tLL Q sLJ MEMORANDUM - HE lVHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON f'y - INFORMA TIOO May 23 1969 TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM Henry A Kis sir ger -1 'yi SUBJECT Analysis of StrE 'tegic Arms Limitaticn Proposals A member of my staff in a aalyzing prelim inary results from the current study of strat gic arms limitation proposals has tentatively concluded that -- some of the option that have gained the l'eatest popularity within the government would appear to give the Soviet Union significant improvements in its retcdiatory capability -- the most comprehensive proposal one tr at bans both MIRVs and ABMs would h ave U S retaliator y capability unchanged but would impl'ove Soviet retaliatory capability by over 70 percent It would l ave them in a position where they could kill more than half 0 the American people i a second strike -- the option that look3 good to us in terms of retaliatory measures one that retaind at least 500 ABM launchers MIRVs and a large U S bomber 'force may well not be acceptable to the Soviet Union Proponents of the comprehensive proposals will argue that we should not be concerned that an agreement inl reases Soviet retaliatory capability We will be deterred fronl attacking them without an agreement they point out and improvements in the Soviet deterrent cannot increase the threat to us In fact they a rgue allowing the Soviet deterrent to improve is a reasonable price to pay to get an agreement since our own retaliatory capability would not be il- pa ired Also other aspects of our TOP SECRET ____ I I t Utt U liltl NA O' 14 Authority By' • _ Itr _ TOP SECRET 2 I strategic capabilities such as how well we can limit damage to ourselves if the Soviets strike fi rst are unchanged even with a comprehensive agreement and these are more impol'tant yardsticks for evaluating an agreement than Soviet retaliatory capability My staff is still analyzing these results because there are some important problems with the mderlying analysis In summary my very tentative judgments would be 1 Agreements which ban MIRVs may mean a significant decline in our second strike capability or increases in Soviet second strik e capability or both 2 Soviet second s rike capability increases in all but one option and the increases are greatest when ABMs are banned Thus an ABM ban would appear to be much more in the Soviet interest than In ours In fact it is probably not in our interest 3 All agreements except one would increas e the number of deaths we would suffer if we struck first and reduce any advantage we might gain by striking first On the other hand Soviet deaths in wars they start are relatively unc Ja nged by any of the agreements and they acquire no advantage from striking first as a result of agreements There is a paradox underlying these results however The Soviets are assumed to develop a much more effective strategic posture under an agreement than the would in the absence of an agreement In part this reflects the fact that Soviet forces in the abs ence of an agreement are agreed intelligence projections made months ago whereas Soviet forces under the agreements are recent judgments of the worst the Soviets could do and still be within the agreement There is a real question however as to whether both sides might feel compelled by uneasiness and caution to go to the limits under an agreement and do more than they would have done otherwise The same phenomenon occurs when rationing is in effect in wartime people buy everything they are allowed to buy even though they have no urgent need for it all I question whether the strength of an American President's resolve in a crisis will be unaffected by the magnitude of Soviet nuclear retaliatory TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 3 capability The prospect of reaching an agreement which would le gitimize significant increases in their capabilities may explain why the Soviets are so interested in proceeding with arms control talks It a so confirms the requirement that our own preparations be measured orderly and thorough I suggest that you read the brief paper my staff prepared which is at Tab A The numbers in the table are taken directly from the current interagency study of strategic arms control options and have been agreed to by the agencies involved Enclosure Tab A - Comments on Strategic Exchange Analysis TOP SECRET TOP SECRET COMMENTS ON STRA TEGIC E_ CCHANGE ANALYSIS NSSM 28 At least three relatively specific objectives have motivated interest in a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union 1 An agreement could freeze or codify strategic relationships in a manner which preservf s equality at worst and aU S edge at best 2 Since both nations may be on the verge of new strategic deployments an agreement might mean significant budgetary r savings compared to the situation that would prevail with no agreement 3 An agreement could reduce uncertainties in the strategic relationship making both sides less nervous about potential threats to its strategic capabilities The analysis done to date raises questions about whether these objectives can be met with the strategic arms limitation options that have been considered 1 The following table compares strategic exchange re suIts for 1978 if there is no agreement and if any of several possible agreements is reached TOP SECR ET TOP SECRET 3 This table has a number of interesting implications a If ABMs but not MIRVs are banned or held at low levels 500 Spartan-type ABM missiles U S second strike capability will be about the same as it would be with no agreement However Soviet second strike capability will increase significantly in all but one case Option III which is a comprehensive offensive and defensive agreement that allows 500 Spartan-type ABM missiles on both sides b The most comprehensive propo sal - - Option IV with a MIRV and ABM ban -- would leave U S second strike capability about as it would be without an agreement but it 'w ould increase Soviet second strike capability by over 70 percent equivalent to - over 40 million Americans killed The reasons Soviet second strike capability increases so sharply are -- because MIRVs are banned the number of nuclear weapons we have available for attacking the Soviet Union is cut back sharply from 8000 to less than 4000 so much more of the Soviets' offensive capability survives aU S attack -- because ABMs are banned more retaliating Soviet missiles will hit their targets in the U S c If we adopt Option IV with MIRVs banned but 500 Spartantype ABM m issiles allowed the no agreement relationship between TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 4 U S and Soviet retaliatory capabilities is reversed a U S edge by this measure becomes significant Soviet edge This is because - - with the MIRV ban we are giving up a significant amount of the offensive capability we would use in a second strike -- because we have less offensive capability aU S first str ke would not destroy as much of the Soviet second strike capability d The simplest a greement -- Option I i which is basically an ICBM launcher freeze -- viould sharply increase Soviet second strike capability a ba 1istic This is because CIA assumes that th Soviets would build missile submarine force twice as larg as ours and put MIRVs on them and we ar c assumed to allow this to happen e A comprehensive offensive and defensive agreement that allows MIRVs and about 500 Spartan-type ABM missiles would produce a 1 alance of second strike capabilities that is better as far as we are concerned than the balance lithat would prevail in the absence of an OO ABM missiles agreement In the table Ws is Option III with t ' - 1 Since this option preserves our ABM our MIRVs and our bombers it is hard to see how the Soviets could find it acceptable The analysis shows tha t during the next decade the Soviet deterrent is significantly more sensitive to MIRVs and ABMs than the U S deterrent ·TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 5 The Soviet deterrent is more sensitive to ABM levels because the Soviets have only a small long-range bomber force whereas we have a large one with an independent second strike capability In fact the results in the table show that a U S ABM system with 500 Spartantype interceptors has a significant anti-Soviet capability -- The Soviet deterrent is more sensitive to MIRVs than ours because they lag significantly in developing a large and invulnerable submarine -based MIR V capability Based on our calculations the Soviets should be extremely interested in an ABM ·ban or a very low limit on them and in a MIRV ban But such an agreement might be difficult to justify in the light of the improvements in Soviet retaliatory capability that we would be ratifying in all options but III 2 The cost analysis can be summarized as follows No Agreement U S Programmed Force vs High Intelligence Projection of Soviet Force s Arms Control Options I III IV Soviet Costs $ Billions Annqal Avg for 1969-78 No ABMs in Arms Control Opt ons $12 44 Hi ABM $10 90 Lo ABM $10 01 $ 9 29 $ 9 05 U S Co sts $ Billion Annual Avg for 1969-78 Including Safeguard Phase I $15 85 $14 75 $14 75 $14 70 TOP SECRET • I LJ V - - Authority By H TOP SECRET 6 This table shows that only if the Soviet Union is planning a large ABM deployment in the absence of an agreement will an agreement I mean significant cost reduc'tions for the Soviets U S strategic budgets 11 for the next decade according to the analysis are relatively insensitive to whether or not there is an agreement and to what kind of an agreement it i 3 The analysis to date has not attempted to compare uncertainties and the costs of hedging against them with and without an agreement Also the study has not analyzed how unilateral U S policies might be useq to stabilize the strategic relationship and reduce risks Thus the analysis leaves unanswered the following questions -- In what ways can a strategic arms agreement be in the interests of the United States and its Allies -- Are there proposals other than the options considered which would better serve U S and Allied interests - - If we insist on maintaining the area protection provided by Safeguard how many launchers must we retain and how will this affect the strategic exchange results and the relative rankings of the options TOP SECR E T - TOP SECRET 7 -- Alternatively if the Soviets propose an ABM ban and we accept can we justify to the Senate and the American people the resulting increase in Soviet retaliatory capability as compared to the no agreement situation -- Should we consider initiating talks but not tabling a proposal TOP SECRET ' 1 1 t l oJ 1'Y 3 LA ll l L U1 1 FOR 1978 ABH Limited to SOO NO ABMS No Agreement U S Progra a ed OPTION I Force vs High Intelligence Projection of Soviet Forces Basically a simple ICBM Freeze III IV Comprehensive III-A Compreheus v e offens1ve and Allow Both OffensivE and defensive limits Sides to defensive limits but nRVs Sup erhard en with no allowed Missile Silos MIRVs Spartan-type ABH Missiles III llI-A Comprehensive comprehenSr-V Allow Both Basically offensive and offensive D a simple defensive limits Sides to '· defensive IiI but MIRVs Superhard en with no ICBM Freeze allowed issile Silos MIRVs I OPTION I J ' l S Second Strike Capability % Soviet people killed promptly 407 Soviet Second Strike capability X U S people killed promptly 330 0 Crisis Stability I t 32 mil Soviet Lives Saved by Striking First Instead of S ond -9 381 397 39% 51% 43% 577 541 417 l S% 11 mil 31 mil 19 Dlil -2 IIlil 1 -5 milEI -'8 milkl 3 mil m il l I J 421 29% 40% 3'm il 18 mil 5 mil -6 il 1 o li 1 U S i5eaths in N lear war u s Strikes First O S Deaths 87 miL Soviets Sttike First U S Deaths 139 ail Difference between U S and Soviets kilied in Soviet First Strike If Soviets lose more at the strategic - 127 mil 111 mil 142 mil£ 142 mil 12 mil 4 mil 130 mil 141 mU 12 mil 17 mil relation hip ' i cons$i red to be' unstable if one side could seve first in a crisis instead of strik ng a _ ThD lNt ons yere done usin 95 mil 107 mil 140 mil 140 mil 135 mil 9 lDil 8 mil 11 mil significant nucberof its own people more than 20-30 million by strikin bl This means that the Soviets would lose more lives by st king first tban by triking seco _I 117 mil second a method Which does not taKe into account fatali ies above the isis ighly deSirable from our of view - point 142 11ion level c S 404 U S Lives Saved by Striking First Instead of econd 411 447 r