' COMMAND F LE POST 1 JAN 46 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE pF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ' WASHINGTON 25 D c IN REPLY REFER TO 2 February 1960 SECRET PERSONAL - FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLY C NO PERSONAL To Flag and General Officers Subj Dope AIRBORNE ALERT One of the problems that has received considerable attention from individual services the Joint Staff and persons responsible for military decisions is the need for and capability of a United States airborne alert Such a program required evaluation to determine the military requirement for such an alert the resultant effect on the long term readiness of the forces used in its execution its cost and relationship to other existing or developing military requirements Quite sometime ago it was agreed that there is a military requirement for a force capable of carrying out an airborne ale rt Since the Air Force has publicly cited the chance of 300 Soviet missiles destroying our retaliatory bombers on the ground such an alert should be imposed during periods of strained U S - Soviet relations or strategic warnings so long as the manned bomber retains its predominant role in United States retaliatory forces SECRET ECLASSIFIED IAW E O 12958 OPNl ' ' 'INST 5513 16 SERIES SECRET SAC has ably demonstrated with an evaluation training program that it has available the capability to support an air alert of 8 combat configured aircraft per wing per day for such periods An effective continuous airborne alert involving one-fourth of the United States heavy bomber force would be very expensive to maintain and would rapidly deteriorate existing equipment This might invite Soviet attack timed to a period of material weaknesses derived from intelligence The resultant replacement of equipment and an increased training program for bomber and tanker crews would involve expenses that must detract from other Air Force programs under the present level funding budget concept Costs for a continuous airborne alert employing 10 wings were developed for several schemes which would progress from an original effort of 6 sorties per day per wing 60 sorties daily After 3 months of growth a 9 sorties per day per wing program could be carried out for 12 months for $553 million A second scheme would p rovide for l l 2 sorties per day per wing 112 sorties per day and after 6 months buildup would cost $770 8 million each year The recently demonstrated high accuracy long-range firings of ATLAS TIT AN and POLARIS indicate that any additional funds 2 SECRET I JECLASSIFIEDIAW E O 12958 OPNA'VINST 5513 16 SE_'RI_E_S_ _ __ SECRET should not be programmed for manned intercontinental bombers but should be diverted toward development of other nuclear retaliatory capabilities The re is a need for systems that will be effective even in event of surprise attack The increasing Soviet ICBM deterioration of the deterrent effectiveness of land based manned bombers is the long term threat that must be prepared for In the annual budget message to Congress an airborne alert program aimed at acquiring and preserving the necessary capability proportional to the military requirements was outlined by the President He said I have also authorized the Department of Defense to begin to acquire a standby airborne alert capability for the heavy bombers This will entail the procurement of extra engines and spare parts and the training of the heavy bomber wings with the ability to conduct an airborne alert It is neither necessary nor practical to fly a continuous airborne alert at this time Such a procedure would over a relatively short period of time seriously degrade our overall capability to respond to attack What I am recommending is a capability to fly such an alert if the need should arise and to maintain that alert for a reasonable period of time until the situation which necessitated it becomes clarifiedn 3 SECRET I ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 1295ft OPNA 1 NST 5515 16 SERIES - -------- ------------- SECRET CONSIDERATIONS OF PREVENTIVE WAR PREEMPTIVE WAR AND TAKING THE INITIATIVE There have been a lot of discussions in lots of newspapers and periodicals about preemptive war There have also been a lot of discussions among the Services here in Washington about the differences between preemptive war preventive war and exercising the initiative In other words to get my own thinking straight I have written the following treatise which you may find of some interest As ICBM's become operational warning times are reduced to the point where a hair trigger seems to be the solution for launching our strategic attack forces One school of thought insists that there is a clear differentiation between preventive war or acts intended to provoke war on the one side and the exercise of initiative on the other side Although superficial examination of this difference might seem to indicate that the differentiation is very small it may on the other hand be quite significant and may portend a trend which could lead to a military posture of the U S that would be dangerous to the security of our country A preventive war is a war initiated by a country because it believes that the initiation of war is necessary to its interests In other words that country is trying to prevent an expansion or domination by its enemies or it is trying to dominate or control some SECRET 4 I ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNA 1 NST 5513 16 SERIES ' c - -- ••• -'A _ _ _ •_ _ ' SECRET other country It is a deliberate thing A nation which decides to conduct a preventive war will decide upon the means by which it will conduct it the number and quality of weapons that it requires and probably will designate a time for starting such a war All preparations will be made for conducting a war of a certain predetermined type at a certain date in order to achieve specific results Preemptive war while very similar to a preventive war in several facets is just a little bit different A preemptive war would be initiated by a nation when it felt sure that its enemy was about to strike In other words a nat on would initiate a preemptive war when it had determined that its enemy was about to conduct a preventive war It would be done with the weapons it had on hand It would be done at a time which primarily would be dependent upon what its enemy did A nation which decided upon preemptive war would be primarily influenced by its belief that its enemy was about to strike it In order for the nation to survive it would have to conduct a preemptive war to prevent the aggressor nation from initiating the first strike The difference between preventive war and preemptive war then is largely a matter of what trig rs the war A preventive SECRET 5 I ECLASSIFIED IAW E O 1295B OPNA' t'INST 5513 1'6 SllRlES - A SECRET war is based upon a coldly calculated date A preemptive war is based upon what a nation believes its enemy is about to do The acceptance of dependence on either a preventive war or preemptive war can be dangerous for any nation The reason for this is that weapons systems would then be so designed as to be of maximum usefulness for that type of war A nation adopting this as a basic national policy would not be ready to accept the first blow It would expect to initiate war the other nation It would expect to get the jump on It would expect to devastate the other nation before it is devastated Although a preventive war would be determined largely upon intelligence data a preemptive war is absolutely dependent upon having intelligence information The accuracy of intelligence from a prospective enemy becomes of paramount importance in a preemptive war A nation whose policy was to conduct a preemptive war would have to be very certain that its intelligence was correct and that it was not rigged or unduly influenced one way or the other even by its own nationals Such a nation would have to make sure that double agents and false information and all the other tricks of the subtle devious intelligence trade were screened out and that it actually had solid intelligence that the enemy proposed to strike 6 So far SECRET I E LASSIFIED IAW E 0 12958 OPNA·vINST 5513 16 SERIES SECRET such intelligence data has not been possible to achieve No nation has ever had such positive information that it could act with certainty This was borne out even in World War II when if there ever was such positive information we had it The execution of both preventive war and preemptive war would depend primarily upon weapons of mass destruction to destroy the enemy's capability so completely that the enemy could not in turn wreak significant damage upon the nation initiating such a war This i s hard to do against a country in which the location of missile launchers will not be known It is impossible to do against such weapons systems as the Polaris weapons system The important thing in both of these wars 1s for the nation who initiates such a war to be able to insure that it can actually destroy the enemy's military capability without itself receiving disastrous damage The exercise of the initiative is a little bit different still The exercise of the initiative also means that when a nation is convinced that the enemy is about to attack it will exercise the initiative and attack the enemy This is preemptive war It is a synonym for preemptive war but using more gentle language and leaving out the term 11 war 11 • It might mean that the ruler of a nation exercises the initiative to attack when he is positively convinced i e • SECRET I ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNA i'1NST 551 16 SERIES I i I SECRET I when he is certain that an att ck is imminent I Certainly a ruler if I I I he were convinced that the enemy was going to attack his country I II should not sit on his hands until the bombs or missiles actually arrive II Certainly too a ruler who is not sure that bombs and missiles were I II heading his way would not want to initiate the destruction of half the world He would have to be positive would have to be convinced He would have to know l He i iI He could not take the chance of initiating such a nuclear war just because he thought that his country was about to be attacked indeed I His intelligence sources would have to be good II I They would not only have to be good he would have to have II I II II absolute complete confidence in their accuracy I It is of course necessary as stated before that a ruler I exercising the initiative when he is convinced his nation is about to i be attacked must do everything he possibly can to inflict the maximum I I ii I J t amount of damage on the enemy and at the same time must protect his own country as best he can this There should be no restriction on At the same time the ruler must be certain that he himself is not initiating a war which would not otherwise occur If a country places too much reliance upon being able to exercise initiative or conduct a preemptive war it places too great a dependence upon the reliability and effectiveness of its 8 SECRET ECLASSIFIED IA W E _ J '2 58 OPNA' 'JNST 5513 16 SERIES SECRET intelligence system It also creates a philosophy which may generate weapons systems that are not usable for other situations and- -i e would not be effective if the initiative were not exercised or if this was not a preemptive or a preventive war What is needed instead are weapons systems which could not be destroyed by the enemy no matter what he does This will eliminate any hair trigger response as being necessary What is needed is the ability to confront an aggressor with graduated power sufficient to deter to prevent him from conducting any kind of a successful war In other words we must make certain that if the enemy wants to start a war his country surely will be destroyed This comes from invulnerable weapons systems which the enemy cannot destroy if he exercises the initiative or conducts a preemptive war or preventive war We use the word invulnerable in connection with the Global Fleet Ballistic Missile System Of course there are no degrees If a system is invulnerable it is invulnerable and of invulnerability it cannot be just a little invulnerable Any single Fleet Ballistic Missile submarine is of course vulnerable to counteraction of one kind or another This vulnerability of the single FBM submarine is of a small order but there are possibilities of sinking it under j I lECLASSIFJED JAW L SECRET E 8 OPNA l1 NST 551 3 16 a l I I ----- - ' SE_'RI_ES_ _ _ Jf SECRET some conditions However the Global Fleet Ballistic Missile System as a whole is invulnerable because not all Polaris submarines can be sunk at once This differs from land-based systems in fixed known locations because if the enemy has enough missiles all fixed missile sites in known locations can be destroyed at once Hence it is proper to say that the Global Fleet Ballistic Missile System is invulnerable but it would not be proper to say that a Fleet Ballistic Missile submarine is invulnerable This is a fine distinction perhaps but it is necessary to make that distinction in view of the care with which other agencies go over our statements ln summary the key to true dete r rence lies in the inevitability of ruinous retaliation This in turn depends on the ability of the retaliatory force to survive and function as a striking force · The ability to retaliate with constantly deployed naval striking forces carriers missile ships and POLARIS submarines will exist before during or after any attack launched by an aggressor The Polaris- loaded submarine entirely 7hidden and moving quietly beneath the sea is in fact virtually invulnerable It cannot be zeroed-in for destruction The individual ship is practically immune from detection To find quickly and to destroy even a significant percentage of the deployed force is imp ossible Starting a preventive war therefore in the i SECRET face of their retaliatory ability would be suicide This same invulner- ability provides time for development of any situation and for decision thereby relieving the pressure to initiate preemptive war No hair- trigger decision based on real or fancied intelligence is necessary The ability to retaliate will exist before during or after any attack launched by an aggressor Polaris submarines will remain on station at all times whether we are at peace or engaged in conflict short of general war Their operation will entail coordination with other ships continuous movement defense against enemy submarines and intermingling with other friendly submarines jeopardized Their safety and effectiveness must not be Accordingly the Unified Commander controlling all other friendly Naval forces in an area must also control the Polaris submarines Our naval component commanders controlling other major naval forces assigned to currently established Unified Commands now have the authority experience and organizational machinery to accomplish this It is clearly recognized that the number of Polaris submarines deployed and the targets they are assigned must be coordinated with other U S Strategic Forces • • This coordination belongs at the highest level - the Joint Chiefs of Staff through them this widely dispersed deterrent will also be directly responsive to the will of the Chief Executive SECRET 11 I JECLASSIFIED IA W E _ 12958 OPNA' 'INST SSU 16 SERIES UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT ON BALLISTIC MISSILES These days one hears and reads a great deal about the missile gap This simple phrase describing a most complicated problem is causing much confusion among even we 11 informed people Without attempting to predict enemy intentions an analysis of his probable capacity and production versus our own brings order out of confusion and permits a realistic evaluation of the implications of the missile gap At the outset it should be said that if the missile gap means that a country on a given day say today has a numerical advantage in the number of ICBM's available then the Soviets may lead us This does not mean as some would have us believe that we are faced with imminent catastrophic attack The diversity striking power and world- wide deployment of our forces particularly the mobile ones presents such potential national destruction that even the maddest Russian probably must be deterred This does not discount the Soviet threat either present or that predicted for the future In the form of the ICBM the Soviets now possess an equalizer which frees them from a secondary position to our long predominant vast nuclear strength significant This is most certainly It warrants emphasis and more reliance on forces that possess inhe_rently characteristics of unfettered mobility long endurance and concealment But this threat must be viewed JECLASSIF1ED IAW E 0 129 OPNAVINST SSB K SJmlliS UNCLASSIFIED not as missile against missile but in the perspective of the Free World's tremendously diverse total-strength Let us examine the vastness of the enemy's problem of effecting total surprise wide scale An enemy strike must be coordinated and timed on a world- He must destroy enough U S and NA TO forces in his initial blow to insure that those surviving are incapable of penetrating his defenses to deliver what he considers unacceptable damage Even Mr Lodge was not told what Mr Khrushchev believes to be unacceptable damage Much is made by some of the millions of casualties the Russians endured in WW II Those who use that experience as a measure forget that those casualties did not occur within a few hours but over a period of many many months Consideration of the shock effect that millions of simultaneous fatalities not to mention the attendant casualties would have on the population of any country leads to the conclusion that not even the Kremlin would deliberately invite destruction of a single 500 kiloton warhead over Moscow or anywhere else in the homeland let alone a couple of hundred over selected targets The Soviet leaders have striven too hard to industrialize Russia during our generation to risk its devastation But in today's environment some people would have us believe 500 kilotons is a small yield Multiply it by five ten or whatever you wish but always compare it with the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was only of 13 kiloton yield Current estimate - Nobody really knows what it was but the estimates vary between 13 and 18 5 kilotons 13 UNCLASSIFIED I ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12 58 OPNA ' NST 5S13 16 SERIES UNCLASSIFIED Now recall the globe girdling disposition of our forces SAC bases sited from Okinawa to North Africa carrier strike forces ranging the millions of square miles of ocean from the Western Pacific to the Eastern Atlantic SACEUR 's tactical air and IRBM installations scattered about Western Europe - and the rapidly approaching most significant assured contribution to be made by POLARIS submarines A portion of the relatively slow reacting liquid fueled ICBM's and a portion of the SAC and TAC aircraft on the ground and ships in port might be surprised It's highly improbable though that the Soviets have or will have soon the capabilities to surprise and destroy simultaneously enough of our forces to warrant their risking the most severe damage to their people and country Further to catch even a portion of our forces by surprise the Soviets would have to have lulled us to a state of relaxation by a prolonged period of relaxed international tensions As you know during periods of international tension up to 80% of our ships are deployed SAC increases the rate of sorties and other forces are alerted for fast reaction The foregoing does not imply that we can rest on our oars that we will be safe and secure forever and ever or that this is an argument for the status quo Far from it As the number and performance of ICBM's and POLARIS type missiles available to the Soviets improve and electronic circuits become increasingly reliable our situation in fact the world situation can become precarious unless we take UNCLASSIFIED ECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPN - ------- - · · -Al 1NST 5513 111 L IiDTl 'c UNCLASSIFIED certain steps now For example with a system CEP of little over one-half mile a successful ICBM with a yield of about 6 5 MT would have a 90% single shot probability of destroying a missile site hardened to withstand 100 psi overpressure With technology advancing so swiftly the achievement of such a CEP could possibly be on the immediate horizon Although it is very difficult to estimate when such a capability might be available operationally to Russia it is obvious that it is just a matter of time Therefore there is little one can do economically to insure a reasonable degree of permanence in the survivability of anything which is fixed with its position known in advance Unfortunately the Iron Curtain and effective security control in Russia prevents us from having such advance information of their missile sites Reconnnaissance satellites may help But they will not be able to locate Russian missile launching submarines or all fixed missile sites which are either hidden or camouflaged let alone keep permanent track of fully mobile forces of long endurance which are relatively base indepe 1 dent As mentioned earlier this means that emphasis and more reliance must be put on forces which are fully mobile - not merely movable - of long endurance and if possible capable of being concealed Only by so doing can we continue reasonably to expect to provide an anemy with a suprise attack timing and coordination problem of the present almost insurmountable proportions UNCLASSIFIED 15 I I CLASSIFIED IA W E- · 2958 OPNA l1NST 5513 16 SERIES ------- ii - J UNCLASSIFIED War gaming is a useful tool for conducting an analysis of this kind War gaming ·however has become to many persons an end in itself It must be remembered that the results of a given war game are predicated entirely on the assumptions for that game In each war game the original assumptions must be scrutinized carefully and if they are they can give you a feel - nothing more for a particular set of conditions War gaming per se does not provide unequivocal solutions to the problems of national strategy We are continually using war gaming and other tools to shed light on and assist us in resolving the interplay of the many factors pertaining to the problems of national strategy There are no simple solutions and the re is no substitute for the application of informed judgment by knowledgeable men Within this context our present situation is far from catastrophic as many pundits would have us believe We have and will continue to have tremendous diverse power some of it mobile widely dispersed over the world We must not overestimate Soviet capabilities and underestimate our own On the other hand poor evaluations in the opposite direction might invite a catastrophic attack on the United States To avoid such total disaster and we can we must anticipate probable future enemy capabilities and our very long lead times for the development and operational introduction of today's UNCLASSIFIED 16 _E_C_ L_A_SS_Ii_ J_E'--D_I_A_W_ _E_-· 0 129_58_ _0PNA·vINST 551l 16 SERIES _i --------- J UNCLASSIFIED and the future's complex weapons The time is upon us when emphasis and more reliance must be placed on systems having unfettered mobiltty long endurance and if possible capability for concealment We cannot afford to give a potential aggressor even a rash gambler's odds by being finessed into a position wherein national survival may depend upon a hair trigger response to a few minutes warning UNCLASSIFIED 17 ECLASSIFIED - I AW E O 1 58 PNA -1 NST 551 16 SERIES