Co-Authored by TLP WHITE Product ID AA21-287A October 14 2021 Ongoing Cyber Threats to U S Water and Wastewater Systems SUMMARY Note This Alert uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics Techniques and Common Knowledge ATT CK® framework version 9 See the ATT CK for Enterprise This joint advisory is the result of analytic efforts Immediate Actions WWS Facilities Can between the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Take Now to Protect Against Malicious the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency CISA Cyber Activity the Environmental Protection Agency EPA and the • Do not click on suspicious links National Security Agency NSA to highlight ongoing • If you use RDP secure and monitor it malicious cyber activity—by both known and • Update your OS and software unknown actors—targeting the information • Use strong passwords technology IT and operational technology OT • Use multi-factor authentication networks systems and devices of U S Water and Wastewater Systems WWS Sector facilities This activity—which includes attempts to compromise system integrity via unauthorized access—threatens the ability of WWS facilities to provide clean potable water to and effectively manage the wastewater of their communities Note although cyber threats across critical infrastructure sectors are increasing this advisory does not intend to indicate greater targeting of the WWS Sector versus others To secure WWS facilities—including Department of Defense DoD water treatment facilities in the United States and abroad—against the TTPs listed below CISA FBI EPA and NSA strongly urge organizations to implement the measures described in the Recommended Mitigations section of this advisory To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory contact your local FBI field office at www fbi gov contact-us field-offices or the FBI’s 24 7 Cyber Watch CyWatch at 855 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi gov When available please include the following information regarding the incident date time and location of the incident type of activity number of people affected type of equipment used for the activity the name of the submitting company or organization and a designated point of contact To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats contact CISA at CISAServiceDesk@cisa dhs gov This document is marked TLP WHITE Disclosure is not limited Sources may use TLP WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release Subject to standard copyright rules TLP WHITE information may be distributed without restriction For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol see http www us-cert gov tlp TLP WHITE FBI CISA EPA NSA TLP WHITE THREAT OVERVIEW Tactics Techniques and Procedures WWS facilities may be vulnerable to the following common tactics techniques and procedures TTPs used by threat actors to compromise IT and OT networks systems and devices • • • Spearphishing personnel to deliver malicious payloads including ransomware T1566 o Spearphishing is one of the most prevalent techniques used for initial access to IT networks Personnel and their potential lack of cyber awareness are a vulnerability within an organization Personnel may open malicious attachments or links to execute malicious payloads contained in emails from threat actors that have successfully bypassed email filtering controls o When organizations integrate IT with OT systems attackers can gain access—either purposefully or inadvertently—to OT assets after the IT network has been compromised through spearphishing and other techniques o Exploitation of internet-connected services and applications that enable remote access to WWS networks T1210 o For example threat actors can exploit a Remote Desktop Protocol RDP that is insecurely connected to the internet to infect a network with ransomware If the RDP is used for process control equipment the attacker could also compromise WWS operations Note the increased use of remote operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic has likely increased the prevalence of weaknesses associated with remote access Exploitation of unsupported or outdated operating systems and software o Threat actors likely seek to take advantage of perceived weaknesses among organizations that either do not have—or choose not to prioritize—resources for IT OT infrastructure modernization WWS facilities tend to allocate resources to physical infrastructure in need of replacement or repair e g pipes rather than IT OT infrastructure o The fact that WWS facilities are inconsistently resourced municipal systems—not all of which have the resources to employ consistently high cybersecurity standards—may contribute to the use of unsupported or outdated operating systems and software Exploitation of control system devices with vulnerable firmware versions o WWS systems commonly use outdated control system devices or firmware versions which expose WWS networks to publicly accessible and remotely executable vulnerabilities Successful compromise of these devices may lead to loss of system control denial of service or loss of sensitive data T0827 WWS Sector Cyber Intrusions Cyber intrusions targeting U S WWS facilities highlight vulnerabilities associated with the following threats • • Insider threats from current or former employees who maintain improperly active credentials Ransomware attacks Page 2 of 7 Product ID AA21-287A TLP WHITE FBI CISA EPA NSA TLP WHITE WWS Sector cyber intrusions from 2019 to early 2021 include • • • • • In August 2021 malicious cyber actors used Ghost variant ransomware against a Californiabased WWS facility The ransomware variant had been in the system for about a month and was discovered when three supervisory control and data acquisition SCADA servers displayed a ransomware message In July 2021 cyber actors used remote access to introduce ZuCaNo ransomware onto a Maine-based WWS facility’s wastewater SCADA computer The treatment system was run manually until the SCADA computer was restored using local control and more frequent operator rounds In March 2021 cyber actors used an unknown ransomware variant against a Nevada-based WWS facility The ransomware affected the victim’s SCADA system and backup systems The SCADA system provides visibility and monitoring but is not a full industrial control system ICS In September 2020 personnel at a New Jersey-based WWS facility discovered potential Makop ransomware had compromised files within their system In March 2019 a former employee at Kansas-based WWS facility unsuccessfully attempted to threaten drinking water safety by using his user credentials which had not been revoked at the time of his resignation to remotely access a facility computer RECOMMENDED MITIGATIONS The FBI CISA EPA and NSA recommend WWS facilities—including DoD water treatment facilities in the United States and abroad—use a risk-informed analysis to determine the applicability of a range of technical and non-technical mitigations to prevent detect and respond to cyber threats WWS Monitoring Personnel responsible for monitoring WWS should check for the following suspicious activities and indicators which may be indicative of threat actor activity • • • • • • • Inability of WWS facility personnel to access SCADA system controls at any time either entirely or in part Unfamiliar data windows or system alerts appearing on SCADA system controls and facility data screens that could indicate a ransomware attack Detection by SCADA system controls or by water treatment personnel of abnormal operating parameters—such as unusually high chemical addition rates—used in the safe and proper treatment of drinking water Access of SCADA systems by unauthorized individuals or groups e g former employees and current employees not authorized assigned to operate SCADA systems and controls Access of SCADA systems at unusual times which may indicate that a legitimate user’s credentials have been compromised Unexplained SCADA system restarts Unchanging parameter values that normally fluctuate Page 3 of 7 Product ID AA21-287A TLP WHITE FBI CISA EPA NSA TLP WHITE Remote Access Mitigations Note The increased use of remote operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic increases the necessity for asset owner-operators to assess the risk associated with enhanced remote access to ensure it falls within acceptable levels • • • • • • Require multi-factor authentication for all remote access to the OT network including from the IT network and external networks Utilize blocklisting and allowlisting to limit remote access to users with a verified business and or operational need Ensure that all remote access technologies have logging enabled and regularly audit these logs to identify instances of unauthorized access Utilize manual start and stop features in place of always activated unattended access to reduce the time remote access services are running Audit networks for systems using remote access services o Close unneeded network ports associated with remote access services e g RDP – Transmission Control Protocol TCP Port 3389 When configuring access control for a host utilize custom settings to limit the access a remote party can attempt to acquire Network Mitigations • • Implement and ensure robust network segmentation between IT and OT networks to limit the ability of malicious cyber actors to pivot to the OT network after compromising the IT network o Implement demilitarized zones DMZs firewalls jump servers and one-way communication diodes to prevent unregulated communication between the IT and OT networks Develop update network maps to ensure a full accounting of all equipment that is connected to the network o Remove any equipment from networks that is not required to conduct operations to reduce the attack surface malicious actors can exploit Planning and Operational Mitigations • • • Ensure the organization’s emergency response plan considers the full range of potential impacts that cyberattacks pose to operations including loss or manipulation of view loss or manipulation of control and threats to safety o The plan should also consider third parties with legitimate need for OT network access including engineers and vendors o Review test and update the emergency response plan on an annual basis to ensure accuracy Exercise the ability to fail over to alternate control systems including manual operation while assuming degraded electronic communications Allow employees to gain decision-making experience via tabletop exercises that incorporate loss of visibility and control scenarios Utilize resources such as the Environment Protection Page 4 of 7 Product ID AA21-287A TLP WHITE FBI CISA EPA NSA TLP WHITE Agency’s EPA Cybersecurity Incident Action Checklist as well as the Ransomware Response Checklist on p 11 of the CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center MS-ISAC Joint Ransomware Guide Safety System Mitigations • Install independent cyber-physical safety systems These are systems that physically prevent dangerous conditions from occurring if the control system is compromised by a threat actor o Examples of cyber-physical safety system controls include  Size of the chemical feed pump  Gearing on valves  Pressure switches etc o These types of controls benefit WWS Sector facilities—especially smaller facilities with limited cybersecurity capability—because they enable facility staff to assess systems from a worst-case scenario and determine protective solutions Enabling cyberphysical safety systems allows operators to take physical steps to limit the damage for example by preventing cyber actors who have gained control of a sodium hydroxide pump from raising the pH to dangerous levels Additional Mitigations • • • • • • Foster an organizational culture of cyber readiness See the CISA Cyber Essentials along with the items listed in the Resources section below for guidance Update software including operating systems applications and firmware on IT network assets Use a risk-based assessment strategy to determine which OT network assets and zones should participate in the patch management program Consider using a centralized patch management system Set antivirus antimalware programs to conduct regular scans of IT network assets using up-todate signatures Use a risk-based asset inventory strategy to determine how OT network assets are identified and evaluated for the presence of malware Implement regular data backup procedures on both the IT and OT networks o Regularly test backups o Ensure backups are not connected to the network to prevent the potential spread of ransomware to the backups When possible enable OT device authentication utilize the encrypted version of OT protocols and encrypt all wireless communications to ensure the confidentiality and authenticity of process control data in transit Employ user account management to o Remove disable or rename any default system accounts wherever possible o Implement account lockout policies to reduce risk from brute-force attacks o Monitor the creation of administrator-level accounts by third-party vendors with robust and privileged account management policies and procedures o Implement a user account policy that includes set durations for deactivation and removal of accounts after employees leave the organization or after accounts reach a defined period of inactivity Page 5 of 7 Product ID AA21-287A TLP WHITE FBI CISA EPA NSA TLP WHITE • • Implement data execution prevention controls such as application allowlisting and software restriction policies that prevent programs from executing from common ransomware locations such as temporary folders supporting popular internet browsers Train users through awareness and simulations to recognize and report phishing and social engineering attempts Identify and suspend access of users exhibiting unusual activity FBI CISA EPA and NSA would like to thank Dragos as well as the WaterISAC for their contributions to this advisory RESOURCES Cyber Hygiene Services CISA offers a range of no-cost cyber hygiene services—including vulnerability scanning and ransomware readiness assessments—to help critical infrastructure organizations assess identify and reduce their exposure to cyber threats By taking advantage of these services organizations of any size will receive recommendations on ways to reduce their risk and mitigate attack vectors Rewards for Justice Reporting The U S Department of State’s Rewards for Justice RFJ program offers a reward of up to $10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U S critical infrastructure See the RFJ website for more information and how to report information securely StopRansomware gov The StopRansomware gov webpage is an interagency resource that provides guidance on ransomware protection detection and response This includes ransomware alerts reports and resources from CISA and other federal partners including • • • CISA and MS-ISAC Joint Ransomware Guide CISA Insights Ransomware Outbreak CISA Webinar Combating Ransomware Additional Resources For additional resources that can assist in preventing and mitigating this activity see • • • • • • • • FBI-CISA-EPA-MS-ISAC Joint CSA Compromise of U S Water Treatment Facility WaterISAC 15 Cybersecurity Fundamentals for Water and Wastewater Utilities American Water Works Association Cybersecurity Guidance and Assessment Tool EPA Cybersecurity Incident Action Checklist EPA Cybersecurity Best Practices for the Water Sector EPA Supporting Cybersecurity Measures with the Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds CISA Cyber Risks Resources for the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector infographic CISA Critical ICS Cybersecurity Performance Goals and Objectives Page 6 of 7 Product ID AA21-287A TLP WHITE FBI CISA EPA NSA TLP WHITE • • • • • • CISA Fact Sheet Rising Ransomware Threat to Operational Technology Assets CISA-MS-ISAC Joint Ransomware Guide NSA CSA Stop Malicious Cyber Activity Against Connected OT CISA Insider Threat Mitigation Resources NIST Special Publication SP 800-167 Guide to Application Whitelisting NIST SP 800-82 Rev 2 Guide to Industrial Control Systems ICS Security Section 6 2 1 DISCLAIMER OF ENDORSEMENT The information and opinions contained in this document are provided as is and without any warranties or guarantees Reference herein to any specific commercial products process or service by trade name trademark manufacturer or otherwise does not constitute or imply its endorsement recommendation or favoring by the United States Government and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes Page 7 of 7 Product ID AA21-287A TLP WHITE