l'OIUI 't ' I TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMDER ' ' 1 '- -' DEPARTN '6 iof STATE 594 I S P- 2 -3A iQP SEEREi COVER SHEET J I· r · 1 · 4 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT S Origin subject efaena no or 2 COPY INFORMATION oi a pmin nl data 1 D ib - Memo to Secy fr s P-GCSmith re Review or strategic Concept w att ' • tr ab A - NSC 5810 1 Tab B - let to I 1-i Secv McElrov Tab C - Ip Paoer ACTION COPY •' INFORMATION COPY I ·r· I Sf FO WAIIDED _ - _ o u I ' - TELEGRAMS DESPATCHES ET COPY NO t s CTo GQQQIDl O I a OFFICE SYMBOL SIGNATURES DATE RECEIVED PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT p E G Mathews p SIP· Chron In 1 - l t COPIES A' Van Hise I 1 c-- I I ID -1 S«rd Conm I Of kc I DATE READ ·- r -- •••r - -• '-· or r 0 ITT ' _ •··••· • ef'p · n rrr nccol-rl - _ h EO 12355 or lHOR t • I 10 OF 3 DATE AND NAME Of PERSON PREPARING FORM J J c ' I In oart and e l u ' cc 1 3 l ii - Ji« -'l-1 'Vilhdraw I ·10 •··r• - 1 - 1 11 • f -' DATE RELEASED - · ' l•J '•i' r -- --vvr r O'f I -t f · • - I - I n'll f k ASSIFIED l O 11 053 tiu v v fl By 'II µ · • i 5 10 -lo ' J I •Ill II · I • ·' - - · INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF DS-747 1 Access to this document shall be limited to those persons requiring the information in the performance of their duties ·· 0 2 Handling storage r production destruction and accountability for this document must comply with specific procedures set forth in security regulations 3 The white copy of this form is a record of persons who have read or had disclosed to them any part of the document identified in Item 2 4 Each person who receives this Top Secret document or reads any part of it shall sign his name and give other information requested in the appropriate space Items ti 7 8 9 10 11 5 When document is destroyed or transmitted outside the Department or the Foreign Service the white cox y of Form DS-747 is removed and placed in the canceled accountability file of the last responsible Top Secret Control Officer 6 Procedure for filing Form DS-747 a Blue copy retained by Top Secret Control Officer of area preparing Top Secret Cover Sheet in his canceled accountability file b Pink or yellow copy filed by Top Secret Control Officer receiving document in his accountability control file When document is released to jurisdiction of another Top Secret Control Officer corresponding pink or yellow copy is transferred to canceled accountability file COMPLETE INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING Tms FORM ARE FOUND IN SECTION 194 4 MANUAL OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES AND IN'SECTION 944 VOLUME 1 PART II OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE MANUAL t _ _ '11l 'cl- OJ- L - t c1____ M1 rs __ O 11u t· co•ic· ci _ • r f i - oi __ 0 Cupic Series ' '11 • 0 j • P 1 I- J _1 2 - lr M 1-k t 7' 11 c- J' 3- S'j J- d¼ r ' c cr 1 - li jj t • January ' lP 195 r fi' - 6- 7lt«Af J TO S - The Secretory THROUGH s s 1 ' ' t L U _ _ -- - ' - -F-# J - iv i-l I f s Ji ·iS -vl · 1 q f- 1 5 I G - Mr Murphy J - h _g l 9C - -1- PROM SI P - Gerard C Smith SUBJECT Review of strategic Concept I o- k -0- 4 -------Q 7 1 - i 2 Cc r q 7 v- uq -t u f' tCLt f In your letter of July 23 1958 to the President you said you had told Secretary McElroy that you re s 'L rnained of the opinion that the military doctrine set forth in parae raphs 13 and 14 of the Basic National · · Security Policy paper Tab A 1s rapidly outgrowing its v 17Js j ucefulness and that we need to apply ourselves urgently to finding an alternative strategic concept You stated also that we should aeek the President's approval of further atudy of an alternative doctrine by a small - - State-Defense group You will recall that the President later gave his approval for this study 1 -P When I ap roached Defense on this subject in early r 1 t V August they requested that the study be deferred un til 1f' _ the FY 1960 budget was behind them the matter lie dormant I accordingly let j 1 1' r fi O ' -✓ e ·' The budget process 16 now drawing to a close and we should press ahead without further delay My talks V n' f· • witb• General Picher Director of the Joint Staff of the Ir- Jes· and others 1n the Pentagon have convinced me that lli'' fl • we must take the initiative as Defense and the Chiefs r ' seem to be paralyzed by inter-service differences · s P has accordingly ventured to draft A Concept of Military Strategy for the 196os 11 Tab C to serve as a basis of discussion with the Pentagon This concept which I believe reflects views that you have expressed in several conversations with Secretary t lcElroy differs from the current strategic concept in the following major respects US 1 We JPOP SEC1tE'l'- 'l'OP SEGRE ' -2- 1 We abandon the major premise of the current concept -- 1 e the threat or massive nuclear retaliation 1s the primary deterrent to allk1nds of Communiat aggression A corollary current premise lei that general war forces are also limited war forces Our premise is that the massive retaliation threat of our general war capability effectively deters only major communist aggression To prevent limited Commwiist aggreea1on a separate deterrent strategy and force apeeifically designed for this purpose is required 2 We also abandon a major thesis of the current concept -- 1 e any substantial overt ens ment of us and USSR armed forces or any BUbatant1al Soviet aggression against the NATO area would automatically trigger ma salve nuclear retaliation against the USSR As you have pointed out this thesis is becoming lees and less credible Although not apeoif'ically stated 1n our paper we assume the probability or a leaser us response to soviet aggression which does not clearly threaten a permanent alteration or the world balance or power againat us 3 We queetion the current counter-force strator our strategic nuclear etr1k1ng force 1a to destroy military targets especially nuclear strike eapab1Ut1es 1n the Col llllluniet empire We believe that th1s strategy will become 1nc as1ngly infeasible 1n the dawning era of qu1ok-reaot1ng and elusive miaslle weapone systems Moreover the destruction or many military targetB would require ground bursts of very large yield weapons with resultant heavy fall-out tho effects or which 1n add1t1on to causing millions or unneceeeary oasualt1eu 1n the Communist emp1r would extend around the worlq Finally the cost ot matching the Communlats missile €or m1ae1le an inherent neceasity of the counter-force strategy would 1n a very rew years require defense budgets substantially larger than the much debated FY 1960 budget You will reoe 11 that the Preeident has on a number of occasions expressed concern that we seem to be 11 over-ineur ng by accumulating too many atrategio weapons systems Our paper therefore 1ncl1nea toward an alternative atrategy which has many adherents in the Pentagon or etr1lc1ng a finite number of control centers and power bases of the Communist empire Although the prime targets of th ta strategy are popula t1on centers the fall-out effects and the number of caoualtiea would be far less than under a counter-force atrategy as we believe that air bursts of many fewer weapons of much lower yield would suffice to accomplish the mission 4 · Because egy which provides that the _primary mie211on P-SECRE'l' -34 Because we incline to a smaller atrateg1c atr1k1ng force we plaoa muo greater emphaaic than the present concept on the invulnerability or the force 5 We question a major assumption of the current concept -- 1 e nuclear weapona will be UBed 1n most lim1ted war eituationa The fact 1s that whenever the issue has ariaen in the past decade we have consistently arawn back from ueing nuclear weapons in limited war s1tua t1ons we bellove that we would rarely find it pollt1oally practicable or militarily desirable to UBe nuclear weapona and accordingly propoi e that our limited war force be able to fight effectively without these weapons Since the queotion or cost is now very much to the fore it 1a pertinent to mention my belief that 1t is reasonable to assume that the eavinga resulting from a shift to a 6maller strategic nuclear etriking force would offset the increased coBtB of an effective limited war for-ce As you indioated to tho Preeident that the review of the strategic oonoept would be held very closely I have sought clearance of th1a memorandum from G and Conly Recommendation It 1s recommended that you sign the attached letter Tab B to Secretary McElroy transmitting the·8 P paper as a basis for state-Defena e d tscuse1on Attachments Tab A Letter to secretary McElroy Tab B S P Draft Paper Tab C NSC '5810 J Approved i' _ f J - 1- D1eapproved _ _ _ __ Concurrenc · C S P EOMathewe AVH In o'I'der to provide a point or depat tlll'i ror stud of the stl'ategic eoncept the Policy P1e nning Starr cf this Depart t or us he a prepared the enclosed r entitled A con- i-1 111taey strat0 ti rr th 1960s ThiO 1P a nts rr pa per put forward as basis tor d1eoaos1on I am cept rcaerving Jlldgment on th1u pepet cw s1cn lllySC lt pend1 l'lg Buch 61s-- Ae I have prov1ously told 10U I do not have 1n mind that we should make any abrupt obange in our- strategic concept I em bWever convinced that U IN aro to malw • 1n _t Jwi next tw yea rtJ • we l USt nO'tl Cetemirle the d1l'eot1on in lfh1cb w wish to go tmd begin to tb lfQ' tor the change A11 18t ant sc or0tn cy Gernro c Srdtb stands re--ady to meet nth your people to disewm the en llosed paper or any oth r related propoce la t tat your I»pe rtment wish to edv ' 1ce I hopo that we sllAU be 1n a position to Nport prcgress to the Prcs1dent mtbin the ne t few C'lC l' h John Footer Culles Enclonuro s P Paper datod Januelcy 5 1959 Tho Honorable Meil H cr lroy crctncy or Dofenzc S P EGMathews AVH January 22 1959 January 5 1959 ' A Concept of US Military Strategy for the 1960s '1 I Objectives 1 The objectives of us military atrategy should be Primary to deter Communist imperialism from resort to force and it occurs Secondary to deal with Communiet aggression 1 f We also need to prevent and halt resort to force within the non-Connnuniat world We ehall be m111ta ·1ly prepared to act to this end if we have an effective strategy and capability to deal w th limited Communist aggression II A Deterr P s Cotmnuniat Aggression General war 2 We must deter soviet nuclear attack on the US end other major Communist aggression wh1oh would threaten a permanent alteration of the world balance of power against us Although we must have active and passive defensive capabilities to reduce the disastrous erreota o a Soviet nuclear attack and should undertake preparatory measures to facilitate national recovery after attack the primary component of our general war deterrent ie our strategic nuclear otriking force 3 If our deterrent 1s to be effective the Commu- niets must be c nv1r ced that retaliation will be inevitable Thia re uiree that our strategic striking force 'be rela- tively invulnero ble Aa the r cm will know the location of most fixed installations r bases missile oites etc 1n the non-Communist world mobility and elusiyeness are among the qualities we ehould emphasize 1n the further develop ent or our striking force 4 A relatively invulnerable US strategic striking force would make impracticnble a pre-emptive Soviet nuclear attack to disarm us It would also reduce the risk of war by TOP SECRET by misadventure as we would not have to renct instantaneously to an ambiguous threat of major Communist aggreao1on we would have time to ver11'y·the threatJ we might also have time for maneuver 5 The Communists must also ba convinced that our strategic striking roroe could inflict a acale or daroagA that would be fatal to tho structure or their empire It may not be neoeseary that we be able to destroy most Communist military targets with the side effect of killing most of the Communiat peoples _lt may be euff1c1ent to have a known capability to deetroy•the_imper1al cont-rol centers and power bases A capability eo designed would be more acceptable to our al Uea and the uncommitted peoples than a oounter-rorce capability with its attendant danger or severe fall-out effeota extending around the world B Overt Limited Aggression 6 We must deter a wide range cf possible overt limited aggressions by Communist illlpel ialism This kind of Commun1et aggreeeion can best be deterred by further development of our present strategy of fOl Ward defense 7 We ahould continue t encourage state8 on the periphery of the Communist•empire to maintain armed roroea cownen5urate with their econ om1o oapac1ty Where the threat ia great and the will to reeiat strong but the indigenous economy weak we should aa we have in the past provide appropriate assistance upon request to enable the endangered otate to maintain forcee at least capable of haraaoing and delaying a ColDlllun1st invaaion I ' 8 We should aleo continue to encourage those few nonCommunist states that have the requi e1te military exper1enoe manpower and eoonomio capacity to develop armed forces that could be made available outside their national territory for collective defense We ebould where necessary provide military aid to this end 9 The US will have to provide the major oupport1ng force at all points on the periphery of the Communist empire For us the essence or a strategy of forward defense is speed of reaction 10 our 10 Our deterrent limited war force should therefore 1 be highly mobile and so deployed ae to be able to react qu1okly in any pa rt of the w n•ld It should comprise a balanced and nex1b le combination of ground1 sea and a1r power In view of tha growing difficu lty of ma 1nta1ning foreign baaoa much of this force may have to be sea-borne in the 19608 Its tra ining ehou ld enable i t to perform effectively in conjunction with widely varied local forces and 1n all typea of terrain and climate ll The force should have nuclear capab111tiea but should be able to fight erreot1vely without using those capabilities 12 Such a US limited war foroe would give the nations under the threat of n·1ert Communist l 1 mited aggression greater confidence than they now have in their security and defensi- bility C Indirect Aggression 13 We must deter Connnuniat imper1al1em from indirect aggression -- covert resort to force We should continue to encourage e n where necessary a se1 all states outa1de the Communist empire to maintain the effective internal security forcea and procedureB which constitute the firsv line of defense again5t Communist indirect aggreaa1on While this function cen normally be left to police forces# the magnitude of the threat of indirect aggression to atatea on the periphery of the Commlllliet empire requires that the training of their military forces include preparation for interna'- Becurity duties 14 ' Indigenous e L'orte to deter covert Communist resort to force should be reinforced by a readily available us l1m1ted war force as de cribed in paragraphs 10 and ll Thia 1s particularly important for the peripheral nonCommunist states where the proximity or communiat military power unless offset by the evident prompt availability of US power tende to sap tho courage or non-Communists and to feed the aggreaaiveness of Communists III Dealing with Communist £$firess1£ _ 15 General War Given a relatively invulnerable US strategic nuclear atr1king force with a known capability to inflict a scale of damage that would fatal to the structure or the Communiet empire it i iry unlikely that the TOP SF CRET- -4- the Communiate would venture major nggresaion which would r1Bk bt'inging that foroe into action If they did tho relative 1nvulne rab1l1ty or our force would enable ue to tailor our reaponse to the character of the aggression At the maximum we ahould employ the full power of our force to destroy the structure of the Communiet empire 16 Limited Ae greea1on Our military reeponae to Communist limited aggression overt or covert should deny the obJect1ves of the aggression 1n a manner least l1lcely to lead to a large oxpans1on of the scope and intensity of the h015t111t1es