-CANADA-UNITED STA'JES MimSTmllAL C »tD mE' ON '70INT Dl F m Distribution S S - -fl SUMMARY Rl lCCRD a MEETING G - f2 EUR - #3 RPM- f4 BNA - #5 #6 Qpem pg Remarks Unolaaa1f1ed INR OD #7 SP Mr Rusk opened the meeting by expressing the US Oovernment 's pleasun - 18 that the DefeDSe Camn l ttee was meeting again Mr Martin said ottawa-#9 that Canada was also very pleased to have the Defense Coimittee Per Joint Bdaeet The Um tad States and Canada did not have the eame obl l on Defense ptions and strength in defense matters but maey questions arose A rnb for both countries as a consequence of their joint effort not Matthews #10 only in continental defense but in NAro It was therefore good Defenseto have an exchaJJge ot views on defense matters SecretaRusk fll-#24 noted the extraord1Dary record both ·countries had made in e r WR joint defense effort Be upreased particular pleasure that the 126- 127 t wo Chairmen of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense WFe present Treas Dillo a observers and asked Mr Wilgress to a• a few words about the #28 Board's work Mr Wilgress explained briefly the origins of the CMS-129 Board in 1940 and £%s record of accamplishment in handling joint 2 Unn Xeroxetlefense problems since then Be noted particularly' the Board1 s copies for interest 1n facilitating US-Canadian consulta on on defense Canadian questions and mentiOJled the paper on this subject that the Embassy via Board recentq prepared and circulated to both govermnents BNA FUTURE PROOR AM FCll 'lHE DEFENSE OF mRTH AMERICA 1be Future 1breat and Measures to Meet Manned Aircratt Maritime and ICB-t Attack roP SECRE'l' Mr McNamara pointed out that the first concern had to be to insure aurdvai of a sufficient part of US retal l atory force to be able to intliot assured destruction on the Sovie t Union The Elccluded frca automatic damgrading and declassl fication •£ _ 1 -µ a ---• - - - - - - - - - - - - - ED ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES TOP SDET SS O'lmRWISE INDICATED -2essential test was the ability to destroy the Soviet Ooverment and llilitary control a plus a large percentage or their population and ec0Do1117 after a well-planned and executed Sov Let surprise attaok on US strategic nuclear forces He then rev lawed the US and Bov Let strategic nuclear forces in 1964 and aa projected tor 1967 alJd 1969 1be banber torcea ot both the US and USSR would decline in the years ahead A oonaiderable portion of the US aircraft vere on $-minute alert and the bulk ot these planes could be expected to penetrate ad attack the Soviet Um on In contrast the US estimate ot the number ot Soviet bcabera that could be expected to oarr out tWO• W81' attaoke on the us or even on Alaska and parts ot Canada and the northwestern United States was small oaapared to the number of US bombers expected to get through to the Bov l et Union be US had about a 4 to l advantage in ICllfa and intended to keep a 3-or-4 to l advantage in the future be Kimlteman missiles were so dispersed and hardened that each Soviet miasile could destroy no more than one Minuteman and even then it would require an almost direct hit There was no question ot the survivability ot these missiles Die Soviet Union did not realq have a counterpart to the US nuclear-powered miaile-firing submarines Present Soviet capabilities in this regard involved short-range missiles that had to be launched from the surface No Soviet submarines seemed to be deplo ed in positions to attack the US or Canada Sane 60% ot the Pol aria missiles were on station at o y t lme in an abaolutely invulnerable position 1be US thus was confident it had assured deetructionn capability and could maintain it Blcchange of nuclear attack would however - and tbia must be underlined -- involve fatalities of up to perhapa 150 million in the US and similar fatalities in both the USSR and western lmrope 'lhere were two clear concluaions Sec MclTamar noted One vu that there could be no winner in a atrateg1c nuclear exchange 1he f eaeible OOllOept was deterrent--that no rational man would laUDCh a strategic attack on the US and Canada if he recognised bis ovn society would be destroyed The first need theretore was to maintain effective deterrence The other wu to take au l table precautions agaiut the poaa bility ot irrati0Jl lit7 or accidental 0 -« 7 -- ' t ' i -- ur CLASSffn- n 111 19sfCJ_____ ' RA o tc - # roPSPDRP l UNLESS OOE RWISE INDICATED -3launching ot hostilities 1 he character and role ot US and Canadian defense must therefore change as the character ot the Soviet threat alters tran manned banbera to ballistic missiles 1he second ooncluai on thus was that together the US and Canada faced sane d lf'tioult and canplex questions Iater this year or next they must decide whether to deplo7 an anti-IOIM system It would be expensive in resources and protect only the major c1ties am perhaps some 30% of the population Add lticmally to be feasible it would require an extensive expansion of tbe fallout shelter programJ otherwise the 81181lW' could detonate his weapons outside the cone of tire and obi eve bis results through fatalities tran the reeult ing fallout And even beyond that step there would be a need to modernize the air defense qstan Mr Ruek commented that certainly this review made clear that the conoept of an etfective first strike had gone by the boards Mr McNamara said that the US had examined the idea of a 11 tull first strike capability a force so large that it would destr07 the eneDIJ' capability to do unacceptable damage to the tree world and had oonoluded that it was absolutely impossible to develop such capability Ml- He er expressed thorough agreement that with capabilities such as outned by Secretary McNamara it would not be rational tor either side to launch a nuclear attack and that the danger was one of irrationality and miacaloulat 1 on He asked what Mr McNamarats present tblnk1ng was on the feas l bilit7 of an anti-IOIM syatem Mr McNamara said he could g Lve no useful guidance at this time until the research aDd development was further advanced Die dec l sion was expected to be taken in November or December or in earq 1965 He did coul der it higbq desirable to depl07 such a aystem it the US could satistaotori J' develop one that cculd destroy IOBu 'lhe US had spent over $2 lxl llion developing the HI lee X and had a system that could destro y an ICJM with a high degree of assurance 'lhe problem however was to find a system able to cope with a saturation attack by 1WV ml ss t lea ua1ng penetration aids Furthermore even a feasible anti-ICBM s -stem probabq would not be worth deploying it a greatq expanded fallout shelter program were not undertaken A request was before Congress to double the number of shelter spaces but it appeared 1'0P SJ XJRE'l' UBIESS ul'iiiiitds INDipA'l'ED TOP S DRE'l' tJm'aS otiiitw SE INDICATED -41mlikel7 that it would be approved at this aeem on llr Hellyer uked Mr MaHamara•s t hougbts on improved manned interoeptore Mr McNamara said that the US was exnd rd ng t-he proper mix in Wenitve farcee and this was as Mr Heller mentioned atteoted by t-he deoisi on on an anti-ICBI 97item e deed ii on on the tara and nmber of improved manned interceptors could not be made Wltil after that deaia lon Mr Ruk commented in a polit 1 oal vein tbat the irrationality ot a nuoieir ezcbange vu not a ocaplete parantee that it would not ooour S1tuations ooul d occur iD wbioh a ohllila ot eveate tended to take over Iba poU tioal problem ot Mk1 ng peace continued to be just as important On the disarmament ad de 1D its Bonfil'e proposal the US vu prepared to take out B-47s 8 1D811bat tuter than 1201'11al Another US objective was to prevent tb la d ghl7 aoph l atioated weapon turnlJlg up in other arms races elsewhere iD the world Dle Soviets did not reject the B-47 propoaal if the US would accept in principle total elimination of all balbers by a gl ven date la t hese figures ahow tbat arrang•ent would disturb the balanc4t of power Also it tor instance China without the support of the USSR should go on a rampage the US had to haw a capability different from that tor detenae against the Soviet Unl on and to elim• l nate all banbers would eJ1m1nate a cr•t deal ot our ttedbility In connection with diaamament Ml- Martin aaked wbat 1111 ortanoe the US gave to ground observation poate Mr Ruak indicated the US would be prepared to work on it but there wae not yet enmgb interest on the other aide to warrant t ldng on the d l tftoult p-oblema involved Mr He1ier aeked wlfat kind ot eituation in regard to Canmum st dbilia e US might uae long-range marmed banbers Hr Rusk said that the US 1l0Ul d not let 1taelt beoane 1nvolved 1n another nstained oonteat restricted to conventional weapou such aa occurred in Korea Dle US haa suata l ned 160 000 oaaualties fighting 001111lurxhm ainoe World War II am would not perm1 t the kind of bJ eed j ng struggle tbat want on in Korea to happen again Mr Martin asked what the US assessment of OOllllllW'list Obim•• nuclear oapaS iity was Mr McNamara felt the Chill88e Camnmista probab could detom te a nuclear device aanetime in the near future but it would have no s l gn1f'ican military value except TOP SECRET UNLESS o1ffiiiWISE INDICATED -S- - perhaps tor the psychological impact on the will of surrounding countries He doubted that the Chinese Ocmauniata would have a signit t cant nuclear capabilit r for quite a number ot years CANADIAN DllFE EE WI'l'E PAPER SFX RET Mr Hellyer gave a short outline of the Canadian White Paper on Defence Its purpose waa to work out a defense structure that would provide mmnnan flexibility with Um1ted resources It contained considerable tmlpbasis on mob ility as Canada expected peacskeeping type operations to be a continuing oocu rrenoe 'lbe reorganization ot the Canadien defense forces was designed to provide a more reapona 1 ve farce and to reduce overhead expenditures to help pay tar the considerable amount of equipnent needed The White Paper had received overwhelming art from the C81lad1an public and the armed forces 1here would not be an y effect on Canada's working relations in military matters with its allies In his comment Mr McNamara expressed concern about the proportionateq low Canadian defense effort Although Canada was second to the US in per capita income US defense expenditures in comparison to GNP were 12S% ot Canada's and Oanada 1 s m llitaey strength per un1 t or population was far lees than that ot the United States 'lbe AJDerioan public and Congress would not tolerate such a situation indefini teq It was also not a good example for our European allies He made these cClllllents with the greatest goodwill and he appreciated that the problem could not be solved immediately It should however be frankly recognized so that steps might lead toward its solution Mr Gordon noted that Canada faced very difficult political and economic problems Tax resources at the disposal of the federal govermnent were being transferred to the provinces Canada I s high deficit on current account with the US was an i nhibiting factor on anything Canada tried to do He also felt that canparing defense expenditures to GNP was a measure that should not be accepted without qualifioationJ it was not just a question of measuring dollars but also how effectively they are epent Canada was hoping to develop ite mobile peacekeeping forces which 1188 an idea that mP SEDRET UNIESS oiiliikQ Sk OOICATED r -·· TOP SECRET UNIBSS OTHERWISE INDICATED -6had great Canadian public acceptance Effective Canadian endeavor in this field would be more useful than additional defense expenditures in other areas that the Canadian public would not support as fully ihe Oanadian Goverment was oonaoioua of the points raised b y Mr M Namara and would keep them in m lld But this a l tuation was not something that thq would be likely to be able to do anytb l rig about until the internal federal-provincial relationabip was clarified and the external econanic situation improved DEFENSE PRODUCTION SHARI O CONFIDPmIAL Mr Drury reviewed the developnent of the Defense Production Sharing oonoept and program He emphasized its great importance for the maintenance of a meaningful Canadian acientific and defense industey- ' lhe large equipment purchases required b y the Defenoe 'White Paper would throw the program badly out of balance unless the United States gave urgent am careful attention to what major US defense procurement could be pla oed in Canada At separate discuseions earlier in the morning Mr McNamara Mr Hellyer and he had agreed to appoint representatives to exam i ne as rapidq and as closely as possible the forecast of procurement requirements both ways in the light of the White Paper and US defense pl amling The group would tr y to see what add1 tions to routine orders might be placed in Canada to achieve the rough balance that was the program's goal Hr McNamara agreed that the program faced an important potentli' 1 problem Die program which had favored Canada in recent years was approacb l ng rough balance and that vu dea lrable However current trends it continued would tip the balance to C nada1 s disadvantage 1he program provided veey substantial preferences to Camd ian firms and the US was tul prepared to continue them In essence the problem was to isolate those areas in which r aned1an industry was fulq competitive 'lbe US was veey much in favar ot the Defense Production Program and would do everything it could to assist in meeting 81l3' upcan1ng problems TOP SDET UNIW OTHJ RWIBE INDICATED ED AT THE NATIO ARCHIVES f- DECLASSffJF D--r ' 1111 196C _____ p tJY D1 tc TOP SID El' 9 UNIESS oTdiwrsE INDICATED -7- Mr Hellyer noted that the probla was political as well as mil 1 tarj ariaeconom l c for the Canadian Government Any decision to make a major purchase in the US caused problems tar the Canadian Goverment 1he participation of Canad an industry in US defense procurement was an important element in the Goverment 1 s ability to make such purchases and defend them to the publ 1 c Messrs McNamara and Dillon also noted that the program excluded several categories of OS cietense expenditures in Canada These expendi tures currentq allowed a net imbalance of $50-60 million Mr Dillon noted that because of its balance ot payments problems the uS was alwaya concerned about this imbalance and always hopeful that these items could be kept under caref lll examination ArI3' progress in reducing them would ahra ys be appreciated Mr Gordon agreed in principle but felt the imbalance in this item should not be considered without ranembering O nada' s overall trade deficit w1 th the US Mr inquired abcu possible restrictions on the export of uncl a as hecFeolmi cal intormation which 11' i' lposed would great hamstring Oanadi an et torts to participate in US defense procurement Mr Dillon said that this resulted ran a transfer o f certain functions l'rom the 1 'reasury to the CGlllllerce Department last April Commerce 'NBB now re-exam n1 ng 1 ts proposed regulations in the light of problems such as that mentioned He assured Mr Drury that if Canada encountered aey- instance in which these regulations were causing real prob lane in the de tense production field he should let the US know -- - SOUTHEAST ASIA SUET Mr Rusk outlined US views on Southeast Asia The major US effort was to convince Peiping and Hanoi before it was too late that they must leave their neighbors alone Political settlements had been agreed and signed by- Hanoi and Peiping in 19$4 and 1962 and the US sought notb ing more than full compliance wi' th these agreements Peiping was f ollold ng a doctrine and course of militanc y am would not leave its neighbors alone until it saw that war was the alternative There were many lessons ot history testifying to this It was extremeq difticult to deal with these problems without expanding hostilities but at same point if the Chinese Commun ists continued their militant behavior the US did not see how war could be avoided 1he US was not spoiling for a fight but it did not believe the Free World could afford the loss of Southeast Asia 'Die US was trying to prevent the war that no one wanted It was important that Peiping and Hanoi get the mesl l ge that they must leave their neighbors alone Mr Martin said that Canada understood and shared the US disappcdnlinent at the ineffectiveness of the Internatic·i l Control Ooan 1 ssions Canada supported the neutralization of I aos and Oembodia but recognized that the situation in divided 'V'iet-Nam did not lend itself' to a policy of neutralization Canada recognized that in the present s 1 tuation in Viet-Nam the US could take no other course and at the present time and in the present circumstances supported the US in what it was doing Both the US and Canada bad the same objective--to get over to Peiping the actual limits of western patience as well as the fundamental lack of hostility on the part of the west it 001111lunist China would leave 1 ts neighbors alone militariq brough the means available to it Canada was trying to help in this regard He wanted to underline however the concern 08nada shared with others about the dangers ot expanding the conflict notwithstanding the provocation Canada felt this could lead to a direct military confrontation between the US and China It could drive the USSR and Communist China together and the international reaction in the UN was bound to be very great Gen«al de Gaulle1 e reasoning in the long term bad an appealing content It was ditfioult to make a judgmen in the long term and Canada hacl no final views on long term prospects but felt honestly that 1 t was hard to see how the present situation could go on indefinlteq It was hard to resist the conclusion that geograpb y bad given China a sort ot priority ot interest in this area Canad felt broadened contacts with the Chinese Communists would help them understand better western strength and the limits ot western patience Such conta ts do not necessar l q further the interests ot our opponents aey more than did co-membership in the UN with the USSR However he did want to make quite clear that Ce nadian policy toward Oanmuniat Cbi1'la bad not changed although the goverl'llllent believed as a statement ot principle that isolation of l Y country TOP SD tr UHIESS OTH iRWISE INDICATED r·• M' - nECLASSli IBD • lh 2f'dCJ___ I - ----- - I P R A D tC i------ -- TOP smtET UNIESS OTHl RWISE INDICATED -91bere was no change ot policy regarding admission ot Communist China to the UN or Id th regard to substantive recognition of the Peiping regime There was however in O nada a grold ng opinion that the facts of international life bad to be recognized and he could not say that the present a1tuation would continue illdefiDiteq However before IJ 1' change if 0ll8 were to take place Canada would be conac Loua of and reapeot m obligationa and certainly would not take 8J V' clec 181 on 'ld thout careful consultation with the US and other allies was not desirable Mr Gordon ccamented that if the US and Ca1111urd st China became involved in war in Asia the situation could depending on the way the hostilities developed lead to ebarp division between opl nion in the US and Canada Mr Rusk pointed out that the US had bad more serious diacussiom with Peiping tJJan an y other western countl J' and had found the Chineee Communists oanpleteq implacable Furthermore at this point in histoey the question ot overtures for add1tional contac-ta with Communist China had to be considered in light of Peiping's appraisal ot what such moves meant At a time when other people's attitudes toward Peiping had an important bearing on the prospects for war or peace it would be unfortunate if aeyone did anything to lead Peiping to think i ta course vaa right i'his would contribute to war and not to peace Regarding Soviet attitudes toward a US-001111lUDiat China confrontation he telt that such a poaeibility caused a very troublesome dilanma for the Ruaeians The US had indications that they were concerned about eaoalation of the problem 1he Ruaaiana showed real concern about what 1 t might be like to 11ve next door to a China whose arrogance had been stimulated by the pretense of nuclear power Not just contacts but a ccmbinat i on of things-western mil ltaey force inoreaaed conaumer danand eto --had worked together in creating better prospects ot peaceful existence with the Sov Let Union In time if China would leave her neighbors alone we might find out whether such a situation would develop in China In repq to a quel J' by Mr Martin about appointment of General 'lq lor and Mr Johnson to Saigon Mr Rusk stressed that this 1U SmRET UNIESS ofDiiRWISE iHDICATED · • 'l'OP smurr UNUSS OTHJ RWISE INDICATED -10represented no change in poli01 Following the departure ot such a well known figure as Ambassador Lodge 1 t bad been necessar v to appoint outstanding men to be sure that Vietnamese morale would not suf fer It had also been important to try to reduce the divisiveness of debate on this eubject to · ·· avoid possibility that BancxL and Peiping would be led to the wrong conclusions about US attitudes Mr McNamara asked Mr Martin it he could clarify somewhat further what he found appealing in General de Oaulle1 s reasoning Mr Martin said he found it ditfioult to conceive how a situation could rimain permanent in 1mich military aesietanoe frail outside was preventing the tree evolution ot a society Mr McNamara telt that the word 11tree was the key and that it anoflier state were try lng to subvert its neighbor this situation could and should go on tor JD8D7 years Did Mr Martin feel there was sane limit beyond which the US should not go in resisting the currents operating from North V1et-Nmn and trOJll Communist China Mr Martin said he could not define the length ot time that the present il tuation could continue but he would be leas than honest if he did not a q that the Canadian Ooverment was concerned about how this Bituation would eventually be resolved INTERNATIONAL PEAOEKEEPINO OONFIDEN'l'IAL Mr Martin rev l ewed Canada's recent etforts and present thinkabout fJie developnent of improved UN peacekeeping oapability C4nada bad orig lnalq suggested a private meeting ot military spokesmen of those countries that have set aside um ts for peacekeeping operations to discuss their experiences in these op8l tions 'lhe idea had been making progress but Sweden and Finland perhaps because ot their propinqulty to the USSR or perhaps because ot Soviet pressures hesitated to participate The Dutch Foreign Minister had also pointed out possible canplioations because other countries were not 1noludedJ addition ot sane other countries would create a more cosmopolitan character diminish the empbasia on NATO countries and satisfy some oanplainta frail Atrioan countries ing TOP SlDU T l1Nll3S OTHERWISE nmIOATED _ -if oECl ASSl ffiD- _i thA J1''f2ftfC ---· f ' 'R 0 IC t k - -- TOP SEx REr UNLESS OTHJliw SE INDICATED -11Canada was now taking some steps to liberalize the character of the meeting how sucoesstul it would be remained to be seen When the UN Seoretaey General was in ottawa recently- Mr Martin had informally let him know Canadian intentions and the Secretary General bad commented that in general he thought the initiative a worthy one Also in view of the recent Izvestia article criticising Canad J an efforts Mr Martin had oaiied in the Soviet Ambassador and explained to him frankly what Oanada bad 1n ill1 nd and that the intention waa not to diminish the Security Council's authority in any way Even if Sweden and Finland and other countries decided not to attend the meeting C tlada intended to persevere There would undoubtedly be further need for this type of peacekeeping machinery and certainly nothing would be lost in trying to be more efficient in dealing with these problEIDS Mr Rusk felt that Canada's action was a very constructive im tiatlve and he hoped it could be developed to include more than the so tar relativeq limited number of countries It it could be broadened it would be a great stimulus to the UN and otter opportunl ties that would not otherwise be available He was not sure that the great powers should atay oanpletely out ot this field It mlght be worth considering at sme paint whether 4 ot the 5 pmnanent members ot the Security Couna l l including the usm but omitting China could not be persuaded at sane point to register an interest in peacekeeping activities that would encourage other smaller countries to participate Mr Martin noted that the Izvestia article imicated that the Sm et union envisaged sltuations in wb tch it might want to participate but while not stating it as a reservation he thought that the idea ot including the Security Council in some way would be better at a later date in order not to complicate Canada's present initiative • r NAro IN 1970 SEDRET Mr Martin noted that as an alliance ot free nations NATO had to operate under the advantages and disadvantages ot the freedoms TOP SEOREr UNIJi SS OTHl RWISE INDICATED «' • _c D E C L e S S ' l r 'J F J - 1 t l f ' f f ___ p eJ o w Dal - - - - -- TOP SUET UNIESS OTHERWISE INDICATED -12enjoyed by its members While there might be differences of opinion between France and others all atfimed the fundamental reasons that had caused the alliance to be established 'While the French position might be difficult to accept there was more to be gained by recognizing the differences in method and making the best of the situation Canada was amious to start the process of re-thinking NAT01 s role in the 19701 s and l980's While not intending to participate in the MlF Canada recognized the political and perhaps other advantages Canada would be interested in US views as to whether the MIF concept could be extended to land-based nuclear forces Canada was also interested to know whether the US felt the NATO force planning exercise would reach its goals and whether it would be possible to create a satisfactory mix of nuclear and conventional forces Canada remained steadfast to the ideals purpose and continuance ot NATO In this connection Canada wished to record again its gratitude and admiration tor the generous attitude taken by the United states in NA in Mr Rusk thanked Mr Martin tor his closing comment and 8 1 d that the OS felt NAro would be important indef l m tely It should also be clarified that NAro does not have to be renewed in 1969 and it was more useful to strengthen the sense ot continuity Consultation in NAO and otherwise would be most important While NA 10 might face a breathing spell in its relations to the Soviet bloc the big problems were not resolved The members also needed to agree on how and in what order consultation should take place Az1 ything less than full discussion among all l5 members raised all sorts ot problems Consultation about issues outside NATO would be increasingly important The chain reactions possible between intlammatory situations in the world today made it necessaey for NATO to keep in touch w1th these other problems The various NATO members did not see other problems in the same way but the free world's position around the world was idvisible Some headway bad been made but there was a long wq to go to find a general policy- among NATO countries compatible w l th their worl d-vide intereot Some wa v bad to be fo'Wld to associate the members with the nuclear issue looking at all the problems the US f'elt that the TOP SmRRl' UNLESS OTH RWISE INDICA'l'ED TOP SDET UNIESS o1mfflmm NDICATED -13MIF would g l ve interested countries an opportunity to take an operatiOEl l part in nuclear matters The US thought the MIF would come into being 8lld was nov vorkina tor a decision to be made in late 1964 'lhe US alree4Y had nuclear weapons in the terr Ltory- of seven countries whose consent was necessar - to their empl0 '1118Dt and the nuclear issue was already multilateral in an important sense It was not a question ot veto as much as ot participation Mr McNamara said that he had checked and found that none ot the western European countries wished to have a mobile nuclear weapon force on its territcr y and therefore this possibility which Mr Martin had asked about did not exist The strike forces did not meet the problem as they were nationally asm gned While there was no urgent mill tary requiJ 'ement for the MlF 1 t would satisfy a poli tioal requirement that would become more presaing with the passage of time and the force would have considerable military utility He hoped that the force planning exercise would be a fruitful activity because he thought proper planning could reduce the substantial waste of western resources now existing because of the imbalance between western forces and defense budgets and the - threat that thq should be meeting An appropriate response had to be developed to meet q- political or militar - aggression at all levels tram the lowest to the highest He was anxious to see the development ot satisfactory forces in this regard proceed more rapidly Mr Rusk closed this item b y expressing great appreciation tor the oiari'ty of Canadianpartioipation in NATO which had been a very stabilizing influence ARMS CONiROL AND Dl FElEE REQUIREMENTS Sl DRET Mr Rusk noted that there bad been sane discussion of disarmament matters under earlier topics He did however want to expl'ess his distress about the relative indifference ot NATO to disarmament matters He did not think real progress was likely in the current disarmament discussions with the Soviets but the west obviously should continue am patiently explore all reasonable possibilities TOP SECIU r UNLF SS OTHERWISE INDICATED DECLASSffJF l ' 1 2'1 B1-- • 1 B ' ef6 RA 0 tC _ zrtf '_ I 31#6 ' 'tr ' _ 4 P-44 --- TOP SOORET UNLESS oiiiitw' SI i llDICAT ED -14He also was concerned about the indifferenoe ot most goverments to arms races elsewhere in the world Something might well be done in these areas but there bad been little i t auy progress Perhaps the Eight at Oeneva should be pressed to come up with some ideas Mr Drury asked i t the US had established a body to 8Ul V'87 the econom l o consequences of disarmament Mr Rusk reported that this was one of the studies made by the Control and Diaarmement Agency and that it Canada did not have a copy he would see that one was forwarded pranptcy This was not the insupportable problem that Mr Khrushchev charged tar there was so mu oh to be done in the US that there would be no problem in finding things to which funds should be devoted Mr McNamara said that there could be no gt eater boon to US society 1iiere would be sane problems of adjustment but given any reasonable time the US could cut baok deteme expenditures to great advantage to 1 ts society 'lbe US never thought about this question when consLdering disarmament propoaalsJ it was taken for granted the eoonaaic consequences would be beneficial Arms OOMMUK QUE 'lbe draft developed by the Oanadi an side was accepted as the joint Comnunique for release to the press TOP SEOREl' UNIESS O' tmRWISE INDICATED CANADA-UNITED STATES MINISTERIAL COMMI T'l'EE ON JOINT DEFENSE WASHINGTON JUNE 25 2 1964 PARTICIPANTS UNITED STATES Secretary of State Dean Rusk Secretary of Defense Robert s McNamara Secretary ot the Treasury Douglas Dillon Ambassador to Canada W WBlton Butterworth Observers Chairman US Section Permanent Joint Board on Defense H Freeman Matthews otherai State Assistant Secretary William R T yler Director Office of British Commonwealth and Northern lmropean Attaire J Harold Shull aw ottioer in Charge Canadian Atf'a1rs Howard Bl-alldon Canadian Desk Officer Raymond J Barrett Defense Aesistant Secretary John T McNaughton Assistant Secretary Thomas D Morris Deputy Assistant Secretary Hanry s Rowen JCS - Lt Oen D Burchinal USAF Central Coordinating Staf't ottawa Bl-ig Oen Frank James OSD ISA -- Capt James G Andrews Treasury Special Assistant to the Secretary Charles Sullivan otfioe of the Secretary -- Robert Bean White Bouse William H Brubeck Lt Col w Y Smith -·· 2 _ CANADA Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin Mirdster ot National Defence Paul Halqer Minister of Finmioe Walter Gordon Minister of Defence Production Charles Di-uryAssociate Minister of National Defence Lucien Cardin Ambassador to the United States c s A Ritchie Observers Chairman Canadian Section Permanent Defense L Dana Wilgress Joint Board on others External Affairs Assistant Under Secretacy Ross Campbell Defence li a l son Division -- Arthur Menzies Defence Liaison Div l sion -- David Kirkwood Far Fast Dl viaion -- R L Rogers National Defence Chairman Chiefs ot Staff Camnittee Air Ohief Marshal Frame Miller Assistant Deputy Minister J s Hodgson Special Assistant to Minister William Lee Military Secretary to Minister I Cdr J M Favreau Chairman Canadian Joint Staff Admiral Piers Finance Deputy Minister R B Bryce Defence Production Deputy Mim ster o W Hunter Assistant · Deputy Minister D B Mundy Intermtional Programs Branch -- R M Trites Canadian Embassy Minister H B Robinson Counselor R P Cameron Counselor M Shenstone Defence Production Representative -- D 01lohrist