I DECLASSIFIED - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Authority N d i 3e u J7 i 1 B l1JARA Date lQ J$ lt l DRAFT J 12 10 66 'IOP 8B8M'I' E' ES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT N •te• on Meetln1 with the Preeldent in Au•tln Texas December 6 1966 with SecHtary McNamua and the Joint Chief• of Stall Tho prHeat '-rere The PrHldent Secretary McNamara Depu y Secl'etary Vaace Oeneral Wheeler Ceneral J obnecm Admiral Mcl onald General McCoaull Oeneral Greene W W 1tow Secretary McNamara reported that a1reement had beea reached between the Secretary of Defen • e the Under Secr tary and Member• of Joint Chief• cm all but ave major lane• the the ABM deleue • yetem advaace strategic bomber advanced ICBM the Azmy force • truc ture aad the appropriate number of nuclear fleet e•cort 1blp1 The lateet Defen• e bwl1et flpl'ea for eubmiHiOll to the Pre • tdent wc re tbeae FY 1967Viemam Supplemental $14 7 billion CNOA I I ' Overall Deleme budget FY 1968 • $'11 1 blWon - NOA 1 Overall expendlturee Fiscal 1967 - $68 3 I Overall expeDdlturH Flecal 1968 • $74 6 i The Pre•ldent aaked If the Joint Cblef• conftrmed Secretary McNamara•• sh temeot The Cbalrmu •o 1tated and Admiral David cDonald added that in bl • experience the Secretary and the Chlel1 have ·never beea •o elo1e together 11 except on the Ave 1peclfled iuuee 'OF 8118Ml'f -• EYES ONL Y NW# 35590 Docid 31395085 ' DECLASSIFIED Authority N klb 13d@ i 8 24 JIARA Date n J·i U_J ' '118 8iUiAillf EYES ONLY Ceneral Wheeler then etated the caae for the deployment ot an ABM system He •aid two new fact• bad to be take11 lDto accouat 1 tho USSR wa• deploying an ABM 1yatem arOllDd Moac ow and they were deploytn1 a ayatem widlly throu hout the USSR whlch mi1ht have ABM capabllitlH Z tbey weH • l in stalling at aa accelerated rate hardeud ICBM'•• the S-11 ·a city bu• ter By 1971 they miaht have between 800-1100 ICBM••• We do not Jmow the objective of Soviet nuclear policy whether it la par ty with the U S or euperiority But taken together thelr new program cOU d reauco our aeaured deatruct loa capability complicate ov r tar1etln1 reduce ccmfldea ce ln ou r ability to penetrate reduce our flHt•atrike capablli and improve the Soviet capability to puraue alm• abort ot nu clear war The Chalrma ihen quoted fioom Secretary McNamara•• paper the latt1 r 1s key judgment Aftor 1tudyi111 the 111bject e xba111tively Mr Vance and I have con eluded we thowd not inltlate ABM deploymeut at tbl • ti me for· any ot th••• purpo1ea We believe that · 11 1 11 The Soviet UniOG wowd be forced to i-eact to a u S ABM deploymmt by in ci'e •ing it• of feuive nuclear force with the reeult that a The riak of a Soviet au clear attack oa the U S would Dot 'be further decreaaed · b The damage to the U s from a Soviet nuclear attack in the event deterrence failed would not be reduced in any me Dlnsfw aenee The foundation of our • ec urity i• the detezirence ot a Soviet nucleazi attack We believe such an attack can be prevented if it le· wadentood by the Soviet• that we poaaeH strategic nuclear force• 10 powerful ae to be capable ot abaorbl111 a Soviet flrat • trike and am'Vlvin1 with aufftclent strength to lmpoH acceptable damaae on them e I• deatl'aetlon by blast and radlation alone of approximately 2 0CJ »-30 of their people u d 50'of their lndu• try We have uch ' R'INJ' today We mu• t malntala it lat the future adjuUq OU forcH to offaet actual or poten tlal cbanae• lD theira n NW# 35590 Docid 31395085 ' --· - _ DECLASSIFIED N A 9 3 c fi I B 14JIARA Date lo J$ U_J Authority _ _ 'e P 811 ' ' JCYES ONLY 12 10 Oeneral Wheeler expree d dlea1reement wltb tbl• judsment · He said we cannot predict confident ly how the Soviet Ualon would rea · to co· inter our deployment of u ABM eyetem an important diveralon pf rHourcea Tbe coete would conatltute The development of multiple warhead• would reduce the kilotonnap of their nuclear payload• the• would face gr ive uncertaintle• in targeting againet our ABM'•• He aid detel'ren e no only techaoloff it wa• a etate of mlnd wH Our having a n ABM ayetem would inc-re••• our deterrence capability a o matter what they did • On the othel haad a lack of a deployed ABM miabt lnci-ea•• the po11sibllitlu of wu by acddeut create an imbaluce or a HDH of lmbalan«r9 between the U S and US R aupe • t• that we are illtereated ODly in the offenH •umiHt• also that the U S wa• not wlWn1 to pay to maintala lte prHoat nu lear auperiorlty• • We would be denytn1 to many of our owa people a chance to eunlve a nuclear exchange 30-50 mlllloa llvee might be eaved by NIKE-X Therefore the JCS recommerada to the Preetdent that we lllltlate deployment of the NIKE-X •yetem ln order to maintain the preeent overall favorable nucleu balance and pve' to wi eome or all of the tollowiDI advama1ee i -- damage limiting capablllty • -- the lmpoeitlon ot new uncel'talnUH ahould the Soviet• contemplate initiating aucleal' wazo -- to demonetrate that we are not liHt-atrike mladed - - and to maiD taln the kl Del of favora l• power enviroameut wblcb helped us during the Cuba mlHlle crl•l• NW# 35590 Docid 31395085 ··- DECLASSIFIED 1 N AJ f 32 ufl e 14 IARADate loJ$ U i I II Authority - - -------------------- J •orseeRB EYESONLY 4 lZ 10 Spec iflc lly dMI JCS ncommeade did we immediately dec ide to develop Optiou A to p1'otect 25 U S qtl••• The coat bL Filc al 1968 would be $800 million for the period Fiacal 67 76 $10 'blllloa The Preaident aaked lf there waa any dlfference between the JCS and Secretary McNamara concenlns tbe coata • N Secretary McNamara eaicl II The Pre1ldent then a1ked lf 01l1' Uni on did not react to our deployment poaitton would be better lf the Soviet The Sectetary agreed that our poaltlOD would be better but that lt wat'S ncODceival le that tbe Soviet Umoa would rec ct to c01mte r Ol1I' not deployment of an ABM 1y1tem The Pruldent then uked wbat dete'l'mlned the dlffereace ln judgment between the Secretary and the JCS Secretary McNamua replied that tbe dllference lay leH ln ratlozaal calculation th81l in the inherently emotional nature of the l••ue It wa• extremely bard to make the caae for a policy wblch appeared to 1M denyua1 protection to our people when the SO let Union wa• wlllill1 to employ large resourcea to protect it• people He aald he wa• fully aware that Uthe Preeident de ided against deployln1 aa ABM •y•tem be wawcl face a moat difficult time po itically ancl paychologlcally Why then doH he recommend asain•t Firat the Soviet Unloa baa been wrOGg bL lt111uclear delenae policy for a decade 'on defense They have ayatematlcally •pent 2 or 3 tlmea what we have It ha• not been worth it Their delenH• are not wOl'th a damn Wei atill can lmpo•• unacceptable loHea cm them even after a flrat •trike NW# 35590 Docid 31395085 ---·-· - --- -- -· ---·-- DECLASSIFIED Authority N ld 1 32 ufl I B l4 JiARA Date lo JiJ I J lff P 888U'l' 5 EYES ONLY 12 10 B cauao they are maklu1 an error la deployio a ABM'• ia uo rea•oa we should also make that error Second we must be clear why lt woulcl be aa error for u• If we go ahead with the $10 'blllioa ABM pro1ram and tbay dld not react Uthe U S struck firat they would lo••· 70 million of wc uld loae only 15 million m ou ra about it their population and we eomet alna Therefo -e they would have to do Their eecurity would depelld oa their doing eometblng about it They would have to brin1 back their aHurecl clama1e capability to ometbln1 • lil e 80 million U s TJ' s strikes flret ABM system fatalitlH under their planning cue which l• Ae they dld • o we cow cl not hold to our inltlal $10 million We would have to expand in re poaee to what they did both I ou r ABM and our offenalve •y•tem• be I Secretary McNamara conclude• that we woulc lauacblng wrHlve• and th3 Soriet Um on into two decade• of eacalatory -action in the nuclear field in which the coat on eac i· aide wo lld prove to be of the order ol $30-40 billion We would each end up no better off than we are at preeeat• • Sec retary McNamara then eald there are certaf n rational role• for l ·1 a limited ABM •yetem ia particular the•• four -- to pl'otect our allen eive force notably our Minutemen -- to protect in the t lme frame 1975-85 agala et a CHICOM ICBM capability -- to protect again t u accidental firln1 of a ei111le miHile -- to protect agalnat a •mall blac'kmall Soviet attack NWi' 35590 booid 1395085 -- ·- - --·-· · -· - ·- ' - ••• • • - -- - - DECLASSIFIED Authority NA 13 r xff B JiARA Date loJ$ il I l IOP smeftl 'f BYES ONLY -6- 12 10 66 IA the face o£ the terrible dilemma facecl lay the P -eeid ea t Secretary Mc-Namara ia inclined to recommen4u a fallb_a ck from bi• Ja dgment apmat l the ABM system a limited •y•tem with tbeae lour capabilitl••• Ola the baail of that •Y•tem we could explore whea l' the Soviet Unloa wa• wlUlq to negotiate a freese acceptable to u•• The President then aaked i there any mlcldle 1round in th la debate 11 Secretary McNamara •ald that the emottonallem attacbln1 to the ABM iHue made middle 1round hard to ftn d The Preelcleni aeked what would the view be ln the ConsreH Secretary McNamara aaid about 25'Yt of the CongreH -• the L4beral•·•would oppoee the ABM Senator• eHll Stennie etc would atron1ly favor i and they would have about 40ft of the CongnH with them The balance of 35 would remain 111 the middle am be eubject to pereua•ion The PrHldem aeked who might be on that middle groUD CL Secretuy McNamara replied Senator like X ucbel aAd Javite ti• pointed out further that the ConpeH had been intereetlna lt•elf in - hi a niatter or a lon1 lime Laat year they voted $16 mlW oll fo1' ABM'•• and wben he inquired what they had la mind they didn't bow they merely wa ted to move in that directlcm The Pi'eaident a1ked again What ie a middle alternative 11 Secretary McNamara pointed out that we did not have to make a final d eciaiOII on way or the other rigllt now J'or ample we bad importaDt tecbDical problem• to overcome with respect to the warhead far the Olympia ABM Nw# 35590 Oocid 31395085 We had to I I DECLASSIFIED - - N l 73 r J lf B MJARA Date lo 11$JU Authority J ' ·OP SECl 9' BIJFiill ONLY in11tall t KwajaleiD a -7- 12 10 66 quite revolutionuy sy•tem fol' •69 te•t• of tb e ABM It is quite risky in fact to •tan bullcBaa plant for the ABM ayetem before those teats are complete In eho rt there are technical reason• to go •low With these una ved technlcal problem aa a backsrowui we could ove forward with a limited •y•tem ·1 0 pt the four o'bjec 1 lvea Secretary M1 Namara hacl earlier atated Ae for the fifth objective•· populatlon protection-• we would llOt be able to walk away from that forever but we wc uld have aome time to eee If anythla1 could 1 te worked out with the Soviet Ur iqn to avoid the interacting eacalation la the nv clear arma race that wa• otherwi 88 inevitable Deputy Secretary Vuce then added that he dicl not believe we could stand for long with· Posture A which p1'omiaed to protect 25 cU le• Under preuure frozn other cU lu encl region• the Congreae would go for a full progr It would be wiser to face from the beginning that if we started down the road to population protecti on it U really Poatul'e B that we were undertakin1 a $20 billion rather than a $10 billion pro1ram · Oenei-al Wheeler Hid that given the leacl ti me we ought to begin to build factoriea now for cel'taill of the component• about which we are teclmically sure We do not have that capability and lt should Dot be delayed Secretary McNamara came back again to the polnt that a ded aion not to deploy would create emotlcmal and political problem• in the cOUDtry ud tbat a decision to deploy merely to protect offensive force• would face the · ' NW# 35590 Docid 31395085 I Authority ' DECLASSIFIED ·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NAi'J 1 l 2c Jfi 1 efi4 JIARA o • o L L -a- EYES ONLY aaui e emotional problem pet•ple _not miHilee 12 10 66 There would be a • tron1 impwee to prot ec t Aa for the factoriH be Hlcl ti c ompcme ot• a complex there al'e many paru to be 1teetecl • Our experience ii that the ay1tem will prove more expenaive tbu we pre1ently calculated ' General Jobnaon Hicl tbe c l'itlcal queado o waa u s cuualt l••• An ABM ayatem would cut· our caaualtlH la a nuclear exchaaae Secretary • McNamara replied that he completely dlaa1reed becaue tbe USSR wowd react to re-eatablieh ita aHul'• d duna1e capabf Ry General Jolmaon a aid that there were connralnta oa their ability Secretary McNamara replied that both an Air Force etu dy if they did react and an NIE had indicated that the Soviet Ualon could not afford not to react The Preeldem wondei-ed U the bHt opporiumty for acreemeat amon1 ua w0' ild not be a dechlon to move - head on a limited baala and to••• what we can nerotiate with the Soviet Union Admiral McDonald said the Soviet Union waa now movin1 ahead both with ABM 1 a and to illcreaae ita offenilve nuc lea r force · Secretary McNamu I aai4 that their defeneive afford wu wa lted General McConnell aaid that tbelr defe Daive efforc wa• not wholly waited Th y had impoaecl •--•r 'l leavy addldonal c •te on the u s to aHure 0 11' continued penetration ability Secretary McNamara aaicl we have ovel'-reacted We have more than inrured that we can •till maintain our aa•Ul'ecl damage capability Tlie Soviet AEM•• bavo not avecl Soviet live• - -· NW# 35590 Docid 31395085 I• DECLASSIFIED 1 i ----------------------------- Authority N A 1 2 ' fl 1s 24 J1ARA Date to JiJu I 101 12 10 66 azuttilri EYES ONLY General McComaell said he can't for1et th t we are dealln1 with the deace1 1danta of Oengbl• Khan They only undel'ltaad force Secretary McNamara a1reed and eaid that ie why at whatever coat we muat main tam our a llJIUl'ed •econd-atrlke dama1• capablllty Deputy Secretary Vance added that that ii why we have 1oae ahead with POSEIDON and other mean• to Huro our ablllty to penetrate an ABM ey • tem Secretary McNamara a•ked ll the JCS would wi•h to expreH any view• if there were a pre- • cOllfereuce Tbe member• of tbe JCS replied that nano of them deaired to meet the preH The subject tben turned to the aecond U em in which there wa• die 1 1reement that ii the advanced ab'ateglc bomber AM SA Nw# 35590 Oocld 31395085