Dt PJ fHME'NT' OF THE r i vy on·rce- Of' THE CHiEi OF AVAL Pl RA'rlONS WASHING'fON 2 5 D C 4 Kirch 1959 C l PERSONAL MEMORANDUM FOR ALL P'LAG OFFICERS Subj Vlew on Adequacy of U S Deterrent Rc taliatory Forces Related to Gene rat and Limited War Capabilities l S l The endo ed vil' ' wci n the adequacy of th United States dete rrertt reu Jiato ry forces as related to gene ra l and limiled war capabiHtie n re furui 1hen for your information This document shc11ld be held do ely only l lt b for your informatlnn Be t regard I ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNAVIN l VIEWS ON ADEQUACY OF U S DETERRENT RETALIATORY F'ORCES AS RELATED TO GENERAL ANO LIMITED WAR CAPABILITIES-- -------- Military Posture Mu5t be Responslve to Clanging World Conditions - The natlon 1 s mllitary po5ture is based upon requirements which are generated in support of the National Strategy Strategy is a dynamic art - it has to be responsive to the continuously changing world conditions Similarly military poatur must be re5ponsive to changing circumstances It mu st undergo constant reevaluation and constant readjustment to new developments on the international political scene as well as to new advancements in the science of war and the technology of weapons Developments Requiring Re-examination of Retaliatory Power There are currently several significant developmenh which require that a very careful 11ppraisal be tn3 de of the future composition of U S deterrent retaliatory for ' es and the target syt tern such forces should be designed to h t a These are The potential Soviet missile capability versus the vulnerability to surprise attack of U S manned bombers and balUstic missiles operated from land bases b The probability that th precise loca tlon d enemy missile launching site will not be known c The tremendous costs of strategic weapon systern and their potential impact upon other vital military requirements ar d upon a sound national econom7 l CDrJ'' I ECLASSIFIED IAW E 0 12 58 OPNAVINST 5513 16 SERIES - ---· ···--· ____ ----------------- _ _ p h no p I ECLASSIFIED IA W E 0 12951 OPNAVINST sst1 1l SERIESf _______ __ red in o a r tetaUatory l' r qui the 1' nuc lmpo rtant to t cond d ln lnstdlations war c onduciinli How how ry 1ndustri al au all of • Do WG ________ ·--------- _____ -- JECLASSIF1Eo IA W E o 129 o _P_N_A_ _IN_S_T_s_s_t3_ l_6_ _SE_ RI_E_S_ _ _ J capability in our m s and ships BMs in rn to a u enemy Are all our forces known to on or s cost of cone can A rtes of assurance warning d now a urprhe k1d in Can Can early with C our rs -from land f solid p a n on a rt r I ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNA·vINST 5513 16 SERIES IAL w ·apons syst ems What are the chances of a technological break-through negating the effectiveness of a single system of the we 1pon 8 What Ls the d zn tructive power ls this power more than nece sary The numbe r l and types of r taliato -y weapon systems which our m jor Allies will have How much does this complicate the cnemy 1 s problem of coordinatbg a ' urprhe attack How does it affect the numbers and types of Wt apon systems required hy the United Sb tes 9 The amount of effort which should be expended on active defense h it useful to coniinue to tievelop and produce sy tems to improve defen 'les again Mt manned bombers ln order to protect our land-based retaliatory power Will the Soviets build up their manned bomber force How much efcort should he expended in attempting to achieve an anti ICBM in the realm o reality Is this There is no such a thing as a perfect ddense but is there even an effective defense system possibie again5t ICBM 1s i ls there a darrge r of falling in to the Maginot line concept 10 The 'ielection weapons system3 for production be obsolete before it b available in quantity life l heH-life be 7 fill the system How lorig will its effective Does the system have growth potential a yi tem already in production Doea it repla ce Should production of an earlier system be cancelled Should production be started before R O solutions are available Should real e41 tate be acquired r1 nd construction c f bases start before weapon 'I hav he n eva 1'1at- d nd prov1cn 5 JECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNA VINST 55l3 16 SERIES H D IAL The cost of new we potl systems Are the cost e tiniates roeali8tic Do t '°ley include the cu t of production tools a nd facilltie facilitie9 and ingtrumentation be requi reJ 11uclear warhea d C St of hardening Whl t ts the co t of How much real e tate is required What h the Wha t will be the a 'l nual mai nten ance and operation cost What other 'lupport b 12 What is the additional coL't of the What will be the ultimate total co5t constructing the 91tes or bases Will n ew test requlz-ed' Cati some other svst em do the job at less cost The ri ing cost of national defense within pre ent d fen e budget levels for limited ar capabilitie Can the new system be absorbed Will it dee reaiJe the fonds available Can the defen8e budg t be expended in the foture without impairing the national economy Ta rgetting Considerations _ - - - - - · __ A1th1 ugh ill of the foregoi11 g factors are importa it ft le of the most important h the det ri nination of the enemy target Jystem to be desh'oyed slnc e thi s largely gove rn5 the extent ai d ost o U S capa bltitie'l required Sho 1ld we plan to att tck all military facilities or should v e attack t'n-emy governm nt contrr l 3 nn lndustriai hdHftc cir 21hoi 1ld the targ t systern be mix of • h se two ECLASSIFIED IAW E 0 129 8 OPNA 'INST 5513 16 SERIES _ it would appear to be of little value to concentrate U i reaourcee on building up a tremendous capability to strike enemy military targets from which the a ircrllft and mhsiles have been launched To be dfective at all a United States strates y baaed on deatroylng the enemy's retaliatory capability would require preventive i urprise attack 'N U' - in essence a Aho lt would require perfect intellig nce on the location of all significant enemy targets The deci8lon to launch a world holoc11u st would be the most drastic and desperate decieion made since civilization began - and it might very well end civilization Theoretically there is no ultimate limit to the number of enemy military targets either fahe or relll Thu I this doctrine • 11ron d force us lnto a spirallng 11 -rns ra ce of m21tching new targeh pos ibly includina fatse targets with sdditJr nal weapons This concept becomes invalid whe l it h recogniz ed thitt lntel igence on large numbers of Soviet military ta rgete will b completely li'tcki ng 'He believe that it is not necessary to have the capability to inflict multimeg8 ton destruction on hundreds of major Sovlet military t irgets and on CCllrnHe ther military t11r1et8 ln order t o provide 'l 1lequ 1 te The concll pt of •le 1tr 1ying the enemy capability to '-ttack rt deterrence a lsrge ca le n• 1ci ea r ex hange ha progres Lvety lu t eff ctlvenes J 1 nd Ntcon1es ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNA 'INST 5513 16 SERIES - - ----- The Flnlte Deterrent System -··- Our objectives can be assurect by the selection of a target sy tem which wUl include the most vulnerable and essential ehmenta in Soviet Ufe th t I ls the control structure of their government and t he Co1nmu11 bt Party and the lndu•trlal complex which ts the foundation of tb elr na tlonal powc t The USSR government and pa rty cn11trols their industry and thelr v ar making capa clty are fln lte and so are the number of nuclear wgapon• and the numbers 0£ dell very vehlcles nece1uu1 ry to destroy thom Moraovor it does not requlre many meaaton• to do thi Untll both •ldcss have concealed o r moblle ballhtlc mbdl ut ln quantity w must add to the taraet Ulllt tho•e manned bomb r a ir ba••• from whlch re-1trlkes can be launched a gs inst the North Am•rlcan Ccmtlnent Inltlatlon of ao atta ck on our NATO allies will not gtve iham any mllltary adva ntaae - since thoy know that such an a ttack wUl brlna the same reta Uatlon on them - just as inevltably · juat a qulckly - and on th« sam• Soviet targets - as would an attack on th• Unlt'-d States By havlna tho capa blllty to d stroy the ba slc element vital to Soviet llfe we do not have to m11 ln t ln the tremendou• retalla t ry p wor whlch would be- 1· qulred to destroy all 11lgnUlcant mllllary targets The objs c tlve l not the people - it l tho control strtldurG and industrial complex oper tcd by them These elc i cn ntg can be destroyed by i ucces dul a ttack on a flnite and rclativ ly small number of tarr c t 1 lECLASSIFlED IA W E 12958 1 OPNA 'INST 5513 16 SERIES I t The destruction of any particular number of enemy control structures and complexes is equally i1npa latable because lt means klllia 1 a lot of people However hlttlag large numbers of mlllta ry taraeta would re1tull ln kiuin1 a much larger number of people due to the wlde 1pread fallout cauaed by 1round bursts of large weapons The taraettlna of enemy government control an d industrial fadllties does aot require specific dama1e to aay one pbyakal element of the complex target ln order to render the complex ineffectual as an entity Moreover a ground burd ls not necei H ty for this purpose - on the contrary a more optimum damage radius la realized throt11h air bur • tlna - and to achieve the same radlu•• this requires far less yield than a ground burst Such a ey11tem offer• a reaUatlc bads from which we can establish a reaaonable mUltary requirement for our deterrent retalh tory force t d For Multiple Strike Syatem• As the means to accompll • h the a bove the U S mu•t develop and mdntaln au fflclent nuclear atrlke force• which the enemy will reco1nls e are capable of ca uslna unacceptable dama1e to the tndu• trial and 1overn me11tal base oft he USSR and of Communlat Chlna regardleea of any effoyt he may undertake As has been prevloualy stated we have ample retaliatory power now to deatroy the enemy no matter what he does Thb power h in our Strategic Alr Command's bombers nd mh11Uea our European IRBMs in our carrier alr in our mbslle subma rlne ln tactical alr and ln the Army's mlsslles ________ I ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNA v'INST 551 16 SERIE _ N I rt it1 placed in several systems to insure that an enemy breakthrou11h in defense agitinst one system does not checkmate our total retaliatory capability ee For Invult1erability 'The prnblem is in the future - as the Soviets phase in their ICBM's our land-based forces become extremely vuln erable and there hi nothing we can rlo tc prevent major l' struction of an unpredictable but appreciable a mount of our land-ba-ied forces The problem is to build sufficient invulnerable forces - forces whose survival is insured no matter what the enemy does faintaining the invulnerability o United States nuclear $trike forcel J in the year ahead wi 11 h c rudal Attempting to achieve this by advancing the c apabillties of mrnmed bombers is of questionable value Such forces would have to be maintained airborne in order to insure l PH'Vival require large force ' of tankeris dispersed ba H Ui It would ai rborne stand-off weapons - in othier VOrds an entirely new complete ma1med bomber weap011 system a svstem of questionable effectiveness against futnre enemy defenge of such a program would be prohibitive The cost Nevertheless re5ear ch only on fast high peed bombers ehould be contim1ed until the retaliatory of ballistic miz liles i proven Another a 'lpt ct h1 thL future problem is that the enemy will know the loc ttion of onr land- ba ed mi sile ites Our security system ls simply not good enough trJ prev nt cli1closure of tbi1 information I ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNA 'INST 551 16 SERIES Invulnerablllty will exist only when the enemy does not kn ow the location of our deterrent forces mobility This can only be achieved by true concealment and Both of these factors are essential The seas provlde a natural environment for achieving both - no artifklal means are required Th e 1eas aho offer the mean13 of drawing enemy flre way from our continent - away from our population Invulnerability ls a must in the future ln order to insure i ncvitable retalb tlon But lt is also important for other reasons It pe rmlts lnc remental appllcatlon of force if the sltu tion indicates that it l• the cour lc of wisdom and it certa inly minimi uu the risk of ha siy or ill considered and irrevocable disastrous decls lons in time of international tension Sufficient Tlme For Decision More Important Ln the Future In the coming years the ablUty to consider snd weigh such dechlons wlll Lncreaee ln importance 'When both sides have quantltl•• of balll•tic mh tlle1 there may be perlods of tension ln which there are i 5ome lndlc atlona that mhsiles might be ls unched by the enemy but thes• indlcatla ns a re not poatltlve Our political leaders will then be ln a quandary as to wh€thor or not to launch mliuile before they are s11re the enemy ha I launched lb ·tacit our balH ltlc mis1tile in known l11catlons may be destroy d false information we will have started a devastating war If they walt lf th y launch on Thls l J one of the fea r15 of our Allies I lECLASSIFIED IA W E O 2 58 OPNA ' INST 5513 16 SERIES _ '' C Surnmary l As long as the U S has the capability of inflictin1 unacceptable damage to 'the enemy regardless of any efforts unde rta en by him against the U 5 or lb Allies and the enemy knows we have and will use this cape bUity the deterrent ls effective and the chances of a general war become leas and leas likely And yet general nu clear war does remain a possibility Therefore the United States mu d be capable of inflicting heavy unacceptable damage to the USSR 5hould the Sovleb ever undertake the d1 H1perate suicidal act of c tarting a gen era1 war The Un ited States has thl capablllty now nd there is nothing the USSR can do to avoid destruction of her government controht her industry her war making capacity er her people should she start a general nuclear war A finite deterrent pollcy will he equally a pplicable to enemy attack on our NATO allies The Soviet know such a n attack will bring just as quickly just a• lnevltably the same deva tatlng attack on their control system as would an attack on the United Stattu It will not be n ecassary to maintain the tremendou5 retallatory power required to de9troy all their military Since we have enough r tallatory power to do the job now we should al o insure an adequl l te limited ws r c spabUUy Although there has been no general war there have be n a total of 18 lin l d vars since World War II ll I ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNAVJNST 5513 16 SERIES I d s war as at are required C war U l3 I JECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNA --rINST 5513 16 SERIES