lhO K C n« 11 'll'coPY 20 Ni LIMITED DISTRIBUTION· · I 22 December 1959 OECL ASSIFIEO l IOrtlY Al IP - Pages 1286 - 1313 incl Au NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES c ' j- _ V J _ u J J 'f ur l O r 1 l -v t -l'·- i f J • t l rJ _nL - • J ll t C' --- OLAUiPICA Th DY - to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF U ili lttll NAM Dal l E¥DED BEYONQ I •' ' '1' 1 1 J IJ l'fll a I on - - Mll QN f_ • IL9- z _A o-vl2o 'lPc· c '-'-' ' _ ' j It ey on 'ARGET COORDINATION AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS u 1 • References a J C s 1620 257- 7 0 6 'i1 'Ii J c s 2056 131 5N' 1 llll llll ot ltU c J c s 2056 134 - - • £• J c s 2056 137 -o Pursuant to agreement at the meeting on 1 December 1959 nclosure A hereto containing the views of •the Chief of staff U S AJmY the Chief of Naval Operations the Chief of Staff u s Air Force and the Colllll andant of the Marine Corps on the questions posed by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of staff in the Enclosure to J C S 2056 134 is circulated for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2 The memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operatio s for the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff OpEOB ls serial_ 000 362P60 subject Target Coordination and Associated Problems dated 30 September 1959 is appended as Enclosure B hereto at the request of the Chief of Navel Operations H L HILLYARD J 0 COBB Joint Secretariat CSAM-401-59 dated 15 December 1959 on file in Joint Secretariat Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations Op-604E br serial 000467P60 dated 20 December 1959 on file in Joint Secretariat CSAFM-565-59 dated 15 December 1959 on file in Joint Secretariat Memorandum by the Commandant of the Marine Corps A03B 6 dw 0003A34859 dated 17 December 1959 subject Target Coordination and Associated Problems U on file 1n Joint Secretariat DISTRIBUTION Gen Twining C JCS Gen t emni tzer CSA · Picher Wellings D Js DD JS Adm Burke ONO n Campbell NSC Rep Gen White CSAF Gen Hillyard is JCS Gen Pate CM' l Capt Cobb DS JCS Adm Austin DCNO-P P seoys TSSC miml VRCI GDS Gen Gerhart DC s P P secys J-2 -r C'l Gen Oakes DC s OPS secys J-3 Gen Greene DC S-P MC secys J-5 S Kit'hU4'W c 19f SS§QT - 1286 Jr11 205 143 J C S FILE 2@P S l'CH • t 2 '11' IP ·-···- • - • • T •- • TO ENCLOSURE B Hf T DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Op-60B ls Ser 000362p60 30 September 1959 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Subject Reference Target Coordination and Associated Problems a CM 380-59 of 17 August 1959 l Reference a is a comprehensive coverage of controversial issues related to atomic strike plans targeting force adequacy and the operational control of strike forces basic These issues are I agree that their resolution calls for command decisions The decisions reached will have a profound effect upon our national security and economic welfare The issues therefore deserve the most careful analysis and with the nation's interests always paramount Individual Service capabilities both current and potential must of course receive due consideration but only to the extent that they can best contribute to national interests Recent and imminent improvements in weapons and their delivery means and other scientific developments may well dictate radical departures from some of the concepts and their implementing measures that were evolved when the relative combat power of the tude u s and the USSR was of a different order of magni- Continued rapid progress in weapon technology is probable Changes in international r-eL tions are inevitable and may be of a nature that will influence our military posture Accordingly it would appear unwise to commit ourselves unnecessarily to any course of action that would be too costly or difficult to alter should such progress and changes so dictate Freedom of maneuver in our military policy and strate D' must be assured Enclosure to J C S 2056 131 •T LvA t'r' JCS 2056 143 - 1299 - Enclosure B · t -i'I T n r 1 I J ' • I I ·• • 2 It is within the broad context of paragraph l above that I have formulated the views set forth be low on the following items that were covered directly or indirectly in the referenced memorandum ' Targeting philosophy The development of atomic strike plans Targetin coordination Force adequacy i e nuclear striking forces ' The operational control of strike forces 3 Tar eting philosophy In paragraphs 17 and 18 of reference a the Chairman outlines two extremes of targetinz philosophy · • -- - ' SE SAHIT 1£1 C rr nmVE ll'IFOFl ilAT 011 iJro i J cf J t 1 The rationale for this conclusion is set forth below • - --- · ·· · · Enclosure to J c s 2056 131 JD 8LC illl' JCS 2056 143 1300 - Enclosure B SANl71Zi D CC 'Y Stiffl m 1 0 m o 1n rn DAt P Y-- J J f II OS C61 1 - •' if AeJ fl 11 I' Hihlllt'1l 11 The development plans As I interpret the first sentence of paragraph 22 of the referenced memorandum it is apparently assumed that a single commander will be responsible for the strategic missionn Pre- sumably this refers to a sinile all-inclusive national strate ic mission I cannot agree that such a mission should be isolated as a separate entity Within the national strategy and executed by a single commander The military strate of the United States covers the world and ita direct application to the will be applied throughout the entire perimeter of the bloc In adc11tion to CINCSAC forces those of CINCLANT CINCEUR and CINCPAC will participate extensively in the application of United States power The simultaneous application of this power from a diversity of sources directions ranges delivery means and commands adds greatly to the threat facing the Soviets It is my view that we should retain this diversified threat Accordingly I believe that the Unified Commanders in a position to do so should participate in the nuclear strikes on strategic targets on a pre-planned national list The optimum procedure is for each to develop his own strilce plan but in close coordination with the other Unified and Specified Commanders I ar ree with the Chairman that improvements in our nuclear strike planning procedures must be made ments are feasible The requisite improve- They require more detailed nd earlier plannin3 coordination under more positive control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The discussion that follows ives the reasons for this thesis Basic to sound atomic strike planning is the development of target lists The target lists adopted and the damage criteria to be applied are of such major import and are so fundamental to the execution of our military stratee y that the Joint Chiefs Enclosure to J c s 2056 131 _ BECllEI' JCS 2056 143 Enclosure B • •• - ' of staff cannot divorce the selves from their formulation Broad policy guidance is necessary but is not by itself sufficient After target nominations are made by the Unified and Specified Commanders concerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff should subject the combined list to the reguired analysis by any appropriate agency such as DASA The final result would be a target list developed ins logical systematic and analytical manner and f1nall r approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Because of the importance of the target list in its relation to national policy I do not see how the Joint Chiefs of Staff can divorce themselves from its development 1n view of their responsibility for the strategic direction of the armed forces Following the development of national strategic target list the commanders concerned would then be assigned targets for their respective nuclear strikes Their detailed plans would be developed and coordinated with the other commanders concerned By this procedure·t11e Joint Chiefs of staff retain in their hands an authority and responsibil ty that I do not believe can be delegated to others without abrogating the JCS responsibilities It should benoted that after the initial target list is developed future modification to it would be comparatively simple In several places in his memorandum the Chairman mentions the complexity that stems from the fact that various commands have operational plans for nuclear strikes He points out the difficulty of war gaming several plans and concludes from this that we should have a single integrated operational plan for the strategic atts clc and that CINCSAC should develop this plan Enclosure to J C S 2056 131 sf CHET JCS 2056 143 - F - 1303 - Enclosure B • _ _ _ l I •' l I IN I 1 J¥ JJ Jl' -- objective in war planning I would strongly emphasize is not simplicity but effectiveness · f u· n A single integrated opera- tional plan for the nuclear strikes drawn up by a single commander would facilitate war gaming However we must ensure that the enemy is faced with a diversity of threats from many directions and many sources To place the total responsibility 'or destruction of all pre-planned targets in the hands of a single commander carries with it a danger that we should not and need not accept 1 e do not know haw much of that commander I s force will be left if we are hit first and we do not lmaw what the status of his communications and control will be This would be placing an undue reliance upon a single strategic concept that may be successful only if executed according to a pre-conceived plan Seldom is such a plan so executed We would forfeit the flexibility that is inherent in the decentralized execution of strilce plans by several unified commanders The military logic of retaining this flexibility is overwhelming In preparation for world War II France had a single pre-conceived plan that shethoughtwas foolproof but it was virtually worthless I agree in general with the Chairman's discussion of damage criteria outlined in paragraph 23 of his memorandum I also agree that we should subject the target lists and damage criteria to analysis by machine and mathematical techniques A major objective of this analysis would be to arrive at an estimate of how much is enough more attention by the JCS This is an item that requires much Decisions thereon far-reaching effects upon types and yields of weapons the national stockpile and delivery force types and levels Decisions tl1ereon are fundamental to the JCS responsibility for strategic direction of the Armed Forces An example of why this responsibility should not be delegated is pertinent here There is a great difference between various commanders• conclusions as to weapons necessary ee€llll T JCS 205c l1 3 i · rn · - • ' 'a · '1 • ·1 • ' • · i r iJ 1 ljfll 1304 Enclosure B t --· sECHET ' tlt --- ' ' ' ·t S • ' ' for destruction of a target For example on s 1' 1llill C' '' ' ' • lf '• l - 'm'lt lll'fO i11 1 0R i sun osocBIU Without expressing an opinion as to which commander is right it is obvious that the differences between the conclusions reached are so great as to indicate a gross miscalculation on the part of some The JCS should not accept either estimate without close analysis This should be followed by positive decisions and guidance and positive follow-through to ensure that their guidance is followed We can accept neither a gross under-estimate nor over-estimate of the effort required In the one case we would run the great risk that the enemy could continue the ar effectively Accepting the other would result in a needlessly high number of weapons and delivery forces with the attendant high cost and at the expense of desperately needed forces for other types of war Instead of further delegating responsibility for such major decisions the JCS should repossess some of their prerogatives that have gone by default with the resultant greatly differing conclusions reflected in current strike plans The factors discussed above are some of the reasons why I think that each Unified and Specified Commander with the requisite forces should develop a nuclear strike plan for general war As a less desirable alternative I could agree to the development or a single integrated strike plan provided The JCS provide the terms of reference snd approve the final B9fl lf JCS 2056 143 Enclosure B - • I ·' - J ' •- a E· U ' 6 L i -· - Its development is participated in by all Unified and Specified Commanders concerned That all Unified end Specified Commanders with nuclear capable strategic delivery forces participate in its execution 5 Targeting coordination One serious error that we can make is to permit the complexity of target coordination to govern our planning procedure I would emphasize here that while simplicity is commendable it is not an end in itself but should influence plans only as it contributes to their effectiveness Instead of considering target coordination first we should start at the other end of the spectrum by Jtermining the objectives of our nuclear strikes and then design the most effective plans to attain those objectives then be tailored to those plans Target coordination would We have not lost our repeatedly demonstrated ability to plan for and execute highly complex military operations I do not attach to the coordinating procedure the degree f complexity that the Chairman does I agree that what is involved here is the - I am sure we can do it What is needed is more positive control and direction by the Joint Chiefs or Staff They have the necesoary agencies and facilities available JCS 2056 143 - 1306 - Enclosure B 6 Force adequacy delivery forces be of It is imperative that a size and type to cause - -'· ·• · we uon•t a further increase in the size of our nuclear strike forces will not compensate for this deficiency I agree with the Chairman that the necessity for prevailing in general war is of such vital importance that any error in judgment as to the size of our nuclear strike forros should be on the safe side The Chairman states that the Soviet's military doctrine is based on the principle of mass • • Our nuclear delivery ·rorces have been based upon the same principle As we move into the missile age we cannot depend to the same extent upon this principle Because of the vulnerability of our fixed bases to a surprise attack we must ensure inevitable concentration of firepower by shifting to dispersed concealed mobile and far leas vulnerable delivery systems We can no longer place major reliance upon planes operating from fixed bases The warning time is too short Likewise fixed missile sites even though hardened will be vulnerable to ballistic missiles of the small CEP that we can expect the Soviets and ourselves to have within the next decade For the missile era the criteria for determining the size of our nuclear strike force Will change In the past this size has been determined largely by the anticipated size of the Soviet's intercontinental bomber force This has resulted in numbers of United States nuclear delivery vehicles of such magnitude that we could lose a substantial portion and still have enough left to devastate the u s s R The basic thesis of TJ2B BB itLi JCS 2056 143 - 1307 - Enclosure B • --- J re ' $ i Jl i it ' '' having enough left after being hit was sound but the result has been progressively increasing numbers to offset a growing vulnerability or our own forces together with an estimate or Soviet capability that has continuously turned out to be much too high Thia process cannot be continued indefinitely without either imposing an unacceptable economic burden upon the United States or by degrading our limited war capabilities to an unacceptable degree or both Fortunately it is not necessary to continue the process The 11ature or characteristics or the forces rather than size alone will assume more importance in determining future force levels Here are some or the reasons why 1 We Will have an increasing Y diver e delivery means e g land based bombers carrier based bombers land based ICBM and IRBM and sea based FBM 2 • The ballistic missile threat to aircraft carriers at sea and to sea based missiles is so small that it can be disregarded 3 There are no means now foreseen by which the Soviets can eliminate the threat or the submarine ballistic missile 4 It may be feasible to make some land based missiles movable by barge road or rail 5 No way is now foreseen for determining the number or Soviet missiles ready for launching Among other means dummy sites could be used freely 6 It is unlikely that we will know the location or most or their missile sites Therefore ' - 11iO c i MJf_ • r hD Ct IJ '· _• •• ll n ll 'f i ' l 'I''- 1 I I ·• •' 7 With an open ended ICBM missile race it is probable that large numbers would be based in the United States which will draw additional enemy missiles to our soil 't f' ¥-BMRE·l1 JCS 2056 143 -1308 - Enclosure B • The security of our nuclear striking forces against a surprise attack by any enemy having the privilege o ' striking first is a primary consideration alive it is useless Unless a retaliatroy force stays In the Polaris submarine we have a missile system now nearing fruition that can above all others stay alive We must not sacrifice the lead that we now hold in this field by failing to exploit the many advantages of using the sea as a base for launching nuclear attacks If the Soviets are to be deterred from initiating general war the diversity of the threat that resides in a combination of the above systems with decentralized control of those systems provides the requisite deterrent If they are not to be deterred then this diversity of weapon systems without astronomical force levels will ensure the enemy's destruction 7 Operational control of strike forces The philosophy that I have outlined throughout this paper including targeting world-wide operations flexibility decentralized execution and other related factors dictates that · _ ·-----· With respect to the Polaris submarine force I agree with the Chairman that this force should remain under Naval control llQ p B'Bflft ' T JCS 2056 143 Enclosure B • until the weapon system has been developed and proven Inclusion · of this last phrase is not intended to imply that the system should ultimately be removed from Naval control I agree with the Chairman that an appropriate nucleus of Naval officers be assigned to CINCSAC 1 s operationai planning staff provided that Air Force officers intimately familiar with CINCSAC 1 s operational plans and planning procedures be attached to the staffs of Unified Commanders having nuclear delivery forces Officers of both Services so assigned should participate actively in all phases of planning by the staff of which they are a part I concur in this procedure in the interest of improved planning and not for the purpose of preparing for an eventual Unified Strategic Command The question of assigning IIBII • 'i J The Chairman in paragraph 32 or his memorandum states that if the series or decisions which he had outlined were taken the question or operational control or the various atrilce forces and problem or mutual interference would be greatly simplified because mutual interference I have pointed out the undesirability or assigning to a single commander the responsibility for planning and executing a single national nuclear strike plan It would appear safer and far more logical to achieve the sought for simplicity and interference reduction by assigning all overseas strategic strike forces to the Unified commanders in who se areas they are based and within whose areas they would conduct their strikes Ir we are seeking simplicity in planning with safety in execution this would be a major step forward 8 There are other factors that are pertinent to these discussions and which were not covered specifically in the Chairman's memorandum One or these relates to changes in military strategy to keep pace with changes in related fields Change is one or the constants or warfare Historically weapon characteristics and the nature or the enemy•have heavily Enclosure to J c s 2056 31 'TY'p SiHHtEI ' ms 2056 143 - 1311 - Enclosure B • ' influenced strategy _ •• f 1 -lJ 'b' -· -- Q foil ' I Some wars have been fought almost entirely on land others predominately on the sea and still others in a combination of the two In recent history the air has become the third medium of combat and air power has played a role of tremendous importance We are now witnessing the emergence of the missile age which will probably result in a decreased emphasis on some categories of air power particularly the long range bomber and tactical aircraft for troop support In essence we are returning to an artillery concept wherein the explosive is launched from the earth's surface or sub-surface However there is one very important difference The artillery battleground will be expanded to include the homeland of the belligerents This means that if we use United Stated soil as the artillery base we will receive on United States soil large numbers of enemy missiles aimed at eliminating our own missile launching sites If there were no altern tives we should pursue this strategy and good ones Fortunately there are alternatives Technology provides us with the means for using the oceans as the artillery base Regardless of any ultimate decision ss to the control of forces the development of strategic plans or the detailed tactics used this nation should exploit every possible means of using the oceans as a base for the delivery of nuclear weapons because of the relative invulnerability and greater effectiveness assured thereby as well as the significant economies possible to achieve Major evolutions such as the above must be recognized and appropriately reflected in all phases of our planning Where necessary we must be willing to break away from procedures and systems conceived and implemented in an era of nuclear deficiency on our part and no nuclear capability of the part of the u s s R JCS 2056 143 Progress has provided the Soviets with a - 1312 - ·- -- J - - substantial capability that is growing in size and versatility Likewise our nuclear power has grown many-fold some notable adjustments to these developments We have made Among other things we have placed diversified delivery means in the hands of Unified Commanders immediately adjacent to Communist Bloc territory This has broadened greatly the base of our military posture To withdraw from these commanders this capability that has been developed so assiduously over the years and centralize it in the hands of a single commander would narrow that base We would thereby forfeit strength that comes from versatile forces and a decentralized control that is so well adapted to our force structure and the strategic positions that we hold around the major portion of the Communist Bloc perimeter Another factor that should be fully recognized is that the military strategy and force structure suitable for an aggressor nation Will normally be unsuitable for the non-aggressor The aggressor can be more specific in his planning both as to timing and as to types of attacks We may be sure that he will explore every possible indication of our weakness in any area and will exploit that weakness in his aggressive moves We on the other hand must be more flexible to be able to meet a variety of thrusts Consequently our force and command structure must be such that we can withstand reverses in some areas without danger of the whole structure toppling 9 I appreciate the Chairman's providing the Joint Chiefs of Staff copies of his memorandum I agree with him that we should resolve the issues discussed 10 In paralleling the distribution of reference a I am providing copies of this memorandum to the Secretary of Defense the Chief of Staff of the Army the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps s ARLEIGH BURKE -' Enclosure to J c s 2056 131 - - p er - - - I- •• f a 1 1 u· ' f' C 2_ 'jli $- l7 rr 'L 1 'lf 11 II 1 __ • __ ••• _