D EPARTMENT O F THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE C H IEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGT ON 25 D C IN R E PLY R EFER TO Op-09 ec m 24 Jan 1961 From Op- 09 Subj Dependab le Stri king Power - attached RADM MI LLER has a good idea but one which before we s ubmit i t seriously we should thoroughly staff - covering such things as command relations cos t e f fectiveness and other a ngles I would make the staff s tudy moderate i n tone as factual as possible a nd in the style o f calm reason However we regard it a nd however we cloak it I am s ure it wi l l be regar de d as a n extreme position and one which every effor t will be ma de to attach the label paroch i al Hence the reasoning in the paper mu st b e well ba lanc ed and compe l l i ng As to timelines s a tru ly good s tudy wou ld be most us eful as background for our membership in the var i ous new Depar tment of Defense staf f c ommittees particularly for Captain Caldwell in the Nov ick group I wou ld recommend tha t the study i f of good quality b e s u bmit ted to the JCS As to internal arrangemen t s the study belongs to and should be made in 06 but the long r ange planners in 93 can certainl y assist Ver y respec tful ly I - SECRET fDECLASSIFIED IAW E O 12958 OPNAVINST 5513 16 SERIES Dependable Striking Power SECRET L The Navy may soon have to consider a new approach to the nuclear striking power problem one which assumes the initiative and accepts the prospect of being a target for a deluge of brickbats from the opposition The following paragraphs and the enclosure suggest a plan of action The timing of the various steps the tactics and the manner of presentation can be worked out a step at a time 2 One step is to recognize that the pre sent SIOP procedure takes care of the first-strike contingency but is not adequate for the Huation with which the United States would be faced if most of our fixed bases and control centers were destroyed by surprise attack Therefore our Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commanders-in-Chief should be directed to prepare strike-back plans under the assumption that fixed-base systems and command control centers have been destroyed by surprise attack This would entail a completely independent planning operation by our Fleet Commanders-in-Chief including the development of an optimum target list within the capacity of available Fleet striking power and Fleet deployment operating and maneuvering plans to minimize damage in event of surprise attack This should be undertaken as a normal Naval planning rneasure to insure the security and effectiveness of the Fleets and to be prepared for any eventuality It would be a significant departure from the fixed-base on station' 1 cone ept The plans of the Fleet Cornmander s in-Chief should be coordinated by CNO or preferably by a new CinC U S Fleets The latter could be created as the Naval counterpart to the Shore- based functional command concept 3 When the pla lning is underway and tte timing is right the Navy should come forward with a building program along the lines of paragraphs 5 to 9 of the enclosure with the objective of providing i 1 Fie next 5-10 years a more dependable deterrent retaliatory posture for the United States in the ballistic missile age In order to gain public support it will be necessary to state force objectives in specific figures Failure to do so in the past has led to the criticism that even the I favy doesn 1t know what it wants 11 L SECRET rnR LASSITIED IAW E O 12958 OPNAVINST 5513 16 SERIES •'t f f SECRET 4 It would be necessary if we are to succeed to push this program simultaneously in the following channels SecNav to Sec Def JCS to SecDef Congress Press and public media 2 SECRET Dependable Deterrence Retaliation SECRET I Over the past twelve years the United States has been maneuvered into a position of accepting and supporting a military strategy which has become out-moded and deficient in many respects a The bulk of U S striking power is operated from fixed installations within the United States whose locations are known to friend and enemy alike b The Soviet Union now has the technical capability of targeting these fixed installations for quick destruction with ballistic missiles in event of war c Concentration of the bulk of U S striking power within the coniines of United States territory insures that the United States itself will be the primary target and will be forced to absorb the bulk of the devastation in event of war d Realization on the part of the American people and government that they themselves will be the primary nuclear target will cause them to shrink if it has not already done so from taking a firm stand against any kind of aggression e The increasing vulnerability of fixed-base systems has forced foe United States to adopt a hair-trigger posture of readiness which is expensive unreliable in tense situations and does not have the durability to survive attack and continue to function effectively until the war's end f A posture of hair-trigger readiness the provocative type of intelligence gathering which is part of it and the vulnerability of the system to surprise attack cause such uneasiness 4 mong our enernies as to our real intentions that they may be led to think in terms of and eventually even to attempt surprise attack g Vulnerability of fixed bases to surprise attack and the necessity for hair-trigger readiness over a long period of time may encourage son e of our own people to consider a strike-fir st strategy even ti1 ou3b it can be proved that such a strategy could not prevent critical damage to the United States itself L SECRET DECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNAVINsT 5513 16 SERIES ' r • f ' j '' t · SECRET 2 The vulnerability of fixed bases and the exposure of the United States itself as the primary target have inhibited the actions of our government in dealing effectively with the many regional crises which are crowding in upon us Fixed- base hair-trigger strategy is selfdefeating since it serves to increase tensions and tends to provoke a drift toward the very type of war the world seeks to avoid 3 It is now technologically possible for the United States at reasonable cost to remove its nuclear striking forces from within the United States and to deploy them in mobile bases over the far reaches of the uninhabited global seas The Polaris missile now full developed and operational and soon to have a range up to 2500 miles is being installed aboard submarines and surface ships Modern aircraft carriers the only mobile air bases our Nation has have been improved tremendously since World War II and are capable of operating from their decks the most modern high performance aircraft technology can provide These tactically integrated air-missile striking forces together with modern amphibious forces and defensive forces capable of denying use of the seas to our enemies provide our Nation with an oceanic maneuvering and battle area over 35 times as extensive as the United States itself With our nuclear striking forces deployed at sea the enemy will be forced to devote the bulk of his counterforce effort against them drawing off nuclear strikes which might otherwise be directed against the United States 4 Nuclear striking forces on the move at sea cannot be targeted 1n advance Their reduced vulnerability to quick destruction discourages enemy planning for surprise attack and reduces the need on our part for hair-trigger response and provocative intelligence gathering 5 Transfer of U S nuclear striking power from its pre sent fixed-base emphasis to a more equitable mix of land-based and sea-based systerns would require the procurement of the following forces over the next 5 to l O year period 24 Attack aircraft carriers 24 Polaris missile cruisers 45 Polaris cruisers -- 6 T 1e attack carriers tl1e cruisers and to some extent the s 1bmarines would have additional capabilities suc11 as antisubrnarine antiair anti- SECRET r LECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNA VINST 5513 16 SERIES SECRET missile and mobile comrnand capabilities as well as capabilities necessary for support of limited war and protection qf shipping operations They would be organized along with other Naval forces into three basic Fleets - - the Atlantic Fleet the Pacific Fleet and the Southern Fleet 7 ' The Southern Fleet would eventually operate from a broad complex of logistic operating and even construction bases to be developed in such areas as Australia New Zealand South America and South Africa far removed from the bases of Sino-Soviet military power 8 Eacn Fleet would be comrnanded from a modern mobile command ship each of which would be capable of takin com mand of the other two Fleets in event any one or both of the others together with our fixed-base command facilities 1 ad been knocked out 9 The foregoing can be achieved at an additional estimated outlay of billion dollars annually over a 10-year period which constitutes about _ _ _ _ _ percent of what is already being spent annually for fixed- base systerns --------- SECRET °DECLASSIFIED IA W E O 12958 OPNA VINST 5513 16 SERIES