V DECLI SSIFIED Authority AJA1L 959 r 1JJ y ARA Date 1 SECRET _f r· i' • I I · •' - ° • - a CCC • rt• - I 11 frl I to 1al9 tt1af Wrll p1n SI • • _••Ult• w _ • • ldt l i -1 da s iae 1 lllill Iii _ ' et I-' ·· •JM•tllil-- • _ ' I • - ----- · - - - - -- s l Le e •• 1U11 • llll1 11-S Cnnt• •--llt•iilatt t t41Me • a tata II ntsctffl• _ PIIL llil t cllfta • ia -----dlln •• •• u- a - - ·••PPt• · na I _ 1 IRP4 1' 1111119 S el _ Hatu d 1 q a • - • •1 1t11J Blllja % a w IOU SECRFT I II j lI I I lI I I v' - ot cL SSJFIED Authority AJN Q jql ' By ARA Date P This doc'Ulllent consists of lL par es Cop No 151' rs Mem ' X pie eries A 102 December 10 19 R 1-1 Korner Decemt--er 10 11 1959 ' MH CRANDUJ fORa -r SUBJF CTs 5tabi iz1ng tha tluclear Deterrent Balance at a li1r h Level Coolidge and Staff Although Mr Coolidge• s draft report highlif hta t he potent ial deairabllity of attempting to stabilize the deterrent balance at a hir h avel ve have not so tar addressed ourselves directly to the ways in Mhich ar IS co itrola might be used tor thi s purpose This paper is an attempt to I strongly believe that the on sensible approach to eerioue A-J'lllS controls over perhaps the next decade and i roba l y the only approach wbicb e might sell to the Soviets as being o r mutual advantare 1 one which is not directed touard reduction of existing am 811 anta b7'-t toward damping down the 11race 11 for 14 ure armmnenta once adequnte deterrent capabilities exist on both ddeeo lr a nuclear stalemate in i'a t ex1r ts ar cl will probably continue to exist thourh · 1t is at pr senL uite 1J 8table • and 1t as a result neither the US or the US 'R reearde goneral nuclear wa r as an acceptable course except in ext remiss th m th01 0 are COMpulsions ou both aides to s ·t bilize this utalcmate to OECL SSIFIED Authority b Nb9 5 1 q By Date SECRET f # JO • 2 ' reduce tbe risks of accident and miscalculation vhicb would upset it and perhaps even to reduce the cost or 111aintaining it This concept does not call for aubstit utine diearm 111ent measures however tully i 9Pectable1 for an adequate miUtary posture On the contrary it i a based on our first achieving an adequate military posture and then attempting to prolona is acceptable situation via ams controls o lndeed we are not goir £ to convince e Soviets to accept the 1118asur-ea envisaged if we continue to lead trot'll weaknees the only huia on which they mif ht accept is if these correspond to the actual situation uisti lf at the tilrteo 111 WHAT IS AN AD UAT DE' i'h TlRtNT BALANC The particular strateeic posture which we would reg8l d as adequate is a matter for the experts to detemine11 Since we have elected a strike second11 strategy however any aaequate deterrent posture would pro at ly have to be baaed largel7 on a relative invulnerable etrike force of second generation hardened or mobile missiles sut 'icient to in1'11ct unacceptable retaliatory damage on the USSR • Apparently Dr l istiako 1 19' believee 1 I am tai g here only bout gene al• war deterrence o 1 do nc t believe it is feasible to achieve deterrent atability with respect to t l•e 'fll hole spectrum or limited wars becauee ot the 1110re limited stakes and infinitely greater nwnber 0£ variables involvedu SECRET --_ _--- -· ___ _ _- -- - -- - - - OECL ' SSIFIED SECRh1' Authority - 3- By ARA Date JP believee that our posture might be adequate once POLAJUS and ATLAS are Mly proven and that at this point we could accept a ban on further long range 111issile teeta However J1181l1 of us tear that his t - ming siq be pJ'aft ture and that not until we have teated both POLARIS and l' It 'UT91AN will we have the degree of nexibilit-7 plue invulnerabllit r vhich we needo What I have 1n mind 18 that onbe we had acbin9d an adequate deterrent posture we might agree to a aeries of measures 'Whim would inhibit 11 na1 prevent the further testing and production of what ·are 11 kely' to be the chi et• weapons ·of intercont inent al warfare in the 19liO'e baJ li st1c miSBiles and t11eir nuclear warheads put a ceiling on tbe race ln other vorda ve would try and tar intercontinental st rategic adYantage at tbia point II O THF TIMINO OF NF ' OTIATIONS In case to acquire a relatively inwlnera'ble retaliat01'1 capability11 and at the flam time to nego-U ate controls t o clamp on a ceiling at- this point wul d requiN several years This givea us plenty or tiM to ilan and build and negotiate before we sign on atl7 dotted lineso ierice1 the bove rationale ie not one which calla tor early c25 rehanai¥e V ementa on anna controls In tact we could not arro rd to uiple1111tnt it at least in rul 11 until we have unJl aterally achieved a deterrent poeture considered adequate by hoth ua and the ' Je aolll years trolll now i srn which rray This in not to say howeveT that we could not beein · __ SEC U T _ DECL SSIFIED Authority AJA 951 W 1 SECR l T By ARA Date5J #l_j 1 - 4 - begin explorinp the stabilit7 concept wit b the Soviet a preferably -'lt the hif hest level prior to that tillll_l There is no compelliftg reaaon why during the buildup period 1111 could not discuss with ow • allies anci then the Sonata the broad concept or stabilizing intercontinental deterrenceo Subsequentq if this proved promising we could follow · through with talka about hem to do doo But not until we bad • bi e•ed the posture we thought adequate vould we be prepared actul to mter into acree•nta to stabilize at that level It should not be be ond our inpnu i t y to protract 8ff7 neaotiationa until fthia tiM o On the other ham there all or se8118 to be no COJ11P8llin£ need to ner otiate the 111easures needed to stabilize the intercontinentd deterrent balance at the sa111e t 1 M We may ebortly hive ·a ban on nuclear taettnr o h It by' l -6 'it see eel st rategically advantageous to proceed to a cut- ott or 1'18e1onable materlala Ule tact that we were not yet ready tor · not missile test bant1 and production cut ofts would neceesariq be a btro However t ha important thing 11 not to let oureelvea be inveigled into one or two particular measures without being am-e that their 1mple1'll8ntation itllo· t the others contemplated would not be de-atabilbiJu rathe-r tb stab1liti1'£ in it a net effects One cannot '901d t he suspicion th it in om- present t ieeemeal ad hoc approach to ams control negotiatiom• we have tailed to assess i'ully bow each of OJI ti ts into any overfill rationale Sr CIL'i' DECLASSIFIED q Authority ·Q ' I NtiD 5 JcQ SECRLT By ARA Date P III - 5- W E rIFIC EASURES TO STABILI1 E T HE INTl RC··NT Nl NTAL E Tli R 0 EtlT P AL 4Nr E Ao Ban on Nuclear Teatingo Thia measure 11 al read - Wider diac slion and 111ay soon be agreed upon Its effect ia pJ'iJllarily to etabiliae one upect ot the deten-ent balance rather than being • upl7 a tirlt at a@• confict nce-building r lo v liJwever• it we had ful q tr ought thJ-ough the concept ot atable deterrence beton we began tba test talka we 1rJ ght hne concluded that turf her testing to provicle in roved nuclear warbem u'l' second generat ion 111issilee eyateM vu h i illr ortant to adequate deterrence B Ban on Miasile Teat111g 1he rationale tor th1a ban would be the aUte u that abov•• i e to put a dal IPff on technoloeical progres• leading to tbe devel0p119nt ot ever never and more accurate 11iasilea 'Which 1111e it again de-atabilize the deterrent balance Aeaml'lnr that w already had relati'fely invulnerable ttobile or hardened eyste ia llhlcb packed an adequate punch why continue the raee for nen better miaaile qateN prcn'iud ve could ef ective prevent t he Soviete tram doing ao A ban on long range iniasUe testing could be ettect1vel7 inarpected according to Dr Kiatiakoweky' e l95f report Indeed it estblatea that We could probably do so adaquate by _u nilateral Tlleane alone - ve ral problata viaa• howeve r vne 1s that maller 1'issUe1 being teatAG can be contu td it h larger missiles J 1t would also be i Oesitle to produce wger wail es l y cluat ering or staging s11181 ler onee Thua a ueation arises • to how I - - DECL SSlflED Authority NN 95_CJ By ARA Date J to how tar down the taet ban should goo Should we'J for exa ple ban all balliatic missile teete Thia might not be so bad from our standpoint Second we cannot stop the race tor space Continued taeting and launching ·118• ot 8 lCh ot space vehicle• will be eeaential vehicles for military testing b r We can limit the teN ot joint tiring and on-site inapect ion but there 1a no quest ion that mU1tarT applications can be tested 1n a peaceful uaea progr111 nen though at considerable dilt1cul tu Co E 1 -off ot IClll and perhaps IRBM Production1 Therefore we need a lll9anure which wuld prevent the Soviets b-olll utilising any technological adTancea 1ihich the7 might have achieved tln-ough oatena1bly' peacetul progra A wq to do this would be via a nbeequent ban on tu rtber pt'Oduetion of ICll •a once each side had acCUl'IUlated an adequate stockpile 'lhffe 1a a further reason tor this cut-otts U8Ullling that neither Iida had built up a autticient mi 11ile force to give it strategic a iper1or1t 7 a cut-ott would uke subsequent achirlamnt or such a posture extre•li dUficulte PreliJd narT studies by CIA imicate tbat it woul a he Yery ditf'icult to detec1 c amestine production of a ff ttl 1tissilee a year ttcn Ter it should r ot be t oo ditficult to deteet prouuction on a 11cale eutticient 1 o upset the deterrent balance for cunt inned r roduction or Ot COUl ee allowance '-'OUld ha'e to be l'lacle ara agreed m ianher of vohiele1 SECR • T ' tor peacetlll DECL SSIFIED AJNb95 CJq 1 By ARA Date IP Authority uses but D thu problem should not prove too great Cut-ott ot Piaaionable lateriala Produetion It we want to atabiliu the intercontinental deterrent balance it would help at- csOM point to operate on warheads u w t ll u delivery vehicles We should be able to determine 1n advance at what· time we will be in a re11onablJ' good poaition with reepect to fissionable Jllateriale on hand alwa a in COJIIJ al ieon to where the Son eta will enough to I'll be that tiJlle i Once we have aur intercontinental deterrent force to a11 v SON anti- missile defenae U feasible and desirable and provide a reaonlble stockpile for lilnited var and ASW ue ve lllight then be able to afford a ll 8 ter1ala cut«f especialq it this put W I in a adTantageou 1101 8 poaition than the R l xiating atudiea nggest that •uch a cuta-ott would be ttritlabl e 1thin acceptable llllite ot tolerance Since each pOller would bave hundred• of 1 hnuaanda ot kilograM of fissionable material a by thia tillle diver• ton or clandestine production probably would not serious up11et 1 he deterrent balance ot C0 11'89 bare t o 0118 peaeetul UN8 proauction would haft to be allollecl JI Cont role on Outer Space A tl tt h part ot t m J J'08'1 •• tbo lgb one vhich we probabq ought to neg0t1ate bMdiateq rather than lat• would be to foreatall the clnelopment ot yet a naw caw eory ot atra1 epic 1oreapona eyoteruJ operating in outer spaceo Thie would inhibit anothff de-stabilizint SECllliT DECLI SSIFIED uthority NA f 95_9 ro a - ARA Date jf SECRE T f v de-etabilizing technological advm1ce 1'he techn1qt e would be to propo e mutual inspect ion or joint progrus in oJ'der to ineure that no offenshe weapona would be installed in satellite• or space ffhicleao Such a ban could probably be adequatel7 J'IIOnitoNd perhaps b7 inspection at point of la 1ncho F Measures to Reduce the Riek or SUJ'PJ'ise AttackI i-11acalculatioE4 err Accident Despite the tact that t he existence · on both aide• or rela ti raly invulnerable nuclear strike tore• would by definition ll'l8b iw clear liar lli h unU kel 7 we cannot e xclllde the de-stabilidng poae1b111t1ea nh£ rent in miscalculation accident or even var b7 despera't ion To the extent that J110asurea can be devieed which will reduce such riaJm eog by tullt 'l' infonnntion ahout each other• a posture and state of readinee• •-which is leaa dangerou if each side 1e Nlat 1Yel7 imulnerable _by ted1 iquee tor quick connun1cat1on in event ot cruia etco theee will belp to l I I I 1' stabilise the detel Nmt balance • need a lllUCh full er examination of too relationship o euch measures to deterrent stability than has been atte ted to dat eo rv p '-J JF r-1w STABILIZ 'l'lO'N T itROUOU ARM$ cr rm 11 s Th ahovt1 sug estiona tflerely- outline a series f tu ally B lPl r rt-ir 1• I I • i- tecbn1qr- - o fGr 1tting a ceiling on btercontinental ciet 6rrent eapabi iH t - s at as h gh or as low a level or l'i1ltual deterrence ss the two side i I L r i ' - --- DECL SSIFIED Authority NN %CJro By ARA Date 1 ' SECRtT 9 before we cari really determine whether it iaa a strategically advanwgeoua b inapectableJ c negotiableo Ind ed the conf ept ot detenent tttability itself' neede research 1n dept he t the miggested measures do at leut seem s t1cientlz prmn _ 1l to wan-Hilt their being reconnended tor intensive st5 aa vap to e2b lH the intercontinental detsrrent balance 1 once ve have reached an ade9 ' a e det errent poat ure '11 8elves While they would onl hold back• ratl '3J' than pywent continued change in rnilitaey tschnolor y and this only two lee areas tbq would at leut hamper the testing of nev advances and eflm it such t esting v clandestinely conducted won id create nothor obstacle through production ransu tl11ae 1118asuree appear to be aguatel y veritiable within levels or tolerar ce which we could aecepto Since they are based on an existi 'lg high level ot mutual deterrent capabilities it would require evasion on a quite tuhstan ial scale to upset this balance Moreover the inaper tion syatarils theineelvea are mutually reinforcing e g th 1 napect on of 011 - space devicee will contribute to the detection ot mi ssile teat inf an- • tee versa inspection of 111i1sile produc ion facil1 ties coul d eive · ni Sf-• into ne vehicles being prepared tor tsstinr inspe t on of ma1 eria u producUo 'l J' r-ili ties l'lliRbt 1 ndieete diversion on a s c Rle which wu k suggest new weapons requireJ11Snta etc -- - i n t DECLI SSIFIED Authority i A LAID 95 q m1 By ARA Date 1 SECRr T IP 10 - It ramair1 1 t to discuss whether these 111easures even if inapecta't l find negotiable are 1n our nat ·onal interest Their met obvious advantage voulci be that 1 while each side would retain an adequate nuc 1 t eterrenta the substitution cf a controlled for an uncontrolled 11 iss le-nuclear environment would reduce the risks of a destructive nuclear • tle t her 'lide would find it easy to achieve - aut1'1cient atrategic mfoaile or nuclear advantage to de-stabilize the deterrent balance '1 o thofie who argue that this would us the threat of masz ive i-etaliation3 Eound e s it vaa when we had nuclear superiority l would reply that this 7 t al reodJ' being denied m in fact u the Soviete achieve stratectc pari y with ourselYe o Ant ther etrong reason for attenpting to stabilize intercontinental tteterrence 1a that at present a ver hich proportion or our rdlitar 1 bud get is eoin tor this purpose at the expense ot other vressinr 1'11i11tary nef' dt Whether or not we have 8J'M controls the threat or li r ited war i8 far more 1 i mediat e than that o reneral war ln the opinion of' many we are 81 better prepared tor general than tor l 1 Jllited var and the so-calls l miesi e gap is tar leas serious in ito 1rnplicati onr than that of tr liillitfl I ability to meet · the Connunista on a less than all--out scalGo So if we coulcl somehow reduce the need tor rapidl y 3uperaed 1 ng eaci genel'ation of strategic weapons with ever new snd usually more eo rt l j genarat1 on s it would facilitate at least some N wallocation -- SECReT l' f t 1 1m r • • to r · DECL SSIFIED Authority AJNb 9f J a l S CRt T 1' i _J - 11 • meetinr limit and cold var u1reatao A third adnntar e or stabilization throuf h ama ontrola ie the o1'tens1ve poaeibilitiee it offers for holding back Soyiet nuclear Btrike capabilities to the level which we think we can· afford Few will deny that the Soviets are ahead or ua in the • ace tor space and probably also tor the 1110ment in the field ot ICBM a 1 It there is even a SO-SO possibility that tbe Russi ans 1111 7 continue to pull ahead of ua ror budgetary reuona among others 1e 1t not advantageous to us t devise meaeures which vill bold them back to our level On th• other hm'ld J _ hile the Soviets are ahead o r ua 1n first generatlon soft ICi 1 a we may I draw ahead of hell 1n second generation eolid fueled 'iea lee Ir so would it not he to our ad vantage to negotiat e a cei ling on the missile race at a tiffle vhen our position 1a 1-ikely t o be' optilwlft w1tr N 5J 8Ct to theire Granted that 1t we put a ceiling on the nuclear weapons and ballistic ll'lieaile race it will ir ereq lead each aide to · develop other atrategic capabUitiea ouch u cw BW Since each side would still retain a 1'ullT adequate nuclear retaliato 7 capability hoveve r it ould do the attark r little food to use » or RW if the defender rould still retnl1ate with nnrlear veaponso '8tell8 Alternativel7 a ceU1nv on offensive del1veey ' mirbt lead to groater emphasis on active and passive If one s cJU T -- aatense DECL SSJFIED urhority t AJA1 959_l4 3y ARA I S CRET Date l P 1 - 12 - It one aide were thua able to nsduce the damage he would absorb· to acceptable level I it would be quite de-etabilizing in its ettecta However if' both aides did eo deterrent atabilit1 woul 4 probabl 1' be enhanced rather than reduced At any rat e it see• to m 1 hat we need not und rear either poBSib111t there are great political and negotiating advantarea in being able to put forth to our allies and then the Scn ete before the torum ot world opinion a clearl 7 UIXl eretandable mid comprehena1'99 progralft for dealing with the moat awesome riaka of all-out nuclear conflict without at the same tilne comp 'Ollliaing our own security poature ln default ot auoh a progrllffl are we not in danp er ot being draged into negotiations without countefflOvea wi h vh1ch to cope with alliecl pre1181U es and the 1killf'ul 1n1tiat1vee of the llSSR In a n 1 belieft that there 1 e a series ot anu control meaS lrU vhicb could enhance rather than detract 1'roJII our 111111tary poet are over the coming decade ' l'hey are at leut euttic ftntly promising to mrit intensive study They are probab 3 adequately inepectableo In tiN they might permit -ua to re-allocate reeources tp IIIS t outer pNaaing rllilitu or cold var needeo The7 111i£ht nen proye acceptable to t he Soviets 1t we lead irolfl strengt ho At a • in11nWll thq provide a clear baeie on which politlcal initiative while resisting other pressures our al ies 11·0 to take the the l R and While they involve rnajor risks at least these are probably calculable and tor tbia reuon mq flJ'OYe more acceptable than the potentially DECL SSJFIED Authority NJ-Jf %1 F ·•' • I By ARA Date m O ·-· 13 pot ntially' quite unstable situation with which - e will athGrwise have to live I recChl8nd that you include a brief atatei nt 0£ this program in your report R W• Y Of J R 1 I · lj