e Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SBCRET TO Op-60 FROM Op-06 suBJECT Dependable Striking Power U DATE Op-06 rfd mt-0034-61 2 Feb 1961 I discussed the Dependable Striking Powertt pa per with ira l Burke I told him that our feeling wa s as outlined in memo and that also I concurred with Rear Admiral lloorer's mments which are attached I told him that there were some good ideas in the paper but that generally I felt the LJUl 60 is a better plan I told him that I would prefer not to give this to my people as a s tudy to turn out but rather to give it to them a s ideas they might use I alijo said that I thought turning out a study on composition of the Navy was getting into Op-93's business and I didn't want to do that 2 Admiral Burke expressed agreement with the above Copy to Op-06B SECRET EC LASSIFIED IA W E O@ 12958 OPNA VINST 5513 16 SERW ' DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFI CE OF THE CHIEF OF N AVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGTON 25 D C p 06 iN REPLY REFER TO For Op-93 ejs Ser 0015P93 1 FEB 1 · 06B lo ----- SECRET ···-· · C - From To Di rector Long Range Objectives Gr oup Deputy Chief o f Naval Operations Plans Policy Op-06 Subj ''Dep endable Str iking Power' ' Comments o n U 1 The fo llowing comments are submitted with respect to the propos al on dependable striki ng power submit t ed by RADM George Miller Bas i c Letter 2 Concur that the ttsecond phase or str ike back plans are ex treme l y def i cient or non- existent and should be deve loped now Th e op t imum tar get l ist s hou l d cover all of Eurasia and contiguous areas Contingency planning wou ld of necessity have to be coord inat ed through the Unified Commander and the JCS The idea of a new CINCUS Fleets who would remain at sea cont inuous l y appears to be a good one 4 Delay action with respect t o Congress and Press media until concept we ll accep t ed in DOD Enclosure 1 3 Concur in general but the ful l str ength of this argument i s based on two assumptions that a1·e not completely true 1 That all shore based missiles are f i xed MINUTEMAN may be on the rails 2 That the USSR will know t he exact coordi nates o f all enemy fixed missile sites The above two items a re almost true but not quite and shou l d be qualified accordingly 4 Concur in gener a l However now i s t he time to do some advance thinking wit h resp e c t to ICBM's with term inal homing or missile i ·am j e ts wi th termina l homing These SECRET LASSIF ED IAW E O 12958 OPNAVINST 111 cv nn ci - SECRET -93 ejs Ser 0015P93 SECRET 1 FEB 1961 two items are some time away but we will hear more of them in rebuttal as we continue to emphasize the point that ships at sea are not suitable targets for ballistic missiles 5 The attainment of these force objectives would require significant reorientation in terms of dollars as well as maapower I do not believe they are realistic in the time span suggested The USAF is too entrenched in aerospace to permit such a radical shift in funding In carrier and cruiser·requirements consideration must also be given to ASW protection as well as replenishment support 6 and 7 The Southern Fleet is a good idea and we J t•J j 1 ' shall defini te y move in that direction as time goes on 0 - Such a Fleet will undoubtedly take the form of several i rs • ·' widely scattered task groups in the southern heaisphere 1•· · including the Indian Ocean 'fe should begin now to ta rtf 1 fr• fJJ a look at the number of assumptions available in the t• · Jx · southern islands preferably the saall islands where w Jr• ii can maximize political and security prob leas which we can w If use without delay for aflo t ogiatic support such D df• development to include log1 st1 c airstrip• ashore In l i If addition we should look into the southern hemisphere LJ f for allied bases and facilities which might be used in i r the strike back operations mentioned in paragraph 2 oif_i- 1 the basic letter r r 2 In my opinion the requirements set forth in LRR-60 present a more solid goal which we might strive for The 45 POLARIS missiles with 8 AS plus 18 CVA ·for combined limited and general war purposes all controlled from fleet command ships would give us formidable forces I believe we will be more successful in achievig such m ifts- Tr·we-aff·-· t- a -• P 9J -- - Q £ wl glf urvival potei itra i M 'forces oat ca1ta fsctma ke· 'a'·signif'Icallt ' ottt'fT6ufion -- - _--- - af _ _ ' ' - •- VI- T H OORER Rear Admiral U s Navy