DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGTON 25 D C IJ o IN PIKJl'LY Nl P'a' ft TO Op93R ac Ser 0008P93 TOP SECRET MEMORAIDUM FOO 'i'HE DISTRIBUTION' LIST Subj Adaptation of the National Hi li tary Posture to the era of Nuclear Parity a suggested Navy Position Hef a b c Op06 Top Secret Memo Op93 Top Secret Memo Top Secret Mam 1_ ' Subject draft Encl 1 Op93 Op06Bl nw BM00043-57 of l May 1957 Op93 cUm Ser 0005P93 of 2 Jul 195'7 Op93 ejs Ser 0007P93 of 30 Oct 1957 Background Reference a submitted 9 ropos als for development of a ttnew concept for atomic oparatiaru n to serve as a basis for resolving the conflict between the agreed priority of a deterrent retaliatory capability and the urgent requirement to increase the capal d lity to deal with peripheral wa ra The Minimal Targ -et Study of Op36-0p922V was proposed as the basis for such a revision and Op93 was nood nated as II action gt'oup 11 with the support of an ad hoc comzrrl ttee from various offices in cm In reference b Op93 proposed a modus operandi and noted that based on the new developments in the situation and basic requirements for national securi ty0 0 a g'Sneral set of principles can be developed From the principles adopted it should then be possible to set forth alternative mill tary mea11s for implem9ntation along with some consider• ations re arding how the effectiveness of the alternative systems might be measured • Discussion 20 Pd'ter considerable preliminary discussion and study of current JCS soli ts it beca lle favident that the 11 min 1 mal tari et concept while a valuable contribution failed to attack the essential issues involved It hio s eradually become evident as oerhaps it should have from the start that the basic disagreement is over objectives at that echelon where national security is defined rather than over m Uitary means once specific tasks are assi sned Thie is not to s a y that indictment of SAC 1 s plans and ctemands on speci fic military points is not justified but that it is some - rhat aside from the main point It seerr s evident that since deterrence of eneral war m_d maintenance of u s security and values are the basic ob jt ctives oreparednass to fight and win a g-eneral war mu st subordinate _ ___ -· I 1 ' ·_• t _ _ ' t I · I l • L_ _E_cL_A_ss_·_1_FI_E__n_1_A_w_ _E_ o _ 12_9s_s_ _ o_P_N_A_ t'l_N_s_·T_s_s_1J_ 1_ _ _s E __ RIE_s_ _ __Jt ·I ubj t t i on of he t o al li tary Poetur arity-· a su gested avy osi t· n I ca J to the a f ar C T cu ssion S C c not get to R si a before the Soviet S C 1 clEs ike o s · s ile · stallations IC s 1n the C55R we the vaot f seer cy which vee them the a ability 'to launch their attack before being so ght out end destroyed by- a revent i u s attack however mas ve d • edi t • Retaliatio capahi lity 1 t e olicy task 1-arge J assiwed to S AC eters general ar by vi rt e its punitive or destructive 1 act Discussi on e r ventive tesk-- that 0£ oreatallin ttac --while esirable capabilit is of second im ortence comoar ed with the a soluteJ y basic r m t of ensuring OSSR rec tion of our c p r ibil ·ty to tali- at • po s sufficient t o inflict ajar • eat ly enc ouraged S IDRET Enclosure 1 I ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNA ST 5513 1 SECRET Subj Adaptation of the National Mill tary Posture to the era of fuclear Parity a suggested Navy Position • High rates of delivery are less desirable solutions to the defense against surprise attack than are low rates of potential attrition in the face of attack Discussion Constraint and deliberation can decrease the magnitude of the economic and social disaster of ieneral war permit high assurances to be attained throug reattack rather than overkilling and afford a prospect of salvaging at least some national political objectives SAC or ICBM in known bases must oreplan the bulk of its attack wl th large safety factors in the light of purely hypothetical and pessimistic military and political situations A mobile system capable of safely withholding attack can afford to accept constraints and to apply its force with sensitive regard for the particular situation foreover i f an enemy- does choose to counter such a system he is constrained to major search and detection efforts rather than the extravagent nuclear weapon expenditures that are called for against hardened fixed sites • Evolution on both sides of attack systems that are invulnerable to surprise and disbanding the vulnerable systems is desirable and can lead to a stable stalemate of mutual deterrences Discussion Such a development no longer places a premium on striking the first blow There is no longer an urg either to forestall the enemyattack or to 1 9t one's mm attack off before being forestalled Fear of disaster will deter deliberate suicidal action and assurance that quick reaction is unnecessary will permit deliberation Only under such conditions can a 9urposeful poll tic al economic and mili ta 'J strategy survive occasional periods of international tension • mutual deterrencerr the u s and its allies can no longer rely on the threat of retaliation to deter perioheral conflicts and must greatly reinforce their weakened conventional capabilities Under conditions of 11 Discussion Nuclear parity and successful ICBM develooments will comprise for the USSR a counter-deterrent to U0 S preventive war that will probably in the near future encourage increased aggressiveness on cold-war and limi ted- ·rnr fronts• IT o 1 REC0 11·IENDA'IT ClS SAC a SAC mu st be constrained to reorient its planning and requirements in f nror of maximu rn security against surprise attack in the interim 2 32GRET SECPJ Subj Adaptation of the National ii litary Posture to the era of Nuclear Parity a su gested vy Position -------------------------------- before secure systems can te substituted for it To the extent feasible this sho' lld be accomplished by ad-hoc methods sacrificing whatever weightof-attack capability is necessary lb quantitative level of attack capability should be specified assured delivery of 1 10 or 100 of present capability would be better than the present insecure posture 'rhe priority task should be to maximize using available resources the nrl ni m um weight of attack that could be launched under any conceivable USSR attack b Planning that depends for its success as does SAC' s concept u s should be prohibited except that con tingency planning for use of maximum available forces in case of LSSR f ai 1' lI'e to make good its blunting capabili-ties should te conducted upon prior initiation by the c To achieve the above noted maximum weight of attack mider the worst circumstances maximum expected overall damage rather than high assurro ice8 of damage of vl3rlous de Tees of severity must be given due wei f ht in ·weapon allocations Under the worst assumptions population may become the only sufficiently vulnerable target system for a seriously outclassed SAC or a secure attack system in its early-build-up phases d As a general guide to prenlanning for contingencies that permit more than a minimal popul3tion attack it is noted that destruction of urban populati o 1s much beyond 30% casualties is mill tarily wasteful• Once this level of casualties is expected in cities or areas designated by the polj tical authorities possible objective any combination containing 2 3 of the urban nopulation weapons should be allocatr- d to major mill tary and indUl3ttial targets i'ith due consideration being given to the civilian casualties imposed and the consequent freeing of even more weapo S from the urely retaliatory mission e It is noted that blunting is t nus deliberately given a low priority when forces are severly limi tad even though if blunting were to ta feasible priorities n time obviously wOlUd ce imoortant The suitability of this distinction follows from the fact that blnnting will be feasible only uhen aade so by the same sort of unforeseeable Soviet l lunder that would permit adequate u s forces to stn-vive i' It is emphasized that invulner 1bility to surprise not necessarily to attrition is the essential feature of the deterrent vesture It is acce0ted that manned bombers l ack ing surprise must m8xim i ze nu ' lbers in order to saturate defenses• I'his nust Je s cce1Jt d 1s a i 'iYidication of t he ultim ate 'msui t h Hi ty of manr1ed bombers as a deterrent force aot JS 2 justi 'icat lcm for D 'oc1ll i ng many more of them EC LASSl ED IA W E O 12958 OPNA 1 NST 5513 16 SERIES Subj osture t tati n p e era of ole ----- ------ --------- -------------nts in eterrent f orces Fu ure devel mants · and IC s uJ d emohasize t _ ort ce o_ sec i -ty a gainst s tise ttack J tajor installations ev n hardened ones ouJ e avo · ded as ciilly uring earl y intr uctory stages sine t se i nvite JM si oounterattac Unless mobile 1 ohers are veloped early increments of missiles must be · tailed with secrecy t e • aramount consideration d li ty of a miss e to fire t n a 11 ar · t me is not ad u te security as t is far AC ''stri alerts d _avy car er- b ince to t er ·asi n t n the b · s of purely cision ocess subject o s uld be unacceptable • I I I b c Sub ack J toe ilea · ' a will be re t ---- 0 ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 QJ'NA TJNST 551 16 SERJRS ---------' $ SECRET Sc _bj Adap t ation of the iational ia litary Posture to the era of rJuclear Parity a sucgested favy Position ---------------------- -----------the early ef ccti·roness of small numbers of missiles It is anticipated however that as soon as these rn i ssiles are available in numbers and as accuracy iID9roves the specified yield may readily be sacrificed for economy or wei ht or in order to enhance the versatility of the weapons i e apDlication to limited war situations as accuracy increases 4 Conventional forces The principal opportunities for conventional warfare will be those which develop from comolicated olitical situations in wh Lch subversion and - rovocation of small nations lead to armed intervention n various -oretexts I'he ability to cope with the military re p ri rements of such si tuatio depends lar 6-ely on the mobility of forces of adequate strength to deal decisi v-oly with armed forces and swiftly enough that consolidatton of puppet political regimes that can successfully claim sovereii -nty cannot develop In addition to greatest feasible support of competent allied ca9abilities specialized ound forces of high caliber air and sea and surface transport of great v-ersatili ty improved aircraft carriers weapons of great discrimination arrl localized effectiveness and command communications appropriate to application of force with utmost constraint 131 d control are required Expansion and r-esearch to support airborne and merchanized Army and Marine units the vertical envelopment conce t and air close support weapons and control precedures are required There is no fixed linrl t to the force levels desired incrensed forces will simply increase the assurance and scale with which u s policy can be imolemented It is the forces that are inadequate that an enem y will choose to challenge 5 I·iili tary contribution to Polj_ tic al and Econorrri c l olicy in a nucleHr stalemate Military support to the abov-a tasks is largely to furnish a position of strength from which they C3ll be confidently nursued Present - eaknesses in the conventional military poature deny freedom of 2ction in these fiel ls • Hun'IaI 'T wes defaulted primarily for lack of di visions in Europe Korea and Indochina would have had much more satisfactory outcomes had we enjoyed several times the available ready and mobile forces capable of arriving at the scene with a fraction of the lead times illustrated by these campaigns 6 Active and passive defense Defense by means other than preVBntive war contributes to the deterrent mission primarily by its effect upon the nor ale of both aggressor and deiender 4 A W8i Jit of attack quite 1dequate to be labeled disastrous can be delivered through any conceivable defenseo Defense however as dis tinguishad from a preventive concept can be implement c d to arry desired scale I lECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 JPNA i'INST 5S13 16 SERft S fr SECRET Subj Adaptation of the I-htional filitary Posture to the era of lhclear Parity a suegeated Navy Position ------------------------------------without the element of pro'location to surprise attack that is _orasent in an aggressi va attitude Defensive measures can and do create doubts in the minds of planners contemplating attack who must plan conservativ ly and thus credit the defenses with more optimi stic capabilities than the defender can afford to plan for The fact that defenses appear more powerful to the aggressor than the defender contributes to the deterrent situation by generally discouraging action rather than nrovoki ng it However the infeasibility of a complete defense makes it meaningless to state specific requirement for the effort allocated Expenditures should be limited by the degree with which defense competes for budget support with other important elements of the national posture ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OfNA'1'1NST 5513 16 SERlE ' Jc vlCJCJl