I JOI IT PLANUING FROH A SERVICE VIEWPOINT delivered by DEFun' DIRECTOR OF PLANS HEADQUARTERS USAF ' to the AIR UAR COLLEGE on 12 JANUARY 1961 'll99Z-61 I Ap s tf'I 04978 Rl • INTRDDUCTION _ FOR THE l'AST TWO MO fillS YOUR CONSID£1 ATION OF 'FACTORS AFFEC'rlll U S MlLITARY STRATEGY HAS BEEN LIKE A Fll liliCll ' CHEF PREPAJU f 'l' liE SPECIALITE DE LA MAISON 11 YOU HAVE SHOPPED THE HARK£TS OF THE tNTKLLI GENCE COMMUNITY ND SELECTED FEDJ llAL AGENCIES YOU HAVE CHOSEN INJl EDimrS WITH GRU I CARE AllD J UDGMFQl' YOU BA VE USED liQUIRED THE MlllNG BOWL OF OSD AND 'I1lE JOlNT STAFF• BP A TEN LIGHTLY 1 TITH THE BUDGET AND FLAVOR EI 1 ITH SEl VICK IlOCllUNES ROLES AND MISSIONS AT nus POIN' l CAN'T ADVISE YOU WllETllER TO BB On FRY OR PEB l APS FREEZE YOUB CONCOCTION ROWEVER • TELL YOIJ A LITTLE ABOUT I CAN VAllOUS K lNDS OF TEHFEB A'l'UU Dit T YOIJI SOLUrION WOUU J Avit TO SURVIVE IN THE EVE tY YEAR WatLD OF KILlTAB Y I WILL llKVlll1 BIUEPLY mE JOIBT PIWGl AM FOR PLAHNING TO ESTABLISB A romr OF DEPA IU1JIUt FOB A SOMEWEAT DETAILED AND lLLDS'lllAnVE LOOK Al A JODIT PIIJi UOO PROBLEM AND FINALLY I VIU CONCLUDE WITH SOME Wl1 E OR LESS JlANDOM AND PERSONAL OBSEll VATTONS THAT SEEM PEB rlHENT THE JOINI PROGRAM TUE JOlll'I PROGRAH FOR Pl ANlllm • IN mE 011 DKR L DISCUSSIOli COMPlUSF S A CHART O ON JOINT LONG RJ l iGE STRATEGIC ESTIMATE JLBSE • A JOINT SillATEGIC OBJECnVES PL AN JSOP AND A JOlliT S1' RATEGIC CA PABILlll ' S FLA ti JSCP GENEILU LY FRODUCED UCB YEAR FOil TliE TD IB PERIODS INDICATED l'llST nm JOINT LONG IW k E STRA'l'EGIC F STIMATE - THE JLRSE - CHART O OFF CHART I ON IlllS ESTI MilE COVERS A FOUR-YEAR PERIOD BEGINNING EIGHT YEAllS IN THE FU'l Ui E IlS l'tml'OSE IS TO Pll DVIDE GUIDANCE FOR FUTUi E ILIIAB Y FOLICIES PLANS AND PROGRAMS AND FU UR R UV1El T Oi' NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES rI COliTAIBS Alf Al'PiAlSAL OF THE WORLD SUUA 'IIO i AN EVALUilION OJI' TRENDS WHI CR COULD INfLUENCE KILITil Y • ECOOOMIC Am FOLll'lCt L COUi SE Ol' ACTION• AN J'OJU' CASTS ·ri E NA11lll Ol' POSSIBLE IBTER NATIOWII CON 'L LTS • INCLIJDUfG THE WEAPONS AND TF ClllfIQUES LIKELY TO BE EMPLOYm BASED ON THESE U'PRAISAL 5 THE ESTIMATE LISTS POSSIBLE U S COt m sES OY MILITARY AC'IION ru TE UIS OF S'IRA TEGIC CONCEPTS AND MILIUR Y POSTURES REQUIRED FOil U S SECUllTY DUB ING THE PfilUOD UNDER COMSIDEi ATION SINCE I AM NO'I GO rn' TO DISCUSS TllK JLRSK IN DE'IAIL TODAY ' lEFORE WE LEAVE IT WE SHOUID RECOGlfIZE THAT SHOULD 11 COGNIZE THAT IT IS AN ES TE ONLY AND THE JCS USUALLY PUT U TO llfI QUIBTLY VITH A NOTED STATE I WAlll' TO n uo r mAT nm Ant Foaa DOES COBSII ER TEE CUB REHr IQ Pi ASlS 'tHOlX llT AllD AfflUffl II GIVEH mIS LONG RAIJ E £n'OllT TO Wt xrDlRR ADf1 UATE OR HP' AllilQ'UL VE HAVE AND WILL COJrl'INUE TO PRESS FOR A Klll E COlfSIDERFJ AND USFl'UL LOOO-RA I R PLAmntG DOCUMENT PAllTICULARLY IS THIS STRATEGIC GUlllANCE FOR OUR LONG LEAD R D PROGRAM TOO OF' ' 'l THE JLRSE Al'PEAllS 'IO J UllllER-STAMP OR TO BE A MERE EXTENS O f '5 -nm mn aMltDIATE PUJI · - CHART l nm li jl OBJECTtVXS PUN i OFF CllART 2 ON TRE rn FUN PRODUC l D IN ACCORDANCR 1 11m nm PLANN m I 1 I I I P'B OGlUJC IS 'JllE JOm S'mA TECIC OBJl cTIVES PUN Wit CALL I I THIS PLA N JSOP ' AlID IT IS IDK n'DIED BY Tli W •TD R PERIOD COll'i iED • 'llllJS tllK JSOP JUST APPROVBD BY '11lE JOim CKIUS OF STJ W llll lil VEK lm IS JSOP•66 - 'IRIS PLAJI COVERS A 36-Klmll·PmuoD' Bf GDmlll FOml TIWIS IR 'rim rtm' JU -'l'liE i I' I l'Ual'OSE 0'1 'IlilS' l'UB l S-TO PR OVIDE GUIMHCE FOJl nIE ANNUAL I I I SERVICE JllIDG TS MmILUATI08 l'UHlfllC Ali S'laATmIC I STOCZ u n -'llllS GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED BY It 'IliNSLA'IIOU I OF NATIONAL 01lJECTIVES AND POLICIES nn O MD ITAU OBJECTIVES AND S'IJ ATE Y l1IE CltllI CAL lll REDIENT · IS EMBODIED Dl 'IRE I 1 i'OB Alli ASSDMED D-nt Y OP A GElffiIIAI AR BF GINlfIHG FOU i Y ARS ' ' Am LOOISTlCS UlilJIRE- FORCE OllJECUVF S IN 'IllE FtJ'11JRS - lifllTS FiOVIDE TllK USIS FOIL SEil VICE BUDGET i EqOES'IS _ ClF 'DIE TllLE fUN 'DI£ nus tNDICATES AS IS Alf OBJECTIVES PLAN ' AND IT SETS A D EFllUTE PATIEliN FOO TUE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF OU i HILITARY FORC S FOR IRE YEARS PIUOR IO 11lE ASSUMED D-DAY AS WELL AS FOIi A CONSID RARLE PERIOD OF TIME THJ Jl FM'Tl Jl CHART 7 OFF CHART 3 ON 11ilS CHARl' DKPICTS ' RELA TJ ONSHIP lJE'IjfE lf THE JOINT • • ' S'IRAl'El IC OllJECUVES PLAN AND SERVICE BUDGE' l'S ·• A CCOBDiro 'JD nm nm JOINT PR OGRA 'l CHIEFS Of sun llAVE ESSE UIJ LL' APP i OVED A JOINT SIB Arr orc OllJECTl VES PLAN WlIICll D-DAY OP' l JULY Ol JEC'IIVES lip L p E D IO • • • • • • - ·' ' • • • • '- '· ' • • l liE • 19 U ' T FOB CE_ SJ q ITT'AJIY OP' DJ FEl lS 1 • • ' • '· • ' • FOR HIS • - fft R _ U X llS - GUIDARCR • n ' • J • • -- - - r 4ltJ FCf WARD me M 1 0 PIE SEJI V Cf4 FOR USE I lMITATIOWl MANPOWE11 ·-•· - tm GETAU GUID t I XHF S SUCH t s -·• -- '-°'' ••-• • • _ a ' • •· • I • ' • • Dua nt n x E't Fl EFARATI01' -·· _ - l1lE 6 ll VJ ES THEN DEVELOP Ill UR INDIVIDUAL BUDGET J · ·' • I ' • • ' ' •• • REQUEST$- All£ FQl J lABDro TO THE f Cl E'IIIBY - ' ' OF DEFENSE AND ' ' THE laF AU 01 'Ore BUDGET FOR · · ' ' llEVIEll ' ' 'lllE R RSUUS OF l1lES E - · ll EVIEWS FR OD E 'IRK _ Dl l' ARlliEllI OF DElEl'lS E BUOG E r IU qUF S T It I _ • 1 ' ' J BUDGET HESS AGE TO THE NEW CQN JlliSS CONGIIBSSIONAL ACTION lliNSl'OSES 'HK BUDG E'l UEST INTO lXlLUll AI'nO L TlONS l 'l 1 JULY l 2 TB ESE FUNDS '1llEfi QRLIGATED AND SPENT SO AS T O BY l JULY _19 65 'DIE OBJECtlVES SET FOJITl l IN THE PI AN CHART OFF CHART 4 ON mrs IS THE UST PLAN UIR ED PY m E JOINT SIIIATEGIC ABILITIES l LA l PL UI FC t nm JOIN'I Fi OGRAM -- IS me JOINr MPLO'lMEUr Oi' PR RS ENILY AVAIUBLE U S MILIURY F l' UJl nm COR IWilIOH OF nm COU WAR A LIMI 'IED WAR 0 o l E iEVJ WAR · lT IS mEPUED A GE fERAL WAit COULD oa llEVISED L NOlu LY J ID ASSl»lES lli EAX our AT ANY TIME DU lNG HE PER WD '1llR PI AH IS Dl EVFECT 'I T 'IllB 1'l AIII r TF S OUR M lTIOJQL f l lClES DlTO KILlTilY OBJECTIVES• SIR4Tl GY • AND TAS IT _SETS FOllll mE D Q ' Of Q 8 • MlLITAB Y FORCES BOtll mos IMMFJllitKi Y_ •v Au 4BLR S WELL AS THOSE W1llCH - 1IS '111RU IZED BE i'ORE - AVfQ D 't M ' tlllS IS THE ' JODlI JrlGHTI 00 FLU BASm UPO ll 1'lUS PLA I• MILITAi Y SEi VlCl' o ASc - FACll UNil'XF J • ID 61 'RC u'Ul COl KMm • DiAIJS · U1 c tJllllENT C4PilIL 'IIES l'Ll iS AN EME GEa 'Y Wil FI ANS • TIUS PLAN W S 13 JlRTATI ED ANJfEKES AHi IS nm_ COKPLRTE CL Rllll'I WAR PUB- OII WllICB ALL OF THK c DCa WAR PUNS ARl E D · Tlnt llEV PLAN FOR l'IEXT JULY -- JSCP-62 -- WA FINALLY APl'llOVED UST M N'I'H AND WILL CIVS me ' INCs A 6 iJNTIIS LF Al TIME FOB D - LOPING THEIR FY 62 WAR PLANS CHART 4 OW OP' TUE TilREE MSlC JOim' l'LANS THE S ST SIGNIYICANT nra AND OffE IJM LVIJt M ST SERV Cl' DI SAGl1EJ KE l IS mE Jbmr SntA TEGIC OBJECTIVES PIAN - 01t JSOP IODAY I YOULD LDm TO DISCUSS TBAT PLAN FUl TlffiR THIS IS THE ONE WlCli SHAPES nIB STR OCTlltE AND lDGET OF THE MILITARY SEJI VICES ALL OF ·nu MILITARY SJ l VI CES HAVE DEVELOPED UNILATERAL llEQUilU MEllIS WHICH ' AlCElf 'roGE'mER ADD UP TO A I IMP tESSIVE BY llli' ll SSIV'E I M AH IDIAITAI ILIBLE DEYENSP BUDGET mucu AIU MAlfl ' Acr Jf S YIRS't HICH BUDGE T CURRm nn JtESULT m nus INITIAL 'CtW' AI ISTICAU Y Vt ARE Ill A Tl ANSttlOH PEi IOD BEI l'EKN llf Al O il SYSTPJ-5 AND RADICALLY NEliT FO'l'Ult'E 'l1IElIB lE All FACED llY Al'ON SYSTi 1- vrm nrr Rl 4UiltEMK IT ro FOR 1'1' I EIUfIZE CUllD1l' FOBCES 111 ORDD'l TO M Ill'IAIN OUII nr-llEI C · s nm - WHICH TO FIGHT ANY ONO OF YAR n AT MIGHT ARISl AND AT 'DIE SAME TIME WE ARE FAC'fD 7llB TlIE NEED TO D'EVELOP AND BUY Nm 'I'Yl'ES OF ID 'APONS OI' BV1'lt na BF 4S T' C COST IN ORDER TO MAINUIH AT WST QllAL'IUTIVE AH ·QtWmTATIVE IJI'm O Jlt ENEMr · COMPARABll ITY THESE lAY J VElll'IUALLY REPLACE 'IO A ·tuvE DE GaE E nlOSl' EC DI USE BY Tim SER VICES BUT IN '1'IIE D11 L FORCE S' 'RlJCTtlR E - ONE THAT IS PROVEN AND CRE WE lCH IN m E YU'IURE 'i1lI L BE WU EYP'ECTIVE BUT AT THE PRESLllT DOES NOT GIVE us AD UATELY r ' JJU E w nm MIX OR ' BALABCZ IS A' CB lTICAL QUF ST C 1 OF- JtlDG mT l1C THIS EBA 01 r ·• · 'I_ · ANOnIER F'AC'I'OR WRICH GREATLY U CREASKS nm R EQUI NTS FOR MILITARY FORCES IS 'rnE INDEP'IllITE NATURE OF fflB CONTINGENCIES 'wH CH WE ' UST l E PRE PARRD TO MEET AND THE VARIETY OF CONCl PTS AND STRATEGIC COURSES UNILATERALLY DEVELOPED AND SUPPORTED nIESE FACTORS RESULT IN EXTRl KEI ' ' · LARGE INITIAL MILITARY DEMANDS FOR THE TAll'AYER'S DOLLAR ti SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT AN A I'I'RARY CEILING ON IBE DEP'El Scc JDG'ET T S INEVITABLE nrn AND MANY OF STA' i'ED SRUVICE IBQUIREMENTS WILL NOT BK MET E ACH SERVICE ' ' HEREFORE TE 'IDS 'IO EMPHASIU mosx CONCEPTS STRAffGIC COURSES AND CONTINGENCIES WIC f ENHANCE ITS CHANCES 'roR SECURING THE GREATEST PROPORTION OF AVAILABLE mIS DIP'FE CE IN EMPHAslS COLORS nIE VIEWPOINT RESOURCES OF EACH SERVICE OH EVERY ELEMENT WICH E1fTERS mro nra PLAN AND'IT IS IN nns UNILArrRAL FRAME OF REFERENCE mAT THE SERVIC S APPROACH nIE JSOP PUNNING PROBLEM AT T IIS POINT A 'ID IBFORE GOI1l'G P'UlrmER INTO nm PLANNING PROCESS ITSELF I nIINJC YOU SHOULD TAKE A QUICK LOOK ' OCCURRE iJ llE BACKGROUND AND l1lE MAJOR CHJ NGES nlAT HAVE 'IN m Jonrr-' PLANNDIG STl IJC'IURE OYER TIIK LAST TEN 'YEARS ' I· l'RlOll 'l'O COMMIT EJ ' simvtce ANl t oonum BY STRATP Gic PLANS OP rnrs ' ' ''i ' THE REORGA _ lATIOH AC'r'OF 1958 STRATEGIC l LANS uc u THE im JOIN'l' MADE UP OP' nm-PLANNERS ROM rue nzru1Y DIRECTOR FOR JOINT STAFF DRAP'Tttl r r • PLANS COMMITTE WAS ASS1STu7l IN 'ffiE JOB BY ' ID' JOWT STRATEGIC PLANS GROUP G I C PLANS GROUP OF TI E JOINT STAFF' AND ORGANIZEQ IN MANY nrrum-HAN Pl ANNlNG 11 A ' S TIIE COM -IITTIIB NORMALLY MET TWICE WEEKLY AND CONSIDERED JOINT PLANS AND OT l 11 AGENDA ITVtS MUCI OF THE GIVE AND TAKE 11IB NEGOTIATION ' IN JOINT PLANN NG WAS ACCOHPLI31IBD BY nrrs C OHMITl'EE AND nus COMMinEE LIKE IT HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED onIBRS AS ONE RESULT OF nIE REORGANIZATION ACT n E Nl'l1 ORGANIZATION REVRALS TIIE FOLLOWING PLANS STRUCTURE IN nm JCS OIART s· ON YOU SEE 'mAT 11IE JOINT STAFF IS NOW CONVENTIONAL IN NAnJl X wtm THE FORMER GROUPS AND 1iWiS REPLACED I y nm J-SKCTIONS SOME OF m OLD PLANNING FUNCTIONS RAVE BREN GIVEN TO UIB NEW J-3 SECTIONS BUT MOST AS YOU WOULD KXPECT HAVE GONE TO THE J- enc CHART 5 OFF nns CHART INDICATES nIB AIR FORCE -- JCS PLANNING RELATIONSHIP CHART 6 ON AS you' ooi su LEVELS Di mERE rs miPLAlmrirc PROCFss llOm SIDES' 'st' ' ' nIE RELATIONSHIP AT omCER Acn o ALL oN m'EI EMENT Ill' nm 'su ss ·or m SYSTEM ARE THESE -owrcklii ucr l' l'i 1iu Y i CLOSE f - CC PARABI E IN RANI I EXPER niCE AND BACKGROUND TO YOU HERE IN TiiE WAR COLLEGE - ABOUT EOUALLY D 'ID ill COLONELS AND' SENIOR LT -COLONELS '- 1 L AND IH ORMAL I ARE DEVELOPtm AT THi ACTION nIE SERVICE I'L NNER OFFICER LEVEL • nrnouGH HIS STATED COt-iCUP c ENCE -- -- - _- __ _ - --- ____ __ ----_- ___ --------- ' - EEP El UNDER CONSIDF UTIO f IN 'IHE JOIHI' STAFP LARGELY DffiJtKillES nIE l IOBJOOAD 'fOR TRK OPERATIONS DKPUII E AJIJ THE JCS WITii EACH L VVEL 'IRYING TO REACH AGREEI VIWS · · THE BASIC THEORY BEHIND JOINT PLA llll'Ill IS TO APPLY THE g AND EXPEllIENCE OP ALL ''DIX MILITARY BER VICF S IN ORDER TO COME 00T ill'IH THH BEST POSSDILE HILITAJI Y 'IN THE NATIONAL Ufl'EREST ANSWn ROH A RE' 41 ISTIC STA IDPOIBT I AM SURE IT IS CLKAll TO YOU THAT THE 11 ESOLTS ACHIEVE AB$•SELDOM TROSE CLF AR 6PARX Llll GEMS OP' KILITAR Y JUOGM rn'I' ARD WISDOM WRICH IS THE GOAL 01' nm PUR fill 1'2 0CESS • CHART 6 OPF • CASE IN POINT -- YOU ARE WATCHING THE DlWELOPMKRT OF THE Junn' STRATffiIC OBJECTIVES PUN FOR ' FY 66 1 ' ' ·' 1T IS lllll'P'Elll Ulll Y 1960 · · THE AST Yl I R F ACH OF 'I'HK SDVICES AS THE JOIMT STAYV · BAS PREPAREI PER'lilllllC TO A VAJ ··sITUAnON A· CIIEAT· Ntl'KBER AS 0 STUDIES IH nm 1965-1968 TIME PEB 10D THESE HAVE BEEJf KADE·AVAILAJIU TO· THI' JODl'r STAFFi AND TKE Jonrr STAFF Oi'FICEIIS RAVE BEEB TROSLOOGHL' l XP ISED T f 'rnEIR ™R SERVICE V EWPOINTS THROUGH MANY R t JRS O'P n - O tKAI DISCUSSION WI'IH ACTION OFFICERS AND OTHER PLANNERS · A CONTnmnc· LIAISON XISTS BE'IWKKN SEltVJ CE ACTION OFFICERS AND rnE RASIC tJAlt PLANS' BRANCH OF - 1-s ' AT UST nm BASIC' PRAF'l' OR FLIMSY'' WAIi ciS BRAlZ ' TI HAS DEVELOPED A Fill ST AS L s3 NORMALLY CALLED OF UIE JSOP FOR TI 66 IBIS DRAFT I AnGELY BASED UPON A I ' LARGELY BASED Ul'O S l NA 'IIOIUL INTELLIGENCE ESl D TE FOlt THAT TIHE PERIOD• DICLUDES STUTFl tC MILITl Y OBJECTIVES Iv STRATEGIC APPUJSAJ • lND A STRATEGIC CO ICEPI 'OlIS DliPT IS mEB SEN'r to O' llD JOINl' S'IAff AGEKCIES AND TO m ACTION OFYICEltS OF l ACB SEit VlC fOR INFORMAL COMMENT 'IRK SllU n GIC MIUTARY 011 EC'IIVF S ilE CHECXED TO DETll 11 MINK IF 1lIXY lll' P'LF CT ADEQUATELY tHE HILlTAR Y ASPEC'IS OF HAnoNAL POLICY AS lli'TE ii lIBTEO BY THE SKllVICE Of 'l'HE ACTION OP1'1CKK llEVUliIR THE i'APKll IN COMSIDEIUOO 'lllE STRATEGIC Al'PRAISAL IT IS IllMEDIATELY APPARENT WHICH COtlCEPT THE JODff STAFi' HAS ADOPTED IRE lNFIJIENCR OB ACX THFJ FXlY O ' UCB SE lVICE KEMBl'Jt OF TlU BASIC WAlt PLANS BllAHCII IS ex EARI Y Hl'IICE BT Ill IMFOiMALLY ON Dm ''FI Df Y AND LAIER ON nm SECOND DRAFT Oil BUFF EACH SERVICE A TEKFTS - 1'0 L UECT mIO 'tHE APPllAISAL DIOSE FACTORS WJUCl l WW HIGHJ IG'll I THE NERD FQJL llS Pil'IICtlLAB FOB CES TO -2E'I -CWl'OOEHCIES OF ITS OWB PRIKAR Y Q ICEU • · EXAMPLE - OVERSIMPLIFIED BtTI WITH SCME BASIS IN FACT -YE' LL SAY nu T 'IRE Al HI FAVOitS i l APl'BAlSi i' llBICB lil'tiASIZES Tim l'OSSllII I EY DURIH IRE l'EIUOD UND CO lSIDEUTION A CONDITION CJY lllTUAL WCI EAR STA ID ATE'' WILL l'KEVAIL ntE ARMY BXLIEVES 'IHAT A GENERAL WAR IS 'MI1CH LIULY THAN LIMlTil WAR ANI THAT lllE SOVIET AlWY WIU CONllNlH-' TO BE THE ' lllADITIO llA AND DEC IS IVE ELEMENT FOB IMPL 'liFB tIN A CONTINENTAL Snu n GY ll E NAVY FAVORS ' - nm VY_P'J VORS llIAT PORTION OF mE SAL WICH t nm lNDlc TES PI cGRAM THAI- nm USSR WILL CONTINUE ITS HA VAL CONSnUCTION SOVIETS Ail B INNlll' TO CONSIDER 'mAT CO WWL OF '1l E SEA IS VIIAL TO SUCCESS IN WAR • AND THAT THE ' I'R X Wf CAN SOVIE NAVAL I CONS ITt rn DIR EX nru AT TO THE UNITED SIA TES ND lIS ALLIES • IN P THE NAVY ENDORSES rru ESTIMATE THAT UHITED '-1 R WILL BECOME THE li lRE Fll DBABLE J 'Ollh Of MII iTAB Y AGGR ESSION BECAUSE Ilf LIMITED ' ' ' WAB U X Oi'1 AND nu Dl ·- Wl ill'Oli ' 1 iYSTEMS lfAVE A aoµ AND THE NAVY ' ' MARINES Mil BF CAJT ED ON PIRST our Tl E AIR FORCE Stll'roRTS AN Al'FliISA waICH INTS • -• • · • ' ' • • ' I • • ' ' Hil lliE SOVIET _ MISSII ES AND AIRCRAFT C • SIITUTE THE ' - - ' ' ' · • ' ' PltIMall Y T lD 'nlE UNl' rED STATES AW 'll AT BALLISTIC ' - ' ' ' 1- LSSll FS WILL GBEATI Y l NCR F Al iE THE ABll l'l'Y OP' T1IE USSR TO •• ·-·• ' - • · • • '· ' IliAT I lSSlL ' • • J I ' • A' l'TACK J ClllEVE SUJU 'llSE lllE INITIAL _ ' ' - ' n - ·• · ' q ' --· ' IS NOTED ALSO nAS_ ijADE lM 'R ESSIVE P i OGRESS IN SPACE •' ' • I • ' • t ' I•' • TlllS lS THE PB E UMINARY -- lo TEST ll OF _ J ' • smrmIUS A iD J UTiffS'iES AUD lJ ENnflES · ' l ' ' ' ' I ' - l • · _ ' • • OP'_ THE SPLITS WIDPl WILL I DzyEL ll' • • • ' '- • i ' ' J_ smnx rc Al'J'iAISAJ 1 _ _ - - l1iE ·' · ' • OP _TllE SERVICES ON THE 1 1 • '_ · J'UIS BOlJ lNG iF ' -· - 1 • · - •J Wl 1 EETINGS ·- · - SERVICE AC'llOS OFFICF RS THE USIC WAI l'u NS •• ' - ' •• ' •• ' · INC1 UDFS I • • • FO • ' DE$ • ' J _BY_™- •• OF 1ANCH FINALLY • EilVIC - ll F Stn l --r A DltAFT S'IRATF GlC APPRAISAL THAT 'WILL SW ' '• ' - CLAD S OF EA CR SER VICE FOR MA JOit roacES t ··• • L · ' uJOR ESS THE S'Dl4Tl GIC CONCEPT ' ' THE ' T THE 1llE Sml VICES · · 't · ' · IIEaE Tllli SITUA' CION BECOMES i RE BINDUlG BECAUSE k MOllE BINDI l1G BECAUSE 'nlE CONCEPT ADOI'TED CAN SHAPE _tHE Foru E OBJECnVES THE All l O tc E ADVOCATES A COtlCEI I OF FREP FOR A GEW llAL - AR t 'HlCll WILL occi ra UND ER • A BEST • TACUCAL WAilNING 'IHI WOULD REQUIRE READINESS 'IO EMPl OY SVBSTANTIAL NlJMBERS OF NUCLEAR WF Al'ONS FROM TlIE OU'l'SE' t · -- THA't IS AN IMMEDIATELY RESl'OtilSIVE OFl'ENSE AtiD RETAINS BUBS'IAN rtAL FORCES FOR All DE E lS E OJ ' THE UNITED S'IA' ES nm AIR FORCE BELIEVES tlIA'l' ffiE MILITABS FOSTURE lll'FOR rll G 'llllS CQ 'CEl'T WOULD DO tilS'I -'IO t WAR WB E aER G OR LIMITE I WOULD l O'l us Dl A l'OSir i ON M ST LIKELY to mo m VIC OR Y ru GAll IlLESS Ci 8'1 J A CENEaAI WAR MIGl r ·STAR r 'l'HE- HAV'l PilOl 'OSES AOOPTlON O'Jl SEVE ZAL snu· IES WHICH lloCLUDE 'IHF FQSSI BLE £MPLQYM EN'I' OF NUCUA t WF Al'ONS YR OM THE OUTSET Oi A GENFl AI WAR D EJ AYEO USR OF NL'™· WEAI'OlilS A U llES'llUCTEl USE Ol ' NUCI F aB WJ APOR h nm WOULD AI SO EMPIIASIZ E l l m l f 1 '0R LIMLTED WARS WZ llCll MIGR7 OR l llGR' C IlO' t IliVQLVE tllE USE OF WIClEA WEAPOliS • nn Y ARE EXnEKELY li'LEXIllLE ·IN mE MA rIEB 01 S'IIIA' tEGIC CONCE l'T lllE Arufi SUPI'OB rS nm MIJLTll'LE 1 ' 0I'OSE1 BY mK W V Bl1£ WQllU II iCLtlDE TEE 'mPtx Bl' T MAJOR I'Pi ETRATION AUD OCCUI'ilIOB 01 SOVIET rnruu roll 'WILt BE nIE ONLY MEANS FOR OllJECTIVES • IN OBSE Wll G Il ESE DIVERSE Vlll S OB S'IRA' F GY YOU ARE AWARE EAT - Alm TO BE EXfECT ED IlECA USE llIBY IlNOLVE THE BASIC DOcmtNE LIND - - mE BASIC A ND CONCKF'IS OY OUR LA ml AliD ' - S Am FO l CES ' ' l'llESE DC CllUNtJ CQt CE 'µi ARE DEEP-ROO ED • • • - ' ' • • - j • • • • '' t ERE IS UITLE nD J OR CCl lPRQMI 5 OE BASIC • • ' ··• I • 'I • • • • • •' ·- I'RILOSOPBY _ON 't1lS FART OJ ·- 'IHE SER BASIC WAR - · -· ' WI ' rnE PLANS llJ ALlCll · mm PUSH P Oll W D 'IO •• • ·' · - • • - •' •• BENEFIT OF EEB VJ CE MUS ' - CO ' nm m c •• SIA GK Ill DlMll Ql'MER'I • -· • • •• • nm AllNUAL W AGlU EMEU't IS_ Jl Sl Gln•• L ' ·- ' ••• • '' L • • FllL U ' nm ·• ' s • - t' •_- OF 'IllE tJOINt 'S rA Vj A m lllE lil VERG KN'I •• ' • • • ' • • • • - VI Ol l__mE Sz B VlCES ARE F IO l J · ' ·-· O • · · ·' _mK '·•· ··- - ' - BECAJJSt OZ BE •-'• SIGUIFlCANCE Tl ll - 'SUBJECT • ANO mE BASIC N l1JllE OF TUE lraDF RI 'tlHG DIS 1GR£EMENlS• A DECISION IS HADE - ' -··· -· ' ' ' - ' - '• TO FOiru ARO nm 'l U l A r• THIS SIAGR 'IO ·-· · - t • -- ' • ' • ''' • ADr I rQNA Gq E Obi m • - ' - --• AF'IEll - •·· eomrs ' AI nm Ql IE FS _ • • I SSUK ' ·- S V JW Snu mJOllS SESS IllE J'OlNt •• a· ' • J O t • j ·•'· ' Cll1El7lf ' -lll E 'IO - O M m Cl FT RU'f i1J rflF FP F AND - T JFO S W AJ3¥ TO 1 · f' 7 A_ CONCEPT KI All_ R m ACCOODAW E GENEr AI LY WI'lll -qtA_ J f X¥4IX t 1 q_ IN s'f¥_A - P P 1£i • -' - f0 J¥I A r mrnAI WAR --lllUUTEI Wim A sorn NIICI E ll t rncit ·- • •• • - • • • ' ' OH _W t RN tlii 0 JiS TllE ru sm - 'J • • • - WAR THE Elil'WrnEm' • 4 •• • - • '·•· wua • • 'IlIE GOVERNDlG PRINCIPLE om UT l3 I s • ' AND - • - ¥'-SS ER ICT o ml lJF Al'Ol1S D muNG_ l'l1R STRATEGIC OPl' RA' l 021 IS 1lIAT · ·- rn INITIAL ll'S ALLIF S MUST ·· ' I 7 'I r - A l HEll GE Willl 't'H llESIDUM OVElt - Ll ADV Am AGE lillD 7 toNCUilRENTLY ·- '· ' -' Ollll S'I LATF GU OfERAnQL S MUST BE DESIG mD SO •AS TO ·' ' - - U FSWlVR · - - s - E W · l'llE u S AND ns' ALLIF S • '' ' D _ O j Bl ilONS °¥' onma ACII CmS ANI DEPLOW ENTS V - A l l roiCES tm L BE C0m UCTEI IN A CC QllDAW J - j llE STR TEGIC DEFENSE COLiCEPT ·· • · IN_ ADDI'IIO il• ·DiCR l ASED EMFBASIS IS GlVE i 'lO COllFLICTS SJ¥aT Oii' GliNEl AL liA 1 · nIE ARMY AND NA VY POSITION llEPF ATEDLY ronmm LESSER - our- mu nmsR IN THE JSOP J'ERI 01 THE CONl LICIS 1ilILL BE ''M llE LIKELY 1 It AI1t FORCE l'OSI'XI011 'WAS AIMED-AT COMPLETING llm Oll _· W P'llIEII WORDS CONFLICTS SHORT OF GF' NERAI - wµ I E ' 1 JXEJ ' HAR rnn ' 'IlW1 GENERAL WAIi - T ' NLY 11U S BAS t 'WAYS 5EEB mE CASE -WILL Uli001 '±IT Nlpf® ' O B SO · trn t pm t -· 19 - m- m 1965 than troT4 umm · THE RiSXS INVOLVED 11 2BA l y Y -t p µ _ Aµf E i N INCB ASED RELUCTANCE TO EEGAGE IN _ -1 iSl ACIALLY YBEil MAJOlL iSSUES AB E DCF JN TO 11 INJ Q w z AlID waEll E fflS DAOOER 01 ' l'HK'CONll'LIC' t l IPANDING TO N Jl1lF 6 tEa · i ·'' • · • · ·' S'pta rf1 r«LCONCEPJ FOR 1%$ hW CON'TAIBS MIJCB · DIS v lJSSION - AR ANll P'WILY iu ax NJZEs 'n A'1 ' TllE ABIµ'IY 'J ijE U•· 6 • l'O DE AL EFFECTZVELY JIN mn J TL'Y i J OU 1'1l E R S WIIJ CON'IINUE 'IO BJ C WCIAL 'IO OOR · ' _ · wrtll 'lJ E J $ sournoN llAC Tg '1 @l 'll R 1 · - nm BASIC RAR PLANS BRANCH GOES ENSUING DlWELOFlIBUI OF Ji PLAN BASED UPON THE APl'lWVF D CO i CEPT r 'IllE APFB fNEO CO Cl'l I' O 'll'Ell S llO - l'All'tl ULAB l'll Olll EK Sil CE I • C9i-cEl'T IS SO Iltl06DLY_S'IATED AS T O CO - E J J CW 'llIE SKB VICES FOR UNILA TE l AL SKB VICE INTER PBETATION CONCUR lN ' l 'l E i ROPOSAL A 'ID BY' 'IlIB It IS APl'lWVED Dil ECTO l STf PF OP THE JOINT THUS• Jll'R FOillTS AT ISSUE IT IS ··- ' NOT NE ESSAB 1 'IO ClUEFS '' PASS IT TO TH E OR lllE - Ol'ERATIONS ' DEJ U' lES · - - VIC 5 ARE 1 -' FORCE • TAB BA SED -'t um u s OF_ RCE __ - _ __ A l t m cAPf' II · _ - ·- -' p u · _ DF TRE Pru ntm ·- pmcr ' ·i1 i s ' QUA TE '1'9 BESQifflCF -··· -AND BUDGET4 - ' · 'fflE II ODJEC'Il YES Pll Orosz D • • ' SllBS'IAN'll 4 L JHlA Y l OB CE 11 TllE ' · ' I AIDiY JNCl tUDE A• • ' ' 011' l4 DIVISIONS • · Of 'IHESE • § IX' WO_l l IJ ' ED - nIE UNITED S'I4TESJ 1 · AllD 'l'BE_ JU MAlNDER •· ' • • • '-· • · • ' • · • • · - • •· • ' I 1 DEl'LO F t _TQ r m AND HAWAII ' ' 'HE•• • •• _ ' • •N -•'• •• '• u _s BASEi ED • _ 2F NS_ tllVISIO w u p1 _ r 11 fo ' • ii ' •• • AVA Q 1 lL ' iQ - - S •• I All GE MO BASE WOULD BE PROVIDED TO l'EBHir A ntEMENDOUS EXP l0£1 • ¥ ¥ J'J -m u ' BATEGIC - 0 1 '- l' U1Jl l 'l'O ·- fiUOil D DA Y WI A H WAR IN DD ARMY PROPOSES TO THE ' ' INCllEAS TL'Y IRK ERS Of lEFAR4 T E l-USSIU - ' ' BATL LIONS ' 6NI C ol Vl JJtY IU' Gnoo rrs _ _ ' • ' RESE WOlllJ 1 IE_ E QUIPPED WITH • • ' • • •• 4 • •• -· • ' ' ' - UIDED - 20 TO 1000 MILES RANGE · ' -ADDllION lllE All MY PROI'OSF $ 'fO HAK E I ' _ ' ' ' · ' • • • • • • - ' I • SIGNIFICANJ INCREASES IN TllE WHICH - '- _ - NUMBER ' OF ·'AAA · BAUALIONS ' I f' • _ -€_ wrm WOULD BE EQUIPPED A H DIFJ RD VERSION OF THE NIKE- wn i' Pi EPARIW nii IEll CUI ES · • - -----j · · _ · · WAY FOR l '' • MA Jcm -•-' • -- PB OCUREMENT - OP NDG' -ZEI IS-' ' - - _ - ·• 1 1 1 7 · --- ' · - 11li i14vJ' FOil Cl OBJECTIVES CONTEMPU TE CONl'lliUED 10 ·-clriou' 0 ·THE iru CARRilm FORCE coNVERSioN 'TO' stmi' ctiERIERS 'Ilw r VESSELS '' uso AI Oro vrm INCLUDE · SUPPORTING FOR A 'sti TE A REQUiru 'ffln' - ' TO CRUISER AND · SUBMA UNE FO NUCLEAR POWERED TO LAUNCII SURFACE -TO-AIR AS IIBLL AS SUllFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSlLF S AND SURROUND THE • ' ' • '•' t ' CARRIER FORCES vrnt A MORE EXTENSIVE AND COSTLY AIR DEFENSE - • - - · · STRIJCTURE 'lllAN THAT DEVOTED 'IO THE DEFENSE OF mE ENTIRE • ' • •• t ' - • • i · ' I OOll l1l A ICAN COli'IIlffiNT ' · r l ' • • IN ADDITION TR- Y WANr 21 NUCI l' AR • - PO JERED SUBMAB INF S EQUll'PEl' lJllH TEE POLARIS MISSILE AND • • _ ·-1 · -·- -· • •• • - -- • • v ··· • - LOOO LF AD TDm FROCUJUl ENT FOR All ADDITIONAL NUMBER LFADIN ro'A FcnicE·O E'-45 ·roLAJUS·s·UBMAR -- '•'miu E KAimE VISIONS 1'7ITH THEIIL O' lN WINGS _ I ·- t FOR Alll SUPPORT ARE INCLUDED t · · _ AS WITH ' TIIE ARM'i OBJ IVES 'IHl llE IS EMI'HASIS ON LONG TERM ·· r •_ - r · ·' · _ MDBILIZA n0N · · · r J 1i1 1 1 ·· · c' 1 ' 1 · - - _• j· · - _ · All FO J E FOll CE OB JECTIVES RE FLECT BJ MAUOR COMBAT wm s•kin- 's ·sq ariiis - - n - - AniIFi• ni · - r • 1 · •_ - · ' r ··- _· ' ' I WITH INCREASED NUMRERS m' MISSILE UNll'S • - 1-1 ·J Il · - 1· - ' • ·_ _ A - __ - • t -- i -A JJ7 ' lllREE sEll VICES' FORCE IBJECUVl - 1 _ _ - if' Z JW' i u --· • · n · - _ · 'T - ' r ' i' INDICATI S CLY ARLY 'mAT 'IBE l E ARE DIVERSE DlrERPilE rATIONS _ · • - • iJ __ - - 1_ · L• · J C • L OF 'IRE ROLES AND MISSIONS ALL nm EE SERVICES HAVE ' ·• L l --F f · · 1 • •• INDICATED A 11 EQUill EMENT FOR nm l UlM nm ARMY AND THE • ·- _· - · · · ' ·•·· • - r· ' ' -- - ·1 r AIR FORCE HAVE COMPET REQUI1tEMENTS FOR SURFACE-TO r SURFACE MISSILES IN •• z ___ • · - - SURP'ACE MISSILES IN 'IHE 300 TO 1500 MILE RANGE• AND BOTH ' • • • 1 • THE ARMY AND 'IllE NAVY ARE COMPETING WITH lllE AI1l FORCE FOR STRATEGIC AIR ROLES THE ARM' AND MAB INES CONTilIDE TIIBIR - · ' · ' PRIVATE COMPETITION IN THE ROLE OF lAND YARYARE ' • • N EIJ IJEAPONS HAVE COMPOUNDEJ nm PROBLEM OF RESOLVIN DIVER GENT SERVICE ' PHILOSOPHIES AS F ACH STRIVES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE NElo7 WFAPONS AND THUS m REASE ITS CON11UBUT10N TO NATIONAL ' - ' · - ' ' i · ' SECURITY ESTABLISHED ROLES AND MISSIONS HAVE LITILE · ' ' · RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON THE GRAIi FOR MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEl-5 · _ - •' · · · · ' •• • • • · • •'••I • · • · · ' · •·- '-' · 5 A DEnfil 'rE VERTONE OF SUSPICION AND B - • I I I • ' I ••· ' DESIRE TO HAVE THE PREDOMINANT ROLE ID SPACE OR FAILING THAT TO DFNY l1 AT ROLE TO AmnlER SERVICE EA CH IS M m A STROn • COMPETITIVE BID FOR nIE DEFENSE DOLLAR RECOGNITION · - •· -r - ' · • ' • AS THE DECISIVE FORt E AND FAILING THAT SERVICE SURVIVAL • _ l •' ' 4 • IN THE NAME OF BEIN A MAJOR CORl'JUBU'IOR TO NATIONAL · mESE ELEMENTS OF STRUGGLE IP YOU WILL ARE PRESENT - ·j - · 'Jf r_ •· · - 1 J • • _i i'•t· 1· AT EACH LEVEL OF JOim' PIANN n' ONE FUNDAMENTAL LESSON FOR SlJCCESSFllL JOmt PLANR IS TO KEEP PERSO ALITI ES OUT r ' ' ·r · G J - · • 1 -- - _- · i • 1T · r 1 - · •• · OF THE BUSIHF 5S DI OTHER TJORDS lllE CONTIWVERSIAL ISSUES · '_ ·_ r- 'fi '·r- 2 ' · ·' _' '·• · · - · 'i ' · n SHOULD BE DF ALT WllH OH AN IMPERSONAL NOT AH EM TIONAL - it ' · • ' j•_ · '· t' • -- i · 1 · _' BASIS m JOmr Pl ANNill YOU WILL SEE CASES OF DZCEPTION • ' '_ • i • AND COLLUSION -- JUST AS YOU WOULn SEE m Mri POKER GAME · - _ ' _· ' THE SIMPLE llESULT IS 'l'HAT IF SOMEBODY WINS SOMEBODY MUST t i' f' l · -·· L · ' _·_ ' • 1· ' ' _ · • '' I ·· - •· LOSE so THE EFFORT IS TO cur THE LOSSES AND MAXIMIZE THE • • • • • • _- GAINS' AND so ' EVERYBODY GETS SOMETHING ' · r ' WI'DllN ' nus FRAMEWORK CONVICTIONS IN - I FUAMEllORI COWIC'l'IONS IN THE NAnoNAI IN'l'E EST MUST BE HEU $TRcrzGI ANI rnu nw CLF RLY - PREUERAIJLY WILE • · i 1 ··• · ' 'j • TO mIS Em An·oet ASIONAL LlGm' 'IOUCR CAN HELP · IS AN EXAMPLE• IU CEN'ILY · 'mE ARMY PLAmtER lND '1'llE AIR FOR CE l'IANUER KtCHAR m ·SOHR rocuMENrS · n E ISSUE AT HAND WAS THE CONCEPT QFs EMPLOYING NUCLF AH WF Af i t· -'l'HE VIIl S WY RE DIAHEnUCALLY- OPPOSED ' THE AIR FORCE PUNNE R PRESEUTEI THE AllMY PLAN1IER Wl'rH A SUGGESTIOH ' ' •• • · I -CHART 1 ON •· • ··· · CHART 7lOW · · -· • · ·BOT LONG• · TH ARm SmT AmmE l PLANNING' · _ · '- • ' ''c · - CHART'--8'0 111 ·- · • BlJ'r IT-IS 00W APRIL OP' l 960 AND THE OBJF CTIVE FORCE • ' -· ' r RAVE 'OLD YOU ' GENERALLY HIY 7 l nm JUSTIPICA TIO -li'Oll -'mEIR CNra-A'O TroRCES1 PLANNEILS ARE CATI rn UPO ' f SUBMISSIOUS ' MM E BY FJ cH ro '' _ 1' SERVICES DEVELOP m t· 'IHE' 0 SE1l VICE nxt µLED AT OF- ·THE' OTllER smvii Es 'iHis •'t5' 'A TAJOI A REIATIVELY EU PROCEDURE -- BUT A SIG m7ICANT ONE m · MANY RESPECTSi-nllS'I IS Lilrn · 'rlll LING 'A NEIGHBOR WY 'ZOO' DON'T LIKE HIS Wil'E-AllifCHIIDllZ U- - A RKAl' 'COUIROVERSill L ElERCIS 'AS · - YOU WILL AP 'ilECIAn · NA'l'UltALLY THE FIRST - J y• 'rHE l'IRS'I IS_ AGAJ 'l' rn AIR _FO ru S SIONS FCllt mE S J G owms li' Dru E -- OIG_ MISSILES R-52 wn GS AND Am- URFACE MlSSILES 'JllK • • ' • • • ' • • • • ' • AR1tY AND FOR THE mM lm5 FB Ol'OSEI NAVY QIAJ I ENGR l1IE NEED _ BY n E FoacE AUD mE DEVELOPMEN r COSTS FOR - - RESIST ' FUNDAMEm' AL' DISAGllE EMENI OVER U TER GENEJlA TION MISSILES • Su t mE I ' · AIB iORC HAS PONE '·-•'- ITS HO 'i U • f1 LSO AND IT - ' -· ' ·----- - ···-' --- · ' '' ·- 9Vt · FRp B_A -BY nm Fmt nm HI E-ZEUS nm ouG l PIE '• PEIUOD OZ l1lE JSOP I • · • ·' • ' · - ·• '' I $l3 JllLLIO N • for ONLY 27 - - NI n-ZEUS SITES ALL PI ANNERS Aft£ YIU COSI • ' Di AQtEEMEN' r O i THE Nfilll FOlt URGEm 'BFSEARCH AND • l • • ' • nEVEI OmENt IN 'IRE ANl'I ' ICllM • •• r ·- - _ _ _ ARFA • -- • •• •• •· • ' BUT 'IlIE NAV'l Joms nm • • • AIR FORCE IN B F SISTING TRIS VASTLY E Xl' l VE l R OGRAM FOR • J_ • - - - • ' • • l'_B - fW J o · • WI'IH rn CONSllll'Jl - l· • u •• SUCR A P il OGR Ali P1ZEW IIll E Am TF ClllUCIJ LY i •• -· • · • _I IMrrED ·- • DE f PFCIS • •• ' •'·-· -r - • __ __ - '- 1 1 t F ' - NAVY'S Ei i l ' -- Ili E l ' 119 13 -1¥- l' o w A t - · n v -_c rns _1 s rROM TJ l'Ff -RDLR REDU CE 'lllEIB ER$ ·- ·• • •1• ' • • CONC ON 'IRE ANTI-SUBMARINE • •• • ' • 1 • • • · DEl ENS E OF lllE CONTINENUL O ilXED STATES · ·' • • 1 ' '•' • WHILE mEY • ' r J m_ nu c ARJ VED - ' ·• I A'lTAa 1 • l • · • nm Am FOR CE •·- I D S jCIAT DlE NA ' S Ji'OR lll E DE i' E OF '•_• 'PIBSE ' t • •r••• CAB IJ' 'J A'J1'ACK FORC AGAINST -- i • • • '• -• • •• • AIR - BR EATBI lG • • • TllltEAT HAS A l' RICE ' ·•- THPJ AT HAS A P lC TAB OF SOME $12 4 BILLY ON tJmOUGll 1966 Wlil' CI 1S ONE-IIAU7-A BtLLION ™ 'IBAll 'IllE 'IO' AL Pi OGilAb '1 ID • COST f t ElWICES FOE All 1'EFENSE l 'OR mE Plil'l'llill l 01 l'll AMERY CAN COln'DiENl' Foo THE stilm PDUOI nllS DISCOV£Icr llF AJI Y CAUSES·A V R OB PROGRESS Bu JEVER IS BEING MADE IN 'rnE AREA OF WBlLIZATION F ' -- ALL mE SER VICE PLANNE l S AGREE TilAT AYnlt D -D Y Cfi A GENERAL wlAR LARGE HORILIZATION You cES Alm mcrc ASEI FRODllC'IlON -- ON 'IRE STYLE OP' JO UJ iu l II • 'il'ILL llOl' BE PROBABLE FR OGRESS • BU1' ONLY· YD IEEN YEARS LA rE •• · SO 'IlI£Y' TACt IE 'IRE PJWBJ EM OF BW LARGE TO MAll 'IHE McraILIZAnoli SUP1'0R T BASE mR AD FORCE SOPFORTS ONLY 'IlW llllmD- l 'OX THE JtESEl Vlt Alm NArIO AL GUARD UNITS BBDUGB't THrtPACTl VE STilUS·ON D-DAY -- THOSE GEml AL TAR MISSION 'IQ 'JHIS wrm AN INITIAL nm PROPOSAL AIR FOR CE- SAYS 'r -'lllE BARDLZ4RE IN STOltAGE FOR USE BY LATER FORCE MOBILIZATioN M Y BP D F SfB OY P • OR DEllllED 'l'BROUGH DISRill'TION OF · AI SO D I S AND FACILITIES ARE DES'tB OYFJ JUll CHAOS EXISTS 'lllEN 'fflESE Jl'OllCES' SllOULD BE USED PROORIJ3 lilOR CIVIL DIWmSE Am ' tmCONST tnn'ION •- AND W CAN'T AFFOlll CONCERN FOll CONVENTIONAL TlLOOP''nl'E EQuu miI m SUCH AN ENVIRONHKNT • · · AIZIJ SO Il' GOES •- UN'llL l7IllH ISSUES ARE ·nv m l1P BY 'rnE Slll VICES A ZI 1Jllll smwrcx nm JOill l'LANNE RS - 'fEO ALL DA-Y SESSIONS ' THE J-S Smlll' ES- A CO i' P tO'd SE POSITION AS HE IS EMPOWERED I I I I _ AS HE IS - T O DO FOruJAIWS IT 'IO T E JOilll' CHIEFS ' _ l __ saowm 1 • •• '· BY A BRFAICOUT THE A l F AS OF SE l VICR DISACJlEF MENl' ' ' 'IliE · • • -·- • I ' JOlll Ol3 n CTIVES 'LAN IS THDfP 1 OH OP ' T lE AG ElIDA 'IRE JOINI' CHIEFS OF FOR STAFF _ • ' ·- • ' l ·-'- HAY -- A HKETmG Ill ' '' • ' ·- ' AND 'IO STAY ON 'IIIE ACElffiA UNrlL R llSOLVED OU JCS AGENIL 24 TIMES FROM 20 KAY TO 14 SEPTEMBER - CONSIDERED l3 TIMES ±nms oih ER Ul Ii - · WHEN 'IREY GE INIO TllE l'ROlll EM THE CHIEFS RECOGNIZE i • • • •- Y ' - · ' nm oa n J'XPERJFJ CE 'mAl mEY CAN'T UESOLVE-'Jl K 'MAJOR _ me TO EACH OF · • l' J l · rosrnous • so - SER VICE • ' I THEY Eli PECI AGREEMZNTS t · · -• · • IN 'IllR LESS SSliSlTIV AREAS AND J 'OmlARJ 'ffiE MAJOR ISSUES ·-· AS SPLI'IS to Tlm SECBE f4BY Ol1' DEFER3E HIS DECISION - '- '• ' ' ·• ' _ ' · - • LATE IN MAY• mEY GET TlE SFCRETAB ' 1 S DEX ISIO i I ' ' I GENERAII Y ALON THESE LINES - CHART l O ON ··-· I • • ' • ''• · • ''f' • - l · • 'f•· '· 'J • •· - _ ' ' · • t • • J AGO •riut FOR CE TABS PRICED oiri' AT ABOUT $55 BILLION ' ·· · wni n-1 ' ifu' 'dm E mi ot · ilAiK WEil E 0 l r · _•r WE STARTED ·1 · ' _ j ' - • • ' • ' - ' ' ' ' • 'llIE j· · ' • • · Jomr mESE 1 Il l L MUCH - I • _ • • YOU'RE RIGllT • I DON'T SAY THAT 'IHIS IS GOOD -- Bl1l' tT IS A FACr 07 LIPE -- IN • ' ' I I i _ • ' cun FS KNOW ll AT mu6cs r • Jomr •• nm - _ · - • •· PT ANITTNG AT LEAST ' • '' ·•• SCOPE AND NA' CURE OF ARE SUCH nJAT T1lE l'LA NN fllS CAN'T DO N lil·wrm THEM -- so TlIEY AiID 'lllEii'op DEPU IES - · - • r • ' •I I- r' '•· • 1 ' _I • - _ • • ' ·r I C ' ' · ' • OURS ' ' OF COURSE IS ' OURS OF COURSE IS LT GElreRAL GE l HA rI • DEPUTY CHIEF 01' S'Lil'P' FOR P'LAl'lS AND PR OGRAMS TACKJ E nIB BIG I'm BLEMS · THEMSELVES -- WITH A LOT OF HIDNl GRT woru ' ' FOIi 'IllE ACTIOU OFi'ICEllS TO l'RDVIDE FOSinONS FACTS ARGUMENTS SUPPORT' AND THE LIKZ VOii 'llIEil CHIEF AS WE GO INl'O nus MAJOR JCS I XEll CISE AT THE HIGIIF ST MILITAID LEVEL I 'IHil l'I WOULD BE APl'ltOPIUATE TO GIVE ' YOU A YIRST HAND IMPRESSION OF THE ARMY CRIEV ON mIS · 1 ' PROCESS -- G-ENKRAL DECI El BAD THIS POIGNANT REMAllK WRICH - - ' HE MADE 'IO A YASHINGTOR REPORTER LAST - - M mm CHART 11 ON ••• IJ YOU DON' 'I l'IGllT YOU' RE DFAD • • • PAUSE ' 1 l' ' •• • •' 1_-' SO NO' J 'IllR CllIE'FS PERSONALLY REVIEW 'lllEIB OWN SEIi VICE m GREA T SUllMISSIORS THEY CHF a THESE u AINST THE DE L D FORCES THE llEQUl STS AND THE STAnlfEmS OF 'Ilm UMIP'IED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS -- THE C SINCE THE CINCs HAVE DIE OPERATIONAL Il ESPO SIBILITY TO MAKE ANY OF 'llIESE PLANS EQfilS -- AND MOST IMPLEMEm THE -- ' - J I _ • • • 1 • ' • - ••• • j • I' _ • ' STRATEGY GIVEN THEIR COl-2- ENTS ARE GIVEN GltF AT WEIGHT THIS IS PAirrICULARLY TRUE NCM -sil CE THE JODlT CHIEFS IIBALlZE 'IllAT TO GET AGREEMENTS THEY Aim GOING 'IO HAVE TO ' ' ADJUST THE RKUTIVE · COMMANDS PRIORITIES - t · •_ COW ANDS n'l'HIN ' ' · 1 AND BETWEEN •• 1 Y j_ l 'IHEY ARE GOIID TO HAVE TO SET 'l1lE GROOND RULES - · c-- · _ ' ' · F· ' · FOIi A GIVE Al'ID 'tAli PROCESS • · IN 'OllS FINAL PERSONAL IIBVIlll -- THE ClUEFS STA l T OUT 'I BY A FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW OF THE SEil VICE POSITIONS ON lASIC MILITARY OBJECTIVES A GOOD STARTING POINT FOR US TODAY IS TO REVIFll ' ' IS TO REvn 1 -- AS l1lEY WOULD -- nm KEY STATEM lIT ON NATIONAL STRATEGY AS IT IS SET OUT IN BASIC NAnO iAL SECURI TY POLICY ' CHART 12 ON EXTRACT OF BNSP ••• THIS IS AN EXTRACT FROM OUR BASIC NATIONAL SECUR I'IY POLICY •••• WILE WE STUDY IT FOll A FDJ 1-ID 'iOITS roiNT OUT LET ME -' ' i · THAT THE Alli FORCE VIEWS nus nr rERJ1 ENCE • ' OP WAR AS THE OVER-ALL NATIONAL OBJECTIVE ' w tm THE SUPPORTING MILIL ll Y OJUECTlVE OF PROVIDING 'IHE CAPABILIT'l TO 'Pll EVAIL IN 1JAll IP I E'ImRENCE SHOULD FAIL SO mE Am FORCE WOULD - - TRANSLATE mIS INIO A MILITARY S'l'l ATECY Am USXS WRICH • • I '' ' - '• ' LF AD TO CREATION OF A lA l WINNING MILITAB Y l'ORCE • HOT TIU · • PY mRIC VICTORY KIND BUT WINNING SUCC SSFULLY -- WHICH • J '7- l · I • NSmES'JJIE Slm VIVAL OF THE U S AS THE DOMINANT NATIONAL ' i ' ' ' · POWEB i 1· 4 row ' · ·' • · • _ 'IRE C llEFS TAKE UP 'IRE morn ntIAL lTEHS OF ·- - - · · _ _ _ _ • - _ ' · -- _ · ' EXPm 5IVK HARWABE WHICH IS GEARED PBDW ILY TO THE ' • CHAR'l' 13 ON '_ GrnERAL WAR CONCEPTS · J OF THE SERVICES - • 1 1 lliEN FU'IURE FORCE OBJECTIVES IRE CONSIDERED THEY MUST I 1 •• • • I _- '- • • - ' • '• • • ' ' BE VIEmm FBA'J nIE CONCEPTUAL BELIEFS OF 'IHE SERVICES ' · _ PROPOSIR 'mEM nlAT IS WHY I WANl' 'ro PUT nIIS llA'mER ' - - BUNDAMm' Al 'ln'E OF CIIAll T ID FRONT OF YOU AS WE CONSIDER nIB SPLn''VIEW'S OF 'l'liE CHIEFS Tll E AIR FORCE nIE Ant ioncE SAYS THA T IN ORDER Fq A CONDUION O'I m m ·1 DITTFJIRENCE TO ' EXlS'I TUE SOVIETS -- DUB GENER AL - • • • · ' ' Wil ENrnY -- HUST BE CONVINCI D TSA 'I STRATEGIC 'OFFENSIVE ' ' OUB CAPABILITl _PLUS 'fRE SUM TO'IAL 0 1 O'l'HER U S _Am AJJIED FORCES - • ll E ABLE TO INFµCT AN l NACCEP'W LE DEGREE OF1 • l • • • • ' • •-· · · • Tf1E DES'llUlC'I vO I ll 'J 'l ER J1 SINO -SOV ET llLOC ' ' _ S'l' ARr l WHILE RESERVING 'IliE nrumw · £ POSltIOB OF mE U S • _ • • • 0 I _ '11WS IN PI ANHDIG - '01K ' FOR 'IHA'I Wlll G AI TO THE r noN WK · ' ' ' l Hffi- BOLDS MAmIAIN OUit ' cAfAlUI UY OF ' -- DESTROYING OIi DISAlU1ING US MU JTABY FOJLCES WHlCff CONSn'IUTE ' '- ' - ' • A IRR FAT TO ' - T · U S AND US ALLIES •• THE Alli ' · FOJ'l CE f9 JPERS •s y FO E AS ONE_ THAT IS AUti YS •-• LE FOil HIM ro p LpSE WHA'I KI SE RE MIGJll' BE Wu LING IO SAC I D'IC •• BE -· CAmlO'I AFFORD •·' ' - _ i L _ · · • • • _ _ __ _ ' • - ·-• • TP us m HE s oF - BlS MILITAJLY ·• -FOa CE -·· ro nm Eli'F s nus xs •co CE ' ' - ' ·-· ' ' ' • _ Hplg J __ sm Y o Yo x HAVE SH EN T1IE UUI TED• S rAl'F S CHAl-1 E 'l1JtOM A ll El AnVEI Y IHVULNEll ABLE • ···• •••·- · • r _ • • · ·•• '-• i · • • • •· SANC' f WI Y _ TAB GE OUL't A I - 'IO A '•' 30 HimlIES ' F A ll t I TO S'pl IXE _ · ms r · AWA l ' THE iUl1 FO v m s A GEWRAY lJAI AS ONE IN WRICH IE • • I• • •'-• • • • • • • '• - • ' • • ' • MUST FI aRTAU XNfJfi WilQ llAS 'IllE CAl'i BILI TY TO USE PDERH • l • ' '• ' • ' I ••• - • ' • • • ' • O _ IG l I O - Ifl t 'IHE U n'D ID TAn S 1 TODAY 'IRE USSR I S O ON Y IU nus • • • • - • - • •• • • • • • • • '•• • I r •· OEFINI ' ION BE A USE BE IS THE ONLY AJ PL'J rHAT ' · ' ' Olm WHO · CAN -'-• ' ' KIND OF FORCl' AGAINS't ' •• J US Ili ll MA Y WELL TlJ E l'Ul'U3 E INCUJDE RED CHINA THE AIB FOllCE 24 - ---- -- · ' - nlE All FORCE BELIEVES THAT ' Ofil PiUMAB Y 11ll1 EA'I JLEQUIR ES ' IN Pl ANNING IN I'RD' All l' ATTEm ION ·• OUB FORCE · AND P UORlTY ' TEE An FORCE C WOUlJ DENY FORCE BUDGE'IlllG ' •· ' Tm _ Ml LUAU tllREl1ml FOR CAl'AllLE ' Tl'Ili THE UNIQUE FOR CE$ '• CAl'A lILD IES IO FIGIII LOCALIZED COUFLIC'I O Lnn riro WARS' Wl'lll LIM crED F Nl MlES -- BUT l'HE EQUll'l'ING AND MA mrAINING OF lll-BEI l l FO l CES FOR SMALL llAl S MUST NO'I DILUTE AND J ' l '_ ' ' REDUCE OUR Sl'RENGTil TO OPPOSE 'IBE • ' • • • ·c 'IllREA't ·• • • BIJ'I pm AlUri ARGUES Ylll llONES'I COUVICTIOU nIA'I WE '• ·• ' ' nus •• 'IHF 1 DON''I NE ED ALL - SAY ''WE AGREE wrm A l EIElmENT 'FORCE FOR G NUCLEAR 'JAR •• OOTE TllEY ·'· ' ' ' AB MY NUCUAR WAR ••• BU'I 1 l1 E ' SA · • Gl NEl AL ' ' SAYS l'I NEED l lO'I B A YAll T INN m F EJ SINCE A _SMAXI ER AND LES EXl'ENSlV DETtRRENT ' FORCE CAli ' ' THE ENEMY FR OM CONSlDl'JUNG mIS EXl'REME AL Trn '' mus SA '1 S 'IliE Rm 1JE HAVE MUJ UAL ' ' ' J • • ·DE'IE lRl'llCE'' IO GENERAL NUCLF A R 1ilAR All a Ei PEC' t IO W VE ' ' ' •· _ • ' • FIGRT ONI Y A mWERAI _COliVE m ONAL • OR NEMU l N- 1 __ ' • ·' • • ' NUCLF AR • • · • ' ' I • • ' m WAR 'PtEREFOU • • J ' • • ' ·• ' ' _ J ' J I I•• • FORCE• - I IS NOt SAB Yi l 't r • · llEDUCE • _ i·• l' · • ·• ' ' • • • • •• ·• •• ' FORCES• IliRGE _srn F GIC • _ · ·• ·• ' • ' 'l'liE wmtY AND 1 · 4•' • •'·· ···' RESOUR C AVAIMBI E 1'1'0R A LAB G COHVENtIO n ' E GROUND _' - - i f - ' - l • _ • · •'• ' • •• I FORCE - M _llE MOBI I U _JiOB SUCR li'OUCK ' ·• L ••· __ ' • ' • ' 'DI in Ftm CE LOOKS •'AT• 'IRE ENllr TllAt ' Om ARMY WOULD 0• ' • I •· • • •' HAVE us l 'IGIII m nus LARGE-SCALF i •CONV T n E lJAR J •• ·•' I w cn lNCl IJDES • THE SOVIETS •• t AND SEES 'NO mm 'IO ON U S RESOUll GES INVOLVED ' ' ' • • • • • IF WE BEGIN to EQUIP FOR r • I nus- nm RAIN ALSO• nIE Am FO CE Al2 GUES ••• •• ·•• T'Il'E or EmAGDmrI YE WILL ' Tl' LEGRAl'll 25 e _ f - ou a IN'IElU IONS ·- - 'I 1 • - J HIM TO PIGW · Oli HIS 1 nm TEil MS -- ANO WILL BE· P ASS m C0ill'ROL OF ALTEllHATlVES 'J O - 1 Erm ll ISIQU RATHE l 'l'llAll D IOO HIS USE Of F m E• UB_ WOULD JIB lilil Ci ATl'Rl'flOtJ OB • Sl OUU HE CHOOSE 'IO _J X ERCISE aIS STRA'IEGIC HIJCI IW t 5Ul'Eal0B ITY WE WOULD- B L DEFF ATED • 'PIB ll AVY WOULD COMPLETELY FOllEGO Am ATIEMP'I AT ''C0UN'l'ERF '- Ill_ GERERAL WAR W FAPONS- OR A S ItATEGIC OFF ENSlVE AND POSTULATES 'lllAT Tint _4BII I'IY 'lO LAUNCH NOCLEAR S' JlllES · A iAms'I A SMALL NIJMBER ov SO'VIE'r CITIES -- son - TAB GETS 'Wl'ffl JUG PAY • OFF · llf DE'Il lUlENr VALUE nm otlGll FOFUJ A'tION ABD mulAJJ DES'l'RUC'tlON- -WlI L BE IDlOUGll - - THEIR INU ERRrncE m D IS AUA IND TES D 'W'ITIJ 1 - IWl oruECtIVE IN Gllra W tn JC AR W WtE THAT mEY ctoO MAJE 'A tlIS'lmt'rl ON BffiEE J 'nl' 01 GlOO IW WARS c· C 'BAVY l'L Vltll R5 CONSID ' Ilfl'f -DETl JlRENCE' '· AS • ADEQUATE to w ua •-Al - COIJBT nm uao JOll t Sl1lU'lU 5100I Y J T _ X li eS TO NECE lSAIW w DO THE -45 II'OJ4RIS _ ' •l I SUl HAlUm S --• GtVEJ lt tAlCE A i' _-- - PWS '11 E 5 TH B1 WOT JLD ADD·0R 0 PBflVlDE NATQ lll'lll l'l 'S SSFARA'J XcDEtERRE l'l' FORCE · TREY IR E- SllT 'rOO CI UR Otl 'JlUt l'OSSJ Bn m Ol' A GENERAL CO mNTIONAL 1All AS ESPOUSED_ B't - _ B_U't L ll 9 ' AN i1'HING _ CLAIM THZ · - · · lllE'l lU'ALLY LEXIBll lTY THAT I MEmIONEB BE ZORE •• 'IO Pl SMIT 'Jl EM TO ADJUST fi'O lCES El'I llER ' 26 · 'DlE A-1R fORCE I '- • DE'TERR t o'l CL _ JmZG IT IS MISLEADDOC •- IT IMPLIES n AT mE -USSB MDS't' ALSO DEnll THE ONI'tw STilES nIK AIR FORCE IS mT GOING TO SUBSCaIBE-'l'O A U S STitATF GY--THAT HAS AS ONE OF ITS POSTU' ATFS Q IB_ DETF' BRENCF WHO'S -NATIONAL FOUC'I AUE WE SE l VING7 TiIDS TH hH l FOR CE SAY3 'IllAT MDTllAL DFl'FBli ENCV - lS NOT A· S'l'RATEGY iOlt GENEnAL llAll - IT IS AN INDICATION THAT WE DON'T _ STRATEGY IN 'IllIS AI l'A · ' · i · AS 'i'Olt' fflE • AVY 1 S DETEllltE C - li X_ All iOR CE SEES nrIS AS -AN OPEll STRATEQI e I WllA'nl J'1 'l'O ACTS' OP' SOVIET MILITAB Y ACGRBSSIOU AGA BST OUR ALL'IES OR 'm PERUBElW STRATEGIC llW EQUAC'l •· WE COULD- N VEit ·lIOblOa A JllEA TY COMMltHR lT''lnl'll SUCH A FORCE SINCE'IT HAS GErtliKR A CRKJ IBtx FIRST Olt SF COUO Sl' B IJrE CAPABILn'Y AND ONCE COMMITr ID 'IlIE SOVIETS lilOULD llE'tAlN' A DECIS'IVE llESIDUAL VORCE ' ALSO · 'IRE PURE RETALIA'Im Y- RAttmE · Ol7 suca· iOll CE 'PllKVDffS '1lW PB ESIDKN'l' FROM A DECISION AGAINST ALTERNATIVE COURSF S OF snAI'mta on -- COMMITIIllG RIM ONLY TO THE ''nETALIATOll 1 IU Sl'O JSE _ ll El E IS A DEFIN TE Nlill mm A 1' A-CE FOlZ A RETALIAtoll'l° FORCE m OUll OVER ALL COUNTRlli'OUCE'- C Oz t E PI BUT S'IANDD G ALONE •• A''RETALIA Oil Y FORCE- IS roT -EOOUGU IT IS A Q ·STRATEGY NOT A CHART 13 OFF 'liEl T TEE -JOINT CHIEFS TURN TO A DlSCUSSIOll' OF '1llE FORCES AND MOBil IZATlON C01'1CEPTS FOR r oNPLICm SRO T OJI' GENERAL 'WAR FIRST GDtERAL YAR l7IRST WHAT IS M ' A '1' BY LIHI ED 'IAR IS OU l U S -MILITARY PWlNING ACAD t IIl J LY m COURSE IT HEAllS A COfil'LICT IB mu R nm O l JECTIVK nm FORCE THE n ruu roaY AND '1' lE I Ill All E LDUTE'D · l'lllLOSOl'lllCA i Y IT liEtlliS A 'WAR IN YIUCH '1lIB SURVIVAL OF otm W TIO I' IS nor AN IMMEDIATE ISSUE -- 01 som mnm m A LIKE VEDT • BIJT1'0lt COLD MILITAll PLA mlllG -- ·7BE Am ll'cm cE SAYS T1 A'f YOU CA B 1 't BE SURE OP' Am Oll' 'mESE''LIMI TA%IONS UNLESS YOU 'E'JiEMY IS Il CAP AnLE OF·EXCIP l om O ' THE LIMITATIONS -- TlllJS • 1ilE SAY THAT AN LD1InD WAlL IN nlE TIME FRAME OF Otm-CONSIDERAnON MDST BE ONE Di TmICH WE ARE OVERl'LY EfiC4GED Wll'll $0MEONE OTHElt 'llWl THE SOVI E r UNION 'mOOOH 'l'HE Sml VICES DO NOO' AGREE COMPI ErELY tJilll 'l'HIS POSITION All I ARE lEJm AII Y AGREED__ MD'S'r•UAVK 'lllE CAPABIUTZ AND- mE·PI EXI RILnY 'IO ENGACE Dl·I nllTEn WARS •- l ' CHAR'r 14 0 1 · _ '' _ c · r t - · · t nIITED 'WAR CONCEPTS ·u OP VARIABLE ImENSrrY ·m tnm AN ' • F NEtfi DIM OOES SES§ 1 i Bm G - CAl' ABILITY OP MATCllilG Oll t li EAPONS I - 1 AND OVER mnca UE CAn'_ nY -MILITARY IMPOSE OUR WD L SUl'ElUOR IlY E Q WE i SHOULll nm DECISION BK MADE ' O · POSSESS' EMPLOY THAT Su n BtanI'LY 'IOilAY ____________ _ ______ --- ------ ' IOM Y 'OIAT $Ul'ER Oll lli ' f XczyT 'IJlE sues ENEMIES n CLUDE ALL ro- IBRS SOVIEJ S Ol- llR Y I M Y BE DIFll'E Ull ARMY SEES 'nUS TYPE O l WAR AS A SITUATION Ill WHICH THE LOCAL FOR CES -- 'IEE INDIGEW JS GROUND AND AIR FORCES OF OUR ALLµ s - - ARE INSlGHIFlCAm' Oll N ' lN-EXlSTE T 'IREY VISUALIZE 4' llll ll'T 01 ' MAlf AMElUCAN SOLDIERS ' J Al S AND OTBEB tIDBILE_ BATILE ' LELI EQUIPMENT IS IMPERATIVE -- 'fl E'l WOULD Ell l'E ID LIMXTEP AND IMMED ANY Et-J ' I N G THE THEOliY WAR l IJ nm SOVIET UNIQN 1-lJOUIJ HAVE US USE l'J ABY MASS l'LlJ IDBlLln' nm SAYS CONCEl'IS TO ro CQN'Ulll mrs THAT WUAT -'IHE HAS IN nm WAY OF IMFLEKlilrl'S - ANl FORCF S ll'Ol LDilT WAJl WE MU MEET HIM - 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