INDICATE • • COLLE C T CHARGE T O DISTRIBUTION ACTION· AM MBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY STATE ' Wi ' EXDIS J1111H111 TOSALT l 7 DELIVERS GARXH0FF 8 00 AM SUBJECT • Paper A•S Strategic Considerations Delegation is authorized to use following paper • - r • SALT Negotiating Paper Aa5 • I RECCMMENDED U s APPROACH A Purpose Our purpose in any preliminary discussion of strategic Jaalaacconsideration would be 1 to set forth elements of u s strategic thinking as a foundation for subsequent discussions ancl 2 to determine as much as possible about Soviet strategic planning the seriousness @ wi th which they consider strategic arms control and their ap1roach to SALT IIIRA TEC ev DRAFTING DATE • TEL EJIT - _J APPl'IOIIED 8Y 1 lASSIFIED SECRET EXDIS Class fi cati on INDICATe D COl 1 £ C T D CHA R C E TO DISTRIBUTION ACTION B AMIMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY Page Z7 Timing Any discussion of strategic considerations would take place after our opening statement and the initial Soviet response thereto • Strategic considerations could be used in explaining and discussing illustrative Option II or exploring Soviet attitudes on the scope of the work program for the main talks We should avoid a lengthy dis• cussion or debate at this stage lest we mislead the Soviets into thinking that we are not interested in coming to grips with the concrete issues asso iated with developing a realistic work program for the main talks on should draw C Talking- Points Which Delegation 1 Strategic Objectives including Arms Control Objectives a A primary strategic objective is deterrence of ·a n attack on the UaSo or its allies b DRAFTED B'I' DRAFTING DATE TEL - EXT CLEARANCES UCUSSIFIED SICRET XDIS Claaailication FOPM 4 • 68 FS-413 APPROVED BY adversar • _j SECRET EXDIS Ctass ticat on Department of State TELEGRAM INDICAT E D D COL l CT CHAR G E TO UClASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION ACTION AMBMBASSY HELSINIO' Page 3 7 PRIORITY ies a range of capabilitJ up to this end we maintai ·• - tt u u • • ·• -• strategic nuclear retaliatory forceso f -t r r- f f • 1 t t ttt s·r tt f • t·n · _r ••·•·•• -•- -•• J ·••· • J ' f • f- 't 1 t We believe any conceivable incentive to initiate nuclear war is reduced if there is assurance that the losses to the • initiator would be unacceptable under any circumstances We believe that such a deterrent positively reduces the likelihood that nuclear war will occur _and that a significant strategic arms control agreement can be con• sistent with this strategy of deterrence • b A second objective is to defend the United States if deterrence fails and our allies against JI nuclear attack We realize that H we cannot expect to escape serious damage from a major nuclear attack We are building an anti-ballistic missile system to a protect our land•based retaliatory forces b defend against the kind of nuclear attack which DRAFTEC ev CRAFTING CATE TEL E XT CLEARANCES SECRET XDIS Classific tion FORMFS-413 4 • 68 APP OV£0 8Y 1 _J SECRET EXDIS _ C 11s s di cat on Department of State TELEGRAM UC SHED INDICATE D D COI I EC T CHARGE TO DISTRIBUTION ACTION AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY Page 4 7 u s s R countries other than the 1M might be able to launch in the next decade and c protect against possible accidental launches • c We would hope to achieve and maintain a stable UoSo•Soviet strategic relationship which would minimize f any incentive to initiate nuclear war • d We believe that agreed limitations on offensive and d fensive strategic systems can be found which contribute to the maintenance of a stable u s -soviet strategic relationship and could enhance the security of both colµltries and of the entire world e We believe that strategic arms control can proQ vi de assurance to each side that its security will be main- reducing tained while at the same time the risks 0RAFTEO BY CRAF TI NG DATE Tltl EXT CI EARANCES1 SECRETL XDIS Cl11111 ilic11tion FOPMFS-413 4 • 68 APPROVED B'I _J SECRET EXDIS Class 1 icatt on Department of State TELEGRAM l it C INDICATE Oc 01 1 ECT D CHARGE TO DISTRIBUTION ACTION AMEMBASSY HELSINKI Page 5 7 PRI CRITY tensions and costs of an unrestrained strategic arms competition f • We believe that there would be value in con- tinuing u s -soviet discussion of issues arising from our strategic g relationships We would like to hear Soviet views on strategic objectives 2 Uncertainties in- Strategic Force Planning a One of the features of the past relationship which may have caused both the U S and u s s R to expand strategic armaments to present levels iii uncertainty DeJ loyments made by one side to ensure against uncertain'ttes may well have constituted an element in the decisions made by the other side DRAFTED av CRAFT ING CATE _j TEI EXT CI EARjl NCE5 UCLASSIFIED SECRET SXDIS Classification f'ORMFS -413 4 • 68 APPROVED SV SECRETIEXDIS C sssilicst1 on Department of State TELEGRAM INDICATE • • COLLE C T CHARG E TO UCUSSIFIED DISTRIBUTION AMEMBASSY HELSINKI ACTI ON- b Page 6 7 PRICIUTY Due to the long lead•times involved in develop- ing strategic weapons systems decisions frequently must be made on the basis of very limited knowledge Miscalculations concerning the other side' s future force • levels and capabilities can result in a decision to build additional strategic forces which in turn may generat 4 a reaction and thus continued arms competition c We believe that every effort should be made to reduce these uncertainties and possible miscalculations We realize that neither side wishes to relinquish military secrets However within the limits set tiy security con- siderations we believe that it is both desirable and feasible to reduce the areas of uncertainty 3 Stability We are concerned with stability_ in two senseso DRAFTED BY ORAFTING OAT15 TEL 15 •T CL£ARANC Eli UCl SSIFIED S CRET I XDIS Cla•silic•tion FOPMFS -413 4 • 68 AP -ROVED IIY _J 5ECRET EXDIS C assificati on Department of State • • TELEGRAM INDICATE COLL£C T CHARI £ TO DISTRIBU n ON ACTION AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRICRITY Page 7 7 We want to maintain crisis stability by which we mean a strategic force relationship in which neither side ha reempt an incentive to Pt ltlK We also want to maintain a stability in strategic force relationship under which perceives neither side WJldclaa the necessity for undertaking • major new arms programs to avoid being placed at a stra• tegic disadvantage a Generally the greater the survivability of suategic weapons systems on both sides the less the incentive for either side to strike first in a crisis situation or to undertake new arms programs in an attempt to gain a strategic advantage Survivability is thus not only essential to deterrence and therefore to crisis a ability but also contributes to a stable B strategic elationship ORAFT£0 8'1' J 0A4FT INC DATE TEL EJtT _ C LEA ANC ES S CR T XDIS Classilication FORMFS•_ IJ 4 • 68 APPl'OVED tl'l't SECRET EXDIS Ctassilicati on Department of State TELEGRAM INDICATE D 0 - COL LE i T CMAR I O ll CUSS FIED DISTRIBUTION ACTION AMEMBASSY HELSINKI b Page 8 7 PRIORITY Strategic systems which have or are perKceived to have U a significant capability for effective attack on the other side's strategic deterrence force will erode crisis stability since the threatened side will have an incentive to preempt in a crisis before its deterrent forces can be destroyedo Such systems may also produc II instabilities since neither side is likely to accept a significant erosion of its deterrent capability and may therefore undertake new strategic arms programs Stability in both senses can be eroded by certain changes in weapon vu- · ----characteristics as well as by increases in numbers of weapons Galt I -• • -• -•- -• •- • •· _ _ • v••1 1•• _J DRAFT E D BY DAAFTING DATE CLEAAANCES SICRET EXDIS Classification FO M 4 • 68 FS-413 APPROVED B'l 1 SECRE T EXDIS Classification Department of State TELEGRAM INDICAT E Oc01 £ CT • CHA AG E TO U ClASSIFIEO DISTRIBUTION ACTION AMEMBASSY HELSINKI c PRICRITY Page 9 7 Another factor affecting stabillity is the capability of the deterrent forces to penetrate defenses Crisis stability could be seriously eroded if one side deployed defenses which reduced the other side's retalia- • tory capability below the level which it would consider adequate for deterrence Defensive deployments could also X prompt the other side to make compensating incrpase or improvements in its offensive forces in order to ' f n f u ••· desired maintain a 111111 level of penetration capability Clearly this factor is complicated by the problem of protecting each country from the level of attack of which MXHEfX third countries are capable d In our view long term XU strategic stability would be enhanced both as it affects the probability of war outbreak in a crisis and as it affects the prospect J l RAFTEO BY OR•FT i NG O•TE TE 1 - EXT CI EAR NCES t SXCRE-T EXDIS Classification FORM F S-413 4 • 68 t P'PROVED BY SECRET IEXDI 5 Classilicati on Department of State TELEGRAM INDICAT E D C OL l CT • CHAR E TO ll Vl SSIFIED DISTRIBUTION ACTION AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY Page 10 7 for avoiding strategic arms build up by frank discussion 0 of activities which could improve or detract from stability Arrangements for· continued discussions of such subjects could be a concomitant of a strategic arms • limitations agreement t 4 Relative Total ssile Throw Weights Total missile throw weight is a measure of the ability potential or actual of a strategic missile force to create damage either in a first strike or in a retaliatory role Therefore a large difference between the total missile throw weights of two countries JiW might imply a large difference in strategic missile capabilities We would like to hear Soviet views on the importance of otal missile throw weight and of significant differences _J in total throw weights DRAFTED 8'1' DRAFTING DATE TEL EXT CLEARANCES U Cl SSlfl SICRET DDIS Claasification FO MFS-413 4 • 6B APPROVED ev SECRET EXDIS C ass1 1cati on Department of State TELEGRAM UCl SSIFIED INDICATE • • COi i EC T CHARGE TO DISTRIBUTION ACTION 5 AM MBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY Page •11 7 Nuclear Capabilities of Other Countries We are engaged in bilateral discussions toward an agreement to limit only the strategic forces of the u s and UoS S R however our strategic planning will continue • to take into account the potential strategic nuclear threats of other nations D Issues to be Avoided in Discussions with Soviets 1 Although our purpose is to explore Soviet strategic thinking on as broad a basis aa possible we must avoid any statements colIIJlitting or appearing to comnit tbe U S to any arms control proposal or position must not prejudge u s We positions on issues however any tight that XK our exploration might shed on these saues will assist U S decision-makers 0RAFTE0 B'O' DRAFTING 0AT1a APPROVED Tla I - EXT CI EAAAHCES D SECRET EXDIS Clauilic •tion _J ev SF CRET FD tS_ __ ciass•fic'at1 on Department of State TELEGRAM INDICATE • • COLLECT ClASSI IED CHARGE TO ------------------------------------- - i DISTRIBUTION ACTION 2 AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY Page 12 7 Statements which reveal specific U S force planning '1 must be avoided we must limit our statements to data contained in unclassified official documentation • 3• Above all we must avoid creating the impression that we are on an intelligence fishing expedition GP 3 END l _J l RAFTEC SY CRAFTING DATE TEL EXT APPROVED CLEARANCES SSlflEO SICRET JXDJS Classification FORM 4 • 68 FS-413 I • ev