COMMf ND fllE I DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS POST 1 JAN 46 WASHINGTON 25 D C IN REPL Y REFER TO SECRET 6 JULY 1059 I t PERSONAL - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I CNO PERSONAL NO 51 To Flag and General Officers Subj Dope I I SECRET Last week the press announced that THE ADMINISTRATION HAD GROUNDED THE NUCLEAR AIRPLANE PROJECT Secretary McElroy had previously asked the Joint Chiefs to review this project and to advise him REGARDING MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN THIS AREA EXCLUSIVE OF ANY PSYCHOLOGICAL AD VANT AGE OF HA YING A NUCLEAR PLANE FL YING BEFORE THE SOVIETS DO The political pressure is for a program that will get a flying platform as soon as possible this idea AEC sponsors Dr York DOD Director of Research and Engineering presented his estimate of the present situation There are two systems under development for the manned aircraft installation The Direct Air Cycle several types of reactors requires split s hielding and even then will have such residual radioactive leakage that one flyover a cow pasture at 5-10 000 feet will radi o actively contaminate milk above the safe limit PLANES USING THE PLANT NICHROME V THAT MUST BE USED IN ANY PLANE OF THE NEAR FUTURE COULD NEVER PROVIDE MUCH MORE THAN 56 MACH AT 10 000 FEET Indirect Air Cycle power SECRET I plants depend upon reactor heat application to a medium which heats the air that passes through the turbine '' This requires only a unit shield ·• and it can be solidly closed ' THESE TYPES are capable of greater i1· growth and according to present techniques COULD PROVIDE A PLANE OF THE SAME WEIGHT WITH A MACH 86 SPEED AND RAISE THE CEILING FROM I 0 000 TO 25 000 FEET developed in the supersonic range A smaller plane could be Major General Keirn USAF I l that they had stressed the requirements for an aircraft nuclear I propulsion system in 1951 i countered Dr York's presentation the next day He remarked In 1953 Mr Wilson terminated the first flight project a convent onally powered B36 carrying an atomic reactor Atomic engines of the NICHROME V type direct air cycle have been run for 200 hours Ii · It I He estimated engine in-flight tests in 1961 if the airframe were available Tests flights from ARCO on chemical fuel to the test area and return would require a plane weighing 585 000 pounds of which 180 000 would be fuel Such I j I configuration and dual propulsion units would be necessary to reduce population and area hazard This has been borne out by the safety studies which have cost more than 2 million dollars called the Convair 54 are desired by the Air Force Two such aircraft This program would cost $940 5 million during the 1960-64 period with the plane 2 SECREI I t l flying early in 1964 General Keirn did not agree with Dr York that the present atomic powered engine had no military potential since the substitution of chemical fuel for the NI-5 fuel could produce a • 9 Mach airplane He believed that it might not be put into the category of a desirable or essential element of a weapon system at the present time but insisted that military potential was there Th e ' Chiefs agreed that the present project WAS NOT SUCH as to _ ' ' ' ' ' convince them th a t THERE IS A MJLITARY REQUIREME T FOR SUCH A WEAPON SYSTEM b t THERE I$ A M ILITARY REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUING THE DEVELOPMENT_IN THIS FIELD This is a fine point that apparently wa re flecte iJn the Administration's ' ' ' ' ' decision to place greater emphasis· on development of mo r_e advanced types of reactors and englnes l' ·11 J sECREI t SECBET THE SPLIT OVER THE COMMAND OF THE POLARIS SYSTEM IS STILL UNRE$OLVED Secretary McElroy recently had the Chiefs in to discuss the problem and this was fortunate It looked as if the Secretary already was sold on the idea of HAVING ALL RETALIATORY STRIKING FORCES UNDER ONE COMMANDER Further discussion indicated that Mr McElroy 'was not fully aware of the implications of this concept For example he did not interpret it as requiring a concentration of all targeting under one commander even though this was specifically included in the Air Force proposal He stated that this was not under dispute sider that naval operations would be a problem He did not con- His idea was that the ope rations of the SSB N s would 'be left to the Navy to handle and that this was merely a matter of two commanders getting together to coordinate their forces We gave a briefing to Mr Mc Elroy which included the full story It pointed out the responsibilities and capabilities of the present organization structure relative to target assignment and coordination and showed the implications of giving such vast responsibility to a single commander It further illustrated that the key to survival in 4 SECRET SECRET the nuclear age is dispersal not consolidation The Secretary has not announced a decision Probably our briefing was successful in making him think a little more about all of these problems At a subsequent press conference he stated that the final decision would not be made for some time The important thing for us is to clear away the smoke screen that has served to confuse the targeting picture Of all of our national weapon systems in existence or programmed the submarine launched POLARIS will be the easiest to target for More importantly the organizational MACHINERY FOR TARGET COORDINATION AND ASSIGNMENT already IS IN PLACE AND FUNCTIONING UNDER THE JCS With a little oiling it can do this job well The big problem will concern the control and coordination of the launching platform- -the SSB N submarine NA VY POSITION THE PRESENT UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE IS ENTIRELY ADEQUATE AND NEEDS NO BASIC CHANGES TO HANDLE POLARIS SYSTEM THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS THROUGH THEIR NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDERS HA VE THE NECESSARY EXPERIENCE ORGANIZATION AND COMMUNICATIONS IN BEING 5 SECRET SECRET I SECREl SECRET IMPORT ANT POINTS 1 ATOMIC TARGET PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL COOR DINA- TION ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR within the existing Unified Command structure They are the responsibility of the JCS incident to the strategic direction of the Armed Services This results in a world-wide plan controlled by JCS and participated in by all Services at all echelons assisted by joint agencies such as DASA and a Joint Targeting arrangement In this scheme the JCS pro1nulgate atomic warfare guidance and allocate weapons to Unified Commanders The Unified Commanders prepare target lists determine level of damage and program weapons and delivery systems and the JCS review and approve final plans 2 THE SSB N SYSTEM WILL INTRODUCE NO NEW TARGET COORDINATION PROBLEMS procedures It is adaptable to the simplest targeting With its high security and invulnerability it can be pret planned for deliberate response against a stable target system The need for a few improvements in procedures should not be interpreted as a r t r requirement for vast changes which would weaken the authority of the JCS 3 CONTROL AND COORDINATION PROPERLY BELONG AT THE JCS LEVEL because these factors determine force levels involve our Allies affect capabilities of all Unified Commanders and are elements 6 SE CRtl SECRET SECRET SECRET of our national policy 4 THE UNIFIED COMMANDER CONTROLLING ALL OTHER FRIENDLY NAVAL FORCES IN THE LAUNCHING AREA MUST ALSO CONTROL THE POLARIS SYSTEM in order to insure effective coordination safety and flexibility in the use of all naval forces Unlike manned air- craft the coordination of the ballistic missile once launched does not involve such factors as ECM communications IFF SAR TOT The operational coordination of the POLARIS system involves continuous coordination of the launching platform rather than the missile This includes coordination with other surface ships continuous movement within firing area defense against enemy submarines and intermixing with friendly submarines These SSB N submarines have passive concurrent collateral capabilities that can provide assistance to our ASW efforts Performance of collateral missions must in no way degrade their capability to carry out their overriding deterrent mission 5 ALL UNITED STATES STRIKING POWER SHOULD NOT BE PUT UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND with a single line of control IF INEVITABLE RETALIATION IS TO BE INSURED The strength of our deterrence lies· in the variety and world-wide deployment of our striking forces Strike back capability must be dispersed to more than one Unified Commander just as certainly as the individual striking units must be dispersed 7 ECLASSIFIE» IA W E O i19Sfl OPNA lJN T C'C1 16' l SECRET SECRET The Air Force in separate recommendations on the 1 61 budget has recommended that 9 POLARIS submarines are adequate and that no more should be laid down If SAC were to get control of POLARIS their recommendations might be similar We know of course that POLARIS in subs or surface ships is cheaper less vulnerable more reliable etc than any other retaliatory system It may be a long while before a decision is reached Our arguments will stand up under close scrutiny and we must all be familiar with them 8