No pbjection To Dec _ssification in Full 2013 11 15 NLC-12-5-3-17-2 Outside the System MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS January 28 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI FROM WILLIA 111 ODOM SUBJECT Items of Interest from the NMCC Visit First I could not hear all of the conversations but the following points emerged from what I did monitor I put them down for our record and possible follow-up The President seems not to have been aware of some of the vulnerabilities of our warning satellites DSP This also relates to Soviet laser Rand D as I understood this part of the discussion Your question about varied Soviet attack strategies raises many questions about our command and control which have concerned me for a long time The President responded as I understood him with a desire to do something about command and control as well as the vulnerability of our warning systems doing something of course requires a large step over a number of years it also requires a change in some of our doctrinal assumptions Harold Brown seems extremely reluctant either to announce a launch on warning policy or to allow the impression to emerge that we might have such policy I missed other interlocutors' responses I will get you some better information on the operational significance of DEFCON levels Harold Brown's mention of changing Soviet strategic doctrine about limiting use of nuclear weapons raises a key issue in which we will possibly see major revisions in the next year or two The intelligence community has a lot of work yet to be done on recorded Soviet exercises but initial impressions by analysts suggest surprising sophistication in limited employment at the theater level as well as at the strategic level I have the impression that the President's view on this is taking a rigid shape He is justified in this view given our present intelligence holdings but it is conceivable that they will change · TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 11 15 NLC-12-5-3-17-2 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 11 15 NLC-12-5-3-17-2 ----- -- V 1 · TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS 2 Your question on the chances of a false warning from the various systems is being researched in the JCS An answer will be forthcoming shortly In this connection I do not believe it was made clear that the DSP systems are not simply waiting for a Soviet launch They record launches almost everyday ours the Soviets and others world-wide Thus we have a vast experience with their reliability arid sensitivities Finally the feedback ha been very positive General Rogers observed that had we had to go to war at this level a few years ago things would have worked rather poorly The IVORY ITEM series has altered that situation remarkably TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013 11 15 NLC-1 1