17 um thS151FIED r - s o r d - 1 - - - s - _j_S- _ oI · nc -- e REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY WCRKING GROUP ON SURPRISE ATTACK August 15 1958 1Cl'A1SSIFIED J' ' ' - · - tl__ ' REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY WCRKING GROUP ON SURPRISE ATTACK I A s lignm ent and N ethod of Approach Th Interagency V orking G oup was instructed to study the problem of re ucing the danger of surprise attack with the objectiv e of presenting an analysis Vhich would facilitate further studies in preparation for discussions not negotiations between US and S0•1iet experts 9 which may open durin1 the first week f October 1958 Throughout its study the Group has fo nctioned as individuals The views xpressed are those of its individual members and not nc essarily those of the · agencies represented J Q ✓ The Group had the benefit of discussions with several military leaders namely Admiral Burke USN General Lemnitzer USA General Power USAF General Weyland USAF and Lt General Lynn USAF and heard a presentation y Mr Hitchcock the Chairman of the Watch Committee It based its report n part on a study of some technical aspects of aurprise attack by a Panel o the fresident's Science ft dvisory Committee appointed by Dr J R Killian Jr which is attached as Appendix I Also attached as appendices are II Statement prepared by the State Department on political effects of surprise attack inspection aareunents with USSR III Statement prepared by CIA on intelligence value of •uch agreements IV A CIA statement on autllentication -procedures to insure eaning ul communications with inspectors that might be stationed in USSR The Group also studied a Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the JCS JCS-17 31 237 dat6d 14 August 1957 with an appendix presenting an outline plan for implementation of an aerial and ground inspection In this connection the Group was briefed by Rear Admiral Dudley and his staff on the current studies ing made for the JCS on this subject P realistic appraisal of the minimum time interval which must pa s between the initiation of discussions by xperts with USSR and the putting into effect of any agreement that may eventually be worked out shows that late 1960 is the ea rlieet possible d te or the commencement of agreed ir spection measures Thus the period 1960-63 is the ea liest period with which an agreement muat be concerned and to be useful it must look further into the future II The Report of the Panel of the President's cience Advisory Committee The Panel appointed by Dr Killiani w 'ldertook to study the e eet of sueh factors as result from progress in weapons technology upon the significance o t _ _ Ll -Z- various types of possible agreements with USSR Appendix I The analysis or this Panel as to the major surprise attack capabilities of the US and USSR and the possible ways of reducing the threat of surprise attack was focused priP1 a rily on the means of delivery of a massive thermonuclear attack although it discussed briefly the problem of local or conventional attack The report consists of the following sections I Framework 0£ nalysis and Report II Safeguards Against Large-Scale Surprise Attack by Conventional lo fanned Bombers III Safeguards Against Large-Scale Surprise ft ttack by Ballistic Missiles IV Safeguards Against Local Surprise ttac k V Communication Facilities for the Inspection System Annex A - Probable Posture in Absence of Agreements Broadly speaking the analysis leads the Panel to the view that agreements in volving only observation and reporting provide very inadequate protection against massive surprise attack particularly by missiles Such observation may give some evidence of impending manned bomber attack and oi other preparations or general war t would be more useful however• in avoiding accidental wa arising out of a misinterpretation of hostile intentions and in safeguarding aga ins local or con• rentional attack There is no minimum level of observation required to have soine value even unlimited inspection on the other hand would not have decisive value Agreements involving operatio cal limitations on bomber forces alone - a l ighly unlikely supposition • may be more effective in providing strong indicationz of possible impending attack but will have disadvantage in that they will tend to reduce the efficiency of our atrforce relative to that of the USSR With regard to missiles agreements intended to lengthen a tificially their reaction time in order to provide earlier warning suffer from two major disadvantages an extreme complexity of monitoring agreements and advantages to the potential violator of the agreement Agreements limiting the size of missile forces appear to be more promising for the reduction of danger from attack by making an attack less profitable such agreements could not be adequately inspected unless there were effective unrestricted ground and aerial observation Agreements eliminating missile fo ces may still further reduce the danger of attack if effectively monitored and if adequate retaiiatory bomber force are retained - fo ''f n - - -3- -· ' 'lo -- c Y As the Panel noted in ita preface it had insufficient time to study and re• port on several aspects of the problem of surprise attack to wit a Measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack through control of nuclear arheads b Monitoring or restriction of naval forces c Additional complications which are created by the forces and interests of allies of USA as well aa China and the Satellite States on the side of USSR d Only selected types of agreements which appeared to be more readily monitored were considered the inspection patterns were only indicated in broad outline e The possibility of local restrictions on the readiness or level of conventional forces in local areas e g the Middle East where this might reduce the likelihood of aggression or preventive action III Ar ea s for Further Technical Study The implications of various types of aireements analyzed by the Panel need to be conaide red in further detail and an effort made to determine whether other types of agreements not considered by the Panel may be more advantage us to USA 1 2 Although our inability to deterrr ine precisely the size of the existing nuclear stockpile of USSR makes c ontrol of nuclear weapons questionable this problem cannot be neglected 3 The problem of naval forces is a very important one particularly because of eventual perfection of missile launching ubmarines it deserves detailed study and the d fining of positions 4 Similarly the problem of nations allied to USA and USSR needs to be studied in detail to defi e sound positions for the team going to the discussions 5 The absence of detailed inspection schemes in the Panel's report is partially compensated or by the informa tion presented in the JCS Memorandu a-n which shows the magnHude of the task involved This Memorandum is being revised now to anticipate the version will be of special value 11 mi 1ile age and the new 6 The Panel noted that while it has aaaumed so-called inspection with free access to all locations actually it may be necessary to exclude certain areas that were agreed upon by both sides• e g •• code rooms to take an extreme example Thia ia a very sensitive problem The danger of discloling too much information to the inspection teL17l9 must be balanced against the possibility of concealment of offen1ive muitary hardware in dangerous quantities Thus the concept o free ccess is a relative one and requires a careful analysis for the guidance of the team to be engaged in discussions with USSR 7 The Group believes that possibilities for local restrictions or limitations of conventional arms in such unstable areas as the lvfiddle East deserve much more thorough study than the Panel was able to devote to them although this is clearly of much lower priority in preparing for the October discussions III Conclusions of the Interagency Working Group A Objectives in Surprise Attack Agreements The element of surprise is present in all offensive military operations from a border raid to a devastating thermonuclear attack The problem of surprise attack has acquired major importance for USA because oi the availability in large numbers of thermonuclear weapons with unparalleled power of destruction and of rapid advances in long-range means of delivery e g jet aircraft and ballistic missiles Therefore the pre ent Group identifies the problem of surprise attack prima -ily with the problem oi reduction of the ·danger of an initial massive thermonuclear attack On the basis of the Panel's report and other information the Group has drawn certain broad conclusions 1 The problem of a massive thermonuclear attack in the 1960' s must be considered from the point of view of a combined bomber and miuile force An agreement involving bomber forces alone is disadvantageous to USA and will not reduce the danger of a massive surprise attack 2 Prosress in weapons technology ia makir g inspection schemes apart from a greem nts on force limitations• less and ' t - - A • - r P- al To · f-f T ti -s- less promising in reducing the danger of a massive r»urpriae attack Not only is warning time diminishing and becoming less susceptible of extension by an inspection system alone but the strategic indicators of enemy intent that will be available in the missile age will be increasingly ambiguous 3 The objective in the design of any agreement for restrictions on forces then is not so much to increase the warning time as it ia to render a massive surprise attack · prospectively as unrewarding as possible · 4 The stability i e freedom from the threat of surprise attack which is achievable by agreement• involving lim itations on forces depends not only on inspection of one's potential enemy and limitations on his force• but also very heavily on the vulnerability of one's own retaliatory forces Even with agreements of this type it remains a matter of extreme importance that the vulnerability of such forces be reduced to acceptable levels in order to safeguard their effectiveness as retaliatory forces 0 5 Short of effective measures leading to extensive disarmament including abolition of nuclear weapons no means for prevention of massive thermonuclear attack will exist However as noted abov·e the danger of such attack possibly may be reduced In their conaiderations both the Group and the Panel as smned that any agreements with the USSR regarding surprise attack will have adequate provisions for monitoring If this is the case certain consequences of any agreements must be taken into consideration when appraising their value to USA On the positive side the following may be mentioned a The dz nger of accidental war may be reduced since each side would have wider knowledge on which to base a judgment aa to whether a given action by the other portended attack For example the i-eacttoa to a thermc nuclear explosion of unknown origin e g an armed missile launched by mistake would beiess likely to lead to prompt massive counterattack b The Iron Curtain may be partially opened because of freer interchange of personnel accompanying inspection measures cj Mutual confidence may be improved by a reduction of tensions # -- -- · · - - - ' · TOP SECRET - ·_ ' -- t· · -6 d Information on USSR will be improved due to legitimate activities of iuapection teams which include USA personnel - · ······································--·-··· ·········-···-···· • • • • • • • • • • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• j ••••• ' On the negative side agreements with USSR may work ·to ihe disadvantage of USA in the following respects a The f'ahe sense of security induced in USA by the existence of any agreement m matter how well ormulated may result in lax enforcement of the inspection and a failure to provide for adequate def ens es b A similar false sense of security on the part of our allies may lead to a dangerous weakening of alliances such as NATO c A poorly designed inspection system may fail to detect secret USSR forces because of inadequate inspection procedures or because of the assignment of inspection duties to neutrals who may prove unequal to the task d Technological breakthroughs not anticipated in the writing of the agreement if utilized by USSR may create unanticipated dangers e Opportunities for sabotage and subversive activities by USSR agento may be offered by the presence of USSR nationals on inspection duty in USA The relative importance of these and other factor-shave not been evaluated by the Group as a whole Further comments on the subject will be found in Appendices II l I and IV B Comments Relating to the Conduct of the October lVeeting 1 The United States has defined the subject of the October meetir1g to be a study of the technical aspects of safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack 11 In negotiations and correspondence with the Soviet Union surprise attack measures have generally been considered by the United States to comprise only some forms of inspection rather than also including substantial arms coith ·ul measures of the sort discussed in Appendix I -· TOP stc T- ·· _- f-- -- · - f i - L -7- z Our analysis of the Appendices leads us to the view that a major reduction of the threat of ma••ive surprise attack cannot be achieved by ob•ernUo11 ud w1po•tfllg alone Limitations on the disposition ancl readlne•• of forces or on size and types of forces appear to be necessary to create more effective safeguards against the po1aibility of s•ive eurpriae attack It ia unlikely that the October talks ·can deal effectively with t1'e threat of surprise attack unless they a re extended beyond discussion of inspection related limited measures Soviet proposals in this area have emphasized arme limitations more than inspection They include for example limits on bomber operation• abandonment of U S overseas bases denuclearization and limitation of force a in a Central European zone Rapacki Plan and reduction or abolition of long- range or intermediate• range missiles and 0 • · 3 The October talks will be restricted to study and discussion by experts and will not be a negotiation ·Avoi a uce of negotiation will be particularly important if limitation• on forces are discussed However if the discussions are to be meaningful a consideration of some of the problems analyzed in Appendix I may be desirable We might seek to discuss in general terms with the Soviet Union the means of surprise attack Such an exploration would be consistent with the U S proposal that the talks concentrate on the ••••• ot jects ol control 11 An exchange on this subject might have intelligence value for the United States It could also throw light on the Soviet assessment of the present and future military situation and on Soviet attitudes toward the possibility of stabilizing the present military situation 4 Appendix I to this report identifies and discusses various possibilities or limitations on forces to reduce the threat of surprise attack As already sta ted these possibilities deserve further intensive study of their acceptability as part of continuing U Sc review of arms control policy Such further study is also essential as part of the preparations for the October meeting in order that a the threat of surprise attack can be discussed a1a inst the background of clear policy as to the measures which are acceptable to the United States and b Soviet propoaab of the kind which have been advanced in the past can be dealt with in this context • TOP SECRET -85 To engage in a discussion of this nature will require a carefully defined procedure for the protection and disclosure of classified information 6 It may be desirable to give advance notice to the Soviet U iion of the manner in which we will be prepared to approach the discus slons and the range of subject• we will be willu ·g to talk about There is precedent to show the value of thil technique in the informal agenda which the U s Ambaiaador gave to the Soviet Foreign Office prior to the present Geneva talks on nuclear test detection and which may have contributed to the fruitfulneu of these technical talks Specifically it may be desirable to inform the USSR tlat USA experts will be prepared to discuss only such measures for the reduction of threat of a surprise attack as can and will be monitored 7 Observation aad i eporttag measures unlimited and limited whether functionally or geo1raphically may in themaelves be appropriate subjects for discuaaion There are strong indications that the United States may gain more than the Soviet Union from any balanced inspection arran rern nt -providine access to each other's territorie1 - •••••••••••••• 0 ••••••• • • • • • • o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 19 •••••••••••• • • a • • • • • • 9 • • • • • • • C • ••• 0 •••• • e e • • • e e e • • 9 •••••••••• ·•········ ······················· ·· ·• ••••••••• ••••••••o••••••• •••••••••• • • • •••••••••e••••••••••••••• 8 • • • • • • o • • a • ••o••••••••• ·············---··········· ••••••••••s•••••••o• ••••••••• ••••••••••••••••••o- •••• ································· ·······••i••··············· ·························· ·-··············· •••••••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ••••••••••••• •••••••••••e•••ra•••••••• ••••••••••••• •a••••••••••••• ••• ••••••••••'•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••e••e•••••••••••• • • • • • • • • • e • o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ···· ·······--··· ·········· ······ • •••••• •••••••••ct•••••••c•o••••••••••c ••••••• • • • • • e e • • • e e e e • e • e • e • • • • e • Cl e • • Ji • • • •••••••••••••••••••••• •C1••••11••••••• ••••• •••• ••o••••r• ••• ••••••••••o••••••••••e•••••••••• ••••••••tt•••••- ••••••• • • • e e e • • • • • O 9 •• • 9 e e • e • • • • 9 O • • • • • • e a a • • • • • • ti tt e • e • e e e e • a e e O • ft e • e O • • e • e e e • C • • O e e e a • • e e 9 e e • 9 9 9 We note that the October talks would according to the U S note of July 31 deal with inspection zones for illustrative purposes Only Our analysis indicates that zones of inspection have very limited value for warning against TOP SECRET· - · · massive surprise attack Zones may perhaps have 10me value however in safeguarding againat local attack in evaluating in1pection techniques and in building confidence It will still be essential to guard agains false c·otsfidence arising from an unjustified belief in the reaulting degree of security 0 Richard M Bissell Jr Philip J Farley John N Irwin II Curtis E LeMay Cieneral USAF Gerard C Smith Jerrold R Zacharias George B Kietiakowskye Chairman Report of Interagency Working Group on surprise attack detailed Department Of Defense 15 Aug 1958 U S Declassified Documents Online link gale com apps doc CK2349319470 USDD u wash74137 sid bookmarkUSDD xid df7365ca pg 1 Accessed 6 July 2021