Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Updated September 11 2020 Congressional Research Service https crsreports congress gov R44245 SUMMARY Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief The following matters are of particular significance to U S -Israel relations Domestic political and economic challenges including COVID-19 A second wave of Coronavirus Disease 2019 COVID-19 in Israel combined with other factors has contributed to domestic political and economic challenges In July popular protests against Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and government policies swelled in connection with these domestic challenges and the ongoing criminal trial against Netanyahu on corruption charges Nevertheless polls suggest that Netanyahu’s Likud party would remain the largest party in the Knesset if new elections were held R44245 September 11 2020 Jim Zanotti Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs U S -Israel security cooperation While Israel maintains robust military and homeland security capabilities it also cooperates closely with the United States on national security matters A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding—signed in 2016—committed the United States to provide Israel $3 3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028 along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense Amounts for future years remain subject to congressional appropriations Israeli-Palestinian issues President Trump has expressed interest in helping resolve the decades-old IsraeliPalestinian conflict His policies however have largely sided with Israeli positions thus alienating Palestine Liberation Organization PLO Chairman and Palestinian Authority PA President Mahmoud Abbas The President’s January 2020 Vision for Peace plan appears to favor Israeli positions on disputed issues such as borders and settlements the status of Jerusalem and its holy sites security and Palestinian refugees After the plan’s release Netanyahu announced his intention to annex areas in the West Bank that the plan anticipates coming under Israeli sovereignty but annexation has not taken place to date UAE and Bahrain normalization deals and possible U S arms sales In August 2020 Israel and the UAE announced their willingness to fully normalize bilateral relations after Israel agreed to suspend plans to annex parts of the West Bank A similar Israel-Bahrain normalization announcement followed in September The agreements could have implications for the region and U S policy The deals could be interpreted as vindicating Prime Minister Netanyahu’s long-standing claim that he could normalize Israel’s relations with Arab countries before reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians Palestinian leaders denounced the UAE deal and withdrew their ambassador from the UAE while UAE officials claim that they have preserved prospects for future negotiations toward a Palestinian state The UAE deal may have increased the likelihood of U S sales of advanced weaponry F-35 aircraft drones electronic warfare planes to the UAE Any sales could face congressional scrutiny related to safeguarding Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge which is codified in U S law Iran and other regional issues Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons Prime Minister Netanyahu strongly supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities Facing intensified U S sanctions Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement Reports suggest that Israel may have been behind a July 2020 explosion that destroyed a number of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility Israel has reportedly conducted a number of military operations in Syria Iraq and Lebanon against Iran and its allies due to concerns about Iran’s efforts to establish a permanent presence in these areas and to improve the accuracy and effectiveness of Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal China Investments in Israel and U S concerns U S officials have raised some concerns with Israel over Chinese investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure that could increase China’s ability to gather intelligence and acquire security-related technologies While Chinese state-owned companies remain engaged in some specific infrastructure projects including operations at Haifa’s seaport set to begin in 2021 in May 2020 Israel turned down the bid of a Chinese-affiliated company to construct a major desalination plant Congressional Research Service Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Contents Introduction Major Issues for U S -Israel Relations 1 Domestic Issues 1 COVID-19 and Economic Challenges 1 Protests and Netanyahu’s Political Status 2 U S Security Cooperation 3 Israeli-Palestinian Issues Under the Trump Administration 3 U S Vision for Peace Plan 4 Possible West Bank Annexation 5 Gaza and Its Challenges 5 Foreign Policy Issues 6 UAE and Bahrain Normalization Deals 6 Israeli-Palestinian Implications 7 U S Arms Sales to UAE and Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge 7 Iran and the Region 8 Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions 8 Hezbollah 9 Syria and Iraq Reported Israeli Airstrikes Against Iran-Backed Forces 9 China Investments in Israel and U S Concerns 10 Figures Figure A-1 Israel Map and Basic Facts 12 Figure D-1 Conceptual Map of Israel 17 Figure D-2 Conceptual Map of Future Palestinian State 18 Figure D-3 Unofficial Map with Green Line 19 Appendixes Appendix A Map and Basic Facts 12 Appendix B Indictments Against Netanyahu and Steps of the Legal Process 13 Appendix C Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset and Their Leaders 14 Appendix D Maps Related to U S Plan 17 Contacts Author Information 20 Congressional Research Service Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Introduction Major Issues for U S -Israel Relations Israel see Appendix A has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas issues with significant implications for U S -Israel relations include the following       Israeli domestic political issues including challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic and associated economic concerns and protests against Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu Israel’s security cooperation with the United States Israeli-Palestinian issues and U S policy Israel’s agreement to normalize relations with the United Arab Emirates in return for suspending plans to annex some areas of the West Bank and implications of the agreement for Israeli-Palestinian issues U S arms sales and Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge Shared U S -Israel concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence including with Lebanon-based Hezbollah Syria and Iraq Chinese investment in Israeli companies and infrastructure and U S concerns about implications for U S national security For background information and analysis on these and other topics including aid arms sales and missile defense cooperation see CRS Report RL33476 Israel Background and U S Relations by Jim Zanotti and CRS Report RL33222 U S Foreign Aid to Israel by Jeremy M Sharp Domestic Issues COVID-19 and Economic Challenges Israel is facing a host of domestic challenges many of which are interrelated Much of the public concern seems connected to a second wave of Coronavirus Disease 2019 COVID-19 cases in Israel significantly larger than the first wave in the spring and associated economic challenges see Appendix A In response to the economic concerns the Knesset enacted a $1 9 billion stimulus plan in July 2020 to provide cash payments to Israeli citizens 1 Many Israelis have protested against Netanyahu and the government’s policies see below Also Prime Minister Netanyahu’s standing has suffered somewhat in public opinion polls amid questions about the survival of the government that took office in May 2020 based on a powersharing agreement between Netanyahu of the Likud party and his main political rival Defense Minister and Alternate Prime Minister Benny Gantz of the Kahol Lavan Blue and White party see textbox below Key Aspects of Power-Sharing Agreement for Israel’s Government Under the power-sharing agreement for Israel’s government that took office in May 2020 Netanyahu is expected to serve as prime minister and Gantz as alternate prime minister and defense minister for the first 18 months of the government’s term at which point Gantz is set to become prime minister for the next 18 months with Netanyahu as his alternate 2 1 2 “Knesset approves amended version of Netanyahu’s NIS 6 5b handouts plan ” Times of Israel July 29 2020 If Netanyahu and Gantz agree after Gantz’s initial 18 months as prime minister Netanyahu will serve another six Congressional Research Service 1 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Observers analyzing the Netanyahu-Gantz deal have identified various perceived benefits for both sides 3 Potential benefits for Netanyahu include his continuation as prime minister and apparent ability to remain in government until he exhausts all appeals if convicted on corruption charges his ability to hold votes on West Bank annexation an effective veto over appointments of key judiciary and justice sector officials and holding sway with the Knesset’s right-of-center majority even during Gantz’s time as prime minister Potential benefits for Gantz include Netanyahu’s lack of immunity from criminal proceedings safeguards intended to ensure that Gantz will become prime minister 18 months through the government’s term as agreed co-ownership of the governing and legislative agenda and effective control over half the cabinet and positions including the defense foreign and justice ministries with significant influence on national security and rule of law in Israel Despite the details of this political agreement it is unclear whether either party would be able to compel its legal enforcement as in the case if Netanyahu were to refuse to step down as prime minister 4 New elections would take place in the event that the government is dissolved Under the terms of the unity agreement Gantz would serve as caretaker prime minister before such elections in most situations if Netanyahu is responsible for the dissolution 5 However if the government dissolves over a failure to pass a budget Netanyahu would reportedly remain as caretaker prime minister The Knesset averted a dissolution in August 2020 by extending the budget deadline for 2020 to December Beyond COVID-19 and its economic impact some criticism of Netanyahu is linked to his ongoing criminal trial on corruption charges see Appendix B and a Knesset Finance Committee vote in June to grant him some personal tax relief Testimony in Netanyahu’s trial is scheduled to begin in January 2021 Protests and Netanyahu’s Political Status Starting in July protestors criticizing Netanyahu and government policies swelled to number in the thousands Debate is ongoing between Netanyahu’s supporters and critics about each other’s culpability for various incidents of incitement and violence as well as the culpability of protestors counter-protestors and police Despite the drop in Netanyahu’s approval rating and the popular protests against him polls suggest that if new elections were held soon Likud would lose some seats but remain the largest party in the Knesset Depending on a number of factors this could put Netanyahu in position to lead a right-of-center coalition 6 The current power-sharing government took office after Knesset elections in March 2020 see Appendix C following two previous elections—in April and September 2019—that failed to produce a government months followed by another six for Gantz Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre The New Israeli National Unity Government May 2020 The designation of alternate prime minister was created by Knesset legislation before the government came into office Under Israeli law only a cabinet member with the status of prime minister can remain in office while under indictment so the designation would allow Netanyahu to retain this status even after a transfer of power to Gantz The designation also is designed to allow for Gantz to take over for Netanyahu without a separate Knesset vote 3 See for example David Horovitz “Gantz tries likely fails to lock Netanyahu into eventually handing over power ” Times of Israel April 21 2020 Yossi Verter “Netanyahu-Gantz Deal Ensures Accused Premier Will Have the Last Word ” haaretz com April 21 2020 Chemi Shalev “Netanyahu-Gantz Unity Deal The Good the Bad the Ugly and the Ominous ” haaretz com April 21 2020 4 Horovitz “Gantz tries likely fails ” 5 See footnote 3 6 Ben Caspit “Coronavirus-infected Israel on brink of anarchy ” Al-Monitor September 8 2020 Congressional Research Service 2 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief U S Security Cooperation While Israel maintains robust military and homeland security capabilities it also cooperates closely with the United States on national security matters U S law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military edge ” or QME 7 Additionally a 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding MOU —signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3 3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028 subject to congressional appropriations Israeli-Palestinian Issues Under the Trump Administration8 President Trump has expressed interest in helping resolve the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict However his policies have largely favored Israeli positions thus alienating Palestine Liberation Organization PLO Chairman and Palestinian Authority PA President Mahmoud Abbas Selected U S Actions Impacting Israeli-Palestinian Issues December 2017 President Trump recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital prompting the PLO PA to cut off high-level diplomatic relations with the United States May 2018 U S embassy opens in Jerusalem August 2018 Administration ends contributions to U N Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNRWA September 2018 Administration reprograms FY2017 economic aid for the West Bank and Gaza to other locations announces closure of PLO office in Washington DC January 2019 As a result of the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 P L 115-253 the Administration ends all bilateral U S aid to the Palestinians March 2019 The U S consulate general in Jerusalem—previously an independent diplomatic mission to the Palestinians—is subsumed under the authority of the U S embassy to Israel President Trump recognizes Israeli sovereignty in the Golan Heights June 2019 At a meeting in Bahrain U S officials roll out $50 billion economic framework for Palestinians in the region tied to the forthcoming peace plan PLO PA officials reject the idea of economic incentives influencing their positions on core political demands November 2019 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says that the Administration disagrees with a 1978 State Department legal opinion stating that Israeli West Bank settlements are inconsistent with international law January 2020 President Trump releases peace plan 7 CRS Report RL33476 Israel Background and U S Relations by Jim Zanotti CRS Report RL33222 U S Foreign Aid to Israel by Jeremy M Sharp 8 For additional background see CRS In Focus IF11237 Israel and the Palestinians Chronology of a Two-State Solution by Jim Zanotti Congressional Research Service 3 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief U S Vision for Peace Plan On January 28 President Trump released a long-promised plan for Israel-Palestinian peace after obtaining expressions of support from both Netanyahu and Gantz The plan is otherwise known as the Vision for Peace described in a document entitled Peace to Prosperity 9 The plan suggests the following key outcomes as the basis for future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 10    Borders and settlements Israel would acquire sovereignty over about 30% of the West Bank see Figure D-1 including settlements and most of the Jordan Valley The Palestinians could eventually acquire a limited form of sovereignty as described below over the remaining territory This includes areas that the Palestinian Authority PA currently administers along with some territory currently belonging to Israel with few Jewish residents that the Palestinians would acquire via swaps to partially compensate for West Bank territory taken by Israel Some areas with minimal contiguity would be connected by roads bridges and tunnels see Figure D-2 Jerusalem and its holy sites Israel would have sovereignty over nearly all of Jerusalem including the Old City and Temple Mount Haram al Sharif with the Palestinians able to obtain some small East Jerusalem areas on the other side of an Israeli separation barrier 11 Taken together the plan and its accompanying White House fact sheet contain some ambiguity about worship on the Temple Mount Haram al Sharif though the plan says that Jordan would maintain its custodial role regarding Muslim holy sites 12 A day after the plan’s release U S Ambassador to Israel David Friedman clarified that the “status quo” only allowing Muslim worship on the Mount Haram would not change absent the agreement of all parties while adding that the Administration hoped that an eventual accord would allow Jews to pray on the Temple Mount as part of greater openness “to religious observance everywhere ”13 Security Israel would retain overall security control over the entire West Bank permanently though Palestinians would potentially assume more security responsibility over time in territory they administer 14 9 White House Peace to Prosperity A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People January 2020 available at https www whitehouse gov wp-content uploads 2020 01 Peace-to-Prosperity-0120 pdf See also White House fact sheet President Donald J Trump’s Vision for Peace Prosperity and a Brighter Future for Israel and the Palestinian People January 28 2020 10 Ibid 11 David M Halbfinger and Isabel Kershner “Trump’s Would-Be Palestinian Capital Dangerous Scattered Slums ” New York Times February 1 2020 For background information on and maps of Jerusalem see CRS Report RL33476 Israel Background and U S Relations by Jim Zanotti The East Jerusalem areas earmarked for the Palestinians were added to the Jerusalem municipality after Israel captured East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan in 1967 12 See footnote 9 13 “US envoy We won’t impose change to status quo to let Jews pray at Temple Mount ” Times of Israel January 29 2020 For more information on the “status quo ” see CRS Report RL33476 Israel Background and U S Relations by Jim Zanotti Some sources remain concerned about the plan’s possible change to the “status quo ” See for example Ir Amim “Ramifications of the US Middle East Plan on the Future of Jerusalem ” April 2020 14 For background information on Palestinian self-governance see CRS In Focus IF10644 The Palestinians Overview and Key Issues for U S Policy by Jim Zanotti Congressional Research Service 4 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief  Palestinian refugees Palestinian refugee claims would be satisfied through internationally funded compensation and resettlement outside of Israel i e no “right of return” to Israel in the West Bank Gaza and third-party states  Palestinian statehood The Palestinians could obtain a demilitarized state within the areas specified in Figure D-2 and Figure D-3 with a capital in Abu Dis or elsewhere straddling the East Jerusalem areas mentioned above and their outskirts 15 Statehood would depend on the Palestinians meeting specified criteria over the next four years that present considerable domestic and practical challenges 16 Such criteria include disarming Hamas in Gaza ending certain international initiatives and financial incentives for violence and recognizing Israel as “the nation state of the Jewish people ”17 Possible West Bank Annexation After the plan’s release Netanyahu announced his intention to annex areas in the West Bank that the plan anticipates coming under Israeli sovereignty as discussed below To identify these areas more precisely a U S -Israel joint committee has begun deliberations to identify the geographical contours of West Bank areas—including Jewish settlements and much of the Jordan Valley—that could become part of Israel Annexation has not occurred to date Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans for annexation as part of its agreement to normalize relations with the UAE see “UAE and Bahrain Normalization Deal” below Before the Israel-UAE deal some observers questioned whether Netanyahu would go through with annexation given other domestic priorities in Israel and some reservations among U S officials 18 The Palestinians Arab states many other international actors and some Members of Congress oppose Israeli annexation of West Bank areas because of concerns that it could contravene international law and existing Israeli-Palestinian agreements and negatively affect stability and regional cooperation For more detailed information on the annexation issue see CRS Report R46433 Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas Frequently Asked Questions by Jim Zanotti Gaza and Its Challenges The Gaza Strip—controlled by the Sunni Islamist group Hamas a U S -designated terrorist organization —faces difficult and complicated political economic and humanitarian conditions 19 Palestinian militants in Gaza regularly clash with Israel’s military as it patrols 15 See footnote 11 White House Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu of the State of Israel in Joint Statements January 28 2020 During that time the plan and President Trump’s remarks—taken together—anticipate that Israel would refrain from building or expanding Jewish settlements in West Bank areas earmarked for a future Palestinian state and from demolishing existing structures in those areas—subject to exceptions for safety and responses to acts of terrorism 17 Israeli insistence on Palestinian recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people was reportedly introduced into an Israeli-Palestinian negotiating context by Tzipi Livni when she was Israeli foreign minister during the 2007-2008 Annapolis negotiations “The Pursuit of Middle East Peace A Status Report ” Ambassador Martin Indyk Washington Institute for Near East Policy May 8 2014 Other specified criteria for Palestinian statehood include reforms in governance and rule of law and anti-incitement in educational curricula 18 See for example Anshel Pfeffer “Why Netanyahu Will Never Annex West Bank Settlements and the Jordan Valley ” haaretz com May 7 2020 19 CRS In Focus IF10644 The Palestinians Overview and Key Issues for U S Policy by Jim Zanotti 16 Congressional Research Service 5 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Gaza’s frontiers with Israel and the clashes periodically escalate toward larger conflict During 2020 Hamas and Israel have reportedly worked through Egypt and Qatar in efforts to establish a long-term cease-fire around Gaza that could ease Israel-Egypt access restrictions for people and goods It is unclear how possible Israeli annexation of West Bank areas or Hamas’s ongoing relationship with Iran might affect these efforts Foreign Policy Issues UAE and Bahrain Normalization Deals20 A joint U S -Israel-UAE statement on August 13 2020 announced that Israel and the UAE have agreed to fully normalize their relations and that Israel is suspending plans to annex parts of the West Bank 21 A similar joint U S -Israel-Bahrain statement on September 11 announced that Israel and Bahrain would fully normalize their relations 22 On September 15 Prime Minister Netanyahu is scheduled to sign agreements with both countries’ foreign ministers at the White House The agreements could have implications for the region and U S policy with the Israel-UAE deal particularly likely to boost bilateral trade and investment 23 Before these two deals Egypt and Jordan had been the only Arab states with formal diplomatic relations with Israel Israel established informal ties with a number of Arab states including the UAE and Bahrain in the 1990s 24 Discreet Israeli links with the UAE and Bahrain on issues including intelligence security and trade have become closer and more public in the past decade as Israel has worked with various Arab Gulf states aligned with the United States in efforts to counter Iran’s regional influence and military capabilities see “Iran and the Region” below 25 Observers have speculated about the prospects for other Arab states to normalize relations with Israel 26 While Saudi Arabia has agreed with Israel to allow mutual flyover privileges for commercial airline flights leaders there have told White House Senior Adviser Jared Kushner that the Saudis would continue to condition normalization with Israel on Israeli-Palestinian peace 27 20 For more information see CRS Insight IN11485 Israel-UAE Normalization and Suspension of West Bank Annexation by Jim Zanotti and Kenneth Katzman and CRS Report RS21852 The United Arab Emirates UAE Issues for U S Policy by Kenneth Katzman 21 White House Joint Statement of the United States the State of Israel and the United Arab Emirates August 13 2020 22 Jacob Magid “Bahrain establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel Trump announces ” Times of Israel September 11 2020 23 Gilead Sher and Yoel Guzansky “The United Arab Emirates and Israel Just Came Clean on Their Extra-Marital Affair ” War on the Rocks August 28 2020 24 Miriam Berger “Israel’s relations in the Middle East explained ” washingtonpost com August 15 2020 Adam Entous “Donald Trump’s New World Order ” New Yorker June 11 2018 CRS Report 95-1013 Bahrain Unrest Security and U S Policy by Kenneth Katzman 25 Steve Hendrix “Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates ” washingtonpost com August 14 2020 CRS Report 95-1013 Bahrain Unrest Security and U S Policy by Kenneth Katzman 26 Hussein Ibish “After the UAE Who Will and Won’t Be Next to Normalize with Israel ” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington August 24 2020 27 “Kushner says Saudi Arabia Bahrain to allow all Israeli flights to use airspace ” Times of Israel September 10 2020 Congressional Research Service 6 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Israeli-Palestinian Implications Israel’s deals with the UAE and Bahrain could be interpreted as vindicating Prime Minister Netanyahu’s long-standing claim that he could normalize Israel’s relations with Arab countries before reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians They also appear to signal a change to Arab states’ previous insistence—in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative—that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties 28 Whether Israeli plans for West Bank annexation are only temporarily postponed is unclear Netanyahu sought in August to reassure Israeli pro-annexation constituencies that declaring Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank remains on his agenda pending U S approval 29 Jared Kushner said that “we do not plan to give our consent for some time ”30 Palestinian leaders denounced the Israel-UAE deal and withdrew their ambassador from the UAE arguing that the UAE legitimized Israel’s annexation threats by bargaining over them and thus acquiesced to a West Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto annexation ”31 UAE officials contend that by significantly delaying Israeli declarations of sovereignty over West Bank areas they have preserved prospects for future negotiations toward a Palestinian state 32 U S Arms Sales to UAE and Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge Some U S and UAE officials have stated that the Israel-UAE deal has increased the likelihood of U S sales of advanced weaponry to the UAE 33 Reportedly the Trump Administration supports a sale of F-35 stealth fighters armed MQ-9 Reaper drones and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare planes to the UAE 34 Some media sources state that Prime Minister Netanyahu acquiesced to the proposed sale in connection with the Israel-UAE deal 35 Netanyahu has repeatedly denied this amid domestic concerns that Israel safeguard its Qualitative Military Edge QME which is codified in U S law 36 To date Israel is the only country in the Middle East that has purchased F-35s from the United States Annelle Sheline “Trump’s Win Is a Loss for the Middle East ” Politico Magazine August 14 2020 The Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in 1967 agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem and provide for the “ a chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194 ” The initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member Arab League which includes the PLO in 2002 and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference now the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation at its 2005 Mecca summit The text of the initiative is available at http www bitterlemons org docs summit html 29 Neri Zilber “Normalization Deal Between Israel and the UAE Signals a Shift in the Region ” foreignpolicy com August 13 2020 30 “U S won’t approve Israeli annexations for ‘some time ’ Kushner says ” Reuters August 17 2020 31 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal ” Al Jazeera August 14 2020 32 “UAE minister We bought lot of time on annexation Palestinians should negotiate ” Times of Israel August 14 2020 33 Neri Zilber “Peace for Warplanes ” foreignpolicy com August 31 2020 34 Mark Mazzetti et al “Israel’s Leader Said to Assent to U A E Sale ” New York Times September 4 2020 35 Ibid 36 “Intel minister We’ll act against sale of F-35s to UAE including in US Congress ” Times of Israel September 5 2020 For more information on QME see CRS Report RL33222 U S Foreign Aid to Israel by Jeremy M Sharp 28 Congressional Research Service 7 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief If the Administration seeks to sell the aircraft mentioned above to the UAE the following points may be relevant to Israel’s stance on the proposed sale and congressional discussion of Israel’s QME   The timing of any proposed sale the type and quantity of aircraft the features included in possible export versions for the UAE and any conditions or limits on use of the aircraft 37 U S willingness to sell or provide additional arms to Israel 38 Iran and the Region Israeli officials cite Iran as a primary concern to Israeli officials largely because of 1 antipathy toward Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime 2 Iran’s broad regional influence especially in Syria Iraq and Lebanon 39 and 3 Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced conventional weapons capabilities Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U S decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA He opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U S sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors Facing the intensified U S sanctions Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement U S -Iran tensions since the U S withdrawal from the JCPOA have led to greater regional uncertainty with implications for Israel 40 Some Israelis have voiced worries about how Iran’s apparent ability to penetrate Saudi air defenses and target Saudi oil facilities could transfer to efforts in targeting Israel 41 Reports suggest that Israel may have been behind a July 2020 explosion that destroyed a number of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility 42 The incident has triggered speculation about whether Israel might more regularly resort to clandestine means to counter Iran’s nuclear program and related projects as it supposedly did during the years before the JCPOA The July explosion took place some weeks after Iran and Israel reportedly exchanged cyberattacks—with Iran supposedly targeting Israel’s drinking water supply and Israel supposedly targeting an Iranian seaport—and in the context of a number of mysterious explosions See for example Joseph Trevithick “Here’s How the U S Could Allay Israeli Concerns over Selling F-35s to UAE ” The Drive August 27 2020 38 Ibid Anna Ahronheim “US sale of F-35 jets to UAE will go ahead What can Israel get in return ” jpost com August 24 2020 Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote that in 2010 the Obama Administration addressed concerns that Israel’s leaders had about the possible effect on QME of a large U S sale of F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia by agreeing to sell Israel additional F-35 aircraft Eli Lake citing Duty by Robert Gates “In Gates Book Details of Israel’s Hard Bargaining over Saudi Arms ” Daily Beast January 10 2014 39 For information on this topic see CRS Report R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies by Kenneth Katzman 40 See for example CRS Report R45795 U S -Iran Conflict and Implications for U S Policy by Kenneth Katzman Kathleen J McInnis and Clayton Thomas 41 Uzi Even “Iran Attack on Saudi Arabia Shows Why Israel Must Shut Down Its Nuclear Reactor ” haaretz com October 6 2019 42 Farnaz Fassihi et al “Explosion at Iran Nuclear Site Sets Back Enrichment Program ” New York Times July 6 2020 37 Congressional Research Service 8 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief affecting Iranian infrastructure 43 One Israeli media source reported however that the explosion apparently did not slow Iran’s ability to produce low-enriched uranium that could reduce its time to “break out” to a nuclear weapon if it chose to do so 44 Hezbollah Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful non-state ally in the region Hezbollah’s forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area and at times escalating into broader conflict 45 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications 46 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range precision and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds 47 Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran raises questions about the potential for Israel-Hezbollah conflict Various sources have referenced possible Iran-backed Hezbollah initiatives to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon 48 In July 2020 a reported Israeli airstrike in Syria presumably targeting alleged arms transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon killed a Hezbollah operative raising questions about a possible Hezbollah response to reinforce deterrence based on its leadership’s past statements 49 Israel’s military thwarted a subsequent attempt to attack Israeli military positions in the disputed Sheb’a Farms area that Israel treats as part of the Golan Heights Some reports assess that Hezbollah does not want escalation partly due to significant political and economic problems in Lebanon but do not rule out the potential for heightened conflict owing to miscalculation between Hezbollah and Israel 50 Syria and Iraq Reported Israeli Airstrikes Against Iran-Backed Forces Israel has reportedly undertaken airstrikes in conflict-plagued Syria and Iraq based on concerns that Iran and its allies could pose threats to Israeli security from there Iran’s westward expansion of influence into Iraq and Syria over the past two decades has provided it with more ways to supply and support Hezbollah apparently leading Israel to broaden its regional theater of military action 51 The U S base at At Tanf in southern Syria reportedly serves as an impediment to Iranian Amos Harel “The Explosion at Natanz Is a Direct Hit on Iran’s Nuclear Program ” haaretz com July 5 2020 Dalia Dassa Kaye “Has Israel been sabotaging Iran Here’s what we know ” washingtonpost com July 15 2020 44 Jon Gambrell “Blasts at Natanz site batter but don’t break Iran nuclear pursuits ” Times of Israel July 16 2020 45 CRS Report R44759 Lebanon by Carla E Humud CRS In Focus IF10703 Lebanese Hezbollah by Carla E Humud 46 For possible conflict scenarios see Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion Counting the cost Avoiding another war between Israel and Hezbollah Atlantic Council May 13 2020 Hanin Ghaddar “How Will Hezbollah Respond to Israel’s Drone Attack ” Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policywatch 3171 August 28 2019 47 See for example Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming Israel ” New York Times April 23 2020 Seth Jones “War by Proxy Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East ” Center for Strategic and International Studies March 11 2019 Jonathan Spyer and Nicholas Blanford “UPDATE Israel raises alarm over advances by Hizbullah and Iran ” Jane’s Intelligence Review January 11 2018 48 Ben Caspit “Hezbollah Israel losing red lines ” Al-Monitor September 4 2019 Katherine Bauer et al “Iran’s Precision Missile Project Moves to Lebanon ” Washington Institute for Near East Policy December 2018 49 Amos Harel “Hezbollah Failed to Attack Israel but Made One Significant Achievement ” haaretz com August 1 2020 50 See for example Amos Harel “For Hezbollah Beirut Devastation Makes Provoking Israel Even Riskier ” haaretz com August 6 2020 51 Seth J Frantzman “Are Israeli Drones Targeting Hezbollah Officers in Syria ” nationalinterest org April 17 2020 43 Congressional Research Service 9 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief efforts to create a land route for weapons from Iran to Lebanon 52 Russia its airspace deconfliction mechanism with Israel and some advanced air defense systems that it has deployed or transferred to Syria also influence the various actors involved 53 Since 2018 Israeli and Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted one another in Syria or around the Syria-Israel border After Iran helped Syria’s government regain control of much of the country Israeli leaders began pledging to prevent Iran from constructing and operating bases or advanced weapons manufacturing facilities in Syria 54 In April 2020 then-Defense Minister Naftali Bennett said that Israeli policy had shifted from blocking Iran’s entrenchment in Syria to forcing it out entirely 55 In Iraq reports suggest that in the summer of 2019 Israel conducted airstrikes against weapons depots or convoys that were connected with Iran-allied Shiite militias A December 2019 media report citing U S officials claimed that Iran had built up a hidden arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles in Iraq that could pose a threat to U S regional partners including Israel 56 Perhaps owing to sensitivities involving U S forces in Iraq then-Defense Minister Bennett suggested in February 2020 that Israel would avoid further direct involvement there—leaving any efforts to counter Iran-backed forces in Iraq to the United States 57 China Investments in Israel and U S Concerns58 U S officials have raised some concerns with Israel over burgeoning Chinese investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure 59 Israel-China investment ties have grown since China announced its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 60 with Israel as an attractive hub of innovation for Chinese partners and China as a huge potential export market and source of investment for Israeli businesses Closer Israel-China economic relations have led to official U S expressions of concern 61 apparently focused on the possibility that China might gather intelligence or acquire technologies with the potential to threaten U S national security in such fields as cybersecurity artificial Caspit “Hezbollah Israel losing red lines ” 52 Jones “War by Proxy Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East ” 53 Anna Ahronheim “Russia Syrian air defense nearly hit passenger plane after Israeli attack ” jpost com February 8 2020 Seth J Frantzman “What’s behind Russia’s criticism of Israeli airstrikes in Syria ” jpost com February 8 2020 54 See for example Israeli Prime Minister’s Office PM Netanyahu’s Speech at the United Nations General Assembly September 27 2018 55 “Defense minister We’ve moved from blocking Iran in Syria to forcing it out ” Times of Israel April 28 2020 56 Julian E Barnes and Eric Schmitt “Iran Is Secretly Moving Missiles Into Iraq U S Officials Say ” New York Times December 5 2019 57 Nati Yefet and Judah Ari Gross “Bennett US agreed to counter Iran in Iraq while Israel fights it in Syria ” Times of Israel February 10 2020 58 For background on past U S concerns regarding Israeli defense transactions with China see CRS Report RL33476 Israel Background and U S Relations by Jim Zanotti CRS Report RL33222 U S Foreign Aid to Israel by Jeremy M Sharp 59 Shira Efron et al Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure Security Implications for Israel and the United States RAND Corporation 2020 and Shira Efron et al The Evolving Israel-China Relationship RAND Corporation 2019 60 For more information on the Belt and Road Initiative see CRS Report R45898 U S -China Relations coordinated by Susan V Lawrence 61 Ron Kampeas “Breaking China A rupture looms between Israel and the United States ” Jewish Telegraphic Agency June 2 2020 Congressional Research Service 10 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief intelligence satellite communications and robotics Previously China-Israel defense industry cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s contributed to tension in the U S -Israel defense relationship and to an apparent de facto U S veto over Israeli arms sales to China 62 In passing the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act S 1790 the Senate expressed its sense in Section 1289 that the U S government should “urge the Government of Israel to consider the security implications of foreign investment in Israel ” Partly due to U S concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy Israel created an advisory panel on foreign investment in Israel in late 2019 63 However this panel reportedly does not have the authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that accounted for most of China’s investments in Israel in the previous decade 64 Apparently debate continues within Israel’s government about how to balance economic interests with national security concerns 65 In the past two years U S officials have made notable efforts to discourage Chinese involvement in specific Israeli infrastructure projects President Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister Netanyahu in March 2019 that U S security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be limited if Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE establish a 5G communications network in Israel in line with similar warnings that the Administration communicated to other U S allies and partners 66 Two Israeli analysts wrote in March 2020 that Israeli officials have reportedly blocked Chinese companies from working on Israeli communications infrastructure 67 Additionally the U S Navy is reportedly reconsidering its practice of periodically docking at the Israeli naval base in Haifa because a state-owned Chinese company the Shanghai International Port Group has secured the contract to operate a new terminal at Haifa’s seaport for 25 years beginning in 2021 68 Other state-owned Chinese companies are developing a new port in Ashdod which also hosts an Israeli naval base and taking part in construction for Tel Aviv’s light rail system and road tunnels in Haifa 69 In May 2020 shortly after Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited Israel and voiced concern that Chinese access to Israeli infrastructure could complicate U S Israel cooperation Israel’s finance ministry chose a domestic contractor to construct a $1 5 billion desalination plant turning down the bid from a subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Group 70 62 Efron et al The Evolving Israel-China Relationship 2019 pp 15-20 Arie Egozi “Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer China Targeted ” Breaking Defense November 13 2019 64 Efron et al Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology 2020 pp 24-25 65 James M Dorsey “Israel-China Relations Staring Into the Abyss of US-Chinese Decoupling ” The Globalist June 9 2020 Mercy A Kuo “US-China-Israel Relations Pompeo’s Visit ” The Diplomat May 27 2020 66 Hiddai Segev Doron Ella and Assaf Orion “My Way or the Huawei The United States-China Race for 5G Dominance ” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No 1193 July 15 2019 67 Hiddai Segev and Assaf Orion “The Great Power Competition over 5G Communications Limited Success for the American Campaign against Huawei ” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No 1268 March 3 2020 68 Roie Yellinek “The Israel-China-U S Triangle and the Haifa Port Project ” Middle East Institute November 27 2018 Section 1289 of S 1790 also contains a provision stating that the United States has an interest in continuing to use the naval base in Haifa but has “serious security concerns” with respect to the leasing arrangements at the Haifa port Reportedly the Israeli government plans to limit sensitive roles at the port to Israelis with security clearances Jack Detsch “Pentagon repeats warning to Israel on Chinese port deal ” Al-Monitor August 7 2019 69 Efron et al The Evolving Israel-China Relationship 2019 p 38 70 “Amid US pressure Israel taps local firm over China for $1 5b desalination plant ” Times of Israel May 26 2020 63 Congressional Research Service 11 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Appendix A Map and Basic Facts Figure A-1 Israel Map and Basic Facts Sources Graphic created by CRS Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Department of State Boundaries 2011 Esri 2013 the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database 2015 DeLorme 2014 Fact information from CIA The World Factbook Economist Intelligence Unit IMF World Economic Outlook Database All numbers are estimates as of 2020 unless specified Numbers for 2021 are projections Notes According to the U S executive branch 1 The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement permanent status to be determined through further negotiation 2 The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations 3 The United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty 4 Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative Additionally the United States recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019 however U N Security Council Resolution 497 adopted on December 17 1981 held that the area of the Golan Heights controlled by Israel’s military is occupied territory belonging to Syria The current U S executive branch map of Israel is available at https www cia gov library publications the-world-factbook attachments maps IS-map gif Congressional Research Service 12 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Appendix B Indictments Against Netanyahu and Steps of the Legal Process Indictments Case 1000 Netanyahu received favors from Hollywood mogul Arnon Milchan and Australian billionaire James Packer in return for taking actions in Milchan’s favor The charge Fraud and breach of trust Netanyahu’s defense There is no legal problem in receiving gifts from friends did not know that his family members requested gifts Case 2000 Netanyahu and Yedioth Ahronoth publisher Arnon Mozes struck a deal Favorable coverage for Netanyahu in return for limiting the circulation of the Sheldon Adelson-owned newspaper Israel Hayom The charge Fraud and breach of trust Netanyahu’s defense He had no intention of implementing the deal and relations between politicians and the media should not be criminalized Case 4000 As communication minister Netanyahu took steps that benefited Shaul Elovitch who controlled telecom company Bezeq—in return for favorable coverage in Bezeq’s Walla News site The charge Bribery fraud and breach of trust Netanyahu’s defense There is no evidence that he was aware of making regulations contingent on favorable coverage Selected Steps in the Legal Process and the Time Between Them Sources For “Indictments ” the content comes from Ha’aretz graphics adapted by CRS For “Selected Steps in the Legal Process and the Time Between Them ” CRS prepared the graphic and made slight content adjustments to underlying source material from Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre The interval listed between Steps 4-5 is an estimate Congressional Research Service 13 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Appendix C Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset and Their Leaders RIGHT Likud Consolidation – 36 Knesset seats Coalition Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology skeptical of territorial compromise has also championed free-market policies Leader Binyamin Netanyahu Born in 1949 Netanyahu has served as prime minister since 2009 and also was prime minister from 1996 to 1999 Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit Sayeret Matkal and received his higher education at MIT Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist However he has negotiated with the Palestinians and many observers discern cautiousness in Netanyahu’s decisions regarding the nature and scale of military operations His rhetorical support for more assertive populist and nationalistic measures including diminishing judicial powers and annexing West Bank territory has increased after criminal allegations surfaced against him for corruption and after President Trump took office Yisrael Beitenu Israel Our Home – 7 seats Opposition Pro-secular right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian speakers from the former Soviet Union Leader Avigdor Lieberman Born in 1958 Lieberman served as Israel’s defense minister until his resignation in November 2018 He served as Israel’s foreign minister for most of the period from 2009 to May 2015 and is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations Lieberman was born in the Soviet Union in what is now Moldova and immigrated to Israel in 1978 He worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997 Disillusioned by Netanyahu’s willingness to consider concessions to the Palestinians Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants He was acquitted of corruption allegations in a 2013 case Yamina Right – 5 seats Opposition Right-of-center merger of three parties New Right Jewish Home and National Union base of support among religious Zionists mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews includes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlements and annexation Leader Naftali Bennett Born in 1972 Bennett served previously as defense education and economy minister He served in various special forces units including as a reservist during the 2006 Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon Bennett was a successful software entrepreneur and has lived in America He served as Netanyahu’s chief of staff from 2006 to 2008 while Netanyahu was opposition leader He led the Yesha Council the umbrella organization for Israeli West Bank settlers from 2010 to 2012 Congressional Research Service 14 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief LEFT Labor Avoda – 3 seats Coalition Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic left-of-center pro-secular Zionist ideology associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Leader Amir Peretz Born in 1952 Peretz is Israel’s economy minister He became Labor’s leader for the second time in July 2019 after serving as party leader from 2005 to 2007 He was first elected to the Knesset in 1988 and has served as defense minister during the 2006 Hezbollah conflict and environment minister Peretz was a farmer in southern Israel and served as mayor of Sderot before joining the Knesset Meretz Vigor – 3 seats Opposition Meretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiatives for social justice and peace with the Palestinians and former Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s Israel Democratic Party Leader Nitzan Horowitz Born in 1965 Horowitz became Meretz’s leader in June 2019 and was first elected to the Knesset in 2009 He had a long career as a prominent journalist before entering politics CENTER Kahol Lavan Blue and White – 15 seats Coalition Centrist party largely formed as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu ostensibly seeking to preserve long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary articulate a vision of Israeli nationalism that is more inclusive of Druze and Arab citizens and have greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian issues Leader Benny Gantz Born in 1959 Gantz is Israel’s defense minister and alternate prime minister and is scheduled to become prime minister by November 2021 under the unity agreement with Netanyahu He served as Chief of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015 He established Hosen L’Yisrael Israel Resilience Party in December 2018 Hosen L’Yisrael merged with the Yesh Atid and Telem parties for the April 2019 September 2019 and March 2020 elections under the Kahol Lavan name When the party split in March 2020 after Gantz agreed to pursue a unity government with Netanyahu Hosen L’Yisrael kept the Kahol Lavan name He has sought to draw contrasts with Netanyahu less through policy specifics than by presenting himself as a figure who is less polarizing and less populist Yesh Atid-Telem – 16 seats Opposition Yesh Atid There Is a Future is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance Telem Hebrew acronym for National Statesman-like Movement formed in January 2019 by former Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon as a center-right pronationalist alternative to Netanyahu The parties merged with Hosen L’Yisrael in early 2019 then split from it in March 2020 Leader Yair Lapid Born in 1963 Lapid is the leader of the opposition in the Knesset He came to politics after a career as a journalist television presenter and author He founded the Yesh Atid party in 2012 and from 2013 to 2014 he served as finance minister Congressional Research Service 15 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Derech Eretz Way of the Land – 2 seats Coalition Center-right faction formed from the split of Kahol Lavan in March 2020 Leaders Zvi Hauser and Yoaz Hendel Born in 1968 Hauser was Netanyahu’s cabinet secretary from 2009 to 2013 and later led a coalition promoting recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights Born in 1975 Hendel is Israel’s communications minister He has been an academic journalist and author covering national security issues Both men joined Telem in early 2019 but formed Derech Eretz when Telem refused to join a unity government in March 2020 ULTRA-ORTHODOX Shas Sephardic Torah Guardians – 9 seats Coalition Mizrahi Haredi “ultra-Orthodox” party favors welfare and education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over Jerusalem Leader Aryeh Deri Born in 1959 Deri is Israel’s interior minister and minister for Negev and Galilee development He led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery fraud and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister He returned as the party’s leader in 2013 United Torah Judaism – 7 seats Coalition Ashkenazi Haredi coalition Agudat Yisrael and Degel Ha’torah favors welfare and education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle opposes territorial compromise with Palestinians and conscription of Haredim generally seeks greater application of Jewish law Leader Yaakov Litzman Born in 1948 Litzman is Israel’s construction and housing minister He was born in Germany and raised in the United States before immigrating to Israel in 1965 Educated in yeshivas traditional Jewish schools he later served as principal of a Hasidic girls’ school in Jerusalem He was first elected to the Knesset in 1999 and has previously served as a member of the Knesset’s finance committee ARAB Joint List – 15 seats Opposition Electoral slate featuring four Arab parties that combine socialist Islamist and Arab nationalist political strains Hadash Democratic Front for Peace and Equality Ta’al Arab Movement for Renewal Ra’am United Arab List Balad National Democratic Assembly Leader Ayman Odeh Born in 1975 Odeh is the leader of Hadash an Arab Israeli socialist party and of the Joint List An attorney he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006 He supports a more democratic egalitarian and peaceseeking society and has sought protection for unrecognized Bedouin villages and advocated for drafting young Arab Israelis for military or civilian national service Sources Various open sources Note Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 2 2020 election The Gesher Bridge party has a single member of the Knesset Orly Levi-Abekasis who is part of the coalition Rafi Peretz split from the Yamina party to join the coalition Congressional Research Service 16 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Appendix D Maps Related to U S Plan Figure D-1 Conceptual Map of Israel Source White House Peace to Prosperity A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People January 2020 Congressional Research Service 17 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Figure D-2 Conceptual Map of Future Palestinian State Source White House Peace to Prosperity A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People January 2020 Congressional Research Service 18 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Figure D-3 Unofficial Map with Green Line Notes Green lines on map represent 1949-1967 Israel-Jordan armistice line for West Bank and 1950-1967 Israel-Egypt armistice line for Gaza All borders are approximate Congressional Research Service 19 Israel Background and U S Relations in Brief Author Information Jim Zanotti Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service CRS CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role CRS Reports as a work of the United States Government are not subject to copyright protection in the United States Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS However as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material Congressional Research Service R44245 · 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