I' 0 CONFIDENTIAL By Susan T Wickwire x74069 UNCLASSIFIED United States Department of State OES-01 INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CTME-00 DS-00 FRB-00 ITC-01 DCP-01 OPIC-Ol SP-00 SA-01 G-00 ACDA-08 ARA-01 OASY-00 EAP-01 FSI-00 L-01 NSAE-00 PA-00 SS0-00 EPAE-00 053R ACDE-00 AS-01 DINT-00 EB-00 H-01 MC0-01 NSCE-00 PM-00 SS-00 PMB-00 AF-01 A-00 DODE-00 EUR-01 IM-01 ADS-00 NSF-01 PRS-00 STR-00 DSCC-00 Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs AGRE-00 CEA-01 AID-00 CIAE-00 AIT-03 COME-00 mi t fng@tfD l XfO TEDE-00 MMP-00 OIC-02 P-00 TRSE-00 PRM-10 INR-00 r-i-oo OIG-04 DTSP-00 T-00 PRME-Ol I0-00 NEA-01 OMB-01 CI0-00 USIE-00 DRL-04 CONFIDENTIAL STATE 237825 E-0- 12958 DECL 12 20 02 TAGS SENV KSCA ENRG PREL JA SUBJECT CLIMATE CHANGE OUTCOMES FROM THE KYOTO CONFERENCE 97 TOKYO 10549 1- CLASSIFIED BY MELINDA L- KIMBLE ACT NG A S OBS REASON E O 12958 l S D 2 U SUMMARY THE THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES COP-3 TO THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE FCCC ENDED ON THURSDAY · DECEMBER 11 1997 NEARLY qNE FULL DAY AFTER ITS SCHEDULED TERMINATION THE PARTIES AGREED TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL A TREATY THAT WILL REQUIRE U S SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE PROTOCOL WILL PRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND ULTIMATELY HARNESS THE FORCES OF THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE TO PROTECT TilE ENVIRONMENT WHILE THE U S SUCCEEDED IN ENSURING THAT THE AGREEMENT INCLUDED MANY OF OUR PROPOSALS WE WERE UNABLE TO OVERCOME SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION TO INCLUDING EXPLICIT PROVISIONS FOR BINDING DEVELOPING COUNTRY COMMITMENTS THIS CABLE BUILDS UPON THE UPDATE PROVIDED IN REFTEL AND REVIEWS THE OUTCOMES OF THE MEETING IT IS ALSO INTENDED TO INFORM POSTS ON THE BEHAVIOR OF HOST GOVERNMENTS AT THE CONFERENCE AN UNCLASSIFIED ASSESSMENT OF THE MEETING AND A SET OF TALKING POINTS TO BE USE IN PUBLIC SETTINGS WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL END SUMMARY LEAD-UP TO THE FINALE 3 SBU A WEEK-LONG SLOWLY MATURING NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS RE-IGNITED BY THE DECEMBER 8 VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT GORE IN HIS SPEECH AT THE COP PLENARY HE STRESSED THAT CONFIDENTIAL l UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY ALAN H FLANIGAN DATE CASE ID 14 JAN 2010 200600252 LJ -- 3 q µ1- RELEASED IN FULL 237825 SOURCE KODAKC 190228 DRAFTED BY OES EGC SWICKWIRE STW -- 12 17 97 647-4069 APPROVED BY OES MKIMBLE L OES SBINIAZ G RPRUDENCIO EB VGREENFIELD EAP RSP CARVIS QES EGO JPERSHING SA INS LLOCHMAN ARA PPC ENOLAN E PBASS AF EPS FLIGHT NEA PPR CLAWSON EUR ERA KKVIEN S S-0 JAMCVERRY ___ ------------------08194A 192325Z 38 P 192319Z DEC 97 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY REF r_ '-1 VJ UNCLASSIFIED I CONFID NTI1JNCLASSIFIED United States Department 9f State IC BINDING EMISSIONS LIMITS WOULD c JlJ N lN- r J £ _fi i JS and International EcHNoLoGIEs To APDREss THE CLIMATE CHAEWvffrf H#i ntal dWd Scientific Affairs REITERATED THE U S COMMITMENT TO REDUCE EMISSIONS BY NEARLY 30 PERCENT OF PROJECTED LEVELS BY 2010 THAT THE AGREEMENT MUST BE STRONG AND COMPREHENSIVE JY J · J nu P e 20520 OF ALL SIX MAJOR GREENHOUSE GASES AND INCLUs'I J f✓6 0§fNKS1 · THAT THE AGREEMENT PROVIDE FOR EMISSIONS TRADING AND IMPLEMENTATION AND T IAT IT HAVE STRICT MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO ANNOUNCED' INCREASED FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE U S NEGOTIATORS IF A COMPREHENSIVE pµAN WERE TO BE PUT IN PLACE ONE WITH REALISTIC TARGETS AND TIMETABLES MARKET MECHANISMS AND THE MEANINGFUL PAATICIPATION OF KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES • THIS LAST STATEMENT WAS WELCOMED BY MANY IN' THE PLENARY AS A SIGN OF U S SERIOUSNESS IN ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT 4 C A FLURRY OF HIGH-LEVEL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ·THE EU JUSCANZ NON ETJ OECD MEMBERS SUCH AS JAPAN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA AND C ITICAL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BEGAN SUNDAY EVENING DECE BER - WITH THE ARRIVAL OF U S STUART EIZENSTAT CHIEF NEGOtIATOR FOR USDEL AND CONTINUED OVER THE FOLLOWING DAYS T E VICE PRESIDENT ALSO MET WITH KEY PLAYERS U S EIZENStAT HELD A MARATHON MEETING UNTIL 3 00 A M ON DECEMBER 9 WI1H THE EU AND JAPAN IN AN EFFORT TO REACH COMMON GROUND ON A RANGE OF ISSUES INCLUDING THE LEVEL OF THE TARGET OASES SINKS FLEXIBILITY MEASURES ARTICLE 10 THE VOLUNTARY OPT-IN FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM PROPOSED BY BRAZIL AND ON DEVELO ING COUNTRIES A SEPARATE PREMEETING WITH JAPAN LEI TO A JOINT STRATEGY ON MOST OF THESE 0 ISSUES THE EU INITJ' ALLY REACTED WITH SURPRISE •AND LEFT FOR ONE HOUR FOR CONS LTATIONS THE EU MINISTERS PRESENT PRESCOTT AND MEACHER FROM THE U K DEBOER FROM THE NETHERLANDS LAHORE FIi OM LUXEMBOURG AND RITT BJERREGARD FROM THE EC'S DG-XI SHOWED A LITTLE FLEXIBILITY BUT DIP NOT WANT TO DISCUSS Ft1RTHER AREAS OF COMPROMISE UNTIL THEY HAD CONSULTED THEIR COLLEAGUES AND AN •EXPERTS GROUP HAD MET ISSUE-BY-ISSUE ANALYSIS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 5 C AFTER AN ALL-NIGHT NEGOTIATING SESSION UNDER THE SKILLFUL LEADERSHIP OF ARGENTINE RAUL ESTRADA CHAIRMAN Of THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE THE PARTIES SUCCEEDED IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON A KYOTO PROTOCOL THAT INCORPORATEP MANY U S PROPOSALS WHILE THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT HAVE N EXE ICIT EROVlSlON THAT WOUI D RAVE 'ElN I BuED l DVl NCEU DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO VOLUNTARILY TAKE ON BINDING EMISSION COMMITMENTS THEY MAY STILL PARTCIPATE IN EMISSIONS TRADING PROVIDED THAT THEY TAKE ON A TARGET UNDER ANNEX B LIST OF QUANTIFIED EMISSION LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OBJECTIVES THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION Of THE OUTCOMES FOR PARTICULAR ISSUES IN THE PROTOCOL LEVEL OF TARGETS THE U S 1 NNOUNCEMENT AT KYOTO THAT I'J ' WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER DIFFERENTIATED TARGETS WAS EMBRAC D BY THE NON-EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES INCLUDING JAPAN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA AND ULTIMATELY PAVED THE WAY FOR AGREEMENT AMONG THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ON LEGALLY BINDING TARGETS THE'EU AGREED TO AN 8 PERCENT REDUCTION THE U S 7 PERCENT AND JAPAN 6 PERCENT WITH AN OVERALL REDUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY 5 2 PERCENT BELOW 1990 LEVELS FOR_ DEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UKRAINE A ID NEW ZEALAND IN PART DUE TO LACK OF FULL AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENTIAL 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL United States Department of State d By Susan T Wickwire x740G9 Ns TRADING AGREED ONLY To sTABrLiziBtt au af i- and Internatlonal ROUGHT oN BOARD WITH AN EIGHT PERCENT t f ' I G and Scientific Affairs 1 90 LEVELS DOWN FROM ITS INITIAL 18 PERttff f MJ'li'# v ESTIMATE WHILE ICELAND HAD THE HIGHEST LEVEL AMONG ANNEX I PARTIES WITH A TEN PERCENT INCREASE REFI' -E 2TWG 1TS D C 20520 UNIQUE SITUATION w asmngwn STRUCTURE OF THE TARGET LARGELY BASED ON U S PROPOSAJ' S IT INCLUDES ALL SIX MAJOR GREENHOUSE GASES AS A BASKET THE EIJ AND JAPAN HAD INSISTED ON ONLY THREE THE COMMITMENT PERIOD IS A MULTI-YEAR PERIOD RATHER THAN A SINGLE YEAR THE TIMING OF THE COMMITMENT PERIOD REFLECTS THE U S -JAPANESE PREFERENCE OF 2008-2012 THE EU PERIOD WAS 2005-2009 WHICH WILL GIVE THE U S ADEQID I TE TIME TO MEET THE TARGET AND COUNTRIES MAY USE CERTAIN REMOVALS BY SINKS SUCH AS THROUGH REFORESTATION TO MEET THEIR EMISSIONS COMMITMENTS THE TREATMENT OF SINKS AND GASES WILL ENABLE THE U S TO ACHIEVE A SIGNIFICANT PART OP ITS 7 PERCENT REDUCTION THUS THE LEVEL OF ACTUAL EFFORT REQUIRED OF THE U S IS CLOSE TO THE ORIGINAL STABILIZATION LEVEL POLICIES AND MEASURES WE SUCCESSFULLY DEFEATED THE EU PROPOSAL TO REQUIRE EACH DEVELOPED COUNTRY IN IMPLEMENTING ITS TARGET TO TAKE SPECIFIED MANDATORY MEASURES EMISSIONS TRADING AS ONE OF THE TWO MAIN ELEMENTS OF FLEXIBILITY ADVOCATED BY THE U S THE INCLUSION OF EMISSIONS TRADING AMONG COUNTRIES WITH TARGETS ALONG WITH JOINT IMPLEMENTATION WAS A CRITICAL FACTOR IN AGREEING TO A MORE STRINGENT EMISSIONS TARGET THE PRINCIPLE OF EMISSIONS TRADING SURVIVED HEATED OPPOSITION LED BY INDIA CHINA AND UNEXPECTEDLY THE l OROPEAN UNION STRONG SUPPORT PROM AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND CANADA RUSSIA UKRAINE AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HELPED FORGE A WORKABLE AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE TOGETHER WITH A LAST-MINUTE COMPROMISE DISCUSSED DURING A RECESS BY U S EIZENSTAT AND CHAIRMAN ESTRADA THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND UKRAINE GAVE UP THEIR DEMAND THAT THEY RECEIVE CREDIT FOR ALL THEIR REDUCTIONS BACK TO 1990 THE TRADING CONCEPT WILL BE MADE OPERATIONAL BY A SET OF RULES AND GUIDELINES TO BE DECIDED BY THE NEXT CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES IN NOVEMBER 1998 COP-4 IN BUENOS AIRES JOINT IMPLEMENTATION CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM COUNTRIES WITH TARGETS MAY ENGAGE IN JOINT IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT THE NEED FOR FURTHER RULES TO BE DECIDED COUNTRIES WITH TARGETS MAY ALSO GET CREDIT INCLUDING THROUGH THEIR PRIVATE SECTORS FOR PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THROUGH A SO-CALLEO CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM THE NORTH-SOUTH OWNERSHIP OF THIS CONCEPT ACHIEVED THROUGH OUR ACTIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH BRAZIL ESTABLISHES A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR ITS SUCCESS THE CONCEPT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES AOSIS INDONESIA MEXICO EGYPT PAKISTAN COSTA RICA AND SOUTH AFRICA THE RULES FOR THIS MECHANISM ALSO WILL REQUIRE FURTHER ELABORATION AT COP-4 CHINA WHICH INITIALLY OPPOSED THE CONCEPT WAS BROUGHT AROUND BY BRAZIL BUT DID NOT ARTICULATE ITS POSITION ON THE FLOOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ALTHOUGH THE PROTOCOL WILL ENGAGE SOME DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTICIPATION THROUGH THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM OUR GREATEST DISAPPOINTMENT WAS THE DEFEAT OF AN EXPLICIT PROVISION WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED DEVELOPING COUN'l'RIES TO VOLUNTARILY TAKE ON BINDING EMISSIONS LIMITS ANP PARTICIPATE IN EMISSIONS TRADING WITH CONFIDENTIAL 3 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL · United States Department of State By Susan T Wickwire x74069 ED coUNTRIEs DESPITE suPPORT FRok-§fi f of Oceans and I nternati'onal TINA cosTA RICA souTH AFRICA AND ffiffental and Scientific Affairs STRIDENT OPPOSITION OF CHINA INDIA AND OTHERS CARRIED THE DAY MEXI O AND KOREA FAVORED EMISSIONS TRADING BUT WOULD ONLY ENDORSE VOLUNTARY EMISSIONS LIMITS FOR m¥1ifQ ffl i D C 20520 COUNTRIES NOTE IN FACT AT ONE POINT nffR'1FfG 5t_o§n t • • DISCUSSION KOREA URGED THE CHAIR TO DELETE THE OPT-IN PROVISION A USDEL MEMBER MADE CLEAR TO THE KOREAN DELEGATE THAT WE FOUND SUCH BEHAVIOR DISTURBING END NOTE AS MENTIONED ABOVE THERE IS AN INDIRECT FALLBACK IN THE EMISSIONS TRADING PROVISION WHICH COULD ALLOW DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO PARTICPATE IN EMISSIONS TRADING PROVIDED THAT THEY TAKE ON A TARGET UNDER ANNEX B THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FOLLOW-ON PROCESS UNDER WHICH KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WOULD COMMIT TO LEGALLY BINDING TARGETS WILL BECOME ONE OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITIES FOR COP-4 NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION IN THE FORM OF A DECISION OF THE PARTIES DOD'S THREE OBJECTIVES WERE ACHIEVED EXEMPTING EMISSIONS FROM BUNKER FUELS EXEMPTING EMISSIONS RESULTING FROM MULTILATERAL OPERATIONS PURSUANT TO THE UN CHARTER AND EXPLICITLY PERMI'I TING COUNTRIES TO DECIDE HOW TO ACCOUNT AMONG THEMSELVES FOR EMISSIONS RELATING TO 'MULTILATERAL OPERATIONS WHICH FOR EXAMPLE WOULD ALLOW THE U S AND GERMANY TO AGREE THAT THE ' J S WOULD COUNT EMISSIONS RELATED TO U S TRAINING IN GERMANY THIS WAS A MAJOR VICTORY COMPENSATION THE OPEC PROPOSAL FOR A COMPENSATION FUND UNDER WHICH DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WOULD COMPENSATE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR INCOME-LOSSES SUFFERED DUE TO ACTIONS TO MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE WAS DEFEATED POLAND PROVED A KEY ALLY ON THIS ISSUE UNFORTUNATELY THE ISSUE rs NOT COMPLETELY DEAD RATHER THE PARTIES AT COP-4 ARE TO CONSIDER WHAT ACTIONS MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO MINIMIZE THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND OR THE IMPACTS OF RESPONSE MEASURES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES U S RUSSIAN FEDERATION CANADA JAPAN AUSTRALIA PLUS OTHERS UMBRELLA THE CONCEPT OF A NON-EU BUBBLER WAS FORMULATED AT KYOTO NEAR THE END OF THE SESSION AS A WAY TO FACILIATE EMISSIONS TRADING UKRAINE NORWAY AND ICELAND ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING IT WAS USED BOTH FOR LEVERAGE AGAINST THE EU 1 NO AS A POTENTJ AL WAY TO REDUCE U S COSTS AND GAIN PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO ANTICIPATED LOW COST REDUCTIONS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND UKRAINE MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE BUT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT TO PURSUE THIS CONCEPT COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT_ THE U S HAD URGED THAT THE PROTOCOL SPECIFY AUTOMATIC CONSEQUENCES FOR EXCEEDING AN EMISSIONS COMMITMENT NAMELY THAT THE NUMBER OF EXCESS TONS BE SUBTRACTED FROM THE VIOLATING PARTY'S FUTURE ALLOWANCE THIS PROPOSAL DID NOT SUCCEED AND NON-COMPLIANCE ISSUES WERE PUT OFF FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION ENTRY INTO FORCE OUR DUAL OBJECTIVE OF SEEKING AN ENTRY INTO FORCE TRIGGER THAT WOULD NOT REQUIRE U S RATIFICATION BUT WOULD REQUIRE A CERTAIN LEVEL OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTICIPATION WAS MET TO TAKE EFFECT THE PROTOCOL MUST BE RATIFIED BY 55 COUNTRIES WHICH MUST INCLUDE AT LEAST 55 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL CA R BON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN 1990 COMMENT CONFIDENTIAL 4 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL United States Dep rtment of State By Susan T Wickwire x74069 Burpau of Oceans and International cc WE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN TH1 Jiflfm1'J'Nfn1'fal and Scienti'°t c A airs PROCESS ON- MANY KEY ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE T ft •'df fi Ef i• ' J• STATES NEARLY ALL OF OUR GOALS WERE ADV INCED TO SOME DEGREE THE FACT OF KYOTO IS THIS THE I J 9 i 'fli C CHANGE IS NOW WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS A FRONT-truifit · 'FOR' THE 21ST CENTURY ALTHOUGH· WE WERE NOT ABLE TO SECURE DEVELOPING COUNTRY COMMITMENTS IN KYOTO THE SERIOUS AMBITIOUS COMMITMENTS MADE BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES PLACES THE U S IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO WORK WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO FORMULATE THE NBCESS r R'l MECHANISMS THROUGH 20520 WHICH KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAN MEANINGFULLY PARTICIPATE IN THE AGREEMENT IN EFFECT WE HAVE THE FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION WITH MUCH WORK STILL TO DO 7 C IN TERMS OF WORKING WITH O'l'HER NATIONS TO ACHIEVE THE PROTOCOL WE SUCCEEDED IN FRACTURING THE G-77 AND CHINA GROUP ALONG REGIONAL AND COMMON INTEREST LINES THE AOSIS COUNTRIES AS WELL AS SIGNIFICANT PLAYERS IN LATIN AMERICA INCLUDING MEXICO ARGENTINA AND CHILE BROKE RANKS TO SUPPORT THE U S POSITION ON INCLUSION OF AN OPT-IN MECHANISM FOR ADVANCED DEVELOPING COUNTRI S AND EMISSIONS TRADING WE ALSO WELCOMED THE PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH BRAZIL WHICH LED TO THE CREATION OF THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM ALTHOUGH BRAZIL HELPED LEAD THE FIGHT TO DELETE THE OPT-IN PROVISION WE ANTICIPATED DIFFICULTIES FROM CHINA INDIA AND OPEC MEMBERS ON MOST FRONTS THE VIGOR OF THEIR ATTACKS EXCEEDED OUR EXPECTATlONS AND THEIR SUCCESS IN TAINTING EMISSIONS TRADING WAS DISAPPOINTING 8 C HOWEVER WE WERE SURPRISED AT THE BEHAVIOR OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WHILE WE HAVE HAD OUR DIFFERENCES OVER THE COURSE OF THE TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS WE HAD WOR ED DILIGENTLY TO BRIDGE THE GAPS IN OUR POSITIONS THROUGH HIGH LEVEL BILATERALS JllilD WORKING LEVEL VIDEO CONFERENCES WITH SOME SUCCESS THE FACTIONS WITHIN THE EU MADE IT DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM IN THE CLOSING STAGES AND TITT IR LAST-MINUTE BACKPEDALING ON EMISSIONS TRADING WAS UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENT IN OUR ESTIMATION THERE WERE THREE -MAJOR CAMPS THE U K LUXEMBOURG AND THE NETHERLANDS APPEARED GENUINELY TO WANT A WIDELY ACCEPTABLE DEAL AND WERE SUPPORTED IN THIS EFFORT BY ITALY AND SURPRISINGLY BY DENMARK • WE UNDERSTAND THAT U K DEPUTY PM PRESCOTT IN PARTICULAR WORKED WITHIN THE EU TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR COMPROMISE POSITIONS A SECOND GROUP LED BY GERMANY AND FRANCE AND INCLUDING AUSTRIA AND PORTUGAL WERE CRITICAL OF THE U S AND TOOK HARDLINE POSITIONS INSISTING UPON THE EU WAY OR NO WAY A THIRD GROUP INCLUDING SPAIN FINLAND AND SWEDEN DID NOT APPEAR TO ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS 9 C DESPITE BEING GRANTED THE RIGHT TO BUBBLE ITS EMISSIONS AS A WHOLE THE EU MADE LITTLE EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE OTHER PARTIES' CONCERNS AND AGREED TO AN 8 PERCENT REDUCTION RATHER THAN 15 PERCENT ONCE SINKS AND ALL SIX GASES WERE INCLUDED ONE SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF THIS LACK OF COOPERATOIN CONCERNED THE DEBATE ON EMISSIONS TRADING ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVED THAT WE HAD AN UNDERSTANDING THE U K SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE EU INTRODUCED LANGUAGE TO MAKE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EMISSIONS TRADING CONTINGENT UPON THE EXAMINATION OF THE ENTITLEMENTS RULES AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF SUCH AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM THAT STATEMEiilT OPENED THE DOOR FOR NUMEROUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO TAKE THEIR SHOTS AT THE SYSTEM BUILDING UPON THE U K 11 SUGGESTION 11 LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FRANCE HELD UP THE PROCEEDINGS BY QUESTIO ING CONFIDENTIAL 5 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED • CONFIDENTIAL United States Department of State By Susan T Wickwire x74069 or THE cLEAN DEVELOPMENT M CHANisM 3N£ ffJJl ef fM Ja11s and International NENT PARAGRAPHS HAD ALREADY BEEN ADOPT fm irll#MPntal and Scientific Affairs ENCOURAGED COMMENTS FROM OTHERS THAT LED TO THE CALL-FOR A STUDY OF THE MECHANISM'S IMPLICATIONS WHICH SERVED TO MUIJDY THE WATERS Washington D C 20520 10 C THE PROTOCO C OPENS FOR SIGNATURE IN MARCH WE WILL NOW TURN OUR ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING A DIPLOMATIC GAME PLAN PARTICULARLY WI'l'H RESPECT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN PREPARATION FOR THE FOORTH CONFERENCE OF PARTIES IN BUENOS AIRES IN NOVEMBER 1998 IN ADDITION WE WILL BE WORKING TO HIGHLIGHT FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS WE HAVE MADE IN KYOTO WE BELIEVE IT IS CRUCIAL TO TIE SUBMISSION FOR RATIFICATION - IF NOT SIGNATURE ITSELF - TO BOTH A SATISFACTORY EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM WHICH THE EU AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO RESTRICT AND MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION BY KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THE FORMER IS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE OUR COMMITMENTS AFFORDABLE THE LATTER TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF WINNING SENATE RATIFICATION ALBRIGHT CONFIDENTIAL 6 UNCLASSIFIED