N П40 26 П ролетарuи всех стран соеди н яtlтесь СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО Т т Брежневу Тихонову Андропову Громыко Устинову Пономареву Русакову 3 Выписка из протокола J 40 заседания Политбюро ЦК Ю1СС от 13 декабря 1981 года 06 инфоомаnии руководства боатских стоан по польскому вопросу СЕКРЕТАРЬ ЦК Утвердить проект указания совпослам в НРБ ВНР ГДР МНР ЧССР Республике Куба СРВ и JШДР прилагается 17-аг ал Общий отдел 1-й сектор Номмунистичесная Партия Gоветсного Союза ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ Подлежит возврату в 7-дневный срок в ЦК КПСС К пункту 26 прот i 40 Секnетно СОФИЯ БУДАПЕIJIГ БЕРЛИН УЛАН-БАТОР ПРАГА ГАВАНА ХАН ОЙ ВЬЕНТЬЯН совпосол Копия ВАРШАВА - СОВПОСОЛ ' РАВА БЕЗ П И И ИКАЦ ПУБЛ Посетите Т Живкова Я Кадара Э Хонеккера Ю Цеденбала Г Гусака Ф Кастро Ле Зуана К Фомвихана и сославшись на поручение ЦК КПСС передайте сле цующее Как друзьям известно польское руководство ввело в стране военное положение объявило о создании Военного Совета нацио­ нального спасения и изолировало наиболее экстремистские элементы из Солидарности Конфедерации независимой Польши 11 и других антисоциалистических групп Оставляет положительное впечатление Обращение В Ярузельского к наро цу в котором на наш взгляд правильно расставлены акце н­ ты по основным вопросам В частности что особенно важно под­ тверждены руководящая роль ПОРП верность ПНР союзническим обя­ зательствам по Варшавскому Договору Условием успешного проведения акции польские товарищи рас­ сматривали строгую секретность О ней было известно лишь в узком окружении В Ярузельского Благодаря этому друзьям удалось за­ стигнуть противника врасплох и операция пока проходит удовлетво­ рительно В самый канун осуществления на iеченного плюш В Ярузельский сообщил об этом в Москву Ему передали что советское руководство относится к такому решению польских товарищей с пониманием Пр� 2 этом мь1 исходим из того что польские друзья будУт решать эти вопросы внутренними силами По нашей предварительной оценке действия польских друзей являются активным шагом отпора контрреволюции и отвечают в этом смысле общей линии братских стран В этих условиях возникает вопрос и об оказании политической и мораль ной поддержки польским товарища � а также дополнительной экономической помощи Советское руководство как и прежде будет действовать в польском вопросе в контакте с братскими страна ш 11 06 исполнении телеграфируйте • 21-аг ол ' с � 1 цхсд t Ф _- - - ----�--­ ОП Ht UtlC л л f 1 Д J у 1- l -1 экз №__ � �199 tr i Со1л Wлн INiicRNЛTION I Н1sпжУ Р1ю1сст HиJJ JN s н·t 11' liars 1 i11 tп1ctio11 l11cl1 11 шl J 10 те tl1em to a lopt 011 eotn 01· a110tl1er 1 1 1111k 1ve hc11·e clюsc11 t 1c сопесt рочtш11 l1еп Т11с rcsюп1tior1 01· оп сг iп Polaпd is а 111attc1· й11· 1 1с Polish U11itc I Vv·oгkcrs· Рагtу its C 11tгal Со111· mittce апd its Pol1tht1гo Ve alreaviy sa1tl to ш1г Polish t'гicпds апd 1vill sa agai11 i11 tl1e Гшuгс 1 1at they musl pшsue а stea Н-ast couгse ·i lюш slackening i11 the east 01· course il' the Poles deliveг а h101 v ю Solidarity the West iп all likeli11ood will 1101 giv t11em credits апd 11·i l поt оПеr апу ot 1er kind of help They аге a11-are of 1 1is апd this obviously is somethi11g that we too have to bear iп miпd For tl1is reaso11 Leonid llyicl1 was correet i11 proposi11g that we i11struc t а group of comrades to exami11e this questio11 takiпg ac ­ count of our capaЫlities to extend substaпtial economic assistaпce to t 1e PPR USTINOV Т11е situatioп in the PPR 01· course is very bad The situation is worseniпg day Ьу day Amoпg the leadership especially i11 the Politburo there is 110 fir11111ess or llпity A11d alJ of this has taken its toll оп t11e state of affairs Only at the last sessio11 of the Polish Politburo 1vas а decisioп u11a11iпюusly appro •ed to iпtю­ duce martial lav A11d no v а lюpes are ridiпg 011 Jaruzelski How v •ill he succeed iп саггуi11g out this decisio11 As yet по 011е сап орепlу speak about the actio11s ot· Jaгuzelski We just dоп ·1 know 1 had а co111 ersatiш1 with Si vic ki Не caпdidly said tliat eYen 1ve the Poles clo11·1 k11ow what the gепегаl is thi11ki11g Thus the mап who has Ьееп etTecti ·ely гesponsiЬ e f'ог dis­ chaгgi11g the duties ot'the Po ish def'ense 111i11iste1· doesn ·1 know liat will hарреп апd what sort оГ actioпs will Ье take11 Ьу tl1e сl�аiгпшп 01· tl1e Council of Miпisters апd 111i11ister With гegard to wl1at Сошгаdе Kuliko1· al­ legedly said about t11e i11tгoductio11 of troops i11to Polaпd Icaп say iп t'ull respo11sЫlity that Kulikov never said this Не simply гepeated what vas said Ьу us a11d Ьу Leoпid Ilyicl1 tl1at we would not leave Polaпd iп tl1e lllrcl1 Апd l1e pertectly 1·е 1 kпows t11at t11e Poles tl1e111selves reqllested us 1101 to introduce troops As fаг as our garrisoпs iп Polaпd аге co11cerned we are foгtifyi11g 1 1е111 111yse1t· аш also iпcliпed totl1i11k tl1at t11e Poles will 11ot e111bai·k o11 а co11fro11tatio11 a11d only i perhaps Solidaгity seizes them Ьу tl1e tl1гoat vill tl1cy соте t'cml1 Т11е рг0Ые111 is tl1at the Polisl1 leac1eгs do поt appear гesolute As was гightly said hсп Ьу tl1c comrades ve пшst поt t'огсе tl1e111 to adopt апу specific decisioпs we ill si111ply саггу out tl1e policyoп wl1icl1 ·е ha e ag ·eccl Fог ошрагt v ·e mllst Ье геаdу oнгselves апJ 1ш1st поt display а11 sort 01' ac tioпs 1101 рго1 icie i ш l1 otlr kcisioпs SUSLO I l clie e as is c icieпt 'ro111 tlн othe1· сшпгаdсs· speecl1es wc all lial'e tl1e sa111c 1·ic1v of'tl1c sitшtio11 iп Pola11 i Jt1гi11g tl1c 1 lюlc 137 p1 l mge J iгcfc'l1 о ' с1 c111s 111 Polam1 11·с ia l· cJ1 playccl slcшJ a 111 a11cl со111роsш·с сшшl st su V 111 tl1c prcS 'С 111lbl t xposc tl1e i11tгigt1e 1· Solillaгity ап 1 оtlн г еош1tсп·с 'о­ llyicl1 Вгаlшс1 spokc аhош tl1is а1 tl1c' рlс1н1111 'с· saitf 1l1is iп рнЬ iс о ош pcoplc ai1tl щ1г lt1tюпагу 1·огсе peoplc sщ1po1·teJ tl1c policy ot· tl1e Co1111пt111is1 CHEl' NENKO 1 f'в у аgгее with 11 Ьаt thc Рагtу Ve · ve dопе а great deal оГ Гk Гог ре асс co111гaclcs liave saicl lie1·e lt is сlеаг that t 1e li11e a11ci it is 110w i111possih e for вs to cl1a11ge ог1г оГ онг partv апd ot· tl1e СС Politbuгo vis-a-vis tl1e positioп Vorld puЬ ic орiпiоп will поt pem1it t1s Polish eve11ts as Гогпшlаtеd i11 the speeches о ' to t1o so We have carrieci out via tl1e UN sllcl1 Leoпid llyic h Вге7 hпеv a11d i11 the decisioпs of' 1110111e11tous diplшnatic actio11s to coпsolidatc tl1e Politbвro is eпtirely соггссt and iп по need 01· рсас е Wl1at а great etTect we havc had 1·ro111 the cliange 1 believe that today we could adopt the visit 01· L 1 Brezlшev о the FRG апd 'rош тапу otheг peacel'ul actioпs we have u11dertake11 Тl1is t·o lowiпg Jec isioп has епаЬ еd all peace-loving t Ollntries to uпder­ 1 Take l 11deг advise111e11t t11e iпf'oг111atio11 pro­ staпd that tl1e Soviet U11io11 stauпchly апd coпsis­ vided Ьу Co111rade Baibakov teпtly llplюlds а policy of реасс That is 1vhy it is 2 111 our relalio11s witl1 the PPR in the future поw impossih e for us to change the positio11 we аЫdе Ьу the ge11eral political liпe оп this matter have adopted vis-a-vis Polaпd si11ce t11e vегу start laid dowп Ьу the CPSU СС a11d also аЫdе Ьу the ot· the Polish events Let the Polish comrades iпstruc tioпs 1·ro111 the CPSU СС Po itburo 011 8 themselves determine what actio11s they 111L1st Decembeг 1981 a11d the excha11ge of opi11io11s pursue It would Ье i11appropriate for us to push t11at occurгed at the СС Politburo's sessio11 оп О them toward more deeisive actioпs But we will December 1981 as earlier tel1 t11e Poles that we regard their 3 lпstruct Co111гades Tikho11ov Кirile11ko actio11s with u11dersta11ding Dolgik11 Aгkl1ipov a11d Baibakov to co11ti11ue As it seems to 111е Jaruzelski is displayi11g а studyiпg questioпs of' ecoпomic assistaпce to certai11 degree of slyness Не vaпts to 111ake Polaпd takiпg accouпt of t11e ехс11апgе of opiп­ excuses t·ог himselt' Ьу сошiпg t·oгth 1vith re­ ioпs at tl1e sessio11 ot' t11e СС Politburo quests whicl1 he presents to the Soviet U11io11 These requests naturally are l1eyo11d our physi­ BREZHNEV How do the comrades teel cal capacity to t·lllfill апd Jaruzelski tl1en says about this'J well look here 1 turned to t11e Soviet U11io11 a11d requested help but didn't receive it EVERYONE ComradeCherпeпko has very At the sa111e time t11e Poles say directly that ргорегlу f ППlllated а the proposals апd поw it tl1ey аге opposed to the iпtroductioп of troops 11' is ti111e to adopt tl1em tюops are iпtroduced that will теап а catastгo­ The dесгее is adopted pl1e 1 thiпk we have гeached а L111a11i111ous view 11еге оп tl1is matter апd there сап Ье по coпsideг­ atioп at all о ' iпtгoducing tгoops As t'аг as tl1e provisioп ot· assista11c e to CPst· СС Politburo Protocol extract Poluпd is co11cer11ed we have giveп that соuпtгу Оп Iпt·or111atio11 about the Polish questio11 тоге tl1a11 а Ы iоп гнЫеs Not loпg ago VC f'or tl1e leaders of' the f�ater11al countries adopted а decision to ship 30 tl1ousaпd toпs ot' 13 l eeerпher 1981 meat to Polaпd of' whicl1 16 t11ousaпd toпs liave already Ьееп deliveгed I dоп 't kпow 1vhetl1eг 1ve · 11 Ье аЫе to ship the t'ul 30 thousaпd toпs Ьш Pгoletariaпs ot· а couпtries uпite 1 iп апу eveпt we appareпtly are oЫiged Ьу this decisioп ю give а t·uгtheг del'iпite пшnЬеr of'toпs Comпшnist Party of the Soviet Uпiоп CENTRAL СОММJТТЕЕ ot· meat as assistaпce TOP SECRET With rcgard to t11e PZPR апd tl1e creatioп о ' а пеw party to replace it 1 believe it wollld Ье i11appropriate to disbaпd the PZPR Tl1ose wlю No Р40 26 spoke here werecoгrect iп агgнiпg tl1at this VOlllcJ ТО Co111гades Bгezl111ev Tik11oпov Ье а co111pletely u11l1elpf't1I actio11 A11dгopov Gromyko Sl slov Ustiпov GRISН IN Tl1e situatioп iп Pola11d is get­ Ро110111агеv Rвsakov Za111yati11 ti11g steadily worse The liпe ot' овr party tov ·aгd tl1e Polisl1 eveпts is eпtiгely сопссt Witl1 respect Extгaet t'го111 Pгotocol No 40 ot' tl1e sessioп оГ tl1e to tl1e pгoposal hy Jaшzelski to disbaпd tl1e PZPR CPSLJ се PolithllГO ar1d сгеаtе а 11e1v рагtу опе с аппоt аgгсе vvitl1 оп 1 3 Dccc111l eг 1981 tliat Тl1сге с ап 11е по talk at all of' i11tюdt1t i11g troops Wc wi l have to look at cco110111ie t1es­ tio11s апсl al wlыt сап Ье giveп to thc Polcs ' ' � � 1 1 ' f ' t I J l I Л I l t H · О п lnt'ormatioп aboot the PtJli- � tio11 J щlЬ� lcaders оГ the ГraterпaJ col ntrics То a tiirrп the clraГt i 11strш tio11s to the So ·iet aшbassatlors iп Bнlgaгia Hш1gary thc Moпgolia Czechoslovakia the Rept1Ыic otToba Vietпam and Сао� lsee attachcd J 1 5 JIJ econoшic assistancc Л1с Soviet lcader·ship а pгeviot1 ly i l l act 011 tl1c Polis 1 чucstion iп close contact with the fratemal coнntries Confirm traпsmittal Ьу teleg1· 11n се SECRETARY C PS ' СС Politburo tгa11s тipt ехссгрО 14 Jаппагу 1 982 Regarding point 26 of Prot No 40 SESSION OF ТНЕ CPSU се POLIТBURO 14 Jaпuary 1 982 Presided over Ьу Comrade L I BREZHNEV SOFIA B UDAPEST BERLIN ULAN-BATOR PRAGUE НА V ANA HANOI VIENTIANE SOVIET AMBASSADOR СС W ARSA W SOVIET AMBASSADOR Рау а cal l 011 Т Zhivkov J Kadar Е H o11ecker ·уu Tsedenbal G Hosak F Castro Li Duan К Phomvihan апd referring to the CPSU СС' s instrнctio11s transmit the folJowing As oнr friends know the PoJish leadership has introduced martial law in the eoontry an­ notшced the formation ot' а Military Council ot· National Salvatio11 and detained the most ex­ tremist elements of 'Solidarity · the 'Confedera­ tion for an lndependent Poland ' a11d other anti­ socialist groups А good impression has been created Ьу W J aruzelski ' s address to the people in which in онr view all the basic qнcstions were given appropriate emphasis In particнlar what is espe­ cial у important is that the address reaffirmed the leading role of the PZPR and the commitment of the PPR to the socialist oЫigations stipнlated Ьу the Warsaw Pact То ensure the sнccess of the operation the Polish comrades observed strict secrecy Only а narrow circle around Jaruzelski knew аЬонt the action 13 Thanks to this our t·пends have sнc­ ceeded in catching the enemy completely un­ awares and the operation so far has been imple­ mented satisfactorily Оп the very eve of implementation of the projectedoperation W Jaruzelski commLшicated about it to Moscow 14 We int'oпned him that the S oviet leadership looked with uпderstanding нроn the decision of the Polish comrades 111 so doing we ensнred that the Polish coшrades woнld re­ solve these matters solely Ьу i nternal шeans ln our preliminary evaluation the mea­ sures taken Ьу the Polish f'riends are an active step to repulse coнnterrevolнtioп and in this seпse they correspoпd with the general line ot' all the fraternal coнntries ln these circшnstances the чoestion arises about of feriпg political анd пюrаl support to the Polish t·гieпds апd also аЬш1t gi ·iпg additioпal Also taking part C omra des Yu У Andropov М S Gorbachev V V Grishin А А Gromyko А Р Кirilenko А Уа Pel'she М А Suslov N А Tikhonov D F Ustiпov К U Chernenko Р N Demichev V V Kuznetsov B N Ponomarev V 1 Dolgikh М V Zimyanin К V Rнsakov Foreign Affairs of the PoJish People' s RернЫiс � B REZHNEV 1 think we all agree that M ikhail Andreevich Sнslov ' s and A ndrei Andreevich Gromyko ' s discussions with Cde Czyrek were нseful Western officials especially the Americans are exerting enormous pressure оп Poland In sнch circumstances it is important to ot fer constant political sнpport for онr f r iends and to bolster their spirits One cannot permit their spirits to sag or ю allow them to relinquish what they have achieved with sнch difficнlty Martial law in the PPR has already lasted а month As Jarнzelski says the counterrevolution is now crushed However the tasks ahead are more complicated A fter introducing relative staЫ ity in the country the Polish comrades mнst now one might say resolve the strategic proЫems of what to do with the trade unions how to revive the economy how to change the consciousness of the masses etc The most important question is the situation in the PZPR Our friends are trying to find а solution No doнbt Jaruzelski does not intend to disband the party or to change its name Ьнt he сап exploit martial law to carry онt а sweeping purge This might yield good resнlts In general one gets the impression that the general as а political actor is very strong and is аЫе оп most occasions to tind proper solutions Sometimes i t seems that he is too cautious апd acts more often than necessary with an еуе to the West and the Chнrch Внt in the cнrrent sitнation sнch gestнres will only rнin thiпgs Along with firm hardline measures оп matters of principle one also пeeds ЛexiЫlity апd circumspection Jt ' s good that Jarнzelski is studyiпg the Ht1ngaria11 ехрегiспсе i 11 st1·t1ggli11g against collnterrevc tioп AII of нs clearly understand that the decis preconclirion f or the fнlJ staЫlization ot· tt1ing Polш1d i s а revival ofthe econoшy n Czechos vakia at'ter 1 968 pol itical efforts made headv precisely Ьесанsе the counterrevolнtion had 1 atJected the economic sphere In Polaпd jнst t opposite is true In this connection а dift'icн t qнestion stan before нs We already are stretched to the limit ош capacity to help the Poles and they ё making sti J more requests Perhaps we can d Ыt more Ьш we certainly can' t give а lot mo1 S t i l l we must of coнrs e answ Jaruzelski's letter 15 explaining i n а comrade way what we can and cannot do B y al l means v must precisely carry онt our agreed deliveries the first qнarter which for the Poles will Ье tl most dif fict1lt winter months Qui te another matter are projects f political prestige which shoнld not impose gre strains оп our economy For example we са lend assistance in bнilding the Warsaw subwa We should meet this request having made 0L participation а matter of рнЫiс knowledge Incidentally the food situation in Poland i поt so bad There is enough bread i n the coнntr and they must find а way ю motivate the peasasntr and to get them to work arranging as we some times say а merger of the city and village The Polish leadership continues to count 01 help from the West Well in principle we сап' Ье against that although to Ье honest it' s doubt t'нl that Western coнntries are аЬонt to start pro• viding material assistance to а military regime They нndoubtedly will try to extract concessions which means we must Ье especially vigilaпt Jaruzelski is raising aпother question of whether he shoнld accept help fro m the Chinese Wel l why not In the process China will Ье disassociating itself from the USA and its eco­ nomic sanctions In conclusion one might say that the Polish question will Ье at the center of international politics for а long time to соте That is why онr Polish commission has continued to work as actively as i t has been нр to now CPSU СС Report on Economic Aid to Ро апd 1980-81 23 September 1982 SPECIAL DOSSIER Secret 1 INFORMAТION about Soviet assistance to Poland in freelv coпvertiЫe currency in 1 980- 1 98 1 -