in Korea - - -· A There are no- suitable strategic air· targets in Korea RoweTer t wuld drop a tew bolltbf t in proper place J in Chin Manchnri a- and Southeastern Russia • In those ffpokelr games• such as Korea and Inda-China _ we H » I presullie have ll8V8l raised the ante -w have alwaYlJ just called tn et - -·· 1ia ought - -ra i'siDg sometine ' ' · Q- · We have heard a lot of op t d mi stic statements today about SAC-1-s capa• bilities - Do you have 3 11 3' reservations about these capabilities Aske by a Navy Captain ' ' ADDITIONAL INmF FSTim STATEMENTS MADE· BY GmERAL LE Y SAC 1 s mission is to conduct strategic air· war tare against the targets 2f assi gned by the JCS •• I hope that _so meida7 all t be atomie weapon targeta in the Soviet CC jp1c will be listed in a complete order of prior it r and that sotBeOne- will b designated to P bombs- on every one of them keyon mo ha a th capability to do this should bf ' eomidered including the RBeaver Patrol i£ they ha ability We have a boss just like all other con nandel -$ am our bo$$ nJ tU e- the JCS This is- not alllays clearly- understood even by niel iba rs 0£ the Jc 5 themsel ves Recsntl 7 when I wa in iasbington one of th JCS expr- ssed apprehension to me tha t I mn ld go oft on 'Irf3' own dropping bombs 'Wherever I please He did not even raalize that I wO k for him of o t I t a1r7 you have arr · d ubta about any parts our program which be deraonstrated we will - glad to take you out an i show you • - e an SAC•s ul t imate goal is to develop a true inter continental bombing capa bili'f Y so that- overseas bases and support i be unnecessary• -1 Il SAC iajf in ellec a sort of •elite corps• cbmnated by a forcetul and dedicated· com mder who has compl ete- eonf i dence in SAC'• abili tr to crush Russia quick17 by a asi ve atomic bombing attacks Ifo aspect of the aoraJ a or long rang• ect or· such attacks- were diacua1 ed and no questions on it were asked planned SAC haa a tl'm'ough ·and i l l g pl Ogrant - and lll c ing it out A-ccordl ngl 7 SAC is probabl 7 in a higherj $tate of' co rabai ream ness todq· · 1-lan arrr _ot - u s military eomnand - ' - -·SAC now- istrike p -- - - i heavil 7 on maeh flight retueling to- carr out ht$' - SAC 1$ eont1d -rtr 'that- when- _t he bell the ' will get the· lion's of the-- stockpile J10· ·matter what tbe Jes •a1iocaUona11 are a-t the nvmant c SAC - gt _ tile--illpressa on a s u c h - that they co -id - thtel989lves a •il vm'7' aervice- to-_ attack whate ver'target I the JCS_ -tall ' i t he 11 to a-Ltack _ ·and 'm etteet do not gi e strateg ic air targe- '°·c d irec ll7 or - - - - -- -- -• -· - - w Bw MOOR · CA 11511 •---· - 1 --