r THE LAUNCH ON WARNING QUESTION IN THE FIRST PHASE OF SALT At the plenary SALT meeting of April 27 1970 Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov argued for a ban on MRV production and denied that MRVs would insure more effective deterrence Such arguments can be uttered only by those interested in a further race They reason as if land-based fixed launchers with precisely established coordinates were the only systems in existence But after all there are also missile-carrying submarines Also in existence and continuously being improved are early-warning systems owing to which the silos containing ICBMs may be empty at the moment when the enemy attempts to strike a blow against them while the ICBMs themselves that had been in these silos would already be in flight Neither can aircraft be discounted In a plenary statement of May 12 ACDA Director Smith noted this passage and asked Do we understand this statement to suggest that a government should plan to launch its ICBM force solely on the possibly fallible reading of signals from its early-warning systems and before it had any further evidence that an attack had in fact been started lFrom USDel Salt tel 36 Apr 27 1972 Secret Limdis MMe COmROL AND DISAI' MAMEJllT AGENQl' t U rrm M v Relei so Excise Dony I ' Ri'M iri'S v 'DaclMsify Doolassify in part l 'OlA PA El O Exemptions _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Downgrade TS to S or C OliDR Classifv _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ OA-UR Class Deolass Auth tI I' ·ti Date · 2 'l · 2 - ACDA PAB EP RWLambert bjg 12 21 73 s - 2 - This would seem inconsistent with any real concern for the problem of accidental or unauthorized launch One of the reasons for the U S emphasis on survivability was precisely to avoid having to resort to such a launch-on-warning policy which would be very dangerous and would increase the risks of unwanted war between our two countries 111 The American delegation noticed that General Ogarkov advised Semenov not to reply immediately to Smith's statement but to await the next meeting Later General Ogarkov privately expressed resentment to Allison that the United States had raised this question As a military man he said General Allison should know the answer When General Allison denied this General Ogarkov claimed that the Soviets had been applying operational training doctrine from American manuals The American delegation believed that the Soviets might mistakenly believe that the United States had a launch on warning policy It considered that Soviet misapprehensions should be corrected · If in fact Soviet delegation and government has been under misapprehension that launch on warning represented U S doctrine could explain some aspects of Soviet SALT delegation stance including lack of readiness accept at full value U S statements of concern over -growing vulnerability of land-based missile force There may of course be some deterrent value in Soviet uncertainty over U S policy in this regard but there also could be risk and danger in such mistaken view There may be some bargaining leverage in noting that Tn7 unconstrained or ineffectually constrained strategic arms competition there might be incentive to turn to a 1 statement by Ambassador Smith May 12 1970 Secret Limdis from USDel Salt tel 63 May 12 1970 Secret Limdis The draft statement was revised on instruction in order to avoid any implication of possible establishment of joint systems on accidental or unauthorized launch from USDel Salt tel 60 May 8 1970 Secret Exdis to USDel Salt tel 71111 May 11 1970 Secret Exdis -- J ORN • • - 3 - launch on warning policy On balance we assume it appropriate to reaffirm that the United States7 considers it highly desirable to-avoid a situation in which either side would feel compelled t rely on a launch on warning doctrine ••• 1 At the plenary meeting of May 15 Mr Semenov said that his statement was unrelated to the question of accidental unauthorized or provocative launches The Soviets were thinking of various American statements in the context of MIRVs and ABMs and they noted that Secretary of Defense Laird had indicated on May 12 that the A ninistration had considered a launch on warning policy in the previous year 2 Speaking to the Jackson subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 12 Secretary of Defense Laird had said ••• The _suggestions made last year that we either increase our offensive forces or assume a posture of launch-on-warning are examples in the first case of the hard and difficult decisions the fiscal year 1971 program is designed to postpone and in the second case of a situation which no President would want to face as the only course of action available in an impending' crisis 3 In the plenary meeting of May 19 Mr Smith explained that there had been suggestions along this line by private individuals and members of Congress but that they had not been considered by the Administration In response to questions from the Jackson subcommittee Secretary Laird had specifically said lFrom USDel Salt tel 65 May 12 1970 Secret Exdis 2semenov Statement May 15 1970 Secret Limdis from USDel Salt tel 73 May 15 1970 Secret Limdis 3Doaumenta on Diaarmament 1970 p 209 --4 • • 1' - 4 - This strategy that has been advocated by some to launch our missiles on warning I believe is a very dangerous strategy and should not be followed by our country I would hope that that kind of strategy would never be adopted by any Administration or by any Congress Mr Smith said that this made the U S position clear and that he would welcome a similar Soviet statement l Mr Sernenov thanked him for clarifying the question and said that this was of value in understanding the American position 2 Later Mr Grinevsky USSR told Garthoff and Akalovsky of the American delegation that the Soviets considered the question closed 3 lstatement by Ambassador Smith May 19 1970 Secret Limdis from USDel Salt tel 76 May 19 1970 Secret Limdis 2us USSR Salt Meeting 9 May 19 1970 Secret 3From USDel Salt tel 105 May 28 1970 Secret Limdis