•• - J • • ' STRATEG1 ARMS LIMI I'ATIONS 1 1968 c f e 1 ' - o bl-During t be course of meetin gs With Ambas-sador Pobtynin i i January 4 5 9 Secretary of State Rusk discussed furtheJ the question _of 11 0vi ng orward on strategic arms talks In accordance ith insttuc·tiot1s se·nt on Janu a ry 20 1 Ambassador Tho pson on January 22nd presented to Premier l ·1 tI Kosygin a mesl age £ rom Pres Ldent Johnsoo which in adJii t o i to expressing satisfaction with t he progress on tbe tj O ts • GI a g8 '' oor -prolifei atiqn r reaty convey·ed the President's sense of § u cgenc over the two related iss'Ues of limit ing the st rategj c a - I - oucle ar a rms -ace and restraining the delivery__ of armaments - £ 1 - Sa to the Mi ddle Ea s t The Presi' den t emphasized that in proposing 1o III A ctiscussions between the Uni'ted States and the USSR he ip no im i way was seeking military ad'itantage Pre nie r Kosygin said the - -Soviets ere still stu iyi 'tlg the -problem an d would study the i ' 2 8 ei points T 1ade i n t he Pres ident ' s m ssag e and give their views iater t Ul J l '§ i _ _ _ _ _ __ - _6 1 To· Moscow tel 1022 28 Jan 20 1968 Secret Nodis I In vie of the fact that the tempo of diplomatic ei fpx ts and i 1tarnal pl 'epara tions i -elat ing ·to the strategic missile talks increase-d during 19'6 8 -the docU1Dent s cited here a re i ncluded in the attached documentary annex 2 From Moscow tel 252_9 Jan 22 196-8 Secret Nod is ' ' t • '' -' - In e conversation on January 24 with _General Davis ACDA Ass j stant Director Gel leral Mes bchery kov the Soviet Military Attacbei indicated that the Soviets would like co hear some specifics 'about limitations oo offensive weapons tte specifically men·t ioned t-tul tiple Independently-Targeted Re-entry Vehicles MIR¥s -and Poseidon as examples of U S z offensive escalat on 1 lo a subsequent conversation on February 23 General 1feshcneryal ov told Genetal -Davis' that Marshal er chko Soviet Minister of Deier e bad given him p ermission to talk with Cen e ral ·D avis about· arms control ma t t rs 2 However - t here wet' no ubseque nt ·ta¼ks in this chann l On 1 _pril 5 Ambassador D' b ynin i 1 1 -response to a ' -q uestion from Atnb ssador Boblen indicated t f at a concrete sugges t ion from the United Sta·tes for discussion would be helpful to t hose in the Soviet Uni on who• favored lisarmament talks He said those qpposed to ea tks argued th at the United Sta•tes c tas ju s t going tltrough the motions and was not serious l Mel'l' COn Davis Mesaeheryakov Jan 24 1968 Secret Limdi s 2 Memcon Davis Meshcheryakov- Feb 23 1968 Secret Li mdi 3 ·Memcon Dbbrynin Thompson and o len Apr 5 196 8 Secr e t ' Notlis • ' -3-- T Also Qn April 5 Ambassador- Bohlen _-and Mr Poster sent separate memoranda to Secretary Rusk recommending di'ffe_ring tac t i cal approaches to the Soviet Union Mr Bohlen recommended that an· o t al s ta temer t be de J -'ive red to· Premier Kosygin or the highest available respgosible SoVi et officia1 j whicb woul d include a somewhat more specific -proposal tha t i' - representatives of State ACDA apd DOD IS had been 11orking on The salient features of t is proposal were that initiatio of c onstruc tion of any adqitional' strategic '• ffens i ve missile launchers inclu·d ing MR IRBMs be probibi ted p and a limit be imposed on the number to be negoc lated of I anti-missile launchers aod associated radars which eath -side could deploy The United States would be prepared ·to re1y e xclusively on national means of verification if these 1imitati Ons applied only to fixed land-based missile systems We would propose that in view of the di f ficulty of ver ifying t hrou gh national means the deployment o f sea-base or mobi le- based strategic missile launc hers the •possibility of n agreed· limitation applying to these w-eapoos could be tbe subject of discussion 1 1 Bohlen t o Rusk memora ndum _Apr 5 1 968 To'p --S ecut ifodi-s i s 7 eW ' ' -4Mr Foster argued that t his proposal would appear to the Soviets to be heavily weighted i n favor of Uni te·d S't ates strategic interests apd th s would be counte -pr9ductrive ' in terms of the initial objective of inducing the Soviets to initiate discussions He suggested instead a teeter from the President to Premier Kosygin which set forth basic objecti leS and principles from which the s-tra egic arms talks should proceed but did not outline a mere specific proposal Mi - Foster also suggested that in view of Soviet interest in • • cbe success fut ·cooclgsj on o the· non-prolilerat'ion treaty they rni ght be petsua ded that a joint US USSR annouocemeht at the General Assemoly due eo resume ·on April 24 of n agreem en t to initiate talks would ma re a significant contribution 1 I to the chat ices of havi ng the treaty opened f or signa•ture ' 1 that summer 'the draft letter t o Kosygin int1uded this I I ' ' No decision was takeo irr rnediately by tbe Secret ar_y I In a memorandum o£ April 22 ·to the Secretary of Defensei the Joint Chiefs of Staff op posed presenting to the Soviets he I I specific negotiating proposal contained in the Aprl S oral s tatement They objected on the grounds that tbe propo al ' I 1 fo'ster to Rusk memorandum Apr • 5 l 96a8 with a•ttached Ira-f t latter from Presiclent Johnson to Chairtl1a n Rosy gi n T p Secre·t Nodis r • • - p S E • - -5- did not meet the following previously expressed JCS criteria ' that any arms cont rol proposal must 1 maintain overall U S q uantdtative a d qualitative superiority in strategic fo i ces 2 per t the U S freedom to modernize its forces • and devel op future capabilities and 3 -pl 'ovi de a means ·for verification other than sole reliance on unilateral' 4 telLigence l On Aprtl 23_ the maeter was dtscussed a r - the Pr es i dent' s luncheon meeting with Sec etaries Rusk and • Clifford but no decision was reached On April 25 ·Mess s Faster and Bohlen agreed upon -and sent -to the Secretary a compromj_se whereby 1 an oral -statement whi ch contained an outline of an inj t a l US • - • • I negotiating proposal and a discussion of cer t ain princ i ples which would underlie an ag reement to li mi t strategic missi les would be given to Kosygin or Gromyko nd 2 a letter wouid be sent from the Presi nt to Premier Kosyg i n p oposing the joint announcement at t9e General Assembly of a decision to 1 Wpeele to CL1fford 1 memorand l lJI Apx 22 1968 Top Secret Modi • r -6begin stra tegic missile talks wi t hi n a sp-e cif tc time period 1 lf trhi-s package ere not approved Mr Foster favored sending a letter alone• but· Mr Bohlen- rec•ommended that in this ev t nothing be sent On April 26 the ·S ecretary appr0111ed and sent • to the White House the reconuneii ded package hich was-- concurre-0 in by Secretary Clifford On April 30 the President dec·ided upon a different message which made no re ference tlo a specific negotiating proposal but in 1uded the proposal for an announcement at the Gen era·l Assembly of an Ameri can-Soviet ag_reement to begin bilateral a 1 ms limita- ti on negotiations This message took the form of a lett er from • the Pres1- dent to Kosygin and was given to Ambassador Dobryn n by Secretary Rusk on May 3 On receipt of the le tter the I Ambassador told t he Secretary that he thought there might be some forthcoming word from -tosaow in the near future 2 An official of the Soviet Ac demy of Sci ences told Henry Kissinger in mid-May at a P ugwasb meeting _that a joint proposal by the Soviet foreign and defense ministries to ac ept the U S ' l Foster- ahd Bohlen to Rusk mernora ndum Apr 25 196-13 · Top s·ecre t odis 2 ' l o Moscow tel 1'5 9227 May 7 1968 Top Secret Nodis • • • • inlt iative for tal ks was forwarded to the Central Colm l 'tt ee to -the CPSU on April 30 1 Howevei on y 11 Fu-st Deputy Foreign Minister l uznetsov told the Secre'tary that the subject of a r esponse to the U S init ia tive-was st-ill under consider- ation in Moscow 2 On May 20 Mr K uznetsov in spea in to the C-eneral Assembly First Committee repeated an April 2·6 I statemeqt tq the effect that th e USSR wa prepared to agree on concrete steps aimed · at limiting and subsequently reducing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapoos and Would be prepared to e cchange views with s tates concerned 3 I'n a conver- sation with the Secretary on Tune 14 Mr Kuzpe tsov remained • non-committal ori wheq a Soviet response the U S initiative J would be forthcoming On June l ' 8 Fisher asked Ambassador Mendelevich when we could e pect an answer on the U S request for talks l nbassado Mendelevich replied the USSR was not egains tha talks but tl ae l 'iolding them was a very delicate matter and had to be decided as P art of the tot a-1 international si tuation 5 - - - - - - - - - -·_ _ - · __ - · 1 2 3 To Moscow tel 1 70S45 M ay 24 1968 $eci et Nodis Ibic l ' Ibid ✓- ·4 Memcon Kuznets v Rus Jun _ef 1968 Seeret Exdis s· MQ nce n Mende tivich trisher June 18· 196 Secret Exd is Y • On J une 'J 7 Fore$ g_n Mini seer Gro llyko in a speec h to the Supreme Sov±et publicly aoaounced that the ''Soviet Governme nc was ready for an exc·hange of opinion on the • limitation and reduction of strategic delivery systems 1 On June 28 Mr Vorontsov of the Soviet Embassy told Assistant Secretary of Defense 'Warnke tbat the Saviet oeg tia- ting t eam had 'Qeen pretty well worked out ana that because of · Vietnam it would not be practi able for them o hold the talks • in Moscow or· Washing too Voroo t-Sov specul ated t ha t the talks could be held in conj unction wi th the ENDC in Geneva t 1ith ·someone like Mr Foster dealing o e dc1y with Em C matters nd che neltt with the bilateral tal ks 2 On June 28 Under Secretary of State Katzenbach gave to Soviet Charge cher niakov a copy of' che following s ta teme n·t Presiden t JohnsQn wQuld 1t1ake and which ·he did make at the NPl' si gning ceren ony concerning the talks An arrangement has been_ reached between the GoverOI11ents of the 'USSR a d the USA -t o enter- in the· nearest futa1 e into discussi'Ons on t he limitation_ • ana reduction o f both offe nsive strategic nuc lear weapons deUvery systems · and sy$tems of defense agai t ballistic missiles · i 2 in Mosc ow T ss Tnterna·tio·nal Se cvi ce Eng' J ish Jun 27 1968 -Utrclassified· b-f ' mcon Voz ontsovl f t ke lun • 28 1968 Secret • · SB SECJ T ' • ' ' r • - 9 - Katzenbach po nted out that the text was not identical ' with t e Soviet- p roposed statement hut the subs t a-rtce w is the same •1 Ambassador Tholl pso n repo ted from lfoscow that Ambassador Dobryni n cold him on June 28 that his unders tand- ing was that talks would begin in Mose ow but would be transferred to Geneva l ater - here they would continue on a bj lateral basi s 2 011 June 29 Soviet Charge Tcherniakov delivered to • Ambassador Bohlen an advance copy of tne nine-point memorandum on Sov tet disarmament proposals which was to be made -public 3 Ambassador l3ohlen pointed out that our desite in reg ird to ' the discussion on the limitation of offensive and 9e ensive nuc l·ear weapons systems had been that th is dtsoussion should ' o-riginall y be on a biJ ateraJ bas ts and tha-t th e i r m emoFandum -proposed' to use the ENDC as a substitute for this approach ' 1 The Charge said he personally did not see any conflict and i did not feel that his suggestion was a substitute for bilateral 4 discpss-i pqs On July 1 Premier Kosygin told Ambassador 1 2 3 4 To Moscow tei 193'3-31 June 28 1968 1 Seoret Nodis _t j From z loscow tel 4442 June 29 l 968· Sec et Nodi s V A 7134 July 8 1968 ' ✓ Memcon llohlen Tcher niakov June 2·9 196 9'e c•r e t tfodi · ' • •s •• - 10 - Thompson tbat in view of the aforementioned memorandum he would not ref e r to the strategic missile 113tter in his statement at tbe Moscow 'r· signing ceremony I osygin did not respond when Ambassador Thompsort ·sa i d he supposed we would' now have to fix a ti11'1e and place for talks 1 Paralleling these• diplomatic efforts to engage the Soviets in bila teral talk wo in Washington progressed on deve1 opl ng a detailed U S positton On March 16 1968 ACDA gave # Secretary Rusk a briefing on their pJ opos d approach to controlling the stt1 ttegic arms race An ACDA staff s tucfy encom- passing the mater l provided Se- cretary Rusk was circulated to other interested agencies on 11 pi -il 11 · The purpose of this st'u dy was t o provide a framework for understanding the problem of reaching a U• 8' -Soviet agreement on c ontroll g the s tr a t egic arms t' ace It recommended the· following four principles for shaping arms control policies l At ay strategic arms limitatioQ agJ eement must provide balanced stra cegj c postures ·acceptable ro both siAes and should cl fe t both offensive and defens lve forces 1 F rom Mosc ow Tel 4452 Joly l 1968 Secret Exdis r ilflJI SEfilET - - 11 - 2 Under an -a greement boeh sides· should be confident of a reasonab1e second-sb ike detep ent forte National means of' verification will be _adequate for a number of important strategic at ms e9ntrol eqnstraints £or other more COJ lp ebensive measures supplementary inspecti on arrangements -would probably be necessary 4 The fi--rst step in achieving strategic arms coni rol is to level off v ritn current force commitme·ots • • On the basis or these princ iples the study wen·t on t'o elaborate on the strategic-technical elements involved in a missile launcher freeze as it would affect four major weapons systems 1 Anti--Bal-lis-tic liU ssiles ABMs 2 l fultiple IndepenBently-Targeted Re-entry Vehicles MIR 1s 3 Fixed Totercontt-nental Ballistic Missiles ICBMs and 4 SubLaunched Ballistic Missiles SL13Ms mobile ICBMs l _i this point io time a critical i sue was whether or not limita tions should be placed upon MlRV development and deployment The study concluded that a three-step approach as required for suCJ1essful agreemenc F irst agreement op t he basic objective5 and p riQc ples of arms cootrol -secoQdly • • 12 - development of a C0lnlII0n appreciation of the ctitic a-1 elements to -pe conarQlled and final·l y otmulation and agr-e mept upon specific measures This procedural apprbach was the theoretical ' basis for the ACDA position on whe th er or C Ot to submit a s pec f fic proposal to the Soviel s i n order to induce them to begin the ta1 ks 1 l a memora nd 101 dated July S- Sec retaary Rusk outlined the organi ational procedure$ for formulating coordinating and deciding upon U S Government policy with reg rd to the strategic missile talks with the Soviets 2 ACDA was given primarY' responsibility £or the prepara·tion for and backstopping of men t pai ticipation in these talks u s Govern- Major policy issues were t o be submitted by A-CDA to the Secretary through an E ec uti've Com • 1nittee of t l e Committee of Principals ' On July 4 a di -aj t basic position paper for the talk s prepared jointly by the Department of Sliaee and ACDA -wa s sent 1 i to members of the Executive Committee of the Committee o r Priocipals 3 I This papet and an a t tached draft • ' opening statement I AC A Sta£ £ Study Strategic t i rns Control for· 1968' Apr 16 1968• 'Top Sec1 et-Resqicted Data · _ y 2 Rusk to Members o_f Intet'agency ·W rking Group on SAL't ' metnorando m 'J ul 8 1·968 Confidetitia•l · ' 3 Me mor nt 1 1m '- for _Exec1 1ci Conm tc'te e of Com11Y tt ee ' f P'l i _n cipa t s · S trat'egic Missile Ta1kst• C with ar ched1 papers Jul 4 1968 l'op Secret Rodis_ l • • ' dSE T l - 13 essentially accepted the principles and policy conclusions outlined in ACD4' s April paper ith the significant exception th l t the question of Multiple Ihdeeende ntly-Targeted Reentry Vehicles MIRVs was to be 1-eft to the Sovie ts to raise A specific launcher liln'itation proposal based on these conc l U stons was embodied in_ the draft op-enio g statement On July 8 the Executive Committee met fol the iµ-st time It establi shed a Working Group chaired by ACDA Deputy Di ctox • Fisher to develop positions an d issues _for consideration by the EX'ecuti ve Committee asked the Depantmeot ·of Defense to draft an opening statement to be considez ed a-long with tbe draft already circulated directed that in drafting the openi g- · '' s tatement consideration be given to the possibility ·of consult- ing on the completed statemen wi th Congr ess and endorsed the ' U S Intelligence Board action to prepare an updated Spec ial National Intelligenc Estimate $NIE on U S • national capabilities to veri fy various strate ic arms control measures- 1 The Wor ing Gr up llet £or the first time Qn July 9 and se t a targec date of Augu c 15 for an agreed posi tion on a specific l Miott es of m ti g ot Utive Co l'ml-i t tee o f CollUIJi t t ee of Princi pals July- 8 1968 Secret Exd s- I • - 14 - 'proposa1 t-o submit to the Soviets The Working Group discussed poten tial problems and issues that would have to be studied i n det tb in the areas of verifica ion military • effects and diplomatic 11egotiations c1nd assi gned responsi bi1i i y for papers to i ndividual membets Ambassador Bohlen noted tha t initiation of MIRV testing scheduled for Aligust might coincide with the opening o f the talks that thought He suggested be- given to ei t her postponing the tests or at least i evising curren t plans for publ izing th em rt fas agreed to look a t the quest -ion •at a • further meeting 1 The Working Gro up tnet severaL tUI eS during t e remainder of July and under its auspices the allowing key docU111ents we e cottL- • ple ed or were in preparation t a revised draft U S proposal circulat ed to the Executive Com iit tee on J u J y 31·2 2 a revised draft of the U S ottening state m ent 3 SNllf 11·13-68 evaluating U S national c apabilities t o verify possible strategic arms control agreements 4 answers to addi tional detailed questions related to SNlE ll 13-68 1 2 Summary of 7 9 68 meeting of Working Gro1 Jp Secret Exd is y' Memorandum for Executive Col llllit ee oJ Principals• IIPreparations for St r a tegic Missile TaJks with attached paper July 31 1968 1 qp Sec·rot Wodi1 eDNr O G f 7' t' -L v ' 1§ SEcfr • al SEC $T r - 15 - co pleted by CIA and DIA on August 5 1 S SNIE 11-15-66 a stUd f of Soviet militacy options i f an agreement along the line·s a f tQe U S proposal was reached 6 a 1 00- pJ epared milita-ry analysis of the· U S proposed position2 The revi sed di aft po$it ton paper coat-ained t hree basic··· chaAges £rota th July 4 d1 aft be reference to the need for an understanding tnat evidence of product'ion ef rnobile ABM systems by the Soviets would he considered as an indication 4 • of intent tb deploy and ' lould be grounds fott considering tltb- draw al from the entire a eemeQt was c leleted A provision was added tqat there would be no replacement of ballistic or cruise · missile suba arines within t he first five years of he agreement • Finally a section on provisions for review and withdrawal as added The Execut'ive Committee met on August 7 to -reviev the July 31 position paper and to hear a DOD briefi ng evaluating th effect of this proposal anrl tts possiQle abrogat on on the J 1 CIA DIA US Ca_pabilities to Verify Proposed' Missile Limit a-- · ti o Agreem t memo r andum August S 1968 Top' Secret Nodis 2 DOD Analysis of S tate ACDA Proposal on S trategic OffensJ vev' ' Defens ive Systems memorandum ··July 22 1968 1 1'op Secre t•• • t 16 - assured destruct 'ion and damage limiting ca bilities of the us· and the USSR tbroqgh 1976 ' he 00Th study concluded that 1 even if the Sovi ets abrogated the agreement the United States would maintain ts assured destruction capanility 2 So iet conversion of the Tallinn system to -n effecti e long raoge ABM wa·s an 11nl1 kely but potentially sertous threat to the U S deterrent thus it would be of prime im-portance that either Tallinn oe limited in numbers or tha t we had confidence that i t could not or would not be converted to an ABM 3 the Soviets might view the agreeinent as a threat to their assured destroction capab'i li ty and may want to limit ABM or ban MIRVs 4 the United States could 'have good o-o nf-idence • • J in its assu r ed des true tion ca abj lity even in the face of cheat1 n_g or abroga t ion by the Soviets Tallinn conversion p'l 'oblem e cepted and the U S limited force would perform as well agains t the- Soviet limited force as would our progranuned force agains t the high NI PP-68 es tima t ed Soviet force 5 improve- ments i missile accuracy -wo ld make our ICBMs vulne able in their p resent silos thus measures 1 0 ipaj ntain survivabilit y should be considered in t h e agreement negotiati'ons 6 d mage 1 -imiting aa-pab1l-i ty of ei-tl e'r si de wo ild not be si g ifica nl ly ef fecti d '• - 1 7 Secretary Rusk reaffi rmed that the President wished to move ahead wi tft the U S • USS talks • was the j ob ot He stated that it the Ex cutive Cosnmi ttee not to find arguments why an agreement eo uld not be a ttained but to dete1 111ine how thi s could be done consistent with maint ainiilg U S security The becutive COl1llllittee agreed that the ageociies shou ld prepare tbeiz views on the draft U S proposal for -discussion at their aext meeting scheduled for Augu s t 14 The Committee also agreed that MIRV fligho testing should proceed as scheduled that ACDA should' make a ·study o f the fot m of' an agreement that · might be rea ched ' ith th e Soviets and t t conting-ency papers for handling t he MIRV and bombe r ques tioos should l e prepared in the event they are raised by- the Sov iets 1 • During the di s - cussion of possible treaty violations Seiretary Rqsk suggested that perhaps a joint U S -USSR commission n strategic missiles could oontinuously review the sftilation so t hat any issues which rose could be cl 2 rtfied rapidly Th is might avert a situation where the gove1 nment would be locked into a position where abrogation would be a majot political act • • 1 Minutes of Meeti11g Qf t he Ex ecoti ve Committee of Committee of Pr iinci2als •A 7 1 968 'Top S -ecret Nodis v 4 P 'Q ET • T 1 8 On August 12 the Joint Cb iefs of Staff subl litted a statement of their views on the July 31 missile talks proposai 1 The lllOSt significant point made was that no restriction sh01 1ld be placed on ABM associat ed radars because of pos_s i b1e erroneous categori-zation of similar adars as integral ballistic m i ssile defensJ elements Toe Working Group a ccepted the cha0 ges proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and submitted a revised ver-sj oo of the Strategic Miss i le 'Talks roposal on Augus t 13 2 • Uoweve-r the State AGDA ancl White House members of th Working Group made th eir agreement to deletion of tqe resttiotion on associated radars provisi'0nal It was -a greed that the pt'oblem should be studied furthet especially in its relation to possible upgtadiqg of the Tail linn system and that it would ruave to be discussed durj ng 1'egotiad ons with Soviet representatives On August 14 the Executive Co mmittee approved this proposal and i t was forwarded to the President for his a pproval on Augus t 15 by the Se-cretary of St ace3 • The U s p1 oposal contained the follo ing elements 1 ' - Gen Allison JCS to ASFisher memo randum Aug 12 1968 itl attached memorandum for Secretary of Defense dated Aug 9 1968 Top Seere t Sensitive 2 Memorapdom for Ex cUtiv-e Co m mittee of Committee of Principals 11Prepara tions for 'S tra tegi c Miss ile lkj U with a ttac 1ed paper Allg 13 1968 ' l'ep Sec e·e J cC L - - T 3 Foster to Rusk memorandum Aug 14 1968 -witb attached m emo- i raodum from 1 Rusk 8 15 68 2 Rusk Foste 8 15 68' 3 Clifford 8 13 63 to the President Top Secret r r r 'P'T J fPSE T • - l9 - Cessation of the ini ciation of conscructi oQ of any additional strategic offensive land•ba$ed missile l ncheri lCBMs and IR MRBMs Cons true tion of launchers underway as oj September 1 7 l96S-1 could be completed A total ban on mobile land-based offensj ve and defensive strategic missilt systems and of sea-based defensive strategic missile systems Cessation of t he cons uction of additi ooal strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing Subll larines Construction of submarines 1ltlderway as of September 1 1968 could be complet-ed subject to agreement OJl this nunib e r However_ the initial U S presen tation would be m9re restrictive omitting any reference to the completion of submarines l lOCler construc tion The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing· st rateg_ic Qffensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited The- deployment by each side o f no more than a sec and equivalent number of fixed land-based anti-ballistic missil e launcher s and associctteil missiJ es the nUmber to be negot iatrecJ The i -oposal would nqt include l unitat-ions on aircraft ' ' ' Qr al'tt'i aitcraft defenses nor prohfbi tien of cechnol9gical improvement e _g Vs within the cons t raiat s of the agreel t ent- --SE ET 1 - ' ' _ SE 20 The u s proposal has been drawn up on the basis that 1n eacb i nstanc e we couLd agre to exclusive reli apce on national means -a ot verafication t ough we would first make concerted effort to in Soviet agreement to additton l means of providing reassurance for cert tin areas ot the f a greement 'l he proposal was accompanied by a separate memorandum from Sec etary Rusk and Mr Fos ter containing 'the specific views of the Department of State and ACDA and a memo andum from Secretary ClL£fotd cont ining the -views of the Depa1rtment of De ense and the J oint Chiefs of Staff In their f lemorandum to the President Secretary Rusk· and Mr • Foster summed ·up their s upport for the U S proposal as follows Politically an a greement such as this would profoundly alcer the c plexion of East-West Delar tioos and provide a climate wherein cooperative efforts would not only - facilitate other arms conttol measures but also c ould be directed toward solving other critical world probl ems Mil itarily an agreement would enhanc e ·str tegic stability for each s ide would waintain a secure deterrent whie h wo Id not be hllreatetied• by a spira ling - at'mS ra c·e p SECrfr T w u c fl ' in the absence of an agreement could only tead -to la ger and more destructive arsenals oa both si c les U S • s crategi c forces a e adequate• -with presently programmed imp1 ovements which are not affected to cope wit the Soviet threat if it is contail led as envisaged in the U S proposal Our national means of verifying Soviet compliance with l he agreement iare such that liol ations that could upset the strategic balance would be detected in time - for corrective m asures to be taken Upon approval by the President of the basic proposal or planning purposes the Working Group retu-rned to the task of dra ting an agreed Initial Presentation and a bask pos i tion aper tl ser'18 as guide1 ines geverning the U S posi on during • • first phase of the talks I • By Augu s t 20 Wor1 ing Group1 agreement • I was reached on the initial presenta ion and the basic position 1 paper except for a JCS object i on co a paragraph in thk latter which would defer discussion of the £ot lll that an agree lient mioht eake e These ' iete £otwai ded to the Elfecutive Committee 'I f ' oci August 21 for considerat'ion at its Augus't 22 meeti n_g 1 t 1 1 • 1 Memoranduµi £or the E te cutive Committee of Conu1d t te§ Qf v Prinoipals August 2 1 1968 with at·t ached Ioitial - Pr se 1tati on of U S Positi ot11 ' Au g ZO 1968 and ' Basic Pc5s i tion- l Papern Aug 20 196S Top ieczec Udt§ oA r tJ4-n 7 f' J - 1ieSE ' - 22 On August 22 the Department of· Defense representative· requested a Work io_g Group meet ing_ to consider chan_ges i-n the- two papers suburitted to the Executiv e Committee the day before The most ibportant of tbese were a added language bearing on the degree · to which the- de'l e- gation should push fot ' supplementary inspection FOCedur es b modification of langµage dealing with how to approach wit bin the context of an anti-ballistic Jilissile limitation the possibility of the Soviets upgrading the Tal 1 inn system and c add iti n to paragraph l s__ection X of the Position paper of the sentence An ' agreement embodying this U S pr oposal woul d have to be in the form of a treaty '' 1 In the diplomatic area the Savi-et -Union afte-r considerable delay which appeared to have been caused by inCetnal disagteet l ents in Moscow cente iog arounq mil it a y of f ic Lals informed the United States shortly befot e th invasion of Czechoslovakia tbat it was pre- I pared to begin talks between ·s pecial representatives in Geneva on September 30 Kowe ver I as a result of the MemorartdUm for ·1 -he Executtve Comm i t tee of Comnl'i t·t ee 'of Principals ''Agreed Changes on 'Initial Present at ion Basic Position Pa 1- er Au 22 j 968 Top Secret t- 1-ff'Ft ' f • ' - 23 - invasion ·and uncert-ainties abouc events in Eul ope the ·1 1nited States delayed the opening of t alks ijevertbeless the Executive Committee met on the • • a£ternoon 0£ August 22 to consider the Wor ki ng Group paper of August 21 aad the proposed Depa tment of Oefe n ee • • changes tnereto 'I ' Seci etary Rusk opened the meeting by pointing out that the questiofl of goµ g ahead with t be - -- - talks and the timing were now obviously-uncertain in view of the Czeohoslcvak situation - However the put pose of the Executive Commi t ee meeting was not to cons id that but to give to the President the wherewithal to go ahead with the talks if anc when he desired The Executive ·Coll'llllittee th en proceeded to deal • li-S- fol lows wi th the Unresolved questi ons resulting fro111 blle Working Group deliberations l H ea·tter the te rm national means of verification wou ld be t ised in pla ce of unilateral -'' or exter al 2 'rhP section tn the --Sa·sicz Po tion Paper dealing wi ttl xpioring the_problem of verificati on with oqe Sov i et s was amended to add ---- - 24 · - Tllis concept should be -pursued dur i ng the s e parti oos of the ·nego ation -but not tQ the extant of prejudicing the negotiations pre eluding if so ip structed reliance solely on national or· means of verifieation 3 The s ection in the basic po_sit-ipn paper dealing with the U S negottiating position on the T lllnn system was amended to in elude The delegation should se ek to elicit informati n on the Tallinn system to assur e us that it is not and wilt not be upgraded into an ABM system OU r nain aim would be to satisfy ow seJ ves that the Tallinn system is not and will no · b' C' upgt· a d into-an· B ' 1-·sys tcil ' tltbout our ltnowledge If we cannot satisfy ourselves on th'is matter then Tallinn launchers must be limited and included in the agreed Soviet ABM level With 'egax d to the form t hat an agreement might 4 take it wa-s agreed that forms other than a treaty should not be excluded at this ti me and he delegation should seek instruc ions if the matter was ra4 sed by tbe Soviets l The additions and changes wet-e incorporated in the revisec i iai ial presentation and baste position papers which were ' ' •• • -- ' · Miautes of the E xec·11tive ommitttee of Coromi tee Qf 1' ri nc·ipiils Aug 22 1968 _sect'et ft1 J · • ' · -SECP T ' if S T - 25 - nt_ to the Presiden and approved by 1tiJu on August 27 JJ Subsequent activity of the Working Group cent ed o n the two unresolved problems of whether radar -restrictions should be included in an anti-ballistic missile limita·- tj on agreement subject u s co and of defi ning the -it e that should be sel cti ve direct observation on Savi et and territory and procedures for such direct observatt on The Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum submitted ' on September 6 apalyzed var iou s faetors they considered significant in appraising both the faasibility and desi'rability of a limitation on radars Y They concl ded that while a lWtation might be de$l rable the basic question of feasibility is the controlling constder a ion which pr eempts the question of desirability and• a l i mitat-ion 1 Fi sber to_ usk memorandum Aug 26 1968 Top Sec et Nod s with attach_ed memorandum £rom Rusk to the President Aug 27 1968 to which are attacbed papers 'Initial Presentatj on of u s Position -and '1 J1asic Pos ition Paper 1 Aug 24 1968 Top Sec1 et Nodis · · V C e le t to Cotmn i ttee_ of Prl ncipals 111e prs n u m 1 11 M Associated Itada rs in sAiT Pro1 osal Sept 9 f96 with et-tmch ed- men1 randum rom Gen Allison to Cha i ma n JCS _ S e y t 4 1 9 68 T9 p Secret • - 26 - on ABM as·soci ated radars would be councer to U S • purposes 1 The essential points in the JCS ar g wnent were large phased-array rad rs essential to an ABM 'system could' not be differeQtia ed from simi a · r dar-s which might be desirable for air defense syst euJS space tracking_ and air traffic control 2 it would be very cifficult to establish some degree of equivalence be t ween U S and Sov'iet radars and 3 detailed technica1 restrictions· on radar characteris tics would be compl cated to negotiate and diffi ul t to verify On Septtember 24 ACDA submitted to the Working Grou p its analysis on the issue in whicn they CQne luded tbat thes prQhlems are not insurmountable and therefore limitations on ABM-associated • radars we re fea-s ible and should be included as pll t'·t of l any ABM agreement An amend'e d £orwaJ d ing memorandum n Se_ptember 26 stated 'that t he A CDA analysis was for i nformation oniy ACDA contended th t a limitation on radars was I de1 1irable because it would add greatly to u s· eonfi deru e ' in its ability to verify 'by national meads Iimitaf i ns - on Soviet ABM deployments espec lY an attempt to pgrade t the 1 'allinn aiJ defense sys t em SEC ftT 7 Furtbe meetings L of· t-be • I ' ' Working Group were not held and thus no consensus was reached by the Working G1 -oup on his qµestion On October 4 ACDA distributed to tbe Worldng Group • a membE 1 'S draft instructions on selective direct observation l i e some form of adversary on siee in s eetion This draft was for information purposes only and Wc rking Group cort- sideJ ation of it waited further develop nent in the negotiating situation r-egardiQg the issue of whether and when- to hold the • talks wtth the USSR The draft isolated three a-reas in which selective direct observat i ons could be justified attd would be demonsttabty usef u in r educing uncertainties These ere a Tallinn complexes b Soviet submarine and surface ship construction fac liti-es c nt MlU3M sites Thi s was supplemented by distribution on October 8' of deta led worlting papers- on each of these three subjects On Septembe 12 correction s nt out Septemb r 19 ACDA distribuced to Wor'king Gro p members a proposed in st ruc io_n on how to handle prl ssi J e 1 ese nrcb a d SJulC e Mem or-anclum foi Membe_x s of the Worki ng Gt oup ''Se tee tive Dire t Observat -i Qn Oet 1- 4 1968 Top $ ¢tee Nodi s GIP s Y 28 - launcbe·rs ACilA pro'f'osed tbac land·ba s ed Research Development_ Te-sting al d Evaluation RJYl' E offensi ve missile launchers and space launchers not oe permitted • to exceed 10 percent of the wtal operational strategic land based and sea-based launcher level A simil r agreed level of ABM RDI lauru hers would be determined following agreementr on an ABM launcher level Test launche rs_ for land base d mobile offensive· alid all mobile defensive systems -would be compl etely ·prohibiteo 1 Discussion of this cir aft also awaited developments in the negotiations situation As noted ea r -lle - 1 tth a' l1 S as a result of' theCzechoslovak invasion did not t ake lip the Soviet o ffer to open ta s in Geneva on Se-pte mber 30 Nevet -t less fol- lowing the invasion Soviet diplomats continue to express a desire to press forward with the missile talks In subsequent months discussion cant4tued within the Administration cl-$ to -whet her or not the missile talks should ·proce_ecl despite Czecnaslovakia The State- 1 epart- ment in a d aft cable on S-epterube-r 6 proposed to consult l t 1emorao dum Sept • 12 1968 • Nis-sile RDT E S ace l auQche'l s top Sea tf t _ sr J 'J • ' a9P SE _ 29 tn the North Atlantic Council on the ossibility of going ahead with the strategic arms talki llowever the Joint Ghiefs of Staff strongly opposed this course of action and it was not pursued l Mr- Foster in a memorandum to Sec- etary RuBk on September 12 urged the Secretary to take up tbe matter of NAC eonsultati ons with the President 1 I On October l7 Mr Fisher rec-otmllended to Secretary Rusk that he transmit to ·tbe President a memorandum -from Mr • • Fisher which recollDllended that the President propose bi- lateral talks start sometime in the week of October i Y The Secretary decided not to transmit the memorandUin t'hrust of Mr F ishe r's ar gument was that i f The talks were not beg before the new Adclnlstration came into office they QOSt probably would not get st art ed before late spring or early surcmier of 1969 In the it terim· both the U S and the U S S R m i ght proceed with aspects of their weapons dev e lop- ment programs such as multip1 e independently-targeted r e - entry vehicJ MJ RV flight testing or mobile missile deployment that might prevent the successful outcome of an y str tegic ms controL talks Gen Whee-Le -to Cli-fl fe9 fa -memorandtllll Sept 10 • 1 8 Top Secre t Exd is w i th attached dJ aft telegr am Sep t 6 1968 Top Secret xais • 2 Foster to · Rusk ·memorandum Sep 12 t968 Secret' Litmdis Jl Fisher to Rusk memorandum Oc t 17 i95g·i T Jp Secret Nodi s ' ll ll D C -1 ' lfn' ' • L '' In the meantitllE a angeme it s concerning possible opening of bilateral talks wex - bej 'ng- handled personally by Se et 2ry Rusk and Mr Rostow in cbe Wbi te House ho continued to have 'infonnal contacts with Ambassador Dobrynin about SALT and a possible Summit meeting he text of a possible Summit communique- that would set up tbe talks and establisn·objectives and Princi ples to guide them was diseu sed and dra£tswere e xcbaqg d On September - 16 Ml' Walt Rostow at President Johnson ' ·s dixection delivered to Ambassador Dobryru n a statell ent of SM T objectives based on those conta ed in tbe paper- approved by the President on August 27 ·1968 1 The Soviets responded with a revised and undated but be- tween s ·e ptembe-r 16 and Dece tii ber 1 statement of Objecti ves and Pri nciples 21 wbich was reviewed by thJ ·Secretaries of State and Defense and t he· Chairman of the Joint• Chief s of Sta££ 1 Walt Rostow co Amb 'Dohrynin informal memprand ·s ept 16 I9'6 8 S'ecre t • 2 _ Amb Dob J - in t o Wal-tt •Rosc ow informal• memor andum und t d 'fQp S t eyes Only Discussions of the Soviet draft continued throughout December focusing on five sugges t-ed changes contained in an Ultdated memorandum from Sec r etary Clifford to Se retal 'y Rus r l · ' Sec retary Clifford and General Wheeler suspected the Sov iets- we re trying to ptovide fo an adjustmenc in the existing bal a nce to bring about numerical equality in some respects The Clifford memorandum pointed out that this wa$ u ndesirable because of asymmetries in both the forces and security ·needs • of the U S and the USSR It recommended that the 11 S take the t'os on i Jiat eftectj ve cletercren e n9w exists and the proper objective should be to ''maintain a stable U S • -Soviet strategic deterrence 11 To this end Secretary Cli fford suggested dropping t he word achieve from the first -proposed objective- and the ' referenc·e to equal securi t y £roro the third proposed pt' inciple The first delet iQTI was agreed t o but since the McCloy-Zorin Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament egot iations • Se ptember 20 1961 states tha t all measures of gener a-1 and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no s tage in ' the treaty could any state or group of ste tes gain mll t ary advantage and that security is assl lred equally for al it was i agreed to rephrase the S viet draft to read and ecur ity should be assured equally for bo tb sides Clifford to Ruskf memorandum undated ' Uop· Sec-ret SES ' ¢T The Clifford memorandum noted I hat the first two baste 11rinciples covered essentially the same subject mattex but phrased i t dif f erent'ly Si nce the phras i llg in t b e second pt inc iple would appear to cover manned bombers but not bomber defenses• i t was sqggested that it be d opped ' leaving tbe first principle with its more general language This was a ccomptished by combining the two principles and - using the phrase offensive and defensive weapons systems' '' throughoa t A fou rth chan ge sugges ted and accepted was to make I the fol lowi ' 'l g changes in t he paragraph 'proposing bilateral ' stUdf of m eans for -preventlng the develOJ ment of s191-ations which pose the risk of escalation to nucle r war 11 to study the· question of talcing step_s to r11le-ot1t minimize the ' possible accidental app eat an e of •confl ic t - fra ught sit uaI tions inv o lvin g the use of strategic umaments n ·1 The final DOD point merely i'lot ed that the So v i t memorand1 1m di d net- ru1 e out the DOD po s ition that any a 0 reei netit should l e in che £orm o•f a treaty A further revi sed version ·was tlten a-ppt oved fo-i coo tder- acion by tha North Atlantic Counci l L tY- To NATo · ·t el 5686 Jan 13 1 1969 1 Top Secret Exdi's ip SR nT I ' I • • ms ET - 33 - On January lS 1969 Secretary usk instructed Ambassador Cleveland to inform our· NATO al1ies the Japanese were informed simultaneously in a restricted session of NAC that in the near future· tqe U S may wish to take tne l ex t step in opening the questi on of the limitation and subsequent reductigp of strateg ic aniiament s 1' The step envisaged was that the U S and U S S R might issue an agreeo st at ement of objectives and principles that wqulq se-rve as a broad framework for more specific talks tbs would follow The Secreta-ey str ssed that the· draft tatement had not yet been subm1tted to the Russians but that the o ject i ves and principles outlined the-rein ' did take ints account conversa·t ions with the Russia n s ove the past several years Amba ssado t Cleveland carried out tbese instruoti ons on Janua1 y 15 1969 poi nting out that the draft state- ment- was submitt'ed i n advance r o o u r NATO allies in 'keeping with prior o s committ11ents to cons ilt in C before apprl aching ti1e Russi ans on disannament matters which 1 To NATO tels 5684- an l 568-5 Secret Exdis I •• Ja a l f J 1969 1 To'p • 34' affected the· sec1 1rity of the All i-ance Ambassc1do r C1evel and -a·l so adnsed NAC thac ope of the U S objectives in pursuing a st ategic arms limitation agreement was t o fulfill the obli_gatians to be undertaken by the U• S a11d USSR under Arti cle VI of tjle Non•Protiferat'ion Treaty Our alli s were not asked for thetr t extual conc1 1r rence in the d aft agreed statement but were asked fo r their po icy r eact ions as soon as possi ble 1 l t was ag·reed to hold another restricted NAC s ession on January 23 1969 at which these rea c tions were to he expressed I ' I J P'rom NATO tel 170 Data__ - 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