t 'JI J ·Jibr mu u11 IIl I ENCLOSURB 1'B DBPAJrDlBN'l' Of THB NAVY OttiH ot the Chief ot Naval Operations 30 September 1959 MBMORANDUM POR THE CHA%8MAH 0 ' HE JODW CHIBPS 01P STAPP SUbJe t Tal'set Coordination and Asaociated Probleme Reterenoe a CM 380-591' ot 17 August 1959 l Reterenoe a ia a 0011prehenaive ooverage or controversial iaauea related to atOlllio strike plans targeting toi-ce adequacy and the operational control ot strike toi-cea 'l'hea• 1aaues are basic I agree that their N olut1on oe lla tor connand dao1s1ona he deoisione reached will have a profound Qf'teot upon our national aecurity and economic weltare 'l'he iHUH therefore deae1-ve the moat cai-et'Ul anatyUa and 111th the nation's interuta alllqs paramount Individl lal Serv1oe oapab111t1es both current and ' potential must or course receive due consideration but only to the extent that they- can beat contribute to national interests Recent and 1-1nent in lrovements in weapons and their deliveey mans and other soient1f1o developtl8nta 1 ma well dictate radical departures from some ot the oonoepta and their inlple- menting meaaurea that were evolved when the relative combat power ot the 11 s anci the USSR wt a of tude dit'i erent order ot aaagn1- Continued re pid progreas in Nea pon teohnology is probable • Chan es in intomational relations aN inevitable and may be or a nature that w1ll 1ntluenoe our mil1t 17 posture Aooordingly it would appear untdse to ooma1t ourselves unneoesa8%'1 to any oourse ot aotion that would be too costly or ditticult to alter should suoh progreas and changes ao dictate Preed011t ot maneuver in our m1l1tar poliof an4 stra tea - mat be aa1n red EnoloauN to J c s 2056 131 ·-x 5sg# JO 2056 J 43 1299 - 9 _1118 - _• ar •e ' a D _ « • f ''411o -il1 11 Pli 11 • 'fi 2 It 11 Id thin the broad context of paragraph l above that I ba ve rormula tecl the v1en aet forth below on the 1'ollom ng iteJ'IIS that were oovered directly' or 1ndireotl7 in the referenced memorandwn 'rar5eting philosophy The develop119nt or atomic atrike plan•• Targeting oool'Clination i'oroe adequacy i e nuclear Btr1king l 'orces 1'he operational oontrol ot •trike toroea 3 'rargetins philoaophY In paragi-apha 17 and 18 or reference a the Chainnan outlines two extremes of tugeting ph1loaopby i ' irst a target syetesi ot deai under the asewaption that we would never strike the t1rst blow Second a tarRet sy tem aona1st1ng pr tmanly' ot all Soviet Apparently this latter system woUld ' u designed on the a BUDIJtion that we ttould know the loca- lieve that we are reatrioted to the choice ot either of these two extreme_ Jf'l'he nt1onale tor th1a conclusion is set forth below • I Today the the against p1'1marJ Soviet u s our European allies an4 our overseas bases is the I t f j aoncerned tha t the USSR 11 pr1 lnar y' • closure to 57 8BSlt 'J JCS 2056 143 f obJeotive here 1• to cieati-oy the ene1111•s kno Wn J o s t 2056 131 Enclosure B 1' 921118 2 ii»AP MtU J•et•'·r' 1n order to m1n11a1ze damage to th• United states But even ffl4er theae oond1tiona our target 11ata should capacity to do it under these ol t'CNlltBtancea on the other hand we lli ht receive a aurprise 1molear attaok we must plan tor this too In this oaae we oould eltl ect heavy damage to our tixed baaes and the lose ot a major portion he probabilitf ot euoh loBBes beool les of our land bued bombers greater aa the threat 8h1t'ts to tbe balliat1o miuila launched from unknown positions The Soviets Will know where O lr Urbases a nd land nd aaile eitee are f I I I I 'lhe taot1cal t18ffl1ng time Will be muoh uhot'ter In a aul'S t'i e attack it 18 not 1nev 1table that •nenw miaa1les Will land before our weapons chances are great that they will Na launched but the Under these conditions 1t would be inJucUoious to launoh the remainder ot our greatly de- pleted to es aga1net a prima%7 target system of empty bases and mtss1lo sites even though we elhoul know their loaat1ona whlch we probably won•t I on the oont the primiuy tu-get 11st then Aa the ma 1or deliverv means ahift to llliasilea the oount er- roroe target1ng concept will be 1eea valJ d than now even in a pre-emptive attack 1t th• looation ot a aubstantial portion or cal means or degra41ng ou 1nt•ll1 nce • 1301 - Enoloau re B11 921118 oI Ai Ji EtkUUI 4 ffle development Aa I interpret the first aentenoe or paragraph 22 ot the retarenoad •emoranduna it is -wparently uawnad that a single connander will be responsible tor 11 the strategic m 1saion11 • Pre- sumably this reters to a s1nsle all-inclusive national atratesic mission I cannot agree that suoh a 1111asion should be isolated as a separate entity within the national atrates and exeouted by a The m111tar atratesr of the U'ni states single oolfflWld er covers the world and its direot application to thff ino-Soviet Blo Jnll be applied throughout the entire perimeter of the bloc In dition to CINCSAC toroea those of CINOLAN'r CINCEUR and ClNOPAO will part101pate extensively in tbe application or United states power The simultaneous a pplloation ot this power trom a diverait¥ or aouroae d1reot1ona r Qgas delivery means and c0111111anda adcls greatly to the threat tao ing the Soviets It is my V'iew tha t we should retain this diveraitied threat Accordingly I believe that the Unified Commanders 1n a position to do eo should participate in the nuclear strikes on strategic tal'gets on a pl'e•planned national 11st The optimum proced1n•e is for each to develop his own atl'ilc• plan but in close coordination 1111th the other l1nit1ed and Speo1e1ed commanders I • • tdth the Chalman that illlprovementa 1n our nuclear strike planning procedures must be made menta are teasibla '1'he rt'l lisite 1Jl1prove• ' beJ require aore detail «1 iuid earl1er plann1nJ cool'd1nat10n under more positive control of' the Joint Ohiefa or start The d11au111on that tollowa i 1ves the reasons tor thi the111e Basic to aoun4 at01110 etrilce plann1ng is the development ot target liats 'l'he tuget l leta dopted and the damage criteria to be applied are ot auoh ma3or import an4 are ao f'undamental to the exeoution ot Bnoloeure to 19 8@§£ JCS 2056 143 0 11' J o s llilit r atratea that the Joint Obiota 2056 l3l ' tll 1' - Enclosure 118 11 15111 921118 t 1 I I fi 1 ii I 11 1 1 IJh ot start cannot 41vorae tba aelvea rrom their fol'llulatton Broad poltoy guldanoe le naoeaaary but la not bf 1taelf sufficient After target n01111natlona ue ll 4e by the Un1t1ed and 8peaitied 00111111andeJ Oa ooncel'ned the Joint Ohiefa ot statt should subject the combined 11st to tha requil'ed anal711is by any appropriate agency auoh aa DASA The final Nault would be a target liat 1eveloped 11 a logical a11temat10 and analytical mannel' and finally •PPl'OVed bT the Joint Ohieta of Stat t Because or the importance ot the target list in 1ta relation to national poliay I do not aee hov the Joint Ob1ef'a ot atatr oan d1VOl'Ce thelll- aelvea from lta development 1n view ot their responsibility ror the strategic dil'ection ot the Follov1ng tile 1'118d toroea development of a natloMl etrategio tal'get list the oommandera oonoerned would then be aastaned ta geta for their respective nuolea strikes Theil' detailed plane would be developed and coordinated with the other commanders ocncerned BT th1a prcoed U'e the Joint Chieta or statf retain 1n their hands an authority and reapona1b1litJ that I do not believe oan be delegated to othera without abrogating the JCS reeponaib111t1ee It 1hould benoted that attel' the initial tuget liat developed futu e 11041t1oat1on to it would be comparat1velJ simple In several plaoeo in h1a memol'am un - the Ohail'man 11ent1ona the o mpla dtJ that atems t'N lll the faot that vartoua oouands have operational plan tox- nuolear atr1kea He points out the d1tt1ou1t - of var g81111ng several plane and oonolwiea t'ro111 thi that we should have a single 1ntegl'ated operational plan tor the 11 atrateg1o attaok and that 01NC8AO ah0ul4 dew lop tbte plan • Bnoloalll'e 1 o @ §EOA4' JOS 2056 l'JJ • J 0 8 2056 131 lnOlOBIU'8 B11 921118- ii - I would ati'Ongly emphalir e t hat is not s1Japlio1ty but etfeotivenese OUl' objeot1ve A sinSle integrated opel'a- t1onal plen toi- the nuoleu 1tr11c e1 drawn up by a single com- mendel' voul4 facilitate var gaming JIOve1 e1' we llluat ens ll'e that the enemr 1a taoed vlth a d1Wita1ty at threats from many daec- tiona and many aouroeo o place the total reapons1b1l1ty- t·or deetztuotion ot all pre-planned targets in the hands of a single co111Z118rlder oai-rtea vttb lt a d nger that ve should not and need not accept • do not lcnow how much ot tbat commender 1a toztce will be left 1r we are hit tU-11t and 'lfe do not know what the status of hia 00111111un1oationa and oontl'ol v1ll be Tb11 would be placing an undue rel1anoe upon a single strategic aonoept that may be aucceastul only 11' executed according to a pre-conceived plan Seldom is such plan ao execated We woUld fortett the tlex1b111ty that 1a inberent in the decentralized execution ot strike plans by several unified coimaandera The m111tar r log1c of retaining tb1s tlex1b1 l1ty i11 overwhelming In prepaI at1on tor World War II rranoe had a single pl'e-oonoeivad plan that ahethoqght waa foolproof but it was virtually worth- lesa I agree 1n general w1th the Oha1rman 1s disousston ot damage orttel'ia outlined in paHgraph 23 ot h1a memorandum I also agree that we a bould aubjeot the taioset lists and dsmase criteria to analysis bl maohlne and mathe11111 tioal teobn1quea A lie Joi' ob3eotive ot this analya1s wo11ld be to arrive at an eati1DBte or hov muoh 1s enough Tilts 1e an item that requ1i-ea mucb mozt• attent1on bf t be JOS Deo La1ons thel'eon bave i'Al'-reaoh1ng erteota upon tn ee and 71 elde or veapona the national etookpile and d tl1ve17 foroe tn ee and levels Deois1ons thereon fundamental ta the JOB respone1b111 ty ror strategic direction of the Arate4 Porcea An exe mple ot why not be delegated ia perttnent here th1a reaponaibiUt1 should There 1a a grraat dittezoence aa to weapons neceesary M IE§ftM' J08 2056 03 921118 Encloam-e B 11h JOE santM 't '• iii's -i· n ·•·• - - tor deatruet1on ot a target Por example on-important targets planned for atteok by both OINOSAC a'K 1r1ed Oommanders the latter IN progrum1ing approx1ma11e17-for tars•t deetru t1cm OlHOSAC 18 P oaraming approximately aa IIIUch yield 'l'he oonclus1ons were reaohad trom the same baaio damage criteria ot 9 structural collapse Oo111Parable d1tterencea between estimated yields required eJd st tbrougbout the tull speot1'um ot the plane tor attaBk or the strategic targets ayate J Without expi-eaeing an optnton ea to which comnander is right it is obv1ous that the d1tterenoea bet 8eD the oon- cluaiona reached are ao great 88 to 1nd1osta a groa8 misaaloula- t1on on the part ot some 'l'he JCS should not eooept aithe eat111 8te without cloae analyaia 'l'h1a should be followed b positive decie1ona and gu14aboe end poeitive follow-through to ensure ihat their guidance is followed We can aooept neither a gl'osa under-eetilllate nor over-eat1mate ot the ertort required In the one case we would l'lln the great 111src that the enemy ould continue the •r ette ttvelJ Aooept11'g the other would reault 1n a needlessly h1gb number or weapon and delivery toroea with the attendant high ooat and at the expense or desperately needed torcae tor other' typee of war tnstea4 ot turther delegating re•P°'111b111tv tor such maJor deois1ona the JCS should repoaaeaa some or their prerogatives that have gone by default with the resultant greatly d1trertng oonolua1one reflected in ourrent atr1ke plans ' 'he taotore d11cu1aed above• • aoma ot the reasons hy I think that eaoh Uaitied and Speo1t1ed Connander wtth the requisite toroea should develop e nuclear tr1ke plan tor general war As a leas 4ee1rable 1ltemat1te I could agree to the de9elopmen or a 11ng1e tate ated atr1ke plan pl'Ovidedr 'nut JCS prortde the tena1 s•• J JCS 2056 l lJ3 t - 11 f the t1nal Plan ot NteNnoe an4 eppro•e - 1305 - 92 1118 Eqolosure B Utl 1 -' 14•11 ••'· • •--nl • 'ii llll- Ite development 1 partiolpated 1n by all Unified a d Specitled oommsndere concerned I 'l'hat all un1t1e4 ·and Speottied commandera with • nuolear oapable strategic dellveey toroaa participate ln i t s exeoutiion 5 Targeting ooordir ation one ee ioua enor that we oab make 1s to permit the oomplex1t ' ot tal'get ooord1aat1on to govern our planning procedure t would emphasize here that while s1mpl1o1cy is oommendable it 1s not an end in itaelr but ahould influence of oona1der1ng target ooordinstion tlrat we should etart et the other end ot the epeotrum by determining the objectives ot our nuclear atrikea and then design the moat effective plans to attain thooe objectives then be _ demonstrated abilitJ to plan for and execute highly complex military operations I do not attach to the coordtnatlng procedure the degree ot complex1t J that ghOh81l'man doea I agree that what 1e involved ha e 18th pre-planning tor targets to e struck at H-hour -to be dona reaardlese ot what toroea 'l'h11 will at 1ke the targets wbethe the torooa mands or only one OQffl from several com- 'lbia pre-planning and oool'd1nat1on are ' T re1at1vel7 1Jnple When OOinJ aNd to the post-strike ooord1net1on that •111 be of many oategonea by the oomoan4era 1n aaboequon• ope tlooo I am sure we oan do 1t What ts needed is more poa1t1ve oontl'ol and direction by the Joint Chiefs ot Statf 'l'bey he•e the neoeaaary asnc1aa and raotl1t1ea available • Of 91 l9Mlf JCS 2056 143 Enclosure ''B '' 9211189 s u 1-fJi ·ii · - 1r JRi 1 It ta 1ftlpa at1ve that o 11ver1 forces be of a 9ize and type to oauae5ooeptable dmnage to the ene1111 even though he abould etrike tiret If 1th auoh a reatdual oapab111ty J the capao1ty tor a pi-e-eJnPt1ve attaok w111 be more than enough • 1t k koow the looatton ot tb• enesa •a m1ea1le ai It' we dou•t a t'Urther 1noreaae 1n the a11e ot our nuolear strike to oea will not oo»penaate tor this 4et1o1eno1 I agNe with the Oha1l'lllan that the neoeesitJ tor pNva111ng in gelleral war 1a or auoh vital inlportaaoe that any error in Judgment aa to the size or our nuclear atrite torc ea ahou14 be on the Bate Bide 'l'be Chaii nan atatea that tlM S vlet •a m tlitary doctrine 18 baaed on the prinoipl• of mass Our nuolear deltveey twoee have been baaed upon the eame pr1no1ple Aa we move into the m1H1le age we cannot depend to tbe same extent upon this principle Beoauae of the lnerabil1ty of our tixed bases to a surPJ 1•• attaok we muat enaure 1nev1ieble c0T1oentratton or t1repower by ahiftins to d1epereed concealed mobilo and tar leas vulnerable del1vel' Y' syeteraa We oan no longer place major relianoe upon planes o rat1ns tr0111 t1xed bases 'ffle waru1ng time is too short Likewise fixed miaalle a1tea even though hardened will be vulnerable to ballistlo mlaa1le1 ot the small CBP that we oan expeot the Soviets and ouraelvea to have within the next deoade 'Por the m1eailt era the o 1ter1a tar determining the size ID the past this of our nuolea strike force will change aize baa been detemtned largely by the ant1o1pated 11ze of the Soviet•• 1ntei-oont1nental bomber toroe ' 'hie bee rea lted 1n numbers of United States nuclear delivai vehlcl•• of 1uoh 111 gn1tude that e could loee a aubataotlal portion and atill ha•• ea0 1 h lett to devaetat• the o s s R The basto the111 or •II ' • lnOlQIUN °B 921118 T• Cll 818i E•h ' J t1 ••-being--• t§ iltlt ht ii - but the reault has been progre1s1ve1r 1noreas1ng numbere to ottaet 8 growing vulnerabilit ' of our own roraea together 1th an estimate of Soviet capability that has oontinuoualy tumad out to be muoh too high 'I'b1s procaae caonot be oont1nuad indefinitely without either impoain an unaooeptable eoonom1c urden upon the 'United States or by degrading our limited war oapab111ties to an unaoceptable degt'ee or both Fortunately it is not necessary to continue the process 'l'he nature o oharaoteriatioa ot the toroea rather than size alone wtll assume more importance in deteminine tuture roroe levels HeN are some ot the reaeons whys l We will have an inoreaaingly diverse delivery means e g land based bombers carrier based bombers land based ICBM and IRBM and see based PBM 2 The ballistic m1as1le threat to aircraft oarriers at sea and to aea ased m1aa1lea 11 ao BD 911 that it can be disregarded 3 There ara no Means no to esaen by which the Soviets oan 11m1nate the threat of the submarine ballistic missile 4 It may be feasible to make some lana baeed miastles movable by ba ge road or ail 5 No way is now toreaeen tor detel'lllining the number or Soviet missiles Nady tor launoh1l1g Among other means dummy sites could be uaed freel-7 6 It 1a unlikely that we will know the looation ot most of their misaile 111tea Thereto tp e-empt1ve attack •ould not al nate the threat or unaooeptable damage to the Un1te4 Stet i 7 With n ended ICBM missile race it is probab1e - - - a that large numbers would be based in the United States wh1oh will draw additional anam v m1ea1lea to our 1011 P Y29#9RE- i JCS 2 56 143 -1308 • -- Bnoloaure ''B 921118 20 'n·¢JP ti- l T - _ 1 a iilf I rfi •·C 'l he aeourit J ot our nuolear striking toroea against a aurpriae attack by any enemy hav1nc the pl iv1lege of str1k1ng first 1a a pr1maE Y oone1derat1on Unleae a retal1atroy rorce ataya altve 1t 1s useleas In the Polaris aubmarine we have a missile system n0t1 nearing fruition that can above all others stay alive We must not saor1f1oe the load that we now hold 1n this rteld by railing to exploit the many advantages ot using the sea as a base or launching nuolear attaoka It the Soneta are to be dete1'1'ed trom tn1tiat1ng general war the 1 ersttiy or or the threat that roaidea in a combination the above s1stema Mith decentl-al1zed oontrol ot those systems provides the requisite deterrent If they are not to be detel'Ted then this diversity or weapon ayatems without aatronomioal force levels will ensure the enemr•s destruction 7 Operational control or strike toroes 'l'he philosophy that I have outlined throughout this paper including targeting world Wide operations flexibility 4 decentralized exeout1on and other related factors dictates a position to sti-1ke the atrateg1o targets on the national 11st It is impossible to disassociate these targets trom ao called taotioal targets of immediate interest to the fol'Ces ot the The two are frequently aollocated and eoono ot tOl'Ce should d1otate that targets or both oategories be destroyed by the forces ot With reapeot to the folar1a submarine toroe I agree w1 the Chairman thet this tOl'Oe ahould remain under No9el control ll 8P HI ft l'l' JCS 2056 143 until the weapon system ha been developed ana proven Inclusion or this laat phrase ia not intended to imply that the system should ultlutely be removed from Navel oontrol I asree w1tb the Cha1J 'lllln that an appropriate nucleus of Naval ottioers be asa1gned to CINCSAC 1 s operational planning statt proVided that Air Poroe otf1oers 1nt1111ately familiar with OINOSAC 1a operational plans end planning proo dures be attached to the stafta or Un1f1ed Oommande1'8 hav1ng nuclear delivery forces Ot1'1oera ot both Ser'lficee eo uaigned should participate actively in all phaaae of planning by the starr or which they ere• part I concur in thia procedure in the interest ot improved Planning a-nd not for the purpose ot preparing for an eventual Unified Strategic command The question of assign1n our targets to be hit by oa rier aircrert w111 be anawe rietly • nation has in these carriers an alert force on atation with movable airtielda Today and even more in the fUtura theee are preaioua oharaoteriatics that cannot be realized by any other force regardless ot coat The Navy has proved repeatedly 1ta ability to exploit theee charaoter1at1ca in many typea ot opet'Btiona When the ob1pe ate down the Naval torcea are 1n poa1tton and ready 'l'hese Naval t01'Cea will hit their aastgned ta geta usually before other forces oa hit their targets n 1a i -eoogn1zed that the percentage or strike planes in our carrier toroea ts amall when compared to the total number ot delivery vehicles in the Tiat1on•a lnventol'J' 1'h1a percentage however may well riee to aubetantlal proport1ona it we receive a surprise attaok A pl'e empt1ve attaok would be pre-planned wtth tven an 1noha8ed nwaber ot oal'l'iers on e at1on It is 1noonoe1vable that the nation under either condition would deny 1taelt the use ot tb1a etnk1ng power b ra111ng to assign a uaz - 1t R-h0 11' JCS 2o 6 l 3 ---- ·- - ----- - - 1310 - - ' Bl lcloeure ''B 921118- ---- ____ l _ u ¥ · r __ r ' - 'ftle Oba1rman tn paragraph 32 ot his mel IOi'andum states that if the series or deotatons whioh he had outlined were taken the question ot operational oontrol of the various atr1lca forces and problem or mutual intwterenoe would be great1 __ _ _ stmpl1t1ed because mutual 1nterrerence ult1ng trom two or more commands tal'Set1ng the aame obJeot1ve foto H-hour attack would be largely eliminated He •ould degnde assigning to a single commander ttui·respons1b1111 J tor planning and executing a airigle national nuclear strike plan It would appear safer and tar more logical to achieve the sought tw s1mplio1ty and interference t-eduotion by aaS1gn1ng all overseas strategic strike toroea to the Unified Col'lllll8nderu in Whose areas they are based and w1thtn whose areas they would conduct their strikes It we are seeking e1mpl1otty in planning# with aaret7 1n execution# this woul4 be a major step fol'1fara 8 Thtre are other taotora that are pertinent to these d1souss1ona and whioh were not oovere4 spec1tloally 1n the Cha1man's inemoraadum • One ot these relates to changes in military strategy to keep pace With changes in relate t1elds Oha ge ts one or the oonstants of warfare B1stor1oally weai on oharaoterietloe and the nat lJ '8 ot he en have heav11 y Bnolosure to ror auua JtlS 2056 143 J c s 2056 l 31 - - 1311 • Enclosure 11 921118- J Hl« PH· r - 1nn ienaed atrategy SolD8 wars have been tousht almost ant1rely on land others predominately on the sea and still others in a combination of the two In reoent hlatory the air has become the th1rd medium ot combat and ai po w has played a role ct tremendous 11nportanoe W'e ara now 1tt eas1ng the emergence ot the ndsaile age wbioh w111 probably result tn a decreased emphasis on some oataganea ot air power particularly hhe long rans• bomber and taot1ca1 aircraft tor troop support In essenoe we are retum1ns to an art1ller oonoept Wherein the a ploeive 111 launched ti'Olll the eal tlh1 s aurtaee or sub-surtaoe However there ia one vt%'7 1mportiaTlt difference 'lhe artillery battlepound will be expanded to include the homeland of the ' belligerents Thu means that it we use United Stated soil ae the art11ler y baas we will reoe1ve on United Stetes eoil large nmil era of enemy m1ee11es a1med at eliminating our own m1asile launoh1ng sites If tbpa were no alteraat1vea we sho ld puraue thla stl'atea Fortunately there are alternatives and good ones ohnology provides us nth the means tor using the oceans as the artiller base Regal'dleee ot 1111 ultimate decision as to the oantrol of to rcee the development ot strategic plans or the detailed taot1os uaed this nation should exploit 8V l'J possible eena ot uaing the oceans as a base tor the del1veey ot nuclear weapons beoauee ot the relative tnvulnereb111tJ an4 sreate etteot1veneas aesured th•reby as well as the signifioabt eooaomiea posa1b1e to achieve Major evolutions auoh as the above must be recognized and appropriately l'fittleoted in all phases of our Planfl1ng Where neoesaary we muat be willing to break away trom procedures and systems oonce1ve and implemented in an era ot nqolear det1c1enoJ on ou pa t and no auolear oapebU1ty ot the part of the • u s s R PNg eaa hes pro'l14ed the Soviets with a s Jit JCS 2056 1 43 • 1312 • Enclosure 11 11 921118 - w e - ti o 'Ir i if ·• ' •TO 'f• b P r ft ' 3 l • substantial oapab111ty tbat 1s growing 1n ai • alld veraatllity L1kewiae our nuolear poNell baa grown many-told We have made some notlable a4Juatmente to theee developments Among other things we have placed d1nra1t1ed delivery means in the bands of vn1r1ed COlllll8hdera 1nne41ately adJacent to Conanuniat Bloc territory Thia hae broadened greatl J the base ot our m111tary posture To N1tb4raw frcnn theaa comandera this oapab1lity that ha been developed ao aaatduoual 7 o•er the yeare and centralize it tn the hande ot a single co111111Snder would nan-ow that base We would therebr tol'fe1t 1trength that oomea fro• versatile toJ Qea and a deoentraliaed control that is eo well adapted to our toroe atNoture and the atrategto poa1t1ona that we hold arou114 the 111 1oi- portlcm ot the COGDUnist Bloc perwte Another taotoio that should be tully recogaized 1a that the m1l1teey strategy and force sti-uoture suitable tor an aggreaaor nation will normal 11 be unsuitable tor the noa-aareaaor The aggressor can be more epeo1f1o 1n h1a planning both a• to timing ana aa to tJpea ot attacka We 111 y be sure that he Nill explore eveey poasible indication ot our weakness in any ares and Nill exploit that wealmeaa in bla aggresstve ovsa We on the other hand nmat be more fleX1ble to be able to 111eet a variety ot tbi-uate oonaequently our foroe and ocmmancS structure must be auoh that we oan withstand reverses 1n some areas Without danger ot the whole ati-uotura toppling 9 I appreoiate tho Oha1nan 1 1 Drovtd1ng the Joint Chiefs or Statt oopiea of b'la J1emoran'1um I agree with hill that we should resolve tha 1aauea disouaaed I 10 In paralleling the d11tnbat1on ot referenoe a I am providing copies ot th11 61110ranclum to the 8ec1 8taey ot Defense the Chief or Statt ot the Arm the Ohl et ot Statt ot the Air Poree end the Commandant ot 11he Marine Corpf • • s AJltlUOB BURKB pa g 921 8 ·•'fl rep SH ·r Bnoloeure B 11